DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 147 254 SO 010 551

AUTHOR	Jelinek, James John, Ed.
TITLE	Philosophy of Education in Cultural Perspective. Essays Commemorating the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Celebration of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society.
INSTITUTION	Far Western Philosophy of Education Society.
PUB DATE	77
NOTE	555p.; Pages 17 and 18 of the original document are copyrighted and therefore not available. They are not included in the pagination
AVAILABLE FROM	Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, c/o Dr. James John Jelinek, Room 412, Hiram Bradford Farmer Education Building, College of Education, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85281 ($15.00, paper cover)
EDRS PRICE	MF-$1.00 Plus Postage. HC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS	Creativity; *Cultural Awareness; Democratic Values; Educational Change; Educational Legislation; *Educational Philosophy; Elementary Secondary Education; Essays; Existentialism; Higher Education; Humanistic Education; Learning; Moral Values; Performance Based Education; Relevance (Education); Supervision; Teacher Education; *Values

ABSTRACT

The manuscript contains 48 essays commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society. Topics included are cultural awareness; the teaching of values; philosophy and teacher education; humanistic education; existentialism and education; the nature of man; and the educational philosophies of Abraham J. Heschel, Celestin Freinet, John Dewey, Friedrich Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, and John Elof Boodin. Additional papers explore such areas as competency-based education, philosophy of the contemporary counter-culture and education, educational innovation, the setting of school and community goals, educational legislation, and instructional supervision. Two appendices list current officers of the Society and the history of previous annual meetings and officers. (JK)

Documents acquired by ERIC include many informal unpublished materials not available from other sources. ERIC makes every effort to obtain the best copy available. Nevertheless, items of marginal reproducibility are often encountered and this affects the quality of the microfiche and hardcopy reproductions ERIC makes available via the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). EDRS is not responsible for the quality of the original document. Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original.

ED147254

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
James John
Jelinek
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC) AND USERS OF THE ERIC SYSTEM."

PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE.

ESSAYS COMMEMORATING THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION OF THE FAR WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

JAMES JOHN JELINEK,
EMERITUS PROFESSOR,
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY,
EDITOR.

PUBLISHED BY THE FAR WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY,
C/O DR. JAMES JOHN JELINEK, EMERITUS PROFESSOR,
COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY,
TEMPE, ARIZONA 85281.

SO 010551

Copyright,
1977,
by
Far Western Philosophy of Education Society.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 74-156779.

The Typesetting, Printing, and Binding of this Book Were Done by the Production Department, Bureau of Publications, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, and the Production Department, Tempe Daily News, Tempe, Arizona.

CONTENTS.

Chapter 1. Beyond Power: The Values System of the New International Society. Charles W. Merrifield. 2

Chapter 2. Cultural Awareness: A Definition, Developmental Format and an Inservice Model. Sara Enriquez, Pi Farr, Frank Saunders. . . . 12

Chapter 3. Man, Nature and Social Management. Samuel Burkhard. . . 21

Chapter 4. A Role for Philosophy of Education in the Setting of School and Community Goals. Gerald E. McDonald. 28

Chapter 5. Education by Choice. Brandt G. Crocker, Donald A. Price, Richard F. Haugh. 40

Chapter 6. How Can Legislators Legislate without a Philosophy of Education? Patricia Berlat. 44

Chapter 7. Philosophical Implications of Training as Contrasted with Teaching. James John Jelinek. 50

Chapter 8. Setting the Stage, Tripping on the Props and How to Float and Swim. Mary K. Barone. 63

Chapter 9. An Investigation Concerning the Nature of Man. Julian Roth. 75

Chapter 10. The Yeshov Method. William F. O'Neill. 83

Chapter 11. Dichotomous Typologies and Development. James L. Jarrett. 95

Chapter 12. The Presentation of Self and Philosophy of Education. James L. Catanzaro. 113

Chapter 13. Epistemology, Mind and Social Invention. Kenneth V. Lottich. 117

Chapter 14. "How Do You Know?" -- The Question Nobody Asks. Bernice Goldmark. 130

Chapter 15. A Possible Epistemology and Some of Its Educational Implications. John B. Connely. 139

Chapter 16. The Development of the Capacity for Aesthetic Reaction through Autonomous Choice. Catharine Fels. 146

Chapter 17. Education and the Pop Philosophers -- Trick, Treat or Trash. Hayden R. Smith and David K. Gast. 152

Chapter 18. Nonsense and Aesthetics. Clyde E. Curran. 191

Chapter 19. Relevance, Creativity and Liberal Education. Catharine Fels. 206

Chapter 20. Is Humanistic Education Philosophical? Gary D. Fenstermacher. 215

Chapter 21. The Growing Edge of Educational Philosophy: Education Versus Therapy. Thomas A. Reed. 222

Chapter 22. A Catholic Concept of Morality and Education. John J. O'Farrell. 234

Chapter 23. The Teaching of Values. Elizabeth Steiner Maccia. . . 243

Chapter 24. A Model for Making and Testing Value Judgments. Lawrence G. Thomas. 250

Chapter 25. The Ontological Foundation of Axiology. Robert Bruce McLaren. 268

Chapter 26. The Direction of the Arrow: Axiology in Crisis. Darold R. Beckman. 275

Chapter 27. Educational Philosophy: From Is to Ought -- The Difficult Rise. Hugh C. Black. 280

Chapter 28. Freedom and Democracy in Education. Stephen L. Alley. 291

Chapter 29. Philosophy and Teacher Education. LeRoy F. Troutner. 298

Chapter 30. Educational Philosophy: Some Cautionary Notes and Qualifications. William F. O'Neill. 308

Chapter 31. Conflicting Theories of Education: A Classification. Hugh C. Black. 318

Chapter 32. Competency-Based Education. James John Jelinek. . . . 328

Chapter 33. The Concept of "Medium" in Education. Michael J. Parsons. 337

Chapter 34. Some Observations on Ordinary Language Philosophizing. Evelina Orteza y Miranda. 349

Chapter 35. Warning: Do Not Innovate Except within Existing Guidelines. Calvin C. Nelson. 369

Chapter 36. Trying to Make Sense Out of "Existential Thought and Education." LeRoy F. Troutner. 377

Chapter 37. Making Sense Out of "Existential Thought and Education." Donald Vandenburg. 387

Chapter 38. Dewey's Relativistic Philosophy, Lewin's Field Psychology and Learning. Morris L. Bigge. 399

Chapter 39. Célestin Freinet: The French Dewey. William Bradley Lee. 422

Chapter 40. Martin Buber and the One-Sided Dialogical Relation. Donald S. Seckinger. 433

Chapter 41. John Elof Boodin's View of Knowledge Disciplines. Kenneth R. Sutton. 439

Chapter 42. The Educational Philosophy of Abraham J. Heschel. Morton C. Fierman. 451

Chapter 43. Nietzsche's Dissection of the Scholar. James W. Hillesheim. 468

Chapter 44. The Integration of Cognitive and Affective Dimensions of Learning: An Analysis from the Perspective of Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy. Steven L. Hackbarth. 481

Chapter 45. You Can't Get There from Here: In Memoriam -- Leonard Fels. William H. McGowan. 497

Chapter 46. A Think Tank Approach: The Problem of Judgment Stylization. T. Frank Saunders. 505

Chapter 47. Alternative Learning and Alternative Assessment. Colleen Decker. 516

Chapter 48. Instructional Supervision in Schools. Robert Alley, Virginia Boyle. 528

APPENDICES.

Appendix A. Officers. 536

Appendix B. History. 537

COVER. James John Jelinek.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

The editor is grateful to his Intern, Ms. Renée Elizabeth Vance, for her assistance in editing the manuscript of *Philosophy of Education in Cultural Perspective*.

J. J. J.

Individuals who live differently, think differently.

1.

PART I. ESSAYS.

2.

CHAPTER 1.

BEYOND POWER: THE VALUE SYSTEM OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY.

CHARLES W. MERRIFIELD.

Educational philosophy, as a central component of social philosophy, has many offices to fill and functions to perform. Not the least of these is to help teachers, students and parents interpret the changing social and intellectual environment and to seek understanding of it in terms of coherence and harmony between shorter-term practical actions and a society's longer-term aspirations and ends-in-view. In this sense, Philosophy becomes a social science in application, helping human societies to interpret underlying shifts in the physical and cultural conditions of life, and -- consequently -- to understand the shifting process of public ethics from outworn creeds and obsolescent doctrines to those which may be more credible. Today, our international society appears to be in the beginnings of one of these profound periods of shifting its value system. The value in transition is that of Power, and the changes involve many of the corollaries of the proposition that might is the ultimate criterion of right. Some reflections on these matters may be of interest in this Society.

The Value System of the Traditional Nation State System.

The inherited structural system of international organization in contemporary society is that of the nation-state. It is of relatively recent origin, beginning formally with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Its eminent philosophers extend from Machiavelli, Hobbes and Bodin through the intervening three centuries to living writers like Raymond Aron, Hans Morgenthau and Inis Claude, Jr. The model of this state-system is that of power politics, and its claims to generality and inclusiveness fundamentally rest upon a prior assumption that all men are born with genetically inherent traits. The theory-model asserts that men are born to seek domination over their fellow-men, and to achieve, by whatever necessary means, overt discretion over the behaviors of others. The search for power is the dominant goal, since without it all the other values -- freedom, happiness, security, prestige, ethical priority -- are rendered precarious in greater or lesser degree.

Endless studies of the power phenomenon have been made: how power originates, how it is concentrated and diffused, checked and balanced; its goals, its structures and mechanisms; its decay, transfer and reorganization. Power and power manipulation have come to be almost the exclusive preoccupation of government and politics. History has been described as "past politics." The folklore is filled with the epic stories of success in gaining power. Power, indeed, is represented as the central value of human societies, as if it constituted the fundamental and essential mechanism by which to sustain the common social process. (1)

The power-politics model also professes to believe that what is true of the power struggle among individuals within societies is also true of the behavior among nation-states. States act like individuals because their goals are simply extensions of individual motivations. State behaviors also display characteristics of acquisitiveness, combativeness and competitiveness. "The desire to dominate," says Hans Morgenthau "in particular, is a constitutive element of all human associations, from the family through fraternal and professional organizations and local political organizations to the state....And would it not be surprising if the struggle for power were but an accidental and ephemeral attribute of international politics when it is a permanent and necessary element of all branches of domestic politics?" (2)

Having made these assumptions, it becomes quite "logical" to draw the necessary conclusions: war and conflict are the normal characteristics of both individuals and states; what is called "peace" is simply a kind of intermittant equilibrium or cease fire between pitbreaks of overt conflict. Domestic governments are necessary among men because they damp down this incessant urge to struggle for power and keep a society from relapsing into utter chaos. But in the multi-polar international realm, still lacking any superiority of concentrated power, the anarchy inevitably continues today under a precarious "balance of terror." Might continues to make right and will continue to do so because one cannot change human nature.

One might add that this is not a caricature. It is the standard political theory taught in the civic education programs of virtually every one of the 138 nation-states now existing. Its central corollary is that when problems arise amongst independent, sovereign nations, the only ultimate resort is to organized violence. It is this proposition -- the ultimate value of coercion as a problem-solving mechanism -- whose credibility is today beginning to be challenged. The challenge to its credibility arises, in part, from the increasingly obvious fact that in view of some contemporary nation's recently achieved levels of technological capability for waging a "first strike," followed by a "retaliatory strike" using ABC warfare -- the resort to ultimate violence appears capable of leaving a devastated planet in which the victims are indistinguishable from the victors. It is the logic of overkill.

The International Functional Commonwealth.

However, the main challenge to the traditional, classical, doctrine of the power-politics model of international society arises from another -- and somewhat more modestly hopeful -- source: the functional commonwealth of voluntary international associations, councils, organizations, federations whose express purposes are to permit nation states to seek their legitimate non-power goals, even as the hurly-burly of power-politics and ideological conflicts swirls about them. This international functional society might, indeed, be correctly termed a "functional commonwealth of non-power." Its currently visible form, like the tip of an iceberg, is the Development System of the United Nations. It includes the formal structures of the UN Economic and Social Council, the UN Development Program, other UN organizations like UNICEF, UNITAR, UNIDO, UNCTAD, as well as the ECOSOC's four Regional Economic Commissions in Geneva, Addis Abbaba, Santiago and Bangkok. Associated with the UN in various functional activities are the several specialized agencies, including the Big Four multi-purpose organizations (UNESCO, WHO, ILO and FAO), the Bank Group (IBRD, IMF, IDA, IFC), along with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. They are supplemented by the work of the more single purpose organizations like the World Meteorological Organization, the Universal Postal Union, the International Telecommunications Union, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization.

These organizations -- some of them having larger memberships than the UN itself -- are in turn assisted by clusters of Non-Governmental Organizations which are private, independent cross-culture organizations. These agencies operate on a functional basis in such special fields as: mapping, weather, child-welfare, conservation, sea and air explorations, epizootics, transport, mental health, codification of law, the cultural arts, non profit commerce, tourism, standardization, emergency relief, and energy resources. The NGO's comprise a body of private technical, professional, and scientific resources in virtually every field of human interest. Their memberships include national professional organizations (and/or individuals) from both the north-south and the east-west hemispheres, from the planned as well as the market and the trade barter economies, from developed as well as developing nations and from across the spectrum of ethnic, religious and racial ideologies. (3)

What is important here, of course, is not that these organizations exist and flourish in the nooks-and-crannies of the power-politics system of nation-states; nor even that they have created an impressive set of demonstrations that nations can cooperate on a non-coercive, voluntary, basis. (4) What is important for social philosophy in our century is their functional method of operation. What seizes our attention is the demonstrated ability of "fortress sovereignties" to collaborate for mutually desirable non-power goals. For the fact is that the functional commonwealth is an existing and flourishing example that -- under certain conditions -- nations can create or permit to be created -- a set of international services and institutions whose method of operation appears to deny the central hypothesis of the classical nation-state system including the doctrine of genetically inborn traits, and the corollary that might always makes right.

The Value-System of the International Functional Commonwealth.

The great attraction of functional enterprise ever since the Rhine River Navigation Commission was established in 1815 has been its inability to coerce its cooperating members or member states. Lacking any ability whatsoever to compel, functional organizations have had to rely on the validity and demonstrability of their programs and projects -- simply to stay in operation. To sustain or extend their range of activities, they have had to proceed solely by attracting voluntary support and participation. This voluntary principle, what Eduard Lindemann once called "the principle of obedience to the unenforceable," far from being a weakness of limitation, is paradoxically the strength of all true functional enterprise. The reason is obvious upon closer scrutiny. What international voluntary enterprise does is to afford men and nations the opportunity to engage in what might be called occasions of "sheltered risk." The cooperating actors retain their options to participate or withdraw at any stage. They may accept or reject the results of functional cooperation. They do not "surrender sovereignty," nor reduce or diminish their independence. No power is lost, political discretion is retained at all times; and the only central question is, as Joseph E. Johnson once said is "...whether the credits exceed the debits, whether as a whole the [international] institution is making a net contribution to the national interest." (5) What the "sheltered risk" type of situation offers to a nation's statesmen is the opportunity to participate, with adequate reservations, in a project or program from which the gains promise to exceed the investment.

This discovery that functional cooperation does not undermine, impugn or diminish jealously guarded sovereign freedoms and independence must surely rank as one of the most remarkable "social learning" experiences of modern international affairs. For as politicians, statesmen and diplomats are learning under the "atomic unbrella," it is becoming steadily more possible to cooperate peacefully and rationally with other nations without surrendering -- at least visibly or articulately -- the inherited folklore which undergirds their power-politics model of the nation-state society. How can this seeming paradox be explained?

At least part of the answer seems to lie in another feature of voluntary functional enterprise, namely its criterion of judgment implied by the nature of proof it employs. Today we are beginning to learn that functional cooperation across the national boundary lines does not weaken or destroy those who cooperate for non-power purposes. Rather, when properly organized on truly responsible experimental foundations, the functional outcomes may very well enhance and undergird the strength and viability of the cooperating nations or trans-national groups. Moreover, as the functional actors "learn from the system," and as confidence and trust ripen and mature, limited new directions tend to open, new tasks appear and new inquiries materialize to extend further new fields for peaceful collaboration.

The clue to this phenomenon seems to reside in what it is that is transferred by nations or national groups when they agree to associate non-violently for the pursuit of non-power goals. It is obvious that political power is not transferred to the international association. Nor is sovereignty, nor the power to compel. What is transferred is the authority to experiment for problem-solving purposes. Poverty is no respecter of national boundaries, nor are ill-health, illiteracy, pollution, unemployment and an accelerating population-growth. Yet all nations feel the negative effects of these things, whether they are rich or poor, developed or developing, capitalist, communist or uncommitted.

What functional actors do is to delegate authority to innovate in those areas of transnational scope which require a global, rather than a national, mobilization of resources. What is required is not ideology, nor threats, nor rhetoric. What is required is responsible experimentation within the accumulated reliable knowledge-fund. When this can be conceptualized, funded and sustained for mutually acceptable non-power goals, the candid "sheltered risk" situation is thus created.

What makes this kind of international behavior unique, of course, is that -- unlike absolutistic or ideological systems -- experimental procedure lacks any "answers in advance" of inquiry. It must proceed with anticipations of doubt and uncertainty. It must provide the necessary margin for error. It is always grounded in human fallibility. It never deals of absolutes or "magic pictures" of inevitable success, only with probabilities and possibilities. And its nature of proof is that of overt and visible and repeatable demonstrability. The Missouri farmer's demand to "show me" is closer to the functional nature of proof than are the incantations of tribal magic.

It is very difficult, of course, for ideologues encased in power-politics cocoons to comprehend a system of thought and conduct which is highly differentiated, fraught with controversy, or which thrives on heterogeneity and is constantly engaged in re-examining its own basic principle and categories. A power monopoly on the other hand, as Ladislav Tondle writing from behind the east-west barrier has said:

"...exhibits a tendency to operate on what might be described as a 'magic picture' of the world...subsumed under ideological categories and principles [whose purpose is] to give all the phenomena of the world an integrated meaning....Empirical data are not welcome unless and in so far as they are in keeping with these categories and principles, or can serve to exemplify and bear them out. When they cannot be so subsumed, they are simply supplemented, wholly in the spirit of Hegel's famous dictum, 'all the worse for the facts.'" (6)

But, as the history of functional enterprises shows, when feasible alternatives to unilateral action by sovereign states is produced through functional collaboration (by combining tools, ideas and skills in novel ways), then the central question for political judgment arises. Since novel (technologically feasible) possibilities for changing national policies now exist -- and because they cannot be forgotten and will not go away even under threats of violence -- how shall Power treat truth? Hitler's answer was to burn the books and the Jews. Stalin's answer was to purge those who insisted that behavioral traits cannot be inherited, and rigorously to censor the historical records.

On the other hand, when statesmen of sovereign nations have perceived that a Universal Postal Union or an International Drug Monitoring Project or a standardization of International Weights and Measures could do them no harm -- and might simplify or protect or enhance their own nations' communications, or health or business and commercial life -- they have sometimes turned to peaceful, non-violent, intelligent international collaboration. Power speaks to truth when it has to -- and when the new behaviors can be rationalized with minimal dislocation into the existing system of power and status.

This, historically, is what has been happening for over a century and a half, and now is taking place in today's world with steadily increasing momentum. Today the UN is primarily a functional agency; its duties in the political realm have been rigorously curtailed or abandoned. The doctrine of "collective security," the centerpiece of the original Charter of the UN, has been quietly buried since the disaster in Korea in the early fifties. The concept of "peace by force" through international organizations is a dead letter. On the other hand, more than four-fifths of each biennial budget in the UN is now allocated to what we have termed functional (problem-solving) development. Ninety percent of United Nations personnel around the world is so engaged. Under the UN's growing experience and leadership, the functional commonwealth has multiplied its effectiveness and scope. The new Development Decade II, commencing in 1970, began with a much more integrated and efficient approach to both substantive problems (like health, education, employment, food, nutrition, soil improvement and pollution), as well as to the methods of development, including "country programming" a long step beyond the old "project" method. In large measure, these great advances in peaceful problem-solving appear to be due to our new-found skills in using political power to create its own antithesis. The new ethics of an associative non-violence are slowly beginning to become understandable to national statesmen. They are beginning to comprehend that a voluntary, functional system operating on a visible, open nature of proof does not necessarily threaten the folklore of the prevailing system of territorial nation-states.

Functional Philosophy on the Educational Frontier.

What has been suggested here is that there exists in recent world history a considerable body of empirical data that gives us new insights into the nature of peace. It is not the classical notion of peace; of temporary cessation of conflict or an unstable equilibrium of forces. It is rather a "working peace" (in David Mitrany's felititous phrase), a continuing effort to approach the problem-solving tasks of ordinary human societies with the most reliable skills and tools and ideas we have developed to date. There is no utopian promise here, no magic picture of perfection, no heaven, no Nirvana, no Valhalla. Functional practice at the international levels conceives peace as a continuing process of inquiry and of problem-solving among those conditions which nourish the roots of war. It seeks to modify or remove overt conditions which impel men to the familiar behaviors of distrust, discrimination, cupidity and the desperations leading to physical violence.

Functional philosophy is only beginning to become articulate. The value system which revolves around the voluntary principle, employing the experimental nature of proof, is yet an infant among the jungles of historical ideologies. The concept of inquiry entered into without knowing the answers in advance still appears a high risk situation to many practitioners of the old power-politics. The notion of organizing society on the basis of skill and creative intelligence, rather than on the basis of invidious criteria such as race, religion, sex, geneology, age and power -- must appear as heresy to diplomats of the old school. And the substitution of doubt, ambiguity and uncertainty as a way of life for the fixed patterns of the inherited doctrines (the mores) must tend to create almost intolerable anxiety levels for those whose lives and egos are preoccupied by the manipulations of Power.

Yet the incremental forward progress of scientific innovation and its applied technologies persists. The demonstrable proofs of the technological process are obstinate in the sense that, once learned, they will not go away. Such things as vaccines, high-yield cereal grains, escape from gravity, micro-miniaturization, cybernated-system production, contra-conceptive food additives, satellites -- and a thousand other technical applications of research and development -- represent real choices for men to make. Once in being, real alternatives precipitate the crisis for political judgment: how shall these things be used?

Perhaps the encouraging thing in our century is the fact that we have begun to learn, as Prof. Ernst Haas has said, that "...political and transpolitical objectives are rarely irreconcilable in actual operation...." (7) That is to say, when Power is required to deal with technological truths, it can employ the functional philosophy as long as it is not required to admit the fact.

An interesting question in this regard was asked of the author after a presentation on Functional Development some years ago in Geneva. The query was: "If functional philosophy and practice continuously undermine the foundations of nation-states and they found out about it, would that not be the end of functionalism?" The question betrayed the questioner, of course, but it was illuminating. Perhaps the best answer was given long ago by Paul S. Reinsch who said:

"...the ideal of a complete national life implies aims that transcend national boundaries....International cooperation is therefore not something that the nations agree to on account of extraneous pressure or by reason of a passing accession of humanitarian enthusiasm....The more nationalism becomes conscious of its true destiny and its effective aims, the more it will contribute to the growth of international institutions." (8)

The value system of the experimental way of life, involving nations as actors is beginning to make headway. The need to inquire into problem-situations of a global character, instead of treating them as if they could be resolved by organized violence is beginning to dawn. Surely among the many mansions of Philosophy there is a place for the continuing study of functional enterprise and its potential contributions both to a peaceful international society and to the implied dignity of the creative human intelligence. It may even be that we could move steadily toward establishing the peace movement on an evidential -- rather than a sentimental -- foundation.

Documentations.

1. Claude, Inis L., Jr., Power and International Relations (N.Y.: Random House, 1962), p. 6. "I use the term power," says Inis Claude (one of the most respected and fair-minded living political realists), "to denote what is essentially military capability -- the elements which contribute directly or indirectly to the capacity to coerce, kill and destroy...the capacity to do physical violence...."

2. Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (N.Y.: Knopf, 1949), pp. 17-18.

11.

3. Those which can undertake truly functional activities (in the sense of the term as used here) are those which have legal status, independent funding, autonomy of internal organization, research and development capabilities including innovation, and whose range of operations is global, as well as regional. Not all the 2,417 NGO's identified in the Union of International Association's Yearbook of International Organizations (Brussels: UIA, 1969) are capable of performing functional operations, nor is it their intent to do so.

4. These might include the famous International Geophysical Year, the Desert Locust project of the UN, the Epidemilogical Intelligence Service operated by the WHO, the Atoms for Peace program of the IAEA, the World Weather Watch of the WMO and the International Council of Scientific Unions in Global Atmospheric Research, the INTERTEL, the Refugee Resettlement Program of the UNHCR in Europe and Africa, the World Food Program operated jointly by the UN and FAO, and the Lower Mekong River Valley Development project, operated by Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia with the assistance of the ECOSOC's Regional Economic Commission (ECAFE) based in Bangkok. There are literally hundreds of other projects which could be mentioned which involve peaceful collaboration of nations (governments) and/or private voluntary cross-cultural groups which -- taken together -- comprise an empirical base for the interpretation made here.

5. As quoted in Haas, Ernst, The Web of Interdependence: The United States and International Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 99.

6. Tondle, Ladislav, "Conflict Situations in Scientific Communities" in International Social Science Journal, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (1970), p. 122.

7. Haas, Ernst, The Web of Interdependence, p. 99.

8. Reinsch, Paul S., Public International Unions: Their Work and Organization (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1916), pp. 10-11.

12.

CHAPTER 2.

CULTURAL AWARENESS: A DEFINITION, DEVELOPMENTAL FORMAT, AND AN INSERVICE MODEL.

SARA ENRIQUEZ, PI FARR, FRANK SAUNDERS.

"The notion that if people would just get to know one another, they would be friends and everything would be all right is as dangerous as it is sentimental." Ina Corinne Brown, 1963.

Introduction: Cultural Awareness As A Bicentennial Theme.

There is in the continuity of the American democracy the pervasive theme of *human equality*, *cooperative educational futures*, and the celebrated ideal of *strength through shared differences*.

Philosophy of education generally assumes some responsibility for exploring those categories of meaning which are assumed by and are often generic to more substantive areas of inquiry. Yet, philosophy as the *integrative discourse* must provide certain interdisciplinary parameters within which a cooperative forum can emerge in which *integrative structures articulate substantive content*, i.e., a framework is formulated which interrelates ideas which will otherwise remain fragmented.

What is needed, specifically, is a model in which the "pervasive themes" of the democracy are identified and intertwined, maintained and illustrated, in each and every educational goal. *A goal or a plan can be defined as an effort to reduce randomness*, *an effort to bring to a focus all relevant variables*. A design or model which can "reduce randomness" in the development of cultural awareness in the society should also facilitate the American dream of human understanding.

The model presented below does indeed establish such a plan in that the various components of student growth programs, staff development offerings, and community awareness services are set in a taxonomy for identification, exploration, and evaluation.

This model proposes what the "integrative" function assumed by philosophic commitment should be, sets the parameters for the inclusion of various content and materials to be used with cultural awareness as an illustrative topic, and provides a completed example of cultural awareness in the content of the model.

What better bicentennial contribution than a recipe for implementing multi-cultural educational goals in our community?

I. Cultural Awareness: A Definition, Developmental Format, and an Inservice Model.

School districts across the nation are grappling with demands that schools provide for the education of minority students in new and creative ways. These demands are generally stated as appeals for open access, equal opportunity, or equal benefit to all students through some sort of restructuring of the educational process. That the goals, strategies, and programs being recommended are not agreed upon by those desiring the change, and may even be in contradiction to one another, makes the task of the educator increasingly difficult. Confounding the situation even further is the general tendency to combine all of these suggestions under the terms "cultural awareness" or "cultural pluralism."

The terms "cultural awareness" and "pluralism" are being used to refer to programs for compensatory or remedial education for minorities on the one hand and for programs requiring mainstreaming on the other. Other conflicts are evident in battles over different approaches to language instruction, e.g., bilingual vs. English-as-a-Second Language, emphasis on academic training as opposed to self-concept development, and, finally, assimilation versus separatism as a struggle for control of schools by those ethnic groups served by the school. Some recent developments of curriculum materials contributing to the new emphasis on cultural awareness can be seen as tangible illustrations of the scope of the conflicts and confusions that exist.

Generally, these materials range from those which require no substantive changes in curriculum development to those which insist on redefining all of history in terms of newly discovered "truth" about ethnicity or cultural meaning. In the first category there are materials that increase the number of stories and pictures that depict non-white middle-class backgrounds. These materials can be found in some of the recent publications and textbook series. The second approach to materials, however, stresses a "heritage-teaching." For Blacks such teaching will include an examination of Africa; for Mexican-Americans, an in-depth study of Mexico; for Indians, an exploration of tribal customs. Examples of this second sort of effort include curricula materials published by the Minority Affairs Division of the Michigan Education Association which call for the acknowledgment by those who work in cultural awareness that the U. S. is a "racist society." (1) Sections on Blacks refer only to Blacks, bilingualism usually refers only to the native language of the student, etc. These workshops and materials lack a clearly defined statement of purpose or goals and rarely establish determinate criteria for evaluation of workshop results. An absence of commonly stated or shared goals makes it difficult to relate these materials and workshops to one another, to identify any precise definition of cultural awareness or pluralism, or to formulate evaluative criteria which can be used in any generic pattern for all such workshops.

Those interested in facilitating cultural awareness or pluralism in more comprehensive and more rigorous ways are left in a perplexing situation. Not only is the focus of cultural awareness unclear, but there does not seem to be an interest in the rules nor the criteria by which to evaluate existing materials and techniques.

The addition of new textbook materials and the reteaching of history are each incomplete in terms of providing a comprehensive inservice program. Cultural awareness workshops and inservice training can and should concentrate on three rather different types of program emphases. These emphases in a cumulative form can also be seen, incidentally, as providing extensive direction for defining bilingual education, an assentic component of cultural awareness. Cultural awareness should not be isolated from bilingual education, as these themes demand parallel attention by their use of parallel criteria for evaluation effectiveness. These two themes can be interwoven by the following definition format:

- two spoken languages with cultural awareness in identifiable cultural systems; then a

- two-language literacy with bicultural participation in a shared effort toward a cooperative forum; and finally a

- comparative linguistics with a cross-cultural analysis for the expansion and refinement of multicultural educational goals in the democracy.

15.

The cultural awareness model (2) presented (Figure I) here offers a framework through which a comprehensive, integrated cultural awareness program can be implemented. The model provides graphic illustrations to indicate:

(c) a comprehensive perspective for viewing components of any cultural awareness program;

(b) a format for determining the relationships among program components; and

(a) ways to define cultural awareness components within the format of the integrated model.

By way of exploring the model, some of the assumptions entailed in its use should be indicated. There are three distinct levels of meaning which guide the identification of ideas:

(c) prescriptive or valued, i.e., purposes

(b) contextual or situational, i.e., parameters

(a) descriptive or analytic, i.e., components

It is from the variations on these three levels that a comprehensive cultural awareness model can emerge. A more detailed examination of the model can be done when some guidelines for each quadrant are established. The model (Figure II) leaves space for examples to be completed by cultural awareness participants using the model.

II. Cultural Awareness Format.

Examining the model, level three VALUE statements set the purpose or value orientation through which the remainder of the components of the model gain meaning. The level two CONTEXT items place the model components into contextual relationships while the level one CONTENT components deal with specific content items.

The columns of the model increase in depth of understanding from a direct examination of contexts, to a more rigorous analysis of "language" and "categories," and finally, to an in-depth exploration of the uses of history as a forum for explaining cultural patterns. The scope of understanding of the meanings of "cultural awareness" increases as an idea is processed up the levels and across the model. (See Figure I)

With the use of the model as a taxonomy, a way of classifying ideas and materials, courses and activities can be classified in terms of a wide variety of cultural awareness foci. As an example, a course or activity which concentrates upon only one culture or one language can be classified as "1-1" program in terms of the criteria designated for "1-1." A "2-3" course or activity would be one which examines the in-depth aspects of language literacy, of cultural conflicts or of the origins of prejudice. Materials designed for use with cultural awareness activities can be analyzed and classified in the same manner.

In planning cultural awareness programs for staff or student development, this model can be useful in ensuring a comprehensive integrated selection of programs as well as providing a guide for selecting materials and activities appropriate to achieving specific purposes. Those programs dealing with cultural awareness in a public school setting will find it necessary to delve into the depth of meaning found in the 3-3 quadrant which can be characterized as the "expert to the expert's slot." This is a way of indicating the scope of expertise to be attained as the inquiry reaches comprehensive fruition. Any extended cultural awareness program on this basis, should include activities and materials which address each of the categories of the model. A Staff Development Department, in like terms, can be assured of the most extensive coverage of the cultural awareness issue by maintaining a careful documentation of the kind and scope of recommended and implemented cultural awareness offerings. (See Figure II)

Summary.

Cultural awareness in terms of this model is transformed into a problem in relational and reflexive examination of "cultural" thinking -- of understanding one's own culture by placing it in various contexts, and relating and contrasting one's culture with other cultures in terms of the broad, pervasive values and goals that unite and are generic to all cultures and to the multicultural educational goals in our democracy.

The AACTE has stated the need for a model to aid in constructing and evaluating cultural awareness or pluralism programs, materials, and activities. "Cultural pluralism is more than temporary accommodation to placate racial and ethnic minorities. It is a concept that aims toward a heightened sense of being and of wholeness of the entire society based on the unique strengths of each of its parts." (3)

Tomorrow together implies a strength in shared differences.

Documentations.

1. Williams, Charles T., The Curriculum Leader as a Change Agent in Institutionalizing Cultural Pluralism, Minority Affairs, Michigan Education Association, 1975, page 1.

2. Adapted from the "Cube of Inquiry," developed by Dr. T. F. Saunders, and published in Double Think, T. F. Saunders and C. [illegible]. Decker, Farmington Press, Box 4922, Tucson, Arizona, 1973.

3. "No One Model American," Journal of Teacher Education, Winter, 1973, Volume 24, page 14.

Books. 1. Brown, Ina Corinne, Understanding Other Cultures, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.

2. Conference On Higher Education Opportunity Program. Conference Proceedings. Syracuse, University of Syracuse, N. Y., December 9-11, 1973.

20.

3. Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, ed. *Report of The First National Congress of Black Professionals in Higher Education*. Austin, Texas: University of Texas, April 5-7, 1972.

4. Michigan Education Association. *Third World Curriculum Handbook*, Vol. I, II, III, IV, 1974.

5. *National Conference on Educational Opportunities for Mexican American*. Austin, Texas: U. S. Office of Education and Southwestern Educational Development Laboratory, April 25-26, 1968.

6. Nicholson, Clara K., *Anthropology and Education*. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968.

7. Saunders, T. Frank and Colleen Decker, *Double Think*. Tucson, Arizona: Farmington Press, P. O. Box 4922, 1973.

8. Williams, Charles T., *The Curriculum Leader As A Change Agent in Institutionalizing Cultural Pluralism*. Minority Affairs Division, Michigan Education Association, 1975.

Articles. 1. "Imperatives in Ethnic Minority Education." *Phi Delta Kappan*, 53, (1972), pp. 266-69.

2. "No One Model American." *Journal of Teaching Education*, (Winter, 1973), Vol. 24, p. 14.

3. "A Philosophy for Cultural Deprivation." *Proceedings of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society*, Santa Barbara, California: University of Santa Barbara Press, 1966.

CHAPTER 3.

MAN, NATURE, AND SOCIAL MANAGEMENT.

SAMUEL BURKHARD.

Two hundred years ago, a group of men launched an experiment on American soil in which the aim was to see if the people could manage their affairs without the aid of a king, emperor, or dictator. They moved on the assumption that all men are created equal and are entitled to the freedom that is necessary to realize the life good to live. They not only initiated a new way to deal with human affairs. They laid down guidelines by which to conduct the management of a new venture in the management of social affairs.

If this continuing experiment is to meet with the anticipated success, managers must constantly take into proper account the nature of man and of the natural environment into which man has been introduced. Furthermore, the educative process demands proper attention for the simple reason that mind-building is directly concerned with the ends toward which social management should move.

Education as a method for insuring the continuity of society is as old as human history. None of the culture which the adult society may have accumulated in the process of living is transmitted to children during their prenatal existence. Children acquire the customs, folkways, and language of their elders by participating with them in the management of the affairs on which life depends. In the early history of man, the mind-building process was carried on without the aid of a specialized institution we now call the school.

It is to be expected that the adult society will take it for granted that the established folkways must be observed as a means for insuring the continuity of the tribe or nation. Acting on this assumption, it is to be expected that the aim in mind-building will be to produce conformists. But in every language and culture there will be individuals who will want to know why certain customs and folkways must be observed. Failure to get satisfactory answers to their questions, they may seek to bring about some changes in the prevailing customs and traditions which, in their judgment, fail to secure for them the things they want. If innovating individuals are too persistent in their efforts to bring about changes in the established ways of life, they run the risk of being executed or banished from their society. After a long time of quizzing the elders in ancient Greece, Socrates was forced to drink the hemlock. The judges decided that this was a fitting fate for the worst man in all Greece. But history has reversed this judgment. We now hold that Socrates was the wisest man in ancient Greece.

In spite of efforts of the established order to resist changes in customs and traditions, in time, it will find that it is fighting a losing battle. It is in the very nature of life to bring about changes in the management of human affairs. But in spite of change that goes on, there are some things in nature that are constant. One of these constant elements is the universal human desire to live. The satisfaction of this calls for more than a goodly supply of food, clothing, and shelter. One of the guidelines for insuring a satisfactory management of human affairs insists that this universal desire to live must be taken into proper account.

Nature has provided an abundance of raw materials which can be used to sustain life, but nature insists that man must assert himself if he is to avail himself of what nature has provided. This activity we call "work." The law of nature insists that man must engage in production if he would live. But man could decide that he does not want to live. In this event he could escape from the necessity of working. Within a short time his life would come to an end. But one of the problems concerning the necessity for working is that we in our social management are not always sure as to who should do the work. The assumption in the argument in this discussion is that work may well be defined as applying to all activities in the rendition of the many services on which life depends.

Nature also insists that the law of gravity must be taken into proper account in the building of houses that will remain standing. Gravity is no respector of persons. It shows no favoritism in dealing with Republicans, Democrats, Communists, or any other groupings we might mention. A painful experience is in store for any man who saws off the limb of the tree on which he is sitting.

Furthermore, the sun continues to rise and set with predictable regularity. No one knows how long it will continue to act in this manner. Even though the heavenly bodies may make drastic changes in the course of time, we of the present expect them to continue in their orbits as they have been doing for ages past. But nature also has ways of acting without any predictable regularity. Rains, earthquakes, and tornadoes come when they come. We simply take what comes.

Man is a child of nature. He has characteristics which must be taken into proper account if we are to have wise management of human affairs. We may well regard man as the crowning product of life's creative process. He is the only creature in existence with a hand that is so constructed that the thumb and fingers can touch each other. Furthermore, in proportion to his body weight he has the largest brain in all creation. With his capacity for insight, he can put his hand to work in making tools which enable him to gain greater control over his environmental resources. We now live in an age of technology which makes wide use of an ancient invention, namely, the wheel and axle. We now are a society running on wheels. With steam and electric energy applied to wheels and axles we have increased our capacity for producing consumer goods. This increased capacity for production of goods is at the present time accompanied with fears that we may be moving toward the time when there will be serious shortage of natural resources. This growing fear is compounded by the aspect of a rapidly increasing world population.

The earth with its natural resources has been here for a long time. Was it created for man or for bugs? I know of no authoritative answer to this question. I have no way of knowing what bugs may think as to ownership of the earth. Man acts on the assumption that it was made for him. In keeping with this assumption, the management of social and economic affairs is in his hands. But bugs have a way of cramping his styles of management.

Social management is complicated by the fact that agreement is lacking among managers as to ends toward which social affairs should be moving. But even so, we may well assume that in the long run we will be satisfied with nothing less than movement toward the more humane society. In one of his public lectures, the late Booker T. Washington told his audience that "No man can hold another man in the ditch without remaining in the ditch with him."

The word "society" can be used to designate social groupings and it can also be used to include the whole of humanity. But none of the social groups as well as nations has exclusive interests. In our bicentennial celebrations we have stressed our independence. But we must remember that a declaration of dependence is also in order to give fruitful direction to our experiment with democratic social management. Interdependence is a fact of associated living. Recognition of the implications of social dependence is of greater importance to humanity than is any declaration of independence. Dependence moves on a two-way street. We are in for trouble when in the giving and receiving process some persons are short-weighted in the exchange of goods and services and others get the lion's share.

The aim of industrial managers is to produce goods that consumers will want. They resort to advertising to let consumers know what the market affords. Under a capitalistic economy, management must make a profit if it is to stay in business. In like manner, labor must receive adequate rewards for the services it renders so that it can pay for its consumer bills. It is, however, no easy matter to determine what constitutes a legitimate profit and a just wage. The method of bargaining is one way to arrive at a working agreement between labor and management. Striking is another method used by labor to secure better contracts. When a strike is on, management can decide to meet the demands of labor, and it also can close the shop and go out of business. If better wages and other benefits are gained by labor, management can resort to raising the prices that consumers must pay for the goods.

In the end, management must look to consumers to provide it with the money it needs to remain in business. If consumers find it difficult to meet increased prices, they also can go on a form of striking by simply curtailing their accustomed consumption of goods and services.

When consumers go on a strike, one thing that management can do is to reduce its labor force. Unemployed workers no longer receive their accustomed income. But the unemployed must go on living. They can turn to governmental agencies to provide them with money to keep them going. Not only is industry dependent on consumers to keep it going, but the unemployed also are dependent on consumers. The government can resort to taxing consumers to take care of problems brought on by industrial mismanagement. In proper perspective, consumers are the mainstay of society, and labor and management are the servants of consumers.

Industrial managers must have access to raw materials if they are to carry on. But no nation has within its boundaries all of the materials that are used in the manufacture of goods. One way to gain access to raw materials is to engage in peaceful trade. But history is full of records in which nations engaged in wars to gain access to the desired materials. The assumption has been that to the victor belongs the spoils.

At one time wars were carried on with clubs, spears, bows, and arrows. Modern warfare is carried on with guns, armored trucks, airplanes, submarines, and atomic bombs. Our current capacity for waging war has developed to such an extent that the nation behind the atomic gun is likely to receive as much damage as is the enemy on the receiving end of the gun. The rivalry between the nations in the production of instruments of warfare calls for huge expenditures of money and the uses of a vast amount of materials. All of the nations want security. Warfare is not the way to get it. There must be a better way to manage both national and international affairs.

States of mind are involved in the management and mismanagement of human affairs. But who are the mind-builders? It is well to note that educators operating within the school are not the only mind-builders in the total society. The educative process is carried on in the total environment. In this environment both leaders and mis-leaders have a share in the formation of minds. Parents, educators, ministers, and statesmen can tell us what the requirements for good citizenship are. But how can they hear what we say in our sane moments when what we do rings in their ears? Presumably the way in which we would have our youth go, we must be going that way ourselves.

In our recent bicentennial celebrations we reminded ourselves of how we gained our independence. We paid our respect to the democratic ideal as the guideline to be followed in the management of our social affairs. But in the environment where we do our daily living, we learn of corruption in governmental affairs. Kidnappings, murders, swindles in business transactions, and many other forms of unethical conduct are reported in the daily news. All this goes on in the environment where we have churches and schools which are supposed to uphold moral standards.

It is assumed that children should obey their parents and teachers. In industry, it is expected that workers will obey the foreman. In governmental affairs, subordinates will get fired if they fail to obey their superiors. Participants in the Watergate scandal acted in obedience to the wishes of the chief executive. In one of his lectures, I heard John Dewey state that the German army did no wrong when it violated Belgium neutrality on its way to Paris. The German army acted consistently with the import of Hegel's philosophy concerning the Absolute in which it was assumed that whoever obeyed the commands of a superior officer did no wrong. But we in this bicentennial time hold that laws provide the guidelines for conduct rather than the desires of men who may hold an office of authority. Participants in the Watergate scandal have gone to prison because they did not obey the laws. In keeping with law, the chief executive was removed from office.

In every society, innovating individuals make their appearance. What to do with them is the problem. Questions of right and wrong are hard nuts to crack. Both innovating individuals and establishments can be either right or wrong. In the Vietnam war, there were soldiers who could not in good conscience do what they were commanded to do. They chose to desert the army and find refuge in other countries rather than participate in unethical conduct. They, along with their enemies, had the desire to live. They had no desire to kill anyone. Wars are destructive not only of lives but also of the natural resources which are necessary to satisfy the desire to live. The challenge of mind-builders is to come to grips with the idea that mankind lives by production and not destruction.

The experiment in self-government that was launched two hundred years ago by the United States of America has not yet run its course. In spite of wars and other conflicts that have taken place in this experiment, we now have what we do have because we are sensitive to the needs of the people and insist on fair play in the management of human affairs. As this experiment in self-government moves on, we the people will be satisfied with nothing less than movement toward a fuller realization of the life good to live.

The democratic ideal moves on the assumption that the individual is entitled to a hearing for any views he may wish to advance. But the challenge to the innovator is for him to show that what he has to offer will improve the conditions under which people live. Freedom to carry on discussion is an essential part of the educational process if the experiment with democracy is to succeed in securing for the people the satisfaction of their wants.

If our experiment with self-government is to turn out well, it is incumbent that we the people in all walks of life realize that all of us have some share in the responsibility for giving good direction to the management of human affairs. A profound respect for ethics as the guideline for the exchange of goods and services is a requirement for securing a satisfactory social management. This requirement is directly related to the implications of social interdependence in all human relations.

With regard to mind-building activities, the adult society needs to know that the way in which it would have the new generation go it must be going that way itself. This is a lifetime assignment for all of us regardless of whether we operate in schools or in other walks of life. It would be much simpler if moral characters could be produced by giving short lectures on what is required of the good democratic citizen. There can be no objection to supplementing environmental influences with lectures designed to give intellectual credibility to democratic guidelines in the management of social affairs.

As life moves on into the future, problems do arise. Confusion prevails in the experiment with democracy as to what is best to do in seeking solutions. Jesus of Nazareth expressed profound wisdom when he told his disciples that he would give to them the keys to the kingdom. The assumption underlying this assertion is that he had profound confidence in the ability of men of intelligence, men of goodwill, men dedicated to the ideal of service would be able to find better and better answers to any problems that may arise in the future. The import of this idea is that the affairs of men are in the hands of men. It is a case in which man is the master.

The import of the foregoing discussion is that mind-building activities should move in the direction of seeking better ways to make life become livable. We may well move on the assumption that man is the custodian of the materials that nature has provided. Man as a tool making and tool using creature has the capacity to make the American experiment move in a good direction. But he also has the freedom to use his capacity to devastate the earth to such an extent that may bring an end to human life.

We will do well to take note of the fact that two hundred years of experimentation with democracy has provided us with a good standard of living. But there still remains much room for making improvements in the management of human affairs.

If the American experiment with democracy is to move forward with greater satisfaction, we the people will have to pay constant respect to high standards of morality. We may well take note of the compulsion under which Jesus of Nazareth lived when he told his friends that he had come "that they may have life, and have it abundantly." John 10:10. Furthermore, Jesus recognized that men have many wants that must be satisfied. But he insisted that the way to gain the satisfaction for their wants was for them to seek first the kingdom of heaven. This is equivalent to saying that the humane society will have the frame of mind which is fundamental to a satisfactory management of human affairs. The ideal of service is the guideline for giving a good direction to the experiment that was launched two hundred years ago.

We are a society with a variety of ethnic cultures, but one thing all of us have in common is the desire to live. The fuller realization of this desire depends on an intelligent respect for democratic guidelines in the management of human affairs.

CHAPTER 4.

A ROLE FOR PHILOSOPHY IN THE SETTING OF SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY GOALS.

GERALD E. MCDONALD.

As a result of recent enabling legislation the California Legislature has set in motion a state-wide scheme which, if successful, would involve the community and the school in unprecedented decision-making activity. In 1968 SBI gave increased responsibility to schools and districts to develop "relevant" educational programs. Despite the fact that it failed to spell out the guidelines which would give direction at the local levels, nevertheless, it reflected the widespread discontent of the taxpayer with the kind of education which he has been asked to support.

With the passage of ACR195 in 1969 the Assembly and Senate Education Committee, acting as a joint committee and in cooperation with a three-member committee of the State Board of Education, was authorized to determine and recommend an appropriate means for developing a program of assessment for the public schools of California. As a consequence the era of accountability was ushered in, from which the educators of this State have yet to recover.

In its report to the California Legislature in May 1970, the Joint Committee on Educational Goals and Evaluation recommended the "extensive and intimate involvement of the public with students and educators" in setting goals and indicated further that "the support of the public for such goals is essential." (1) This recommendation would seem to make sense. If the educators are to be held accountable for the degree to which they are achieving the ends of education, if in other words they are to be held accountable for rendering effective the educational means, then the public must be largely responsible to themselves and to the youth for determining the educational ends.

Evidently it made sense to the State Legislature because subsequently it expressed the intention of developing guidelines which would assist school districts in determining local educational goals with broad community involvement. Section 7502 of the Education Code states:

"The Legislature hereby recognizes that, because of the common needs and interests of the citizens of this state and the nation, there is a need to establish a common state curriculum for the public schools, but that, because of economic, geographic, physical, political and social diversity, there is a need for the development of educational programs at the local level, with the guidance of competent and experienced educators and citizens. Therefore, it is the intent of the Legislature to set broad minimum standards and guidelines for educational programs, and to encourage local districts to develop programs that will best fit the needs and interests of the pupils, pursuant to stated philosophy, goals and objectives." (2)

The outcome of such legislative activity remains to be seen, but in the meantime a role which educational philosophy (to be referred to simply as philosophy) could play in California school and community goal setting may be considered. AB2430 was amended in the 1970 Regular Session of the California Legislature to introduce several sections to the Education Code pertaining to educational programs. Section 7561 provides a definition of the word philosophy, which according to the legislators "means a composite statement of the relationship between the individual and society based upon beliefs, concepts and attitudes from which the goals and objectives of the district are derived."

What is interesting about this section of the legislation is that it specifies the role which philosophy is to play in goal setting at the school district level. Goals will not be developed to fit the needs of pupils, that is, pupil needs by themselves will not constitute a legitimate basis for developing goals. Rather the people will first state their educational philosophy and from it they will derive goals which will then be fitted to the needs of pupils.

The full significance of the role hinges upon how the word "derived" is construed. Actually the wording of the legislation admits of two interpretations. On the one hand goals may be said to be contained implicitly in a stated philosophy in much the same way as a conclusion is reputed to be contained in the major and minor propositions of a syllogism. Starting with philosophical givens the people or, better yet, an elite group of the most logical minds would make explicit or deduce the correct goal conclusions. Once formulated, philosophy would function as a sole repository of the content necessary to give direction to a school district.

On the other hand, goals may be said to be derived in the sense that specific conceptions of man and society are singled out of a philosophical system and function as the motives which prompt goal choices. Imagine a committee in a local school district who has developed a classical realist philosophical statement. Man, they say, is a rational intuitive being who possesses the "powers" of poetic and noetic insight and of inductive and deductive reasoning. Moreover, these "powers" or potencies must be freed or actualized not only by encouraging their expression but also by providing an object to be grasped. (3) Because of their conceptions of what man is they have been able to formulate and agree to the following as their primary educational goal: From the earliest grades onward the intellectual powers of students will be cultivated. On the condition that these committee members did in fact formulate and choose this goal because of their convictions about what man is, a school district goal may be said to be derived from philosophy.

Do the actions of this committee seem improbable? Perhaps, but to derive goals in this second sense comes closer to the spirit of the legislation. Philosophy systematically formulated must not only make a practical difference in education, it must also involve the masses of the people in its formulation.

The educational philosopher (to be referred to simply as the philosopher), however, has not supported this role. Even when he urged his students to adopt a system of thought (e.g., Thomism, idealism, neo-realism, etc.) and trace out its implications for the classroom, he never seriously argued that it would make a noticeable difference in their teaching performance. Only when he conceived of his discipline as a process of critically examining the practical thinking of educators did he allow that perhaps it might effect changes in educational practice. If administrators and teachers would critically examine (using concepts and categories of philosophy) the ideas guiding their educational choices and, consequently, if they could uncover inconsistencies and establish better norms, then the process could generate an improvement in practice. Notice there is no guarantee that philosophy will make a practical difference, just the suggestion that it could. (4)

It is no accident that the Philosophy of Education Society has chosen the process role for its discipline. (5) Its members have long realized that systems of thought formulated in a college or university classroom and apart from the educational decisions of the local schools not only confuse their students concerning the true system, but provoke much snipping among their colleagues and fail to assist the educator in resolving the immediate and pressing practical problems of the schools. Moreover, they could have told the legislators responsible for AB2430 that deriving goals from a composite philosophic statement is not the same as actual goal setting at the local district level, that if the people are to be mandated to develop goals from such a statement, granting that it is possible to agree to one, what they could hope for at best would be a set of normative principles stated in the most general terms and not what the legislators intended, namely, specific directives for action which reflect the conditions in the local community.

But what precisely is defective about approaching educational goal setting with a carefully worked-out system of thought? The usual criticism of a philosophic system is that it embodies characteristics which do not square against social and educational reality. For example, its monolithic structure is not befitting a community of persons coming from quite different spiritual and intellectual backgrounds and possessed of divergent conceptions of man and his relationship to society. Or the charge is made that the static character of a system offers a set of completed solutions when what is needed are the conceptual tools necessary to identify and define educational problems.

Criticisms of this sort center in an attack upon the system and miss the mark. It is not the system but the position of thought that is faulty. When thought is formulated antecedent to educational decision-making, there is simply no guarantee that it will effect actual educational decisions. This is the chief defect in approaching educational goal-setting at the school district level with what AB2430 defines as a composite statement of man and his relationship to society.

But if the people were to choose their goals first and then try to examine critically the reasons for their choices, would they not develop more carefully considered criteria and as a consequence would they not be inclined to effect changes for the better in their goal setting? The presumption is that the people would have reasons which would guide their choices. Do those who are currently involved with the direction of their schools display these reasons? If so, where are they located? In the stated educational philosophy of a school district? Hardly! A cursory examination of such statements gathered by the California School Boards Association from school districts throughout the State reveals that these are generalized affirmations of faith in democracy and in the perfectibility of man which bear no resemblance to reasons guiding the choices of educational goals. (6) Are they to be found in the statements of a goals committee? Perhaps, but having served eighteen months on a goals committee of an elementary school district, I discovered no such reasons at work in my fellow committee members.

Of course not, some may say, because the reasons referred to above are judged already to be formulated. The point precisely is to have the people make explicit their reasons Is it not possible for the people to act upon assumptions or reasons which are vaguely conceived, poorly articulated and unexamined? If so, might not philosophy help the people single out their assumptions and subject them to critical examination? The answer is that philosophy indeed could help people clarify and refine their thinking about their choice of educational goals, but this critical process is no guarantee that changes for the better in goal setting would take place. It is my contention that reasons which are vaguely conceived, poorly articulated and unexamined cannot be shown to effect educational decisions in the first place. Therefore, how can this process of clarifying and refining their reasons be shown to lead to anything but a dichotomy between what a person is thinking and what he is doing.

For those who would involve the people in the goal setting process, the teaching situation offers much that is instructive. When, as often happens, a practice teacher is uncertain about how to act in the teaching situation, he is strongly inclined to observe how others are acting (or have acted) and to model his behavior accordingly. The demand inherent in the situation to do something and the need for approval of what is being done tend to render any sort of theoretical guidance irrelevant. And if the practice teacher is successful, that is, if he does the job according to the expectations of the resident teacher, principal, or the superintendent (who may be looking for a full time teacher for the next school term), then his teaching behavior may be explained by his response to conditions external to him. How often has the practice teacher affirmed that what he needs is more practice in the classroom and fewer education courses! And how often in recent weeks has the State Commission for Teacher Preparation and Licensing expressed the same viewpoint! (7)

The experienced teacher is a product of the traditional ways of doing things in education. How often in graduate education courses has he affirmed that what he does in his own classroom he doesn't believe in, but what he believes in he dare not practice, that is, if he is to receive a contract for the coming year. Tradition may be defined as a powerful force in shaping a teacher's behavior involving neither his head nor his heart. Tradition can explain why college students are lectured on the techniques and need for group discussion or why a course on human freedom is lecture-oriented and totally prescribed. It can even explain why Thomist teachers teach Thomistic philosophy un-Thomistically.

An analysis of the teaching situation shows that a teacher is primarily a technician, that the external conditions in the educational status quo tend to reinforce such behavior, that when he attempts to examine critically the supposed internal conditions accountable for his teaching behavior he merely develops a dichotomy between what he thinks and what he does. Unfortunately the development of the critical disposition has become a sacred cow to which teachers, teacher educators, and even students pay homage. Americans must think their way, critically of course, to a responsible way of life. But why? Granted that they may be acting without thinking, why must they think critically as a prior condition for action? It makes more sense to say that Americans should establish a way of life as a prior condition for careful thinking. For example, Christianity established first a Christian community and only later did it develop a carefully considered philosophy and theology.

If there is a crisis in education, it has developed from not being able to conduct our schools, not from being unable to think critically about the rational bases of such conduct. The conduct in question has nothing to do with a technology of the means but relates directly to the goodness or value of the ends. Not being able to conduct our schools in this sense means being unable to choose what is good or valuable. The defect does not follow from an indecisiveness when faced with ends already known to be good; rather it is a matter of not being able to follow the steps involved in an act of choice. In the past when the people assembled and arrived at decisions, what they decided was judged to be good for the community. Good followed upon choice and because the community's problems were not too complicated, choice was often rendered by a collective and simple fiat. Today our problems are immensely more complicated and the average person must learn how to make decisions whose consequences extend far beyond the local community. Consequently, if the people bypass examining the so-called reasons which guide educational choices and attend to the choosing process itself, then, I believe that we can identify a role which philosophy can play in California school and community goal setting.

In setting goals for a school district, four steps are recommended: (1) make an initial selection of goals; (2) select the goal strategies; (3) determine the policies which follow from the selection of goal strategies; (4) justify the goal strategies selected.

I. Make an initial selection of goals. It is important to keep in mind that the average person, the man in the street, oftentimes acts with little perception of the meaning or value of what he chooses. A vote is taken when the motion is not clear. A political candidate is elected, yet the issues which separate him from his opponent are indistinguishable. Educational goals are adopted by a committee and its most articulate members find it difficult to explain them to a community. But is this not the American way of doing things? Act now and think later; drop the bomb and when the war is over consider the ethics of total destruction in a college classroom.

However, when action and afterthought are systematically connected, the latter may serve to improve the quality of the former. In other words, an initial selection of goals undertaken promptly and methodically (perhaps by playing a goal-setting game) may generate intense interest and provoke reflection and the consequent realization that the goal choices were poorly perceived. (8) In turn this realization could occasion a reformulation of the goals so as to include more meaningful alternatives. Perhaps a goals committee would prefer to think first before choosing, but chances are that they do not know what they think until they are first required to take a stand.

Let us suppose that the people in school district X have chosen as their top three goals the following: (1) to help students develop pride in their work and a feeling of self-worth; (2) to develop good character and self-respect; (3) to learn to respect and get along with people with whom we work and play. Actually these goal statements exist in slightly altered form in the policy statements of California school districts. (9) Notice that they are couched in general terms and written so as to elicit wholehearted support. Notice also that they fail to indicate how the goals are to be achieved and, as a consequence, have very little meaning.

It is as if a traveler told us that his destination is the city of Zerkie, while at the same time telling us that there are no known ways of getting there. Is Zerkie his destination when there are no road maps, no person or thing to point the way? Perhaps, but only vaguely! It is the philosopher, not the educator or layman, who is best able to make this observation because by virtue of his training he is more sensitive than others to the relationship of means and ends. He knows that ends as perceived, even the most ultimate, are distinct but not separate from the means. Omit consideration of the means and the ends remain unclear. Likewise, it is the philosopher who can best alert people to the vagueness written into their initial goal choices.

II. Select the goal strategies. It has become commonplace to say that our cultural values are in a state of transition. How often has it been said that our views toward freedom and authority, war and peace, work and leisure, competition and cooperation, right and wrong, etc., are changing and that the changes cause people to question their conventional or traditional ways of feeling and behaving. Some favor the "old ways," others the new; still others are undecided. When people take opposite positions on these practical matters issues appear. Failure to take a position results in confusion, but very often the failure itself is a result of not being able to formulate the issues.

Because he knows very well that the different proposals made for the conduct of our schools reflect changes in attitude toward society's values, the philosopher is able to identify a number of issues which relate to the way the goals of the schools are to be achieved. In each instance he is able to formulate two ways of achieving a goal, two goal strategies, which are mutually exclusive. For example, the first goal chosen by school district X may be reformulated as follows:

To help students develop pride in their work and a feeling of self-worth the school:

(a) should help each student set his own standards of performance. _______

(b) should establish performance standards which are excellent and worthwhile for all. _______

It seems clear that the fundamental manner in which the school is "to help students develop pride in their work and a feeling of self-worth" is so different in these two goal strategies that if (a) is chosen, (b) is rejected. At first teachers are reluctant to take a stand on this issue and tend to seek a via media, a middle position, which would include elements of both strategies. However, once key terms are defined and concrete illustrations are drawn, once teachers are allowed to restate the central meaning in their own language, they are able to take a stand and at the same time discover that their positions are different. As a result the poignancy of the issue becomes clear.

Because the average lay person would probably become frustrated were he to attempt to formulate an issue of this dimension, goal strategies should be formulated beforehand and presented to him for discussion. Quite likely the layman also lacks the discussion skills necessary to identify an issue and take a stand on it. As a consequence, a philosopher is needed to undertake three important tasks: (1) develop mutually exclusive strategies for the goals selected initially; (2) formulate the discussion skills needed to cope with goal strategy issues (10); (3) train discussion leaders who in turn could impart the discussion skills to the people.

III. Determine the policies which follow from the selection of goal strategies. It is recommended that goal setting embody a process of improving upon a person's prior choices. Choose a goal, reflect upon the alternative strategies for achieving it and take a stand on a strategy. The process may include a third step: choose a goal-strategy, consider the contrasting or divergent policies for implementing it and take a stand on select policies. Just as a goal can become more meaningful when a stand is taken on its strategy, so a goal strategy can be perceived to have more meaning when the policies for implementing it are determined. The means-end relationship involved in this third step is clear to the philosopher. He especially can alert the people to the vagueness in a goal strategy when they fail to see that it makes any practical difference either in the management of existing programs, or in the professional behavior of administrators and teachers or in the allocation of a school district budget.

A collection of school policies might be formulated so that it would be necessary to distinguish between those which "follow" from a goal strategy choice and those which do not. Suppose, for example, the people in school district X have made the following choices:

Goal Statement. To help students develop pride in their work and a feeling of self-worth. __x__

Goal Strategy. (a) the school should help each student set his own standards of performance. ______

(b) the school should establish performance standards which are excellent and worthwhile for all. __x__

Consequent Instructional Policies. 1. Letter grades or numerical scores will be used by the teacher in evaluating student performance. __x__

2. Each student will be encouraged to develop a work contract with his teacher which reflects his interests, purposes and potential. __x__

3. Students will be given incentives (in the form of prizes, placement in the honor role, etc.) to compete for the best grades. __x__

Whether or not the three instructional policies "follow" from a choice of goal strategy (b) depends upon the degree to which goal strategy (b) is realized or achieved. The people should be informed of this definition of the word, follow, from the outset. Moreover, since the people are merely stating their preference for a policy and not executing it, they have no first hand evidence for the validity of their choices. For this reason they should be assisted by the considered opinions of educators concerning the policies which follow from designated goal strategies. As they gain competence in perceiving the connections between antecedent and consequent choices, the people will find it necessary to revise and refine their goal and goal strategy formulations.

IV. Justify the goal strategies selected. There are situations in the lives of Americans where they simply do not know how to act, where they become confused and paralyzed by indecision. Under such circumstances their best recourse is to take a stand, choose a course of action, be decisive. Choice becomes a pre-condition for thought; having chosen meaning will follow.

If there is any validity to this latter statement, need the people proceed further with goal setting when they have committed themselves to a set of goals which they perceive clearly? The answer depends upon the extent of their commitment and the degree to which they have invested their goals with meaning. A goal once chosen can mean a strategy for achieving it and a strategy once chosen can mean the ways of implementing it. Ends and means may be so closely associated that one comes to suggest and mean the other. However, meaning is operational in this context; the moment of truth comes when the actual execution of a choice takes place.

Because the people will stop short of executing their choices, will the act of choosing generate sufficient meaning so as to effect long-range commitment? My guess is that neither choice nor the execution of what is chosen will be sufficient. A goal has at best two divergent ways of being achieved. For example, in helping students develop pride in their work and a feeling of self-worth, the school can either help each student set his own standards of performance or it can urge students to meet performance standards which are excellent and worthwhile for all. By themselves, that is, apart from the values which people hold, one alternative is no more compelling than the other. Each has a neutral status and a choice of one over the other is arbitrary.

If education is to survive, the people must choose and arrive at practical agreements. However, long-range commitment involves choosing that which is perceived to be profoundly valuable, and since given goal strategy (itself a practical proposition) has no built-in value, each person must infuse it with his own beliefs and personal convictions. Most of us are inheritors of rich, intellectual and spiritual traditions, while some of us like the black man are striving to renew acquaintance with our cultural roots. (11) Here is the source of our moral vigor and self-identity and of our theoretical conceptions concerning life, society and the human condition. These constitute the theoretical foundation and justification for our long-range commitments.

We live in a pluralistic society where people at the local school district level are free to take issue with one another concerning the significance or value of a goal strategy. Consequently the people must subordinate their divergent private convictions to a common public dedication while at the same time bringing them to bear in strengthening their practical agreements. (12)

Doubtless, there are a number of different ways of justifying goal strategy selections. One suggestion is to compose different philosophico-historical conceptions of man and express them in language which the layman can understand. Thus he may be asked to choose those conceptions which in his estimation justify the pattern of his goal strategy selections. As an assist to the layman, philosophers of different theoretical persuasions might be asked to develop a guide in which goal strategy formulations and their philosophical justifications are identified.

In order to assist the people at the local school district level guidelines might be developed which would include a game for setting goals, suggestions for discussing goal strategy issues, and a set of policies and a philosophic viewpoint for different patterns of goal strategy selections. By composing and organizing these materials, by preparing group discussion leaders and by consulting with the people themselves, the philosopher (as well as philosophy) has a significant role to play in California school and community goal setting.

Documentations.

1. Joint Committee on Educational Goals and Evaluation, The Way to Relevance and Accountability in Education. (Sacramento: California Legislature, May 1970), p. 21.

2. Amended in Assembly June 10, 1970, ASSEMBLY BILL No. 2430, California Legislature: 1970 Regular Session.

3. "Above all the liberation of which we are speaking depends essentially on the full adhesion of the mind to the objective reality to be seen. Let us never deceive or rebuke the thirst for seeing in youth's intelligence. The freeing of the intuitive power is achieved in the soul through the object grasped towards which this power naturally tends. cf. Jacques Maritain, Education at the Crossroads (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 44.

4. Donald Arnstine, "Philosophical Foundations," The Teachers Handbook, Dwight W. Allen, Eli Seifman, ed. (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1971), pp. 571-572.

5. "Putting it another way: When we (1) single out and examine the criteria and assumptions guiding the choices being made in education, and (2) conduct our examination in terms of the concepts and categories of philosophy we are working within the discipline of the philosophy of education." See "The Distinctive Nature of the Discipline of the Philosophy of Education," Educational Theory, IV (January 1954), pp. 1-3.

6. For information concerning the educational philosophy of school districts, write Edmund L. Lewis, Assistant Executive Secretary, California School Boards Association, 800-9th Street, Suite 201, Sacramento, California 95814.

7. cf. Work Study Proposal, March 3, 1972, prepared by the Commission, 1020 "O" Street, Sacramento, California. The Proposal is not an official document of the Commission.

8. Experience has shown me that a goal setting game is an excellent way of involving teachers and school board members in an initial selection of goals. See Appendix A for materials developed by the Northern California Development Center, Chico State College, under the direction of Dr. O. Keith Rose.

9. Educational Goals and Objectives, California School Boards Association, September 1969, p. 6.

10. See Appendix B for a description of these skills.

11. Unfortunately, too many of us are "growing up absurd" cut off as it were from the cultural sources which give meaning and value to our lives. Step IV becomes ineffective to the degree that we are alienated from our past.

12. Jacques Maritain introduces a similar argument for teaching the democratic charter. See Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 119-126.

CHAPTER 5.

EDUCATION BY CHOICE.

BRANDT G. CROCKER, DONALD A. PRICE, RICHARD F. HAUGH.

Traditionally, educational leaders within a school system have sought what they considered to be the best educational program available, and subjected all students, teachers, administrators, and parents to that program. Too frequently, this method has not worked. For, as schools have existed as a single system for everyone, they have increasingly satisfied no one. There are too many variants in education to have a particular educational system with a single philosophy to suit everyone in a school. The individual differences of students, teachers, administrators, and parents cannot be adequately dealt with in the typical school with one philosophy.

Since 1970, however, educators throughout the country have become increasingly interested in the development of options within the framework of the public schools. Because of its emphasis on diversity, *Education By Choice* in Senior High II, Quincy, Illinois, has attracted the attention of many people who are concerned about improving the learning environment. The *Education By Choice* model has promoted individual involvement in educational planning because each participant has the opportunity to make decisions about his immediate and future learning. Educators, who have chosen from educational alternatives, have an opportunity to enhance their sense of personal and professional satisfaction. Parents and the public have also benefited from the creation of many options and alternatives to the monolithic system of the past, but the prime benefit has been for the student, who has the chance to grow in a society of self-actualized men rather than coercive institutions.

The purpose of *Education By Choice* is to provide seven alternative schools to the 1,450 eleventh and twelfth grade students of Quincy Senior High II. Each student may choose the school-within-a-school which offers him an educational environment that most accurately reflects his individual learning style. These schools vary in degree of structure, methodology, and philosophical orientation and have been named the Traditional School

(275 students), Flexible School (375 students), P.I.E. School (275 students), Fine Arts School (125 students), Career School (175 students), Work Study School (125 students), and Special Education School (100 students).

These schools, briefly described, are as follows:

Traditional School.

The emphasis of the Traditional School is on the continuation of the fine quality and methods of education that have transpired during past years and which have proved to be successful for many young people. The Traditional School is designed for those students who desire or need direction, guidance, and supervision.

Flexible School.

The Flexible School is designed to meet the needs of students who desire a relatively structured program, yet wish to have some alternatives and flexibility available to them within that structure.

P.I.E. School.

Each teacher-advisor in P.I.E. (Project to Individualize Education) is concerned with the personal and academic growth of individual students. Students are considered to be responsible human beings deserving of respect and capable of making decisions, as well as taking the consequences for those decisions.

Fine Arts School.

The Fine Arts School is a school providing an environment in which people work together, form strong personal relationships, and develop both socially and academically. Trust and decision-making are encouraged and reinforced through many activities that involve staff members and students working together.

Career School.

The Career School has been designed to assist students in acquiring those occupational skills and attitudes necessary in today's world of work. Vocational experiences are directed toward meeting the individual interests and abilities of students, and graduates are prepared to compete in the job market.

Work Study School.

The basic philosophy of the Work Study School is centered around the belief that within the right structure and with guidance, every student can enjoy a degree of success. Emphasis is placed on the development of positive attitudes by individual students toward themselves, school, and the community.

Special Education School.

The purpose of the Special Education School is to meet the many and different needs of students requiring special education services. These needs focus on the academic, vocational, social, emotional, and physical growth of the student.

Inherent within the development of the Education By Choice model is a process orientation involving teachers, administrators, students, parents, and community members. The process includes elements such as needs assessment techniques, consensus, shared decision-making, problem solving strategies, and techniques for communication. The goal of the project has been the creation of learning environments which positively influence the affective behavior of the participants and which facilitate their continued cognitive growth in comparison to national norms.

CHAPTER 6.

HOW CAN LEGISLATORS LEGISLATE WITHOUT A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION?

PATRICIA BERLAT.

"We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend unwarrantable jurisdiction over us." (1)

"For use of the given or finished to anticipate the consequences of processes going on is precisely what is meant by 'ideas,' by 'intelligence.'" (2)

As authority to legislate is given (1) so then also authority to legislate is withheld. (2) As authority and the legitimatizing of authority is defined and redefined in the literature by political philosophers, administrators, and legislators, so then also does that meaning lack in substance. As the concepts about the meaning of authority remain either linear, circular, or triadic in kind, so then also do many traditional kinds of problems, as non-genuine, both in political philosophy and in the philosophies of education. But if, with Dewey, anticipating the consequences of the processes going on is of value, then as given, intelligence is the pervasive.

Holding Dewey's democratic criteria in our right hand and the substantive problem regarding the relationship of political philosophy to a philosophy of education in our left, let us together cooperatively and deliberately move toward those ends. An attempt to 'capture' that relationship on a self-to-self basis as is so often attempted in psychology is to miss the point, while a linear cause-effect assumption will do the same. That the colonists selected not to adopt an Hegelian frame and thereby lock us into a Marx-Engels triad, or keep us rolling up and down hill in an organismic or circular move, one can quite simply thank them for, and proceed on the alternate.

For surely we have been called upon to take issue with a problem seen as confronting us today *as* philosophers of education *in* a democracy and *with* that very relationship as a current and controversial problem. For surely also as we *act* upon that issue either new consequences had better emerge, or we had better vacate the premises as the colonists did only a short time ago -- and perhaps for the same kinds of reasons.

Those colonists, with reasons, who gathered themselves together as we do today, vacated their premises (as we have at least not *yet* been forced to do), selected from between, within, and among various political philosophies available at that time and constructed the framework of a society. In that very *process* there must have been much divergence of thought and much provoking of thought, for surely also the construction of such a document is not a simple task. Nor is the task simple of *demanding* that diverging kinds of thoughts or provoking thought *exist* and *continue* to exist *in* that society. For such is not only the *premise* upon which a democracy is based, but also the *ends* upon which it turns. Such ends place that heavy task *precisely* upon philosophers of education such that if they should hesitate in picking it up, democratic ends fall.

The criteria-laden hands of a democracy *necessarily* reach OUT to philosophers to educate *for* such principles just as those same hands set the 'tenure' of legislators *in* *balance* and *in* *service* to such ends, as in turning. Tenures of legislators *as* legislators hang in the balance between the *continuance* of provoking thought as the most *basic* democratic principle, much the same as educators are assured of the tenure to be able to continue to do so. When and if educators cease to maintain such a premise and thereby slowly vacate their premises *as* educators, the grounds of a democracy are *vacated* and thereby also legislators are out of business as such. That which is recognized as democratic falls limply to the floor in the valuing of similarity, stagnation, ultimate truth, or final analysis. In conjunction with Max Black, "Any number of clear cases can be found of *making* *something* *happen*." (3)

With the meaning of Dewey's criteria one understands intelligence as a *force* in social action (4) such that to exalt *thought* in *name* while ignoring its efficacy in *fact*, i.e., that kind of thinking which betters life and furthers more deliberate kinds of ends, is to initiate a sinister and perilous concept. (5) A concept which, to certain ways of thinking, has pervaded not only traditional philosophic literature, but the literature of many of the other disciplines as well. What *has* *been* perpetrated upon we who reside in the present by those *kinds* of traditional concepts from *out* of the past are the 'ideas' embodied in *thinking* in such a way. Concepts which are embodied in 'self' analysis -- as singular; concepts of organismic ends -- as circular; concepts of from here-to-there, as linear; and a concept of the eternal triangle -- 'squared,' are in evidence. When with taking that which has been given as suggesting a differing kind of assumption as we hold Dewey's criteria, evaporation is effected.

If philosophers of education choose not to vacate their premises, choose not to raise arms to engage in political battle and perhaps expend their thinking during battle, then perhaps differing kinds of assumptions will be made in revising and in sweeping away some debris in the field while at the same time instituting a new field as non-linear, non-circular, non-triadic, but effective in kind. Since some of the sweeping has already been done, the task is not too difficult. Goldmark states, "My indictment of philosophers of education is based on the assumption that there is a distinctive task that philosophers of education have . . . ." (6) That distinctive task, if so acted upon, eliminates the necessity of enjoining political factions in battle, eliminates the necessity of vacating the premises, and eliminates the logical consequences of such actions in bringing a democracy to its knees withOUT us.

For without us thought is not provoked. Diverging thoughts are not of value, and those peculiar structures that stand around the world labelled "educational institutions" shrivel into the stagnant pools of 1984. (7) Evidence for such a claim abounds if one is so inclined to look. For those in Hitler's Germany who chose to provoke thought, construct new ways of thinking about their world, were not only a threat to the premature closure of ideas, but also, upon vacating the premises, shackled Germany and enhanced our grounds.

A contemporary political philosopher, Murphy, sees the problem of today as perhaps only slightly different in kind. "The contemporary American government generates a pervasive and substantial amount of moral agony among its citizens." (8) His thought is provoked by students abandoning "business as usual" in the classrooms in an effort to enjoin political factions and clogged political channels for redress, possibly in much the same way we philosophers of education are so called upon today, and as the colonists were forced into then.

That which makes authority legitimate is our consent, both initially by document and subsequently by the conditions in that document. If today it becomes too difficult to withhold consent, then perhaps we should inquire into Mill's claim. Mill was provoked by the thought that in such a framework the more active part of the populace may seek to oppress others. (9) However, encased in that claim is the assumption that all things being equal such will be the case, which simply says something about certain kinds of predictions and the efficacy of thought, as the issues create a flux in parts and in oppression.

But if such is the case for educators today sometimes, then at those times philosophers of education find themselves pinched into the creases of the oppressed. Again, we cannot ethically vacate the classrooms for reasons so stated above. As for the same ethical reasons, we cannot allow students either to additionally clog political channels, or vacate the pangs in the struggle which accompany responsible inquiry into such actions. So, again, we must act forcefully as philosophers of education.

When we do that, then that which guides people into either constructing or destructing societies, throws into broken-like relief the meaning of the words "fear of oppression" and "moral agony." That societies and institutions as well as the people housed in and out of them have been levelled by such uncontrolled criteria is in evidence. That societies have been constructively built, solidly built, ethically and aesthetically built for long range ends by deliberately instituting such criteria is also in evidence. (see 1) That such criteria are effective in the constructing of theories, reconstructing of assumptions about past and present theories, (see 2) and that such criteria sometimes become "a unifying design by which to understand diversity" (10) is also in evidence.

In designing the fear of oppression and the selections of political philosophers from among political philosophies, legislators were issued into being. By the same kind of design, that is with current agonies and current selections by educational philosophers as that kind of guiding criteria, they are issued OUT. Deliberation about that agony, and about that fear, as a criterion, institutes more adequate conditions for the establishing of "relief" from less adequate conditions. With more adequate conditions current consent is withheld deliberately and in conjunction with Dewey's intelligence criteria, a democracy's ethical criteria, and Saunders' qualitative criteria, as bonded.

So that, "When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve political bonds" (11) instead more significant and non-political bonds exist as movers, such that dissolution or vacation is no longer the significant issue, but that one of reconstruction is.

When reconstruction is, then relative kinds of "tenure" positions are known such that a legislator's tenure swings in balance and in service to those philosophers of education so engaged. Engaged in that relative swing we provide legislators, educators, students, and all parts of the whole "with experiences of a certain type which they would not otherwise have." (12) That *kind* of experience, as known, directs the reader's attention "to the *act* and to the *making* that is the analysis." (13)

Experiential analysis as valued, philosophically lifts relative weights from both left and right, from the consequences of shrivelling thought in the Kremlin to the consequences of oppressive agony, and vacates nothing. To vacate nothing means to swing Dewey's criteria up, over, and *back* with *force* -- against a point of precision effecting philosophic bonds to the right. *From* that point distinctions rise and societies fall. From that point *on* legislators turn and philosophers move . . . toward warrantable jurisdiction.

Documentations.

1. In Congress, *The Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United States of America*, (July 4, 1776).

2. Dewey, John, *Creative Intelligence*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1917, p. 21.

3. Black, Max, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962, p. 153.

4. Dewey, John, *A Common Faith*, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1934, p. 79.

5. Dewey, John, *Creative Intelligence*, p. 28.

6. Goldmark, Bernice, *Proceedings* of the Far Western Philosophy of Education, "How Do You Know You Know? -- The Question Nobody Asks," J. J. Jelinek, editor, 1972, p. 259.

7. Orwell, George, *1984*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1949.

8. Murphy, Jeffrie G., *Civil Disobedience and Violence*, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1971, p. 64.

9. Mill, J. S., "Utilitarian Defense of Individual Liberty," *Political Philosophy*, Alan Gerwith, editor, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965, pp. 106ff.

49.

10. Saunders, T. Frank, _Emotion_: _A Philosophic Analysis_, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Book Co., 1964, p. iii.

11. _Declaration_.

12. Saunders, _op_. _cit_., p. 95.

13. Champlin, Nathaniel L., _Educational Leadership_, "Value Inquiry and the Philosophy of Education," May 1956, p. 467.

CHAPTER 7.

PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF TRAINING AS CONTRASTED WITH TEACHING.

JAMES JOHN JELINEK.

The history of education highlights basic disagreements of pioneer investigators in the field of scientific learning theory: William James, the first great American writer in the area of learning, posited the hypothesis that repetition is "the great law of habit." His student, E. L. Thorndike, found it impossible to make the law of repetition ("use") account for all his experimental findings and formulated the "law of effect." John B. Watson, by way of his affinity for Pavlovian thought concluded that the conditioned response is "the fundamental unit of habit." Within the last four decades many investigators have vigorously pursued the implications and the relationships of these various fundamental concepts which were formulated during the first decades of the century. The result has been an ambitious attempt by psychologists, among the first of which was E. B. Holt (1) in 1931, to base the psychology of learning exclusively upon the principle of conditioning.

Foremost among the early critics of the single principle theory of conditioning was O. Hobart Mowrer (2) who stated "there are two basic learning processes: the process whereby the solutions to problems, that is, ordinary 'habits' are acquired, and the process whereby emotional learning, or 'conditioning,' takes place." "Similarly," he stated, "in the field of education it is useful to differentiate between teaching and training" to help decide "the oft-debated question as to whether 'indoctrination' is a legitimate function of education." A distinction between teaching and training, he said, also was "relevant to the issues which have arisen between progressive education and more traditional educational philosophies."

Today, what light can a critical analysis of these critical analyses of pioneer investigators of twenty-five to seventy-five years ago bring to bear on the effects of training on learning as contrasted with the effects of teaching on learning?

Pavlov's experiment of the dog, the meat, and the bell is too well known to require retelling here, but it is important to reconstruct the main point of the experiment, that point being that artificial stimuli can become incorporated into the makeup of an individual. For a dog to salivate when meat was brought to him was to be expected, but no one in Pavlov's time would have supposed that a dog would salivate when a bell was rung. Yet by ringing a bell every time meat was brought, Pavlov was able to "condition" dog nature so salivation took place merely at the ringing of the bell, without the presence of meat. Out of this and subsequent experiments the idea of the "conditioned response" entered the thinking of our century.

In these experiments what was found to be true of the dog was easily shown to be true of man. Man can be conditioned to be a creature that he otherwise is not. The act of conditioning is the act of training -- the mode by which an artificial stimulus becomes built into the structure of any living organism, including, of course, man. By way of training a person can be conditioned to eat an olive and like it, to kill his fellow men and feel proud of it, to insult a minority race and feel justified in doing so. (3) The eating of the olive is accompanied by approving smiles, the killing of his fellow men is accompanied by citations, medals, and praise, the insult to a minority race is accompanied by praise for the concern of the majority. In each case the artificial stimulus is so closely tied up with the satisfaction of a particular want that the response to the stimulus is felt to be "natural."

Yet what seems to be "natural" turns out to be grossly "unnatural." It would seem to be likely that a person, or even an animal, would be alert to the consequences of his acts: if the consequence is favorable, the action producing it would be perpetuated; if the consequence is unfavorable, the action producing it would be abandoned. However, in a state of arrestment, that which in a previous paper I refer to as "negative disintegrationism" (4), there is a paradox of behavior that is at the same time self-perpetuating and self-defeating. In this arrestment paradox, actions which have predominantly unfavorable consequences persist over a period of months, years, or even a lifetime. The actions in such instances are self-perpetuating and self-defeating.

Having observed the arrestment paradox in his experimental subjects, Pavlov (5) concluded that it was a "chronic pathological state" caused (a) by a "clashing of excitatory and inhibitory processes," and (b) by overexcitation. In both instances he conceived of the arrestment paradox as the resulting "disturbance of the higher nervous activity" involving definite injury of or damage to the brain cells." He regarded it as a "pathological" state involving structural or physiochemical derangement of cortical mechanisms. Because he felt the arrestment paradox to be a matter of brain damage he thought therapy should follow traditional medical practices -- sedation, rest, diet, and the like. These observations led Pavlov to an elaborate classification of constitutional, temperament types of dogs, to the exclusive neglect of life-history factors. He had no conception of the extent to which what happens in one situation is influenced by what has been learned in past situations.

The fact of the matter is that the arrestment paradox is caused by the conditioning, the training process, itself. How to produce the arrestment paradox, or "vicious circle" or "psychopathic upset" (2) as it is sometimes called, is a simple matter for the research physiologist: The animal is trained to react in certain ways to certain stimuli, and then is placed into a situation in which these responses are impossible. Although each of his attempts is blocked, the animal continues to go on responding as he has been trained to do, caught in the grips of the arrestment paradox, until he finally breaks down. His actions become abnormal, quite different from what is natural to him in health. The sheep, normally gregarious, becomes solitary and morose, neither mingling with other sheep nor eating nor drinking nor responding even to the simplest and most familiar circumstances. Likewise the rat in the arrestment paradox continues responses that are self-perpetuating and self-defeating, continuing trained responses by dashing his head against a locked door until bruised and bleeding he batters himself to exhaustion.

Again, what is found to be true of animals is easily shown to be true of man. For example, the research studies on the condition of American youth completed by a staff of specialists for the National Youth Commission (6) reveal that being a Negro youth means living in an intimate culture whose incentives, rewards, and punishments prevent the development of those types of personal standards, attitudes, and habits the general community deems desirable. The society trains youth to live up to the ideals of the country -- to cringe to no man, to choose one's own life work, to resist affronts to human dignity, to work toward honestly earned success -- but the society puts Negro youth into the situation of the animal in the psychological laboratory in which the arrestment paradox is to be caused by making it impossible for him to live up to those national ideals as other youth in America do. There are indeed among our students those whose behavior patterns give evidence of the arrestment paradox, those who give evidence of self-perpetuating, self-defeating behavior characterized by the same bewildered, senseless tangle of abnormal nerve-reactions studied in animals by psychologists in laboratory experiments.

The basic assumption of training is that man's behavior can be conditioned effectively through external stimuli -- by grades, money, or other rewards. This assumption postulates a certain view of the nature of man and of society that is saturated with materialism, bred in mechanism, and steeped in empiricism. The consequences of this mode are identifiable: (a) The person loses his ability to think, (b) he becomes the prey of those who condition him, (c) he destroys his desire to find out the "why" of life, (d) he loses his ability to formulate ideals and to bring them to fruition, (e) he becomes a passive individual upon whom habits are impressed by his trainer, (f) he becomes anti-intellectual, (g) he relinquishes responsibility for his own actions, (h) he turns to violence when rewards are withheld, (i) he loses his freedom to infinite individuality (7), (j) he limits his perspective, (k) he is law-abiding only when he is observed, (l) he learns gamesmanship, especially the game of revenge.

Until recently there has been little evidence to show how the twelve billion cells within the brain store memory. The most noted explorer in this field has been Wilder Penfield (8) who has conducted a series of experiments during which he has touched the temporal cortex of the brain of a patient with a weak electric current transmitted through a galvanic probe. On the basis of this research it was concluded (a) that the electrode evokes a single recollection, not a mixture of memories or generalization, (b) that not only past events are recorded in detail but also the feelings that were associated with those events, (c) that the brain functions as a high-fidelity recorder of every experience from birth, and (d) that the person exists in two states at the same time -- that is, he is at the same time in the experience and outside of it, observing it.

A significant extension of the research by Penfield came from Lawrence S. Kubie during the course of which he concluded "that early in life, sometimes within the earliest months, a central emotional position is established. . . . The clinical fact which is already evident is that once a central emotional position is established it becomes the affective position to which that individual will return automatically for the rest of his days." (9)

There are three basic conceptualizations of self (central emotional positions or ego states) that can be developed -- that of the Trainee, that of the Trainer, and that of the Teacher/Learner.

The Trainee Ego State: Characteristics.

In the Trainee ego state the individual feels he is at the mercy of others. As a child he lacks the equipment and experience necessary to form a different conceptualization of self, so his only guide is the reactions of others to him. There is little cause for him to question these appraisals, and in any case he is far too helpless to challenge them or to rebel against them. He passively accepts the judgments which are communicated empathetically at first, and by words, gestures, and deeds in this period. . . . thus the self-attitudes (conceptualizations of self) are carried forever by the individual, with some allowance for the influence of extraordinary environmental circumstances and modification through later experiences. (10) Thus, basic to the development of the Trainee ego state (conceptualization of self) is the mode of manipulation, the mode of reward and punishment, by the Trainer.

Submission to authority, desire for a strong leader to tell in behavioristic terms what to do, when to do it, how to do it, and even how to feel about it, all characterize the Trainee ego state. Authoritarian submission is evoked in relation to a variety of authoritarian figures -- parents, older people, political leaders, academic trainers, supernatural power, and the like. The Trainee ego state is characterized by an exaggerated, all-out emotional need to submit. This would be indicated by agreement that obedience and respect are the most important virtues children should learn, and that a person should obey without question the decisions of the Trainer. In this sense there is a certain masochistic component to the Trainee ego state.

The Trainer Ego State: Characteristics.

The Trainer ego state, on the other hand, is essentially made up of behavior copied from parents or authority figures. A person in the Trainer ego state is a playback of his Trainer. Thus, in this state the person is essentially nonperceptive and noncognitive. He employs a constant and arbitrary basis for decisions and serves as a repository of traditions and values of his own Trainers.

The Trainer ego state is developed at a time when the individual lives under a system of rigid restraints and who for this reason feels put upon and is likely not only to seek a person as an object upon which he can "take it out" but also be particularly annoyed at the idea that that person as an object is "getting away with something." There is a sadistic component to the Trainer ego state, just as there is the masochistic component to the Trainee ego state.

The person in a Trainee ego state who cannot bring himself to criticize his trainers has a desire to condemn, reject, and punish those who violate these values. Once the individual has convinced himself there are people who ought to be trained, he has the mode through which his impulses may be expressed, even while he thinks of himself as thoroughly moral.

The Teacher/Learner Ego State: Characteristics.

When a person is in a Teacher/Learner ego state he regards himself and others as subjects, a subject being one who knows and acts, rather than as objects, an object being one who is known and is acted upon. He is inner, rather than outer, directed. He invokes modes of inquiring, hypothesizing, problem-solving, and reconstructing experience. Growth for him is a matter of a person's rethinking an experience thus facing each subsequent situation a different person. (11)

In these terms, the philosophical implications of training as contrasted with teaching can be stated by way of principles, the independent variables of which identify the behaviors inherent in the ego state and the dependent variables of which identify the consequences of those actions.

The Trainee Ego State: Implications.

The basic principles of the Trainee ego state include the following:

Extrinsicism. If man's behavior is conditioned by external stimuli, by extrinsic motivation, by grades, money, or other rewards administered by another, then (a) he loses the ability to contemplate, (b) he becomes the prey of those who condition him, (c) he destroys his desire to find out the "why" of life, (d) he loses his ability to formulate ideals and to bring them to fruition, (e) he becomes a passive individual upon whom habits are impressed by his trainer, (f) he becomes anti-intellectual, (g) he relinquishes responsibility for his own actions, (h) he turns to violence when rewards are withheld, (i) he loses his freedom to infinite individuality, (j) he limits his perspective, (k) he is law-abiding only when he is observed, (l) he is revengeful and vindictive, and (m) he is polemical.

Necrophileticism. If individuals are alienated from their own decision-making, then they change into objects.

Passivism. If students (trainees) accept the passive role imposed upon them by their trainers, they adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented view of reality deposited in them.

Action. If men are frustrated in their efforts to act responsibly, if they find themselves unable to use their faculties, then they experience a sense of anguish which causes them to reject their impotence by submitting to and identifying with a charismatic person, a benevolent trainer, or group having power, thus by this symbolic participation in another's life having the illusion of acting, when in reality they are only submitting to and becoming a part of those who act.

Essentialism. If trainees work at storing deposits entrusted to them, then they do not develop the critical approaches necessary for the reconstruction of their experience.

Exploitation. If the oppressed remain unaware of the causes of their condition, then they fatalistically accept their exploitation.

Self. If the oppressed is at the same time himself and the oppressor whose will he has internalized, then he is confronted over and over again with the choice between being a whole self or a divided self, between following another's prescriptions or his own values, between speaking out or being silent, between experiencing respect or alienation, between being a spectator or an actor, between being a phony person or an authentic person.

The Trainer Ego State: Implications.

The basic principles of the Trainer ego state are as follows:

Conditioning. If a trainer sets up environmental situations that force trainees to make those responses desired by him, if he reinforces those responses when they occur, if he creates an emotional response of acceptance of both himself and those competencies that are to be learned, if he presents problem situations in this context of acceptance, if he extinguishes largely through nonreinforcement and partly through mildly punishing contingencies behavior that interferes with the trainees' learning the competencies he wants them to learn, if he presents situations in which the trainees know in strict behavioristic terms what they are to learn to do, if the trainees receive immediate feedback from their trainer concerning responses they make and they compare their progress with their past performance to see if they are doing what they are supposed to do, then the trainer changes the behavior of the trainees, individually and in groups, so that they behave in ways he wants them to behave and they do not behave in ways he does not want them to behave.

Democracy. If a society and its institutions, especially educational institutions, preach about democracy as a philosophy to the exclusion of implementing it as a technique, then its young are easy marks for any dictator who sets his sights upon them and manipulates them -- their thoughts, feelings, and actions -- for his personal aggrandizement.

Narration. If the trainer and trainee relationship at any level, inside or outside the school, is narrative in character, if it involves a narrating subject (the trainer) and patient listening objects (the trainees), then (a) education becomes the act of depositing in which trainees are the depositories and the trainers are the depositors. (b) the content of instruction, whether it be descriptive or valuational, is lifeless, petrified, motionless, static, compartmentalized -- alien to the existential experience of the trainees, detached from the meaning and the totality that engendered it and could give it significance, (c) the narration leads the students to memorize mechanically the narrated content, turns them into containers to be filled by the trainer -- thus the more completely he fills the container the better trainer he is, the more meekly the containers permit themselves to be filled, the better trainees they are, (d) the approach is irrelevant to the reconstruction of experience of the trainee, (e) knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable to those whom they consider to know nothing, (f) the approach minimizes and annuls the creative power of the trainees and encourages their credulity in such a way as to serve the interests of the oppressors who care neither to have the world or the experience of the trainees reconstructed, (g) the interests of the oppressors lie in changing the consciousness of the oppressed, not the situation which oppresses them for the more the oppressed can be led to adapt to the situation the more easily they can be dominated, (h) the approach masks the effort to turn men into automatons and thereby negates their efforts at humanization, (i) the oppressors react forcefully against any action in the educational situation which stimulates the critical faculties of the trainees who seek to solve the problems of their own lives, (j) the oppressed are regarded as pathological cases of a healthy society, marginal individuals who deviate from the general configuration of a good society, and who must be trained to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented view of reality deposited in them, (k) the educated man is the adapted man because he is better fit for the world as it is.

Doublemindedness. If in a pedagogical encounter there is extrinsic motivation, divided attention, doublemindedness, that is, if the goals of the trainer are different from the goals of the trainee, if the demands of the trainer forbid the direct expression of the purposes of the learner, if the entire surrender and wholehearted adoption of the course of action demanded of the trainee by the trainer is impossible, if there is so-called "stern discipline" -- external coercive pressure, if there is motivation through rewards extraneous to the thing to be done, if there is schooling that is merely preparatory, schooling with ends beyond the student's present grasp, if there is exaggerated emphasis upon drill exercise designed to produce skill in action independently of thought -- exercises having no purpose but the production of automatic skill, if what is spontaneous and vital in mental action and reaction goes unused and untested, then (a) the trainee deliberately revolts or deliberately attempts to deceive others, (b) the outcome is a confused and divided state of interest in which the trainee is fooled as to his own real intent, (c) the trainee tries to serve two masters at once -- on the one hand, he wants to do what is expected of him, to please others, to get their approval, to be apprehensive of penalty, to "pay attention to the lesson" or whatever the requirement is; but on the other hand, he wants to pursue his own purposes since the evident suppression of their exhibition does not abolish them, he finds irksome the strain of attention to what is hostile to desire, in spite of his outward behavior, his underlying desires determine the main course of his thought and his deeper emotional responses, his mind wanders from the nominal subject and devotes itself to what is intrinsically more desirable, (d) there is an obvious loss of energy of thought immediately available when one is consciously trying to seem to try to attend to one matter while his imagination is spontaneously going out to more congenial affairs, (e) there is a subtle and permanent crippling of intelligent activity based upon the fostering of habitual self-deception inherent in the doublemindedness that hampers integrity and completeness of mental action, (f) a split is developed between conscious thought and attention and impulsive emotion and desire, (g) reflective dealings with the content of instruction is constrained and half-hearted attention wanders, (h) dealings with the interests of the student by the student become illicit; transactions with them are furtive; the discipline that comes from regulating response by deliberate inquiry having a purpose fails; the deepest concern and most congenial enterprises of the imagination (since they center about the things dearest to desire) are casual and concealed; they enter into action in ways which are unacknowledged; and they are demoralizing because they are not subject to rectification by consideration of consequences.

Dehumanization. If teachers are well-intentioned trainers who do not realize they are serving only to dehumanize their students, if they fail to perceive their efforts to train are themselves contradictions about reality, then, sooner or later, these processes of dehumanization lead even passive students to turn against their trainers and to discover through existential experience that their present way of life is irreconcilable with their becoming fully human, and that, through their relations with others, reality is basically a process, undergoing constant transformation.

Domination. If there is domination of one person over another, if a person manipulates another in terms of his own ends, then there is pathology of love -- sadism in the dominator and masochism in the dominated.

The Teacher/Learner Ego State: Implications.

The basic principles of the Teacher/Learner ego state include the following:

Heurism. If the teacher and student relationship at any level, inside or outside the school, is heuristic in nature, if it involves modes of inquiring, hypothesizing, problem-solving, if teachers and students are both subjects (a subject being one who knows and acts) rather than subjects and objects (an object being one who is known and is acted upon), then (a) education becomes responding to the intentionalities of the participants, (b) languaging replaces narrating, (c) acts of cognition replace transferrals of information, (d) cognizable objects (referents) intermediate cognitive individuals (the subjects -- the teachers and the students), (e) dialogical relations are used to the fullest capacity of the cognitive actors (teachers and students) to cooperate in perceiving the same cognizable objects (referents), (f) the term subject or teacher/student replaces trainer-of-the-trainees and subjects or students/teachers replaces trainees of the trainer, (g) the teacher is no longer merely the one-who-teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue with students, who, in turn, while being taught also teach; all become jointly responsible for the process in which they all grow, (h) no one teaches another, nor is anyone "self-trained;" individuals teach each other, mediated by the referents of their world, (i) the teacher-student is not cognitive in his preparation and narrative in his presentation, (j) the teacher-student does not regard cognizable objects (referents) as his private property but as the objects of reflection by himself and his students, (k) the teacher-student reconstructs his reflections in the reflections of students, (l) the students are critical coinvestigators in dialogue with the teacher, (m) the teacher-student studies reality with students and reconstructs his earlier reflections and considerations as the students express their own, (n) education involves a constant unveiling of reality, (o) education strives for the emergence of consciousness and critical intervention in reality, (p) teachers and students pursue problems relating to themselves in the world and with the world and feel increasingly more challenged and obliged to respond to that challenge, (q) authentic reflection considers men in their reactions with the world, (r) students, simultaneously reflecting on themselves and on the world, increase the scope of their perception and begin to direct their observations toward previously inconspicuous phenomena, (s) students develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality in process, in reconstruction.

Dialogue. If individuals speak their word, name the world, and reconstruct it in thought and/or action, then their dialogue becomes the way in which they attain significance as persons, (a) the dialogue is not reduced to the act of one individual's depositing ideas into another, (b) it is not a simple exchange of ideas to be consumed by discussants, (c) it is not a hostile, polemical argument between individuals who are committed not to the search for truth and meaning but rather to the imposition of their own truth and meaning, (d) it is not a situation in which some individuals name the world on behalf of others, (e) it is not a crafty instrument for the domination of one individual by another.

Education. If education is carried on by "A" for "B" or by "A" about "B," if oppressors act upon men to indoctrinate them and adjust them to a reality which must remain unreconstructed, then the ensuing behaviors are training behaviors that are, in themselves, acts of violence; if, on the other hand, education is carried on by "A" with "B," if the teacher asks himself what he will dialogue with the students about, then the preoccupation with the content of the dialogue is a preoccupation with curriculum in authentic education, mediated by the world, a world which impresses and challenges both teacher and student, giving rise to descriptions and valuations about it impregnated with hopes, anxieties, doubts, and the like.

Interactionism. If an individual perceives content as instrumental toward eliminating a factor that disintegrates his dynamic equilibrium, then (a) he pursues that content with a discipline, even if it is at first unpleasant to him, (b) he considers it a means to an end, (c) he learns it, (d) he builds it into structure so that he can use it whenever the disintegrative factor reappears, and (e) he develops pleasure in it.

Conscientiatization. If men gain inner freedom, then they learn conscientiatization -- to perceive social, political, sexual, religious, and economic contradictions and to take action against the oppressive elements of the society that create these contradictions.

Reconstructionism. If a person rethinks his experience, then he faces each subsequent situation a different person.

Disintegrationism. If the dynamic equilibrium of the individual is disintegrated, then (a) he responds to remove the disintegrative factor, (b) his responses continue if his first response is not instrumental in the removal, (c) his responses vary, and (d) he builds into structure the response that effectively removes the disintegrative factor.

Documentations.

1. E. B. Holt, *Animal Drive and the Learning Process*, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York, 1931.

2. O. H. Mowrer, "On the Dual Nature of Learning: A Reinterpretation of 'Conditioning' and 'Problem-Solving,'" *Harvard Education Review* 17:102-148, 1947.

3. George G. Nathan, *The New American Credo: A Contribution Toward the Interpretation of the American Mind*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1927, 223 pp.

4. James John Jelinek, "A Reconstructed Epistemology for Philosophy of Education," *Philosophy of Education: 1969*, Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, Tempe, Arizona, 1969.

5. I. P. Pavlov, *Conditioned Reflexes*, Translated by G. V. Anrep, Oxford University Press, London, 1927, pp. 284, 318.

6. Winfield H. Rogers, et. al., *Explorations in Living: A Record of the Democratic Spirit*, Reynal and Hitchcock, New York, 1941, p. 198.

7. B. F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1971.

8. Wilder Penfield, "Memory Mechanisms," *American Medical Association Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, 1952, 67: 178-198.

9. Lawrence S. Kubie, "The Neurotic Process as the Focus of Physiological and Psychoanalytic Research," *The Journal of Mental Science*, 1958, Vol. 104, No. 435.

10. Harry Stack Sullivan, pp. 73, 74 in *Psychoanalytic Theories of Personality*, by G. S. Blum, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1953.

11. James John Jelinek, "Presidential Address," *Philosophy of Education: 1972-1973*, Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, Tempe, Arizona, 1973.

CHAPTER 8.

SETTING THE STAGE, TRIPPING ON THE PROPS AND HOW TO FLOAT AND SWIM.

MARY K. BARONE.

"A mighty fortress is our God
A bulwark never failing.
But what we need in a universe such as ours are not rocks and bastions:
we need a knowledge of how to float and swim." Alan Watts, Beyond
Theology: The Art of Godmanship.

"He shook his head and laughed. I can't say it in words. God, man, I've got to learn a musical instrument so I can really say what it sounds like." (1)

"If you should happen to have access to Ravi Shankar's music, Renee Magritte's paintings, or a delightfully grotesque Laughing Buddha, put this paper aside. Let the music flow, go with it into the paintings. Rub the belly of Buddha. Of course you're laughing: it tickles. You're scratching your navel."

"Now that you've complied with the above directions, and since you were able to assemble the music, the paintings and the Buddha from your immediate environment, the general public will probably sign a certificate of your mental incompetence with great glee. On the other hand, if you didn't bother with the props and you're still reading, you're probably intrigued, and there are public doubts regarding your sanity as well. In either event,

"The time has come, the eggman said, to speak of many things:

Of cellular perception and what the planet sings of men like Watts and Einstein and if Tim Leary's dead as if all that might matter in the world outside my head.

The time has come, O Carpenter, to climb down from that cross and feed me with your body and never count the loss but gain your sense in laughter until you lose your mind.

Spin around! The future approaches from behind."

Setting the Stage.

The human species, if observed as close as possible to its point of emergence, behaves essentially, in its beginnings, in exactly the same way as every other zoological phylum as it shoots into existence. (2) Mankind finds itself endlessly fascinating, either in the particular or both the particular and general states of being. A crying infant is concerned with the needs of a particular "I am" only; the responsive other who cares for that infant is concerned with a larger particular referred to as "we." The same is true, however, for a den of wolves. The young are concerned with their own needs; the adult wolves spend time and energy filling the needs of the young. If this were the extent of human capacity, Hermann Hesse could never have conceived of Steppenwolf. There would have been no dilemma, no persona around/within whom to build the book. What is it then about the essence of the human which separates it from the other forms of natural phenomena?

"Once life, along this particular ray (of direct psychism) reached a critical point of arrangement (or, as we call it in this context, of convolution) it became hyper-centered upon itself, to the point of becoming capable of foresight and invention. It became conscious "in the second degree." And this was sufficient to enable it in the course of a few hundreds of thousands of years to transform the surface and appearance of the earth." (3)

If it is within the context of a self-reflective zoological phylum that each individual human being is born, how then can we account for the dilemma of Western civilized man? How can a particle of a self-reflective race live, propagate, and die without any sense of true community? How can he bitterly (or without reflection) identify himself only within the confines of what Vonnegut would call a false karass? It may be that

"a sort of collective co-consciousness can still be found among tribes classified by ethnologists as 'primitive' which in a quite natural way facilitates the cohesion and proper functioning of the group. It must have been so practically everywhere on the earth in pre-neolithic times. In the other hand, as civilization began to rise, so an increasing agitation became continually apparent in populations each consistent element of which felt itself under pressure from a more lively capacity for, and hence need of, more autonomous activity and enjoyment. This was so marked that toward the end of the nineteenth century it could be seriously asked whether hominization was not approaching, through pulverization and fragmentation, its final phase." (4)

By the end of the nineteenth century almost all habitable areas of the earth's surface contained pockets of the human race who were in contact (at least through trade) with other areas of the globe. The white-skinned propagator of Western civilization had expanded his influence world wide, and the sun was never to set on Victoria's empire. At the same time, as a result of having extended to its limits the physical expansion of his culture, white-skinned man was confronted with a new and amazing awareness of fact. He had become so influential, so far-flung in his importance that he discovered that his was the minority race. He had become large enough to become aware of his insignificance. He owned the world but, like David, only with the cooperation of Goliath.

Lacking the original David's advantage, that of having only an individual giant to kill, Western civilized man resorted, with the highest altruistic motives, to the next best defense: subversion. Under the banner of the White Man's Burden, he strove to propagate his theories of the superiority of the white race. He chose to indoctrinate with his culture and values those individuals of other races who qualified in his eyes as superior individuals.

White men used these criteria to separate the 'superior' member of another racial group from his apparent peers: the individual must have courage and ambition, a strong ego coupled with a streak of vanity; he must be adaptable and plastic enough to function in an alien environment, and yet not so fluid as to lose his identity. He must be vital and intelligent enough to absorb and dispense the values of that alien culture and yet not so vital and intelligent as to be able to see through and act upon the holes in that adopted culture.

Since that delicate balance of power couldn't be maintained indefinitely, Western David has found himself in the midst of an amusing dilemma. As Goliath rises into his own, David must either quit his posturing and hope for equality (pray for mercy!) or begin to realize that his identity, his manner of vision, must be enlarged and may, in fact, be built on false premises. The first step, of course, might be inquiring politely of

Goliath if, perhaps, he doesn't have a sister at home. This common sense approach, however, tends to be frowned upon by the power structure that set up the problem in the first place. After all, wide scale intermingling would be subversive to the subversion of the foreign element.

The myth of the superiority of a separate branch of the human race reached its zenith under the influence of Adolph Hitler. The recoil-in-horror of the rest of Western civilization at the exposure of the atrocities accomplished in the name of Aryan Right must be followed through to its logical conclusion.

The chant of "Never again!" echoes around the United Nations. I drive through a police cordon to get home from work. Arafat is in New York. I think of the repercussions of Arafat's injury or death at this time, in this place, and quake and pray for peace. I think again of Dag Hammarskjöld and wonder, again, at the cause of the plane crash that killed him. And Kennedy, and King, and Kennedy again. And Ghandi. In place of a superior race, we continue a mythology of superior individuals. Further, we expect that individuals invested with power (Nasser, Nixon, Willy Brandt, Trudeau) will conduct themselves as superior men. We do not differentiate between the function of office and the function of the individual. Our cult of the superiority of the individual must go the way of the Victorian British/Third Reich cult of racial superiority, for we have a new Hitler to hold over the heads of our enemies.

At about the time the physical individual Adolph Hitler disappeared into death or obscurity, we activated his new world counterpart. We realized the theory. E does equal mc^2. We replaced the individual proponent of racial superiority with his impersonal alter ego: nuclear weapons (the collective defense against individual outrage).

It becomes more critical than ever to ask whether or not we are creating our final phase at the present time. According to Timothy Leary,

"The one thing DNA fears is radiation. That's why the Van Allen Belt is there." (5)

In our intense hurry to protect our mythology of both individuality and superiority we have finally subverted ourselves to the brink of essential disaster: the altering of DNA throughout the planet, despite the safeguards the planet has provided to prevent such an event.

Congratulations are in order. We've made our point. Now, where do we go from here?

Tripping on the Props.

"It is of the very essence of our striving for understanding that, on the one hand, it attempts to encompass the great and complex variety of man's experience, and that on the other, it looks for simplicity and economy in the basic assumptions. The belief that these two objectives can exist side by side is, in view of the primitive state of our scientific knowledge, a matter of faith." (6)

It is time to become conscious in the third degree. It is no longer enough to be aware of myself as a superior individual; it is no longer enough to limit my awareness to individuality at all. If the whole of the race does, in fact, consist of separate individuals, and both the whole and the individual coexist simultaneously, it is a matter of our
perception
attention
span and focus
which can differentiate between the two
which can consider the part
a whole unto itself, which can analyze it further
into component parts, each to be regarded as a separate discrete
whole which can be considered a part of a whole a-part of a whole.

I repeat, it is time to become conscious in the third degree: I must become aware of myself as a living, reflective whole fragment of a larger living, reflective whole fragment (totality of zoological phylum Homo Sapiens) of a living whole. Should I manage to blow myself off the planet prematurely, the only "small step for man, giant leap for mankind" the race will have made is the marvelously complex, incredibly simple physical step into space. We will have missed the whole point: the farther out you travel, the farther in you get. Expansion does not imply contraction. Expansion demands it. The only way back to the garden is to step off the planet.

Stepping off one's accustomed planet creates a deliberate or accidental release from all the social games and basic assumptions necessary to life within the race on the planet. Like Valentine Michael Smith, Heinlein's Man from Mars, you will undergo a certain degree of culture shock. Not only are all the customary assumptions without foundation in the new location, adherence to earth customs while off the planet might be referred to as the extra-terrestrial equivalent of psychosis. Should you manage to survive and adapt, like the non-white superior individual referred to earlier in relation to the British Empire, and become "outer-space sane," there is still more to be encountered. Once you step back onto terra firma, you are confronted with all the worldly sanity you had to discard to get back here in the first place. Your outer-space sanity might be referred to as terrestrial psychosis, as two of the basic assumptions discarded are the absolute linear quality of time and the dimensions of space. There is only now. There is only here.

I am not implying that, as is currently popular in some circles, schizophrenics are the true artists, or that all of the mad are truly sane. Most of the mad are simply crazy; not sane enough to live on earth terms, not mad enough to escape from earth terms. Caught. Defeated. Living in a half-world. Pathetic. Furious. Indifferent. Sad. Rather, I am saying that time and space are great games, huge toys created by man as a result of his physical sense perception on earth. Fantastic! We're free to explore, literally, any time, any place. Only, that wall, which I know certainly is a shimmering molecular mirage, simply an apparent physical division of the game called space, well, that wall bruises my body if I try to walk through it. My essential brothers, the flames, will sure as hell raise turmoil with my nervous system if I share the space and time games with the flames and my hand. From my third-floor fire escape, it is obvious that the apparent division between the metallic floor that holds me and the grass covered ground isn't 'real.' All the same plane, all the same place, only I'll spend the next few months in traction if I attempt to navigate that apparent space with my body.

Now what? Where do I go from here? Having left the planet, I've lost the innocence of the totally terrestrial being. I can't deny where I've been, and can't return where I was. Maybe I should talk to Buzz Aldrin and arrange a Great Escape. But there isn't any place to escape to. BE. NOW. HERE. BE. HERE. NOW. BE. NOW. HERE. BE NOWHERE.

It is time to become conscious in the third degree. Time, space and spatial/temporal creations/activity are a great game. My game. They are my creation, as I am. And I, having played in them so long, have given them their own (my) life: they have set up their own rules and regulations for existence and for coexistence with them. No two physical bodies can occupy the same space at the same time. What goes up must come down (until recently). Thou shalt not kill. For each and every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart. Photosynthesis occurs. Magenta and yellow together flow red. January first is New Year's Day. Natural laws. Biblical commandments. Social amenities. Earth-sane. A small fragment of a larger sane. They don't exist side by side, but one within the other, within itself, within themselves. If we continue to operate solely, totally within earth-sane terms, we're going to blow us off the planet sooner than we need to.

How to Float and Swim.

"Fueled by radiant energy beams from the sun, the great carbon cycle of photosynthesis and respiration goes on endlessly. Out of the cycle spring ATP molecules with the energy which all living creatures require for growing, glowing, fighting, fleeing and reproducing."

"The ATP molecules store the sun's energy in a chemical bond. The energy stays locked up until it is released when the bond breaks."

"For every job requiring energy, a particular enzyme, specifically designed for that job, does the bond-splitting. Muscle cells, for example, store not only ATP but also the enzyme that splits the ATP when the muscle contracts. The luminescent tissue of the railroad worm... stores not only ATP but also the specific enzyme needed to release ATP's energy for luminescence. Without ATP, living things would freeze in their tracks -- deprived of the all-important link that holds together the chain of life. Similarly, the ATP, without its needed enzymes, would be unable to perform its important function." (7)

What of rocks which are luminescent under black light? Do the rocks store ATP? Is it present in the black light waves? Where is the enzyme necessary to split the ATP and cause the rock's luminescence? How does this release of energy differ from the human aura?

Certain individuals claim to be able to see with their physical eyes the aura of luminescence, of radiant energy, emitting from the human body. Thermal photography's startling visual effects seem to substantiate this claim, or at least raise it from the realm of occult phenomena to the realm of that which is probably observable. It is within the framework of probability that we will unlock the doors which separate the arts, the sciences and occult phenomena within the next ten years. By 1984. By 2001 certainly enough to call Stanley Kubrick a prophet as well as a consummate film-maker. That assumes, of course, that we have not managed in the meantime to escape the planet in an intense moment of nuclear fusion.

It is also within the framework of probability that the main chance we have to avoid such a nuclear moment lies in creating a psychic implosion (chemical change) of such immense magnitude and scope as to make nuclear disaster unnecessary. For we are on the edge, at the turning point, at a crisis of cyclic change. The key to change

"is always chemical. Consciousness is a chemical process. Learning, sensing, remembering, forgetting are alterations in a biochemical book." (8)

Given the time, we'll look back at the state of knowledge in 1975 with the same amusement and roars of laughter which greeted Oklahoma!'s serenade to the unnatural modernity of Kansas City. Hopefully, we'll look back with the same wry awareness that there's always farther to go.

Is there a point at which we have gone as far as we can go in any given direction? Consider the direction of expansion, and consider whether there is a point at which contraction, convolution does become necessary. Breathe in and stop. Your lungs are expanded to full capacity. Your heartbeat continues long after your lungs have begun to hurt. You still have an option. You can exhale and your heart will continue to function right along with your lungs, or you can hold your breath until your heartbeat has stopped entirely. You can kill yourself quite easily that way, if you can overcome the reflex action of your diaphragm.

Do we, on a global scale, have some sort of psychic or planetary diaphragm which will prevent us from halting our collective heart action, from altering our chemical essence with radiation? Or is that the function of the Van Allen Belt, as Timothy Leary would have it?

Does it really matter? If you and I and time and space and all that we learn in school are a game we play with Ourself, it really doesn't matter in the long run. We'll keep on being whoever it is we truly are, and this aspect of being (human, earthlings) will end. So?

So, there is a regret, a melancholy, a fury full of cosmic laughter that we might not consider all of our sense-knowledge, all of the bittersweet sensuality of being human, here, now worth enough to cherish.

We are at a crisis of cyclic change: we are at a present momentary zenith of expansion in terms of technology, world population, the physical sciences and economic growth for profit. We feel the economic contraction beginning, for example, and perhaps can begin to empathize with those in a like situation around the world. The myth of individuality begins to melt only when my individual self comes to a point of crisis which is so severe that I must admit its killing quality to my self. To me. Perhaps we have not gone far enough, have not pushed to the limits. We must die in order to be born again.

Triage, the lifeboat theory, is part of our past, our present, and part of most probable futures. The theory and practice are perfectly acceptable to the true believer in the myth of the individual, since he or she naturally assumes that he or she will be a survivor. And yet who, even with the awareness that the lifeboat might suddenly spring a nuclear leak, would be willing to jump overboard, to learn to float and swim?

The only way for a human body to float indefinitely is for a human being to stop swimming and drown. The only way to avoid drowning is to keep on swimming or to climb back into the lifeboat. Full time swimming is not a viable alternative. It leads to drowning. Climbing back into the lifeboat will sink the boat.

The above paragraph assumes that there is real water for a body or a boat to sink into, and assumes that human life begins at birth and ends at death. It is operative in a future which may contain a new quantity of knowledge, but makes no allowance for a change in the quality of what we accept to be true. If we build for ourselves such a future, which operates solely on earth-sane terms, we will manufacture that nuclear leak in the planet. And yet, it is only through forecasting probable futures, individually and racially, that we can prevent or minimize that leak. It is the only way to create a sanity which can be earthbound or not.

Probability and the future are of the essence of American education today. The majority of teachers and students alike are forecasting probable futures which they assume will be very much like the present. The future may be more sophisticated, but will, they assume, be built on today's root assumptions. It is logical to them that working with yesterday's knowledge today will prepare the citizens of tomorrow to both solve tomorrow's problems and cope with tomorrow's successes. Again, it is time to become conscious in the third degree. We are educating a nation, perhaps a world, of Scarlett O'Haras.

Scarlett O'Hara was well educated in the best traditions of early- and mid-nineteenth century genteel Southern womanhood. She knew absolutely everything she needed to know; she was her mother's apt pupil. Had the Civil War never occurred, had Scarlett been able to live within the framework of the certain, solid world for which she was educated, she simply would have out-maneuvered Melanie and married Ashley Wilkes herself on page nine. Fortunately for Ms. Mitchell's novel, Scarlett had, like the rest of us, her tragic flaw. She inhabited a planet known for nothing so much as its capacity to surprise.

We must teach our children to forecast a variety of alternatives for the future. We must teach them to read between the lines as well as teach them to decipher the words. But first, we must teach ourselves.

We must become conscious in the third degree; we must step off the planet and view our yesterday with the eyes of Kubrick's star-child. Only then can we begin to accept the awful, amusing responsibility we have of shaping our tomorrow. The time to do that is today.

Since an invitation to step 'off the planet' is, at best, nebulous and vague, perhaps a further invitation is in order. You are invited to creative responsible play. The price of admission is still your mind. Read or reread Steppenwolf. Follow it up with T. S. Eliot's Four Quartets. Listen to the music of the Moody Blues. Spin a piece of Calder sculpture. Rub the belly of your favorite Buddha. Plan your own trip. Go wherever it takes you. Change your future.

"Because forecasting probable futures in one's own life and for the world is becoming more difficult, it is increasingly more important for young people to learn to be able to do just that. The process of developing internal discipline in one's life is dependent upon understanding the slower rhythms in one's life as well as those aspects of the social environment that are most likely to recur. To the degree that change itself becomes a major constant in people's lives, it is important for students to learn more about their own limits, to anticipate problems of adjustments and transmutation, and to be able to relate to other people struggling with the process of transition." (9)

This particular structure for education, these aims, have far reaching ramifications. The process of acquiring internal discipline has not necessarily been an end-product of traditional or contemporary American schooling. It has been a by-product, particularly in Jesuit schools and universities, but often at the cost of the flexibility required to cope with change. Learning For Tomorrow: The Role of the Future in Education, edited by Alvin Toffler, is a practical tool for implementing the above structure. It supplies some answers to important questions, such as "Why should I bring the future into my classroom?", "How can I use the future to reach my students?", "Is there really going to be time for a future?"

Whether or not we'll have time to effectively use the game of forecasting probable futures as a teaching/learning experience is irrelevant. The point is, to begin, and, having begun, to play. And in play to discover that you can forecast the destruction of the world, the end of the race, the disillusion of the universe, and can continue to forecast larger games in larger worlds where those words are very real and have no meaning. Since we can apparently put off but cannot avoid both individual and racial death, the only thing to do in the interim is simply to keep on living. To conjure futures, to play with probabilities, to keep on keeping on. To discover that we have the myth of Sisyphus all wrong. In truth, he spends eternity standing on Olympus playing with a yo-yo. There's nothing else for any of us to do.

"For in the light of what we know now in physical terms, it is not unreasonable to wager that deep down at the center 'I Myself' is 'It' -- as in 'as it was in the beginning, is now and ever shall be, world without end.'"

"If this is a hope... then it should be challenged and tested with the question, 'Why do you want to believe that? Is it because you are afraid of dying, of coming to an end? Is this identification with the cosmic Self the last desperate resort of your ego to continue its game? Indeed, if this Supreme Identity is, for me, a belief to which I am clinging, I am in total self-contradiction. Not only is there no sense in clinging to what I am; the very act of clinging implies that I do not really know that I am it! Such belief is merely doubt dressed up. The final meaning of negative theology, of knowing God by unknowing, of the abandonment of idols both sensible and conceptual, is that ultimate faith is not in or upon anything at all. It is complete letting go. Not only is it beyond theology; it is also beyond atheism and nihilism. Such letting go cannot be attained. It cannot be acquired or developed through perseverance and exercises, except insofar as such efforts prove the impossibility of acquiring it. Letting go comes only through desperation. When you know that it is beyond you -- beyond your powers of action as beyond your powers of relaxation. When you know that it is beyond you, when you give up every last trick and device for getting it, including this 'giving up' as something one might do, say, at ten o'clock tonight. That you cannot by any means do it -- that IS it! That is the mighty self-abandonment which gives birth to the stars." (10)

Documentations.

1. Timothy Leary, _The Politics of Ecstasy_, College Notes and Texts, New York, 1968, p. 286.

2. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, _Man's Place in Nature_, Harper and Row, New York, 1966, p. 72.

3. _Ibid_., pp. 62, 63.

4. _Ibid_., pp. 93, 94.

5. Timothy Leary, _op_. _cit_., p. 279.

6. Albert Einstein, _Ideas and Opinions_, Dell, New York, 1973, p. 347.

7. John Pfeiffer, _The Cell_, Time-Life Books, New York, 1970, p. 50.

8. Timothy Leary, _op_. _cit_., p. 286.

9. Alvin Toffler, ed., _Learning For Tomorrow: The Role of the Future in Education_, Vintage Books (Random House), New York, 1974, p. 293.

10. Alan Watts, _Beyond Theology: The Art of Godmanship_, Vintage Books (Random House), New York, 1973, pp. 221, 222.

CHAPTER 9.

AN INVESTIGATION CONCERNING THE NATURE OF MAN.

JULIAN ROTH.

Many analyses of the history of man's development reveal his constant struggle to solve the issues of relationships between the one and the many. This paper is yet another search for a resolution to this problem. In the process of formulating my beliefs in this investigation, I see them (my beliefs) as ranging from the idle ramblings of a neophyte student in philosophy, through the potentials of an experimentalist's plan of action, or a synthesis of several current philosophic theories, to a -- wouldn't it be nice if it were -- final resolution of man's greatest concern. I ask you to help me decide if my views are tenable, if the investigation should continue, what is left unanswered, and what the future direction of my search should be.

The study attempts to locate an explanation of the nature of man which will account for his apparent difficulty in solving the issue of the relationship between the me and the not-me, and, at the same time, offer a frame of reference from which man can accurately analyze himself and his universe. Man seems to be constantly struggling to determine his status as an individual and his status as a member of the human race. He searches for answers to questions that will give him guidance in determining his rights and privileges as an individual while, at the same time, trying to define the extent of his obligation to his contextual universe.

In most instances where a solution to this dilemma is sought, the basic assumption offered as a starting point proposes that the individual and society represent two separate distinct existent entities. The resolution must, of necessity, make one dominate the other, or assign certain absolute rights and obligations to the individual and other absolute rights to society, or hold that these rights are relative and seek some form of delicate balance between the two. As an example, we may recall the belief that man, by his very nature, has responsibilities to himself and his neighbor. Should a conflict situation arise in the execution of these responsibilities, he must use prudence to determine the correct value in a preexistent hierarchy of values to settle the controversy. In a very real sense, semantically but not ontologically conceived, it appears that the dualistic assumption causes the problem rather than provides for its solution.

Monistic theories have not had much better success. Generally, they seek to demonstrate that one, either the individual or society, is superior to the other. Consequently, they are in a continuous quandary as to why the superior one is in a constant struggle to maintain its superiority. Man the thesis, society the antithesis; society the thesis, man the antithesis with the synthesis emphasizing first one, then the other, typifies monistic viewpoints.

Current outcries against conformity and increasingly prevalent demands for attention to individuality highlight the need for a resolution of the problem. Man reels in perplexion! He calls for conformity and admires non-conformity. He wants to be different, but is unwilling or unable to tolerate differences. He advocates the value and importance of brotherhood, but, frequently acts to destroy it. Equality yes, equality no! Diversity yes, diversity no! Freedom yes, freedom no!

In my search for a solution to this all-important problem, I have summarily rejected all traditional concepts of the nature of man and will not present proof of their inadequacies at this time. I am, however, fully cognizant of the fact that future expansion of my position will require a detailed analysis of their failures. It is my belief that the traditional resolutions of this issue and the problems engendered thereby have been responsible for man's inability to identify the main focal point for the direction of his investigations. Or, stating it another way, man must free himself from traditional frames of reference before he can attack the basic question of the analysis of his nature.

Both the philosophies of Experimentalism and Existentialism repudiate traditional beliefs about the nature of man, each concluding with a new, but, generally held different and conflicting interpretation of man's real nature. It is in the combination or synthesis of these two positions that I believe we can find a workable solution to the alleged individual thesis social antithesis conflict. The goal of the combination is to demonstrate that the individual and society are not thesis and antithesis requiring a synthesis that leads to a new existent or that makes one dominate the other, but rather that each is no more than the face of a single coin. It is the context considered at any particular time and place alone that gives us a clue as to whether one side of the coin, the individual aspect of man, or the other side, the social aspect of man is more prominently displayed, or even, perhaps, if the coin is standing on end.

In common conversation, it is usually held that Existentialism is the philosophy of individualism and that Experimentalism is the philosophy of socialness. The former places greatest emphasis on the individual aspects of man's nature; the latter on the social aspects. Actually, the two philosophies account for both aspects to some degree, and, despite seeming differences of degree or kind, both philosophies agree that man is in a continuous state of development or a continuous state of becoming. For the Experimentalist, man becomes what he knows; for the Existentialist, man becomes what he chooses. If, then, we can locate common denominators at the concrete level of discourse for the highly abstract concepts of the Experimentalist's "knowing" and the Existentialist's "choosing," we should be able, at a minimum, to demonstrate that man creates himself in the knowing-choosing. And, go yet further, and demonstrate that in the knowing-choosing, man arrives at conclusions regarding what is himself and what is not himself, or, in the same process in which man creates himself, he creates his universe.

Before pursuing this line of investigation, however, an attempt will be made to resolve the ontological differences between experimentalism and existentialism. The ontological problem centers on the issue of the meaning of existence as prior to essence posited by the Existentialists and the undifferentiated continuum abstraction of the Experimentalists. What I choose to become, my essence and the essence of my universe, the Existentialist believes is selected from this prior to my choice existence that is nothingness until I have made my choice and, even then, all that I have not chosen still remains nothingness. What I know or what is the me and the not-me of my universe, the Experimentalist contends is wrought out of the prior undifferentiated continuum of experience which, also, in the realist sense, is nothing until the knowing process is completed and even then only what is known is something and the rest remains undifferentiated. Is there a common factor to be found in these apparent differences that will at once allow us to adequately account for each, to explain more fully the choosing-knowing process, and, thence, arrive at the originally indicated new description of the nature of man?

I believe that, in part, the common factor can be found by using Descartes' conclusion, _cogito_ _ergo_ _sum_, as a point of reference. Though we may reject other portions of Descartes' theory, it is recognizable that in the development of the process whereby he arrived at the conclusion, _I_ _think_, _therefore_ _I_ _am_, he did force us to identify the problem of the egocentric predicament. Should we choose to disregard the _think_ or _mind_ aspect of this situation and say no more than I am, we still are faced with the problem of trying to explain how we can possibly get out of the I, whatever it may be, mind, matter or X.

All of man's attempts to free himself from the bounds of the egocentric predicament produce the same end result: some form of assumption either logically or intuitively derived. Man has never been able to prove the existence of anything outside himself. He may desire to, and, on the basis of many types of logical arguments, arrive at the conclusion that others, or, at least other things, realistically exist. However, he can go no further logically or emotionally than to so choose.

If we accept the egocentric predicament as an ontological fact and do not continue with Descartes to reconstruct the external universe that he previously destroyed, we are logically forced to arrive at some form of subjectivistic position. Either to the conclusion that every object apprehended is created or constructed by a preexistent apprehender. Or, the belief that there is a knowing mind that cannot know an external world. Or, finally, to the solopsistic position that only the individual self exists.

Must either of these two general solutions, the assumption of something unprovable or subjectivism of one form or another, constitute the only possible end points in the investigation of the nature of man? What happens if we go one step further than Descartes and say, "True, I cannot, at my present stage -- once I am engaged in the doubting process -- doubt the existence of the thing doubting, but, does this prevent me from doubting the existence of the thing doubting prior to the start of the doubting process?" In other words, was there an existent I before the doubting process began that persisted during the process and that will remain after the process is concluded or was the I engaged in that activity created in the process, existent as long as the activity continued, and something entirely new and different with a change in activity?

It is my belief that the answer to this problem can be found in the analysis and synthesis of Dewey's concept of knowledge and the Existentialist's concept of choice and, that within the same context, we will be able to resolve the ontological differences between these two philosophies. Without making any effort, at this point, to expansively detail the process whereby he arrives at his conclusions, let us examine the results or end product of the process of obtaining knowledge as described by Dewey. "Knowledge," he says, "is knowledge of relationships." I find myself in a disturbing situation. I formulate plans of action, evaluate and predict possible consequences, choose a plan, act on it, and undergo the consequences. What I know as a result of this process, and all that I know, is the relationship between the plan that I chose to action and the consequences that resulted from my action. What has been described is what Dewey calls a completed experience -- doing and undergoing. There are two factors in this account that are important to the present discussion. The first is the time factor involved. The relationship that I know is only knowledge at a particular point in time. Certainly there may be later consequences that follow from this act, but, once I have acted again, I can never return to the time prior to my second act to prove the direct relationship between acting on my first plan of action and future consequences. I can never return to the point in time prior to the time that I acted!

The second factor concerns the nature of the products of this completed experience. Out of the analysis of this experiencing process comes the me and the not-me, the subject-object of this particular time-moment. Or, restated, at any time moment in which I act I create myself and my universe. I recognize that the I and its existence are sticky items here; clarification will follow a discussion of the Existentialist's concept of choice.

The Existentialist says that man is free, that he is absolute freedom and that beyond that he chooses. Man has existence before he gains essence, but, since existence is nothingness, man has no real a priori human nature until he makes choices. He chooses and by these choices he determines his own nature and the nature of his universe. He is only what he chooses to act on, not what he desires. In the process of acting on his choices he creates himself and his universe. Further, since existence is nothingness or him before he chooses, it can be concluded that, as far as man is concerned, the total process represents self-creation. Again, in Existentialism as in Experimentalism, the time factor is important to our discussion. Once the choice-action has been accomplished, I can never return to exactly the same me-universe that existed for me before the choice action occurred. In the process of acting on my choice a new me and a new universe are created.

The commonality between these two philosophies as they have been so briefly presented is the concept of time. The time concept bears further examination. What is meant when the terms past, present, and future are used in these philosophies? What is past experience? In what manner can we discuss the issue of past choices? From the Experimentalists we learn that, in the process of doing and undergoing, there is created a new me and a new not-me. If this is accepted as fact, then, it must be concluded that the past can be nothing more than the new me's reflective analysis of the present. All that he (the new-me) can really say is that his conclusions about the past are what he now -- in the present -- chooses to believe. It is impossible for him to ever return to the past to verify these conclusions! He also tells us that the future is no more than hypothesis; that it is impossible for him to do any more than predict what it will be. He cannot know it until he has acted.

The Existentialist leaves us the same set of conclusions. Once I have acted on my choices, I can never return in time to the essence that was before because in the choice-action I create new essences, a new me, and a new universe. I may choose what I hypothesize is the past, but, in reality, it is no longer past, but future. The future, too, is not knowable until I have acted. My desires do not determine what will be. What becomes is what I act on!

Modern scientific theory is consonant with this data. Such theory posits the belief that it is not possible for man to ever locate the starting point or absolute zero point of any system under examination, and, further, that there is no way that man can separate himself from the system that he is measuring. Thus support is given to the only conclusion which I am able to draw -- man can never have genuine knowledge of anything more than his concept of the immediate present. In his analysis of this present, he may assign certain factors a past classification and others a future classification; however, these beliefs, hypotheses, or predications about the past and the future have no status except as classification constructs.

We are left, then, with two basic items which require further explanation. What is the nature of the present and what is the meaning or nature of the I that does the choosing-knowing-creating? Can the present be anything more for me than what I now conceive it to be? If I can do no more than hypothesize about the past and the future, if I cannot know where the present came from or where the future will go, can I say any more than that the present is also my creation?

I can now offer my belief that Dewey's undifferentiated continuum and Sartre's existence as nothingness represent their concepts of the underlying basis of the present. The undifferentiated continuum and existence prior to essence depict their concepts of the from whence the present that they construct originated. They are the same in that they can only be choices of belief, and in the fact that both contend that their hypotheses are meaningless until acted upon. They are different only in the descriptions that each gives to his construct. Traditional constructs positing reality as existent have the same status. They represent the choices that some men make to explain the source of the present.

There is one additional phase of this concept of the present that requires further elaboration. It involves a question concerning the experimentalist's "knowing" and the existentialist's "choosing" constructs and their relatedness to the possibilities of the analysis of the present. If it is agreed that all that I can have any awareness of at any particular time-moment is my present as I construct or conceive it to be, then, is there any way that I can demonstrate it to be a result of a doing-undergoing or a choosing process? I must answer *no*. Neither of these views can be more than theories selected from an analysis of the present designed to explain the process whereby it arrived at the currently analyzed state. The theories, by their very nature, prevent their own proof because they are *becoming* theories -- what is me now cannot possibly return to the me of the past, except through retrospective analysis of the present, to prove the process. The conclusions that I draw to demonstrate the developmental process explaining the me-universe that I now hold constitutes an hypothesis based on my analysis of its current status. Process must then also be my creation. We may add parenthetically the belief that even the static theories concerning the origin of man and the universe fall into the same category; however, I reserve proof of this contention to some future time.

We are now in a position to return to the second item in this presentation still in need of explanation -- the meaning of the term I. How can the *I* in the statement, "I create me and my universe be explained? Must it be a given order to establish the position being developed or is there another alternative? The starting point for this investigation can be found in Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum* if it is examined in the light of the previously described concept of time as a factor of analysis.

It is with the conclusion of the existence of the *I*, or if you will, of thought that we can disagree. Descartes analyzed his concepts of the present and concluded, I am, assuming that this also explained, I was, and I am always going to be, without recognizing, or at least, indicating recognition of the fact that *I was* is nothing more than an hypothesis about what may have been and that *I am going to be* is nothing more than speculation about what may become: both inferences based on his analysis of what he created as his present. He did not prove his existence. All that he actually did as a result of his analysis was to arrive at a classification construct of what he believed to be himself and what he believed to be not himself. What he did with the not himself is now unimportant.

Further light may be shed on this problem by borrowing the phrase "it experiences" from Dewey as elaborated by Thomas with the phrase "it is raining." The it here is an expletive indicating that something is happening without a now distinguishable subject or object. If we conclude that the something, as yet not distinguishable into subject or object, going on is a phrase describing the analysis of the present, then the I in the statement, I create me and my universe in the process of analyzing the present that is itself being simultaneously created, is equivalent to and has no more existence than the expletive it in "it is raining." The I, it, process, present, analysis, and me-universe are all constructs. What and if they are before they are constructed is impossible to demonstrate.

How, then, are such philosophical concepts as existence, essence, static, change, changing, and unchanging explained? It must be answered that these terms represent a series of viewpoints usable in the analytic process to describe the choices that I make in the delineation of my me-universe construct. The terms emotional and rational, frequently used as points of conflict between experimentalism and existentialism in relation to the choosing-knowing endeavor hold a similar status. They are use constructs effective to describe varying degrees of analysis and certainly upon which I believe I would like to act in dealing with the present or predicting the future.

In summary, the me-universe represents all that is, at any time-moment of analysis. Whatever else may be, was, or will be cannot be known. All that any man can choose-know about himself and his universe is himself and his universe. He is free to deal with both as he chooses because both are his creations. If there are any other existents outside me-universe they are unknowable to me and, thence, are not forces of influence in me-universe choices.

What conclusions can now be drawn regarding the issue of the relationship between the individual and society? The me-universe construct proposed here leads to the conclusion that individual and society are differentiating designators analytically, but not existentially, valid. It further follows that the relationship between the me-not-me of me-universe is, at any particular point in time, a result of my analysis of my creation. In other words, what is and all that is, was, or can be must be what I make it. There is no way of accounting for anything else. What I am as an individual and what I am as a social being I decide, I make, I am responsible for. Not responsible for in the moral good-bad sense, but responsible for in the creative sense. What I do with what I create, the relationships that I establish are my choices.

CHAPTER 10.

THE YESHOV METHOD.

WILLIAM F. O'NEILL.

One of the most fascinating educational experiments of our era -- certainly one that has vast and significant implications for educational theory and practice -- has been the attempt on the part of both the Soviet and Chinese communists to bring about significant modifications in personal identity by means of "thought reform." Ever since the massive American involvement in Korea during the early fifties in which large numbers of prisoners-of-war were subjected to systematic ideological reeducation by their Chinese captors, a steady torrent of newspaper studies, magazine articles, scientific reports and books has sought to determine the true nature and effectiveness of Communist "brainwashing" practices. What makes these conversion attempts particularly fascinating is that they are implicitly, if unintentionally, rooted in some extremely sophisticated philosophical and psychological assumptions about the nature of learning, belief and personal identity. Thought reform frequently tends to resemble a perverse sort of pragmatism in which behavior is expected to evolve naturally out of action but in which the learning situation is carefully prestructured in order to permit only the proper sort of action and therefore the proper sort of learning to occur. Of the various techniques used in thought reform one of the most fascinating because of its extreme indirection and subtlety is the so-called Yeshov method.

The Yeshov method, as originally conceived, was a method of interrogation developed by the NKVD during the era of the Soviet purge trials of the thirties when Yeshov served as the Commissar for Internal Affairs. The method was largely abandoned in the Soviet Union under Yeshov's successor Beria (1) but it has taken on substantially new importance under the Chinese. During the Yeshov period in the Soviet Union, the method itself consisted, in the words of Beck and Godin

". . .of making it the arrested man's primary task to build up the whole case against himself, more or less with his own inventive powers. Every arrested man had not only to invent his own 'legend' but at the same time to do his utmost to make it plausible in every detail, relating it to actual events or giving them the desired twist. . . .The grotesque result of this was that the accused strained every nerve to convince their examining magistrates that their invented legends were true and represented the most serious political crimes possible, so that the story should not be rejected as too improbable or insignificant. If they were rejected, it meant only a continuation of the interrogation until the legend was altered or replaced by a new one involving a sufficiently serious political crime." (2)

In a more general sense, the method itself -- and particularly as it has been adapted or reinvented by the Chinese -- can be broken down into three major phases: an accusation phase, a confession phase and a phase of "reconstructed confession."

The Yeshov method commences when the prisoner is charged with being guilty of some offense against the state. The accusation itself is left purposefully vague. In many cases, the individual is simply accused of undefined treason or some unspecified sort of conspiracy. Generally, the charge is left more or less "open" or ambiguous. The implication is that the prisoner, being guilty, obviously knows "why" he is guilty and that, by withholding information about the exact nature of his crimes or, at the very least, by withholding verbal confirmation of guilty acts of which the authorities are already (ostensibly) fully informed, he simply compounds his guilt by refusing to cooperate with the authorities.

At the same time that the prisoner is charged with vague crimes, he is subjected to intense physical and psychological pressures to confess and to repent. The situation can generally be summarized as follows: The prisoner is accused of unspecified crimes by an omnipotent state; he becomes, in effect, guilty by definition. He is punished for these crimes and is, at the same time, led to understand that such punishment can be alleviated and ultimately even eliminated only on condition that he (a) confess his guilt, (b) identify his crimes, (c) repent and (d) seek some sort of appropriate atonement as recompense for his previous criminal activities.

In effect, then, the prisoner is subjected to extreme duress for failing to confess to what are in many instances purely imaginary or, at the very least, unrecognized acts. If such stress continues for a sufficient period of time, two results ordinarily occur: (a) The prisoner develops a need to be guilty. (He begins, in effect, to require guilt as an instrumental-value, as a means of alleviating situational punishment.) (b) He develops a corresponding need to discover some appropriate sort of crime which can serve as an effective explanation (or justification) for such guilt.

Ultimately, then, the prisoner is faced with a peculiar dilemma. He can escape from anxiety only by translating this anxiety into objective (factual) terms which are relevant to the situation at hand. He is, however, faced with a situation in which such anxiety can only be lessened on condition that it be identified as an expression of guilt and properly associated with some appropriate sort of criminal act. In essence, the prisoner is faced with not one but three problems.

His first problem is whether or not to make a formal admission of guilt. Since this is a precondition for any sort of subsequent adjustment within the brainwashing situation, the prisoner is ordinarily constrained to make this initial concession and typically submits _pro forma_ to certain vague crimes against the State. In so doing, however, he assumes the _fact_ of his guilt as a sort of working-hypothesis which is required to guarantee survival within a very difficult situation.

Having conceded his "guilt," the prisoner is now faced with the second and far more rigorous problem of _defining_ his guilt -- of identifying the exact nature and extent of his crimes. This entails two basic subproblems: (a) specifying the crimes, and (b) establishing that he accepts such acts are "crimes" by "proving," i.e., explaining why such crimes are blameworthy to begin with and why he is therefore objectively "guilty" of having committed them.

The advantage of such an indirect attack lies in the fact that the prisoner is forced not only to _indict_ himself but to be his own _prosecutor_ as well. As in therapy and as Dollard and Miller state:

"An advantage of a skillful question over a direct assertion is that it forces the patient to respond by thinking and seeing relationships for himself. Thus he is less likely to learn to listen and more likely to learn to think. The ultimate goal. . .is for the patient to ask the right questions for himself." (3)

In the Yeshov method, there is no way the prisoner can avoid involvement. "In totalitarian dictatorships," states E. V. Walter, "one of the postural insignia is the mask of enthusiasm. Because silent obedience is an uncertain quality, the citizen body is denied the right of silence." (4) If he refuses to participate, he faces extreme and categorical punishment. If he cooperates, he continues to be punished, but such punishment becomes selective and more or less predictable because it is directed toward only specific responses.

The third and final problem the prisoner is faced with in the Yeshov method is that of establishing his repentance. Again, however, this procedure entails two distinct steps: (a) making a formal (verbal) declaration of repentance, and (b) demonstrating informal (nonverbal) signs of sincerity which corroborate and verify such declarations. This latter phase of the repentance process is particularly significant, for the Communists are not content with formal expressions of regret. They demand that such expressions be reinforced by other aspects of the individual's expressive behavior as well. Such cues, as Walter suggests, act as an "internal network of alarms designed to reveal subjective disobedience. Ritual actions with little apparent objective meaning function as postural insignia, screening out and isolating intractable superegos." (5)

The outward and informal signs of such inward grace naturally vary. They extend beyond specific content, however, to encompass such things as the degree of interaction (i.e., the amount of participation in the study group), the degree of enthusiasm demonstrated, the internal consistency of statements made, the pertinence and significance of points brought up in discussion, and so on. In a similar sense, the authorities may direct their attention to the degree of congruency demonstrated between verbal behavior and such nonverbal behavior as posture, vocal inflections and observed attentiveness. As one of Lifton's informants who was subjected to systematic thought reform by the Chinese Communists observed:

". . .they keep a record, and after one week if you are not saying anything, they tell you you are resisting your reeducation. . . .If you think out five or six problems it is a good manifestation; you are progressing because you like to discuss your imperialist thoughts. This is necessary, because if you don't get rid of these thoughts, you can't put in new ones." (6)

Or, as Lifton notes of still another prisoner, a Catholic priest who was interned by the Chinese, when he

". . .was too quiet and did not produce enough "wrong thoughts," he was criticized for not being "sincere" -- for not taking an active enough part in thought reform. When his views showed the slightest deviation from Communist orthodoxy, he was told that he was "too subjective," "individualistic," that he retained "imperialist attitudes." When it was felt that he was not wholeheartedly involved in his reform -- but was merely going through the motions -- he was accused of "spreading a smoke screen," "windowdressing," "finding a loophole," or "failing to combine theory with practice." (7)

In many respects, then, the Yeshov method functions like an aberrant sort of client-centered therapy conducted under conditions of extreme duress. Ultimately, the individual finds himself, like Kafka's Joseph K, not only accused of undisclosed crimes, but in imminent danger of succumbing to his own gnawing sense of guilt. Gradually, he is led to understand that he can reduce his anxiety only by accepting the situational-definition of himself as guilty. Once he has accepted this definition, however, his guilt tends to become self-confirming, not only because it is continuously reinforced, but also because it leads to a new sort of guilt which arises out of his own self-betrayal. Again, and as Lifton indicates:

"The prisoner finds an every-expanding part of himself falling into dishonor in his own eyes. . . .At this point the prisoner faces the most dangerous part of thought reform. He experiences guilt and shame much more profound and much more threatening to his inner integrity than any experience in relation to previous psychological steps. He is confronted with his human limitations, with the contrast between what he is and what he would be. His emotion may be called true or genuine guilt, or true shame -- or existential guilt -- to distinguish it from less profound and more synthetic forms of inner experience. He undergoes a self-exposure which is on the border of guilt and shame. . . .The realignment of affirmation and negation within one identity requires an endless repetition, a continuous application of self to the doctrine -- and indeed, this is the essence of reeducation. The prisoner must, like a man under special psychological treatment, analyze the causes of his deficiency, work through his resistances (or "thought problems") until he thinks and feels in terms of the doctrinal truths to which all of life is reduced. . . .as his reeducation proceeds, he finds himself first announcing, and then experiencing, the refashioned identity which is emerging. His sense of nakedness and vulnerability nourished the growth of the "new man." (8)

In the final analysis, the individual's only effective "self"-defense resides in a rejection of his original self-identity. Necessarily, he begins to "meditate on his crimes." Gradually he perceives that his only recourse is to become an active collaborator in his own self-denigration, to confabulate whatever crimes are necessary in order to establish and "justify" his guilt. As a result, his basic problem becomes primarily that of discovering relevant cues, creditable information which can be used as a guide in contriving the sort of confession which the situation demands. Such cues are forthcoming, not only by means of "suggestive interrogation" (9) but within the continuing group-study sessions themselves.

Gradually, then, a "creative," pedagogical confession begins to emerge. The prisoner's ". . .compulsion to confess dedicates him to the task of continuously carving out and refilling his own inner void -- under the active supervision and broad moral guidance of his captors." (10) "By adopting the 'peoples' standpoint," notes Lifton, "he channels non-specific feelings of guilt into a paranoid, pseudo-logical system. His sense of evil, formerly vague and free-floating, is now made to do specific work for reform." (11) Through the continuous effects of selective reinforcement within a totally controlled learning situation, in short, a combination of emitted and elicited behavior is gradually "shaped" to approximate the kind of self which is required.

Advantages of the Yeshov Method. The advantages of the Yeshov method from the point of view of the thought reformers are various, but several are particularly worth noting.

To begin with, the Yeshov method makes conversion a matter of self-interest. The individual is forced to collaborate in his own self-subversion, to conspire actively against himself. Self-criticism becomes, in effect, the sole solution to the problem of external duress. In such a situation, as in the mental institutions studied by Goffman

> ". . .for the patient to express hatred of the system is to give evidence that his place in it is justified and that he is not yet ready to leave it. A systematic confusion between obedience to others and one's own personal adjustment is sponsored." (12)

In addition, the Yeshov method expedites learning in a number of ways. For one thing, it encourages a maximum degree of both attention and active behavioral involvement, each prerequisite for any sort of effective learning. In William James' memorable words, "No reception without reaction, no impression without correlative expression." (13) It also guarantees that a maximum degree of learning will be self-motivated, subjectively relevant and "problem-centered." In all of these ways, it acts to maximize not only the assimilation but also the retention and transfer of knowledge. A related advantage stems from the fact that it roots theory in practice, and practice in theory. In so doing, it compels a fuller understanding of ideology, demanding not only that the ideas learned be applied to actual policies and practices but that policies and practices in turn be fully explicable in terms of overall ideological considerations. In all of these ways, the Yeshov method capitalizes fully on "the logic of the psychologic."

This method is particularly appropriate when applied to the modification of personal values, because the changes incurred are founded upon the basic psychodynamics which underlie all human behavior and which therefore work regardless of differences in personal values and even in the absence of pre-existing feelings of guilt.

One of the things which make this method of creating and exacerbating guilt-feelings so exceedingly effective is the fact that it ordinarily works whether the victim is originally guilty or not. The extraordinary thing about it is not only that it creates a situation in which the prisoner's only effective response is the admission of real guilt but that it can create such guilt even where it did not originally exist. The only way the prisoner can prove his innocence is by proving his ability to comprehend and identify his own guilt, a process which entails the most arduous sort of introspective self-analysis. As Herriot C. Mills suggests,

> ". . .parroting theory or the official line is not enough. Nor is mere intellectual acknowledgement of the reasonableness of the stipulated position sufficient. The important thing is to apply correct theory so as to discredit one's previous incorrect conceptions so thoroughly in one's own eyes that one gladly discards them and accepts the new. It is not sufficient for one to come to the genuine intellectual position that landlords, one's father or friend, perhaps, were bad. This proves unresolved sympathy for the old order." (14)

Finally, effectively handled, such an approach results, not only in a commitment to a significantly new pattern of specific beliefs, but, more importantly, in a prepotent and self-sustaining dedication to a continuous process of ideological self-psychoanalysis. Again, the situation is analogous to what occurs in therapy.

> "The person stops to think instead of rushing into action. He attempts to see where blocks in association point and to decode dreams. He tries to trace vague anxieties to specific problem areas. He tests his reasoning for inconsistencies. He searches for missing units in his verbal series. In the privacy of his own mind, he will attempt to label irrational emotional responses which he is making to persons in his real life. He will try at least to be clear with himself when he is at fault. He wants to act reasonably and therefore he must identify his unreasonable behavior." (15)

Once a person has emerged from the Yeshov treatment, he is totally ideological. He not only acts in an ideologically "correct" way, he reflects in the ideologically appropriate way before he acts, and he is also given to reflecting upon and therefore criticizing himself on the *basis of interiorized ideological standards*. He is both consciously and *self*-consciously Communist. It is not only the habits developed in self-criticism but, perhaps more importantly, the *habit of self-criticism itself* which transfers over to apply beyond the specific thought-reform situation. The aim of brainwashing is not merely a certain type of knowledge but, far more significant, a certain type of personality. As Bauer comments:

"The process whereby the individual shapes his own character is known in Soviet literature as "self-training." Soviet psychologists have not been entirely clear about just when self-training begins, just as they have not been completely explicit about when the individual becomes "responsible" for his environment. Development of self-training is apparently a continuous process with small beginnings. "In the process of development there are gradually *created new internal conditions for self-development*."

"Self-training" becomes an effective source as the individual develops ideals, a definite image of the course of life along which he will guide himself. It is for this reason that ideology and "Communist morality" plays a larger part in Soviet education. The individual is instructed to aid in molding himself to such a life ideal by giving himself self-encouragement, and particularly by constant practice of those traits of character which he is striving to develop in himself." (16)

As Lifton notes with respect to prisoners who are subjected to thought reform by the Chinese Communists

". . .it is not Communist doctrine per se which mattered, but rather the use of Communist doctrine and its reasoning techniques to broaden the prisoners' self-exposure. . . [For these prisoners] it was no longer enough to admit guilt, to feel guilty, or even to recognize specific guilty actions. The prisoner had to extend his self-condemnation to every aspect of his being, and learn to see his life as a series of shameful and evil acts -- shameful and evil not only in their possible opposition to Communism, but also because they violated his own cherished ideals." (17)

The Subjectification of Truth. Ironically, the individual undergoes a total "subjectification of truth" in the Yeshov method. By external (noninstitutional) standards he may be said to "lose his mind," to become a victim of weird delusions. In terms of his previous sense of reality, he begins to believe that which is *not* true and to doubt that which *is*. As Meerloo states:

"Where thinking is isolated from free exchange with others' minds and can no longer expand, delusion may follow. Whenever ideas are compartmentalized, behind and between curtains, the process of continual alert confrontation of facts and reality is hampered. The system freezes, becomes rigid, and dies of delusion." (18)

But what do we mean by "delusion," by "truth?" The fact is that we frequently tend to overlook a very basic point. In a total institution, truth exists only in context; reality is situational. What is objective or "real" by external standards -- because it works according to noninstitutional rules -- may be viewed in an entirely different way in a totally self-contained world in which no external criticism is permissible.

How long, it may well be asked, can anyone's "external perspective" be reasonably expected to endure in the absence of corroborating evidence and reinforcing consequences? As sociologist Erving Goffman indicates, even the "perception of losing one's mind is based on culturally-derived and socially-ingrained stereotypes as to the significance of symptoms such as hearing voices, losing temporal and spatial orientation, and sensing that one is being followed. . ." (19) In a similar sense, and as psychologists Dollard and Miller state:

". . .we have reason to believe that children receive special training in discriminating between the 'make believe' and the real, in perceiving accurately, and in responding to external cues rather than to images when the two are in conflict. If this is indeed learned, it should be unlearned when the balance of reinforcements is radically changed. Whenever paying attention to external cues is consistently painful so that the subject is reinforced by a reduction in fear of some other strong drive every time he shifts his attention from the external to the internal response-produced cues, he should learn to pay attention to the latter. Such learning would predispose him to hallucinations. It should be noted, however, that for the members of our society, the drive aroused by paying attention to external cues will have to be exceedingly strong; otherwise its reduction will be more than counteracted by the strong anxiety aroused by seeing and hearing things that logically should not be there and that others report are not there."

"It is interesting to note that in other societies where the social training is less against and more for reporting hallucinations they seem to occur much more frequently." (20)

What, in the final analysis, then, is our much-vaunted sense of reality but an internalized symbolic representation of the general meanings which inhere within the daily presentations of the everyday environment?

The fact is that the usual sort of "objectivity" frequently does not work in the total environment of thought reform and is therefore "objectively false" in two respects. First, it is not supported by the evidence of others. Secondly, it does not provide an effective basis for the solution of existing problems.

In this respect, the seemingly heartfelt and sincere confessions offered by some of the prominent "old Communists" who were purged in the Soviet trials of the thirties is not terribly remarkable despite the fact that they were not objectively guilty of the crimes of which they were accused. What tends to be overlooked, and as Leites and Bernault indicate in their book The Ritual of Liquidation (1954), (21) is the fact that these men owed their primary allegiance to the ideological faith of Communism and that, in terms of such a faith, they could actually serve their religion (and themselves) far more effectively by an act of final confession -- albeit false -- than by any proclamation of innocence. In what was ostensibly a final act of self-abnegation, they actually reaffirmed the meaning inherent in their own lives by choosing to die as an ideological sacrifice to their own prepotent sense of political-identity. In so doing, they made the quite proper choice of "public good" (which encompasses personal good in such cases of ideological-identity) over the illusory "bourgeois" goal of "privatistic innocence." As Schein suggests, these public false confessions are perhaps best understood "as a final act in . . .the service of the party and the symbolic reidentification [with the party] which this act. . .signified." (22) "To judge the government to which one has devoted one's whole life as wrong makes a mockery out of one's own past. It is easier to see oneself as wrong and to reaffirm the system." (23)

For the true believer, in short, damnation can also be a sort of self-verification. The whole situation is oddly reminiscent of Alice in Wonderland.

"When I use the word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master -- that's all."

Documentations.

1. F. Beck and W. Godin, Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession. Translated from the original German by Eric Mosbacher and David Porter. (New York: Viking Press, 1961), p. 116.

2. Ibid., pp. 43-4.

3. John Dollard and Neal Miller, Personality and Psychotherapy: An Analysis In Terms of Learning, Thinking and Culture. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 397.

4. E. V. Walter, "The Politics of Decivilization," in Maurice R. Stein, Arthur J. Vidich and David Manning White (eds.), Identity and Anxiety: Survival of the Person in Mass Society. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), p. 303.

5. Ibid.

6. Robert J. Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of Brainwashing in China. (New York: W. W. Norton Co., Inc., 1963), p. 29.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., pp. 78-9.

9. Edward Hunter, Brainwashing: The Story of the Men Who Defied It. (New York: Pyramid, 1956), p. 69.

10. Lifton, op. cit., p. 75.

11. Ibid.

12. Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1961), p. 385.

13. William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology; and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1958), p. 39.

14. Herriot C. Mills, "Thought Reform, Ideological Remolding in China," in Eric and Mary Josephson, *Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society*. (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962), p. 550.

15. Dollard and Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

16. Raymond A. Bauer, *The New Man in Soviet Psychology*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 149.

17. Lifton, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

18. Joost von Meerloo, *The Rape of the Mind: The Psychology of Thought Control, Menticide, and Brainwashing*. (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1961), p. 27.

19. Goffman, *op. cit.*

20. Dollard and Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-1.

21. Nathan Lites and Elsa Bernault, *The Ritual of Liquidation*. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954).

22. Edgar Schein, with Inge Schneier and Curtis H. Barker, *Coercive Persuasion: A Socio-Psychological Analysis of the "Brainwashing" of American Civilian Prisoners by the Chinese Communists*. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1961), p. 100.

23. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 11.

DICHOTOMOUS TYPOLOGIES AND DEVELOPMENT.

JAMES L. JARRETT.

Public speakers and essay writers are fond -- overly fond -- of the formula: "There are two types of people. . ." Inevitably some wag came to comment: There are two types of people, those who do and those who don't say, "There are two types of people." Typically the distinction is an invidious one, usually ethnocentric in nature. There are them and there are us. The ancient Greeks very naturally lumped all the non-Greek speaking people into one undifferentiated class, the babblers, so that there were Greeks and there were Barbarians. (And doubtless there were very sincere Greeks who protested, "You mustn't think there is anything *wrong* with being a barbarian; they're just *different*.") If the Hebrews thought of themselves as the Chosen People, it followed that other peoples had failed to be chosen, and since the ways of God are inscrutable, who is to say whether the choice was deserved? Still, there it is and besides, the chosen bear a heavy burden. Moslems and Infidels, Saints and Sinners, the Saved and the Damned, Freemen and Slaves, Civilized and Savage, Highlanders and Lowlanders, Islanders and Outlanders, People of the City and People of the Country, Patricians and Plebeians, White and Colored, the Big-enders and the Little-enders. Doubtless one of the oldest and most basic of these dichotomies was the one first made famous by Plato when in the *Republic*, it was noted that talk about the state or city is misleading, for every city is two cities, the city of the rich and the city of the poor. (423) And typically the groups are very uneven in size and number. There are the Happy Few, the Leaders (actual or potential), and there are the Many, the Masses, the Followers, the Hewers of Wood and the Drawers of Water.

In societies where egalitarianism has become a part of the prevailing ideology, efforts have to be made to soften the invidiousness of the distinction. One must no longer speak of Upper Classes and Lower Classes, but there is the more recent distinction based on language habits between U and Non-U.

And so on -- for there is an indefinitely large number of such distinctions. However, let us here single out a very few influential ones for a little amplification.

One imagines that in primitive societies the basic dichotomous categories must have been male/female, young/old, powerful/weak. At a basic survival level, physical power -- the ability to hit, lift, pull, throw, and run (which early become the basic skills in athletic games too) -- is naturally esteemed while its absence is regretted and despised. But it must have been early in man's history when the powers associated with hiding, stalking, luring, tricking, planning, noting patterns, and persuading were also acknowledged and rewarded. It is good to have on your side not only the giant Aias of bulging muscle and thick skin, but also the wily Odysseus, skilled in diplomacy. And with the sophisticating of group effort, the deviser of the hunt, the general, the pilot and guide, the employer of winged words, the interpreter of signs from nature, gods, and me easily outstripped in honor and fame those whose power was merely brutish. And, of course, with the proliferation of machines, physical strength came largely to be an aesthetic matter, except in so far as it signified an ability to survive the onslaughts of accident and disease. So in our own day, the great question about boy or man is as to whether he is intelligent. (Perhaps no change is more important than the shift of values, among females, from physical attractiveness (rather than strength) to intelligence.)

The sorting out, the recognitions, the classifications begin in infancy! The mother notes the alertness of the child's look, and his ability to recognize the objects and persons of his milieu, and delights in the earliness of his first words -- or worries if these seem a little slow in coming. And of course schools -- or so it sometimes seems -- revolve entirely around the distinction between the fast and the slow, the bright and the dim, the intelligent and the stupid (though this word is so devastatingly negative as to be used only whisperingly), those who have the appropriate and requisite knowledge and the ignorant.

But with the rise in the importance of intellectual acumen, it is only natural that there should be an immense intellectual effort expended on understanding it, at least with respect to the means of recognizing and rewarding it; and therefore it became essential to go beyond such global categories as bright and dull: the question was where exactly is the dividing line and how can finer gradations on either side be made. As everyone knows, the answer came with the invention of a relation, a ratio between chronological age and mental age: the intelligence quotient. Mental age, it was discovered, could be assigned with quite an impressive degree of reliability (defined as the agreement among different instances of assessment) by administering tests in which pupils were asked to solve problems, mainly verbal and arithmetical, of various degrees of complexity. The tests put emphasis upon problem solving-skills not highly reliant upon knowledge, except vocabulary. And very quickly after such activity began it was found possible to "standardize" the results and plot curves of normal distribution. Then by assigning the number 100 to the middle point in the bell-shaped curve, it was easy enough to assign numbers to other points, and behold every schoolchild was thus discovered to have an I.Q., even before testing.

It cannot be denied that this device was one very useful for teachers. For instance, it often saved them the trouble of "knocking themselves out" over a child whose I.Q. plainly showed that he was just not going to profit from the effort. High I.Q.'s not only confirmed teachers' hunches, but sometimes showed them an ability that had remained latent, and which therefore challenged their best efforts to motivate, to overcome blocks and inhibitions, to try new imaginative approaches in their teaching.

But as we all know, there has come about in the last few years a strong, negative reaction to intelligence testing and intelligence typing. In part -- perhaps even mainly -- this has reflected a rejection of the assumption that each person has a determinate, innate, and fixed intelligence, a quality or power that is inherited and thus unamendable to modification. Behavioral scientists by and large have, on the contrary, tended to embrace the Lockeian tabula rasa theory of the human infant -- but carrying it well beyond Locke's own beliefs -- such that whatever anyone is he has become as a result of environmental causes, dietary, climatic, economic, educational, etc. Man is made by his society: so the dictum of the sociologist runs. The anthropologist says, Say, rather, Culture. And the psychologist normally puts the emphasis upon learning, which in turn is said to be a matter of conditioning: therefore, an I.Q., however good a predictor it be, for instance of academic success, is inevitably a measure of achievement, at least in part. And even if there are aspects of intelligence that are passed along in the genes, heredity is so inextricably intertwined with environmental influence, that it is simply mischievous to pretend to distinguish them. (Pace, Arthur Jensen)

Theoretically -- the academic psychologists may continue -- it would be interesting, if possible, to devise a test that measures innate intelligence, but practically this turns out to be impossible. Furthermore, the sociologist chimes in, tests are inevitably culturally biased and so discriminate against any persons or groups imperfectly enculturated.

The controversy around these points has become enormous, and continues almost unabated. However, our interests are in two other sorts of reactions to the I.Q. The first represents an objection to equating intelligence in general (the "g" factor of the testers) with what might better be called a kind of intelligence. The point can be made by analogizing from the concept "strength." It is no doubt easy enough to determine the weight-lifting ability of each individual, requiring little more than agreement about the kind of lift that will be employed and the sort of object that will, in varying weights, be lifted. But now suppose it is proposed to speak of this ability as one's strength, so that if I can lift 150 pounds, then that number is the index of my strength. Pretty evidently, many persons would respond in somewhat the following fashion, "You can, of course, stipulate that that is what you will mean by 'strength,' but you can scarcely legislate such usage, since in fact ordinary usage is much broader; hence it is well known among physical educators that a champion weight lifter is my no means necessarily also a champion boxer or wrestler or rope puller (as in tug-of-war); or more precisely, lifting is a specific ability alongside other specific abilities like hitting, pulling, twisting, to say nothing of the ability to endure hitting and other forms of punishment. Yet these are also strengths, or say, rather, kinds of strength. Some might have very high positive correlation with weight-lifting strength, but none of them has perfect and some have relatively low correlation. Therefore, it is misleading to identify strength, in general with weight-lifting strength."

The fact that many tests of intellectual or academic ability now reveal both a quantitative factor and a verbal factor, with fairly wide discrepancy between the new not uncommon (the correlation has been found to be), already shows a move away from intelligence-in-general. But a number of specific factors have been shown by Guilford and his followers to be sufficiently low in correlation to warrant listing as "independent" factors, and yet each of them may be, without strain, called a kind of intelligence.

But without following out the various moves in this debate, there does seem to be some justification for using the word "intelligence" to mean something like "acumen or skill with respect to any of a range of human acts or functions." Thus, a person could be called intelligent (with or without a more precise specification of degree) verbally, numerically, spatially, mechanically, socially, and in other ways. But for many this is much too loose.

I will return to the matter of kinds of intelligence when I come to the whole matter of the principal functions of the self, but meantime I turn to a closely related objection to emphasis upon I.Q.

Thorndike made famous his claim that anything that exists at all exists in a certain degree or amount -- thereby spurring psychology on to a heavier infusion of statistical control and to a stronger attempt to weigh and measure human behavior. No one could seriously deny that academic psychology and derivatively educational theory and practice today are heavily quantitative. From beginning to end of the process of schooling, pupils -- and to some degree, teachers -- are measured with respect to ability and achievement, of many kinds. In the properly run school, every pupil exists not only (perhaps not even often) three-dimensionally, but two-dimensionally, in a "profile," such that various aspects of his personality can be compared with his fellows and with norms, at a glance. Now, since vagueness in all sorts of description and evaluation is obviously a grievous fault, any valid correction by a number (position on a scale, etc.) is to be welcomed. But the trouble, or rather *a* trouble, is that, in Whitehead's words, so often the "exactness is a fake." Thus, the original assignment of a number (say) may be itself on the very shakiest of grounds, an impressionistic judgment, for instance, or a dubious assumption of connectivity, as when ability to recall multiple digits might be taken to signify arithmetic ability; yet, all this may of course be forgotten in the presence of the number itself, which often has the fascination of a reptilian eye.

Thus, I posit a new corruption of Gresham's Law. Numbered things tend to drive unnumbered things out of the attention. The college applicant with a combined SAT of 1400, the senior with a grade point average of 3.6, the graduate with an upper-second degree, the completion of 36 units beyond the B.A., the achievement of a score in Economics two sigmas above the mean -- the definiteness and seeming authoritativeness of these specifications makes them eye-catching, memorable, and in many contexts, compelling, even to one who is uninformed as to the basis of the assignment of the number, or, *mirabile dictu!* to the one who is genuinely skeptical about the instrument of measurement.

But worst of all is the next step: the identification of the person with the measurement, the number, the position on the scale. Just as in the world of commerce a person may come to be known as a $50,000-a-year man, so in school, a child may be identified with his I.Q. Bad enough that he should be identified with his intellect or his ability to reason abstractly (about a certain subject matter, in a certain symbolic code); but now those functions themselves are replaced by a number, with all its magical efficacy.

But even if one overcomes the irrational reverence for the seeming precision of the I.Q., it is easy enough to slip back into a vaguer, but no less superstitious, attitude toward quantitative differences of intellect as the essential difference among individuals. Ultimately it does not matter whether one thinks of numbers like 130 and 89, or of something as naive as "quart containers" and "pint containers" (which we teachers are enjoined to "fill with cream, not skim milk"), or just the division between the bright and the dull (with or without a large middle group of average or middling or mediocre): the great damage is in the implicit, but efficacious, reduction of the psyche to just this aspect of the so-complex multiplicity of functions and powers.

The point is not that all psyches are equal; there does indeed seem some reason for making out some of the differences in terms of "size," even. But if, in a parody of Cartesian thought, one supposes "I think, therefore I am; and the better I think, the more I am," then indeed there has been a viciously simplistic reduction of the psyche, which may, among other things, infect the entire schooling process.

Nor is this situation much altered if one speaks not merely of thinking but also (or instead) of knowledge (as in the container analogy), so that the basic distinction is now between those who know and those who are ignorant.

Let us now move to another of the dangerously reductive dichotomies, but this time in which the invidiousness can cut in either direction, depending upon how it is formulated. If it is Young/Old, then in our society today, it is youth which we admire, envy, even emulate if our claims on it are not immediately strong and apparent. In fact, "old" is used almost as sparingly as "stupid," being, like it, an unforgivable insult, a cruel "put-down," a dismissal and relegation; notice, instead, the fashionableness of the word "older." The real estate salesman speaks of one of his properties, just short of decrepitude as "an older house," where "older" is no longer a comparative but a kind of euphemism for old. And the advertizer, in order not to reduce his market, says his product, perhaps a sports car or a tour to the Bahamas, is "for the young and the young in heart," or in the mild but revealing joke, "for the young of all ages."

Youth now means vigor, buoyancy, daringness, life-lovingness, playfulness, pleasure-centeredness, tolerance, and above all, flexibility. Oldness means stodginess, traditionalism, moralism, timorousness, living in the past, an excessive veneration for law and order, conventionality, safety and security. Above all, to be old is to be rigid. In many vocabularies now, rigidity is the most heinous of sins, as flexibility is the most shining of virtues.

If in some times and places the old person is presumed -- at least in the absence of clearly contradictory evidence -- to be widely experienced, knowledgeable, dispassionate, and even, at least to an extent, wise, now the presumption is of senility.

Margaret Mead has said that ours is the first society in the entire sweep of history in which the older people have willingly gone to school to the younger people. It is not just that the young have set themselves up as teachers: there is nothing new in that, as we know from the Greeks; it is the common supposition of the old that the young have discovered truths that they have missed, and which, even now, they should, and perhaps can, gain.

Recent studies such as Aries' Centuries of Childhood, have shown that in many earlier times there was only the dimmest recognition of a specific period like childhood and youth. After infancy, it almost seemed, one passed directly into being an undersized, weak, inexperienced, naive, and ignorant person whom time and infinite pains might improve. Today, childhood is recognized as a wholly legitimate period and phase, in no way inferior to any other (only different), and, if anything, a particularly enviable time. "O best philosopher!" cries the romantic poet of the babe, and many who have taken this stance, have especially praised the naturalness, innocence, (even after the lessons of Freudian revelations of sexuality, jealousy, hatred in the young child), unaffectedness of those in the pre-corrupted state. Today, Rousseau's "negative education" is enjoying a strong revival of popularity: leave the child alone, do not tamper with him, spare him your indoctrination, avoid at all costs socializing him (into the inevitably iniquitous society). Instead, center upon him, and to the extent possible, be like unto him. Not alone the school, but the family, the home, then, becomes child-centered.

But now turn the distinction in the other direction, without necessarily abandoning any of the values just listed, and speak of the Mature/Immature. Clearly, there is very little to be said in favor of immaturity, where the emphasis is upon unripeness, incompleteness, lack of sureness, indeterminacy of form, flightiness, and undependability. The mature person is thought of as seasoned, reflective, confident, well-grouped, stable, sensible, even sage. He is marked by consistency and calmness, beyond the stage of the quixotic, wilfull, impulsive, irresponsible, fickle, and moody. "Grow up!" is the scornful admonition to the person who so acts that one feels he ought to know better: he is, alas, still immature.

Clearly, immaturity is not a matter of chronological age, but as we have seen, neither, increasingly, is being young -- at the very least, being young-minded and young of heart and youthful in outlook (and dress).

Once again, the danger lies in an exaggeration of how much is told when a person is described either as young or mature, immature or "older." The point is not so much that these are necessarily vague as well as ambiguous terms, as that the categories tend to wipe out finer, more subtle characterizations, and end by identifying what ought to be a distinctive individual with a rather ill-conceived group.

At this point I omit consideration of other interesting dichotomous typologies: Masculine/Feminine, Social/Individual, Selfish/Unselfish, even William James' Once-born and Twice-born, to say nothing of Tender-Minded/Tough-Minded, in order to have a look at a dichotomy I know not whether to name Positive/Negative, Optimistic/Pessimistic, or Romantic/Naturalistic. I am thinking of that group who believe that at bottom human beings are O.K. on the one hand; and on the other that group that believes they (we) are basically bad. You will say "Calvinism" about the latter, but actually this supposition has a kind of common currency not tied to a theory or Original Sin and Damnation at all; I'm thinking of expressions common enough among Pub Philosophers, such as, "People always really look after No. 1;" and other cracker-barrel references to civilization and politeness and morality all being "a pretty thin veneer plastered on the top of a worm-eaten plank." According to this way of thinking, neither education nor anything else is going to make much difference to most people, not in any fundamental way, and if there are some who, somehow, attain a kind of salvation, they are very few, and the means inexplicable, as is accurately said about the ways of God.

This attitude is diametrically opposed to that of the Romantics or Optimists -- though "optimism" may be an inappropriate label for those who, like Rousseau, are greatly impressed with the corrupting power of society. But at least in this respect they may be called optimists: basically men and women are good, healthy, altruistic, innocent, generous, trusting; so that if we can just prevent corruption, or if we can remove the inevitable taint affixed by social forces, then our outlook is bright. Thus, Rousseau's famous "negative education," all the things teachers and parents should, for Nature's sake, refrain from doing, in the devout expectation that, left alone, the child will preserve his primal innocence and healthiness, and learn the lessons that Nature herself, and not her societal aberrations, have to teach.

But I should suppose that, in spite of some new popularity of the latter position among youth-cult romantics, and a continuing adherence to the sour view of man's essential nastiness, much the most widely held position among those who have had some exposure to the social sciences, is a radical neutralism that maintains that a human being is only what he becomes, or that it is nonsensical to speak in valuational terms about the infant: neither good nor bad, neither sinner nor saint constitutionally, he exists as pure potentiality. Now, this is a way of thinking that may appall the educator or the parent: it puts an almost crushing burden of responsibility on his shoulders. Still, it does give him a chance to make a difference, to do things that count.

But even this neutralism quickly turns out to branch dichotomously. There is the school that descends from John Locke, saying that the newborn infant is a tabula rasa, literally susceptible of being furnished forth with the most elaborate, elegant, complicated of scenarios, or, of course, merely scrawled upon haphazardly, confusedly, meagerly. In its radically behavioristic branch, this school will insist that every infant is a potential Mozart, Molière, or Darwin (as well as Lucrezia Borgia, Hitler, or Jack the Ripper, of course).

The other branch may be called "Developmentalism." In all its forms, it postulates part of the scenario's having already been prepared, by birth; at least, the division into acts and scenes. We will return to Developmentalism for a more extended treatment, but first let us look a little further at radical environmentalism. (I shall here avoid "behaviorism" as a label because in its best known forms today, this would apply to certain kinds of environmentalism only.)

The prevalence of environmentalism today in the circles of social and behavioral scientists may, or course, most simply and adequately be explained by its truth, if it is true. But to the extent that its truth remains controverted, it is worth remarking that it also quite easily and comfortingly fits in with certain other postulates popular among students of social processes and structures. Thus, for the economists and political scientists, with their propensity for explaining various features of human conduct in terms of class membership, wealth, property, access to the determiners of civil policy, the nature of the prevailing government, and such-like factors, it is naturally welcome news that there is little or nothing in the new infant that countervails such influences. The social psychologists, sociologists, and cultural anthropologists are certainly committed to the belief that people are the way they are, mainly or wholly, because of social stratification, the power of certain social institutions, prevailing cultural patterns and values, and so on. The point becomes even clearer with a look at the anthropologist's functional assumption of a fundamental equality among peoples abstracted from the cultural determinants. That is, they assume no significant difference between two physically healthy new-born infants with respect to their capacity to learn the entire range of human skills, attitudes, and values, however different they may be in appearance or however varied be their respective sets of parents in all cultural ways. This assumption permits the anthropologist then to say, in effect, the things I talk about are therefore important, even all-important in the understanding of human nature.

With this in mind it is not hard to understand the magnitude of the response, in some quarters, when a Jensen or an Eysenck claims to have discovered a difference in the mean intelligence of certain racial groups which is owing to inheritance and not merely to cultural influence. No one is surprised that members of the groups, primarily blacks, characterized as noticeable inferior, or the average, in basic intelligence, especially given the still widespread tendency of other groups so to disparage them, quite apart from any scientific evidence, should react with great heat to such claims; and the same is evidently true with persons who have, in political, economic, and other social ways, defended their real, and not simply their ethical, equality. But a great many social scientists have an additional reason (still apart from the soundness of their attack upon the methods and procedures of their antagonists) for the emotionality of their response: namely, that one of their most deep-seated beliefs, that in human equality, is hereby challenged; especially when that belief, as we have noted, is basic to the claims they make for the omnipotence of their own concepts for explaining all human behavior -- with the possible exception of their own ability to stand apart from and examine their own culture.

Feminism, regarded as another kind of egalitarianism, is somewhat similarly challenged by any claim of an inherent difference in ability, at least with respect to any function regarded as important, between males and females. If one supposes a well-qualified psychologist revealing that his tests and analyses show not only a significant difference between men and women in, say, creativity, and one that can not at all be satisfactorily accounted for by cultural or (more broadly) environmental forces, and therefore innate, one can imagine the strength of the attack from feminists. (Feminists qua egalitarians, it should be added, ought to be equally incensed whether the significant difference favors either sex; though obviously "feminists" defined as those partial to the feminine half, could be expected to respond very differently, as the distinction was indicated in one way rather than the other.)

I have ranged the feminist and anti-racialist egalitarians under the rubric of Environmentalists because of the strong tendency of these groups to minimize or deny innate differences, and to explain human differences entirely or almost entirely be cultural and societal influence. However, there is no logical necessity for this affiliation, and no doubt a significant number of those in the group to which I now turn, will protest that they too are egalitarians: that is, the Developmentalists.

By a Developmentalist I mean, roughly stated, that kind of person who believes that human growth is, to some considerable extent, a matter of "unfolding" what already lies within, the actualizing of certain potentialities, and that this process proceeds by recognizable stages.

Although we may tend to think of Developmentalism as a new educational position, in studying the history of educational philosophy, I have been impressed with the number of the great thinkers, right from the beginning, who have been easily classifiable in this camp, Plato and Rousseau being only the most conspicuous and best known examples. But in our own day, doubtless the name of Jean Piaget is emblazoned more brightly than all the rest, not least because unlike most of the philosophers, he has forged his theories in the continual presence of live boys and girls. Part of his message may be interpreted as designed to keep the teacher from pounding his head against a wall that only time will successfully remove. That is, Piaget shows (I take it) that it is foolish to try to teach certain concepts, like the most famous of examples, conservation, to children who have not yet reached a certain point of maturation; and similarly, that there is no point at all in trying to develop certain moral principles prematurely in the developmental process. But there is a positive side too, represented most adequately on the side of moral development by Lawrence Kohlberg, who counsels about ways of moving pupils on to a new level, in the reasoned belief that they will not at all necessarily move there by themselves.

Developmentalism as represented by the Piagetan example is a further instance of what I earlier spoke of as neutralism with respect to the vexed question of the innate goodness or badness, innocence or corruption, of the human species.

But now I find my fairly neat little scheme somewhat clouded by my observation that some developmentalists may be contrasted with each other in terms of whether their general outlook for what might loosely be called favorable development is on the whole gloomy or bright.

Thus, Sigmund Freud has certainly got to be classified as a developmentalist. His famous account of the psycho-sexual development of human beings from the anal through the oral and onto the genital stages has certainly been hugely influential in our century, though doubtless more on the side of psycho-therapy than of the education that goes on in schools. According to Freud, it is of utmost importance for the individual not to get estopped at either of the first two stages, reasonable and inevitable though they be for infants; and this importance is not by any means confined to the development of a satisfactory sex life, in which, if the truth must be known and said, Freud had little interest. No, the point is that arrest, fixation, at a premature stage, or regression thereto after passing beyond, signifies a more or less serious sickness, with a consequent impairing of the individual's chances for normal adjustment to family, school, or society at large, for success in his job and his human relations, and for anything even resembling happiness.

But Freud had another, though closely related, type of developmentalism in his psychology, or should we now say meta-psychology, that emerged when he came to his well-known topographical account of the psyche. If "Id" (or IT) stands for the whole dark, instinctual, elemental, pre-moral, timeless, and unconscious aspects of the psyche, the hope for human development lies in the emergence, out of this animalistic substratum, of Ego. His slogan was, "Where Id was, Ego shall be," but this is not to be taken for prediction so much as for a hope, even -- it is not too much to say -- a wistful hope. By this I mean that Freud remained -- or rather late in life became particularly -- pessimistic about any large number of us developing strong Egos, staying firmly grounded in the genital level, and living mainly and effectively according to the Pleasure Principle, (tempered by realism) at least up to the point of old age where it is natural enough for the death wish to predominate.

Virtually every great interest of mankind turns out, on Freud's analysis, to be either ineffectual or iniquitous. Art yields some satisfaction, but makes otherwise no real difference in the world, for few take it seriously. Philosophy is, if anything, of even less import. There is nothing to be hoped for from political organization, for man's basic aggressiveness will inevitably prove too strong for manifestos for peace and harmony. Religion he said, is entirely delusional, offering imaginary surcease to real pain. "The function of education...is to inhibit, forbid, and suppress..." no doubt necessary functions, but hardly in themselves conducive to happiness. "Virtually our only hope for the future," he wrote in 1933, six years before his death, "lies in the possibility that reason, the scientific spirit, should establish a dictatorship over the human mind." (It is most interesting that he remained, contrary to much supposition, a rationalist, normatively, to the end.) But even this is a forlorn hope, as witness the large-scale rejection of his own theories by scientists in psychology and the social scientists, thus testifying to the difficulty of even a scientist's being scientific beyond a very narrow range of his primary interest.

Here then is an important instance of a profound developmentalist who was also a pessimist: we know, he said, how development ought to go, but we are nearly helpless to make it do so. And to the extent that any of us gains self-knowledge, we have little reason to be pleased with what we have got acquainted with. In speaking of the melancholic, in his fine essay, "Mourning and Melancholy," Freud said,

"When is his heightened self-criticism (the melancholic) describes himself as petty, egoistic, dishonest, lacking in independence, one whose sole aim has been to hide the weaknesses of his own nature, it may be, as far as we know, that he has come pretty near to understanding himself; we only wonder why a man has to be ill before he can be accessible to a truth of this kind." (XIV, 246)

Not all followers of the master follow him in his basically pessimistic outlook. Erik Erickson is a notable example of a Freudian, albeit an original one, who seems more hopeful, as he details the identity crises through which one must pass on the way to wholeness.

But let us follow instead the lead of one who from having been a Freudian, the designated heir-apparent to the empire itself, revolted and gradually worked out the major competitive view, in psycho-therapy, to that of Freud himself. I mean, of course, C. Jung.

Jung, however, might well have been amused at anybody's classifying him with the optimists, for on his account the way is strait and narrow, and but few have been able to summon up the energy to follow it more than a little way. Still. . .

In Jungian thought there are at least three ways in which developmentalism appears. The first will here be hardly more than named, and not discussed: the development that marks the transition from the first to the second great halves of life. Jung saw the tasks of the relatively young person to be those associated mainly with making his way in the world, overcoming the external obstacles, achieving a niche, establishing a base, and hopefully, a modicum of success. The second half is, properly, concerned with consolidating, with turning in some measure away from the battle with the world inward, there to encounter the battle with oneself, in the interest of establishing meaningfulness. I say, "properly," for a great many persons are prevented from really getting on with this latter task, which is basically religious and philosophic in nature, by never having sufficiently won the earlier battles, or from having become so enamored with them that he does not realize there are any other kinds.

The second kind of developmentalism in Jungian thought consists in working beyond one's "natural" ways of functioning in order to strengthen one's underdeveloped capacities. Here again I can give the subject (in one of my mother's favorite phrases) but "a lick and a promise:" His distinction between the extroverted and the introverted has passed into the common and not only the conventional learning, but less well-known is his quadratic arrangement of the human functions -- cognitive functions, one may say: Each of us, he claimed, has a primary, relatively easy, natural way of functioning, and most of us have a subsidiary way that is almost as ready and facile. But the opposites of these ways, especially the opposite of our primary type is our so-called "inferior" function. If we name the functions thinking, intuiting, sensing, and feeling -- though the names are not especially accurate -- the grouping yields thinking and feeling as opposed, as well as intuiting and sensing. Now, the developmental part of this is that each of us has the task of strengthening those sides that are most nearly primitive, crude, inferior, and unfunctional. If I am intuitively adept, I'll have to work on my relation to the solid world of palpable things. If it is feeling, or a ready ability to sense the value of persons, that is my forte, the process of thinking will develop only by virtue of a special effort. And so on. Those of us who are introverts have probably had some assistance -- not necessarily effective -- from teachers, scoutmasters, coaches, and parents in becoming more outgoing and sociable; but I wonder how many teachers try to cultivate the underdeveloped introverting functions of their pupils?

The third aspect of Jungian developmentalism though it is to be understood that they overlap -- is the most complex of all. It may be here named, the assimilation and unification of the unconscious aspects of the self, or the advance from the Unconscious to Egohood, and from Egohood to Selfhood.

I can here say only briefly what I take this to mean. The way Jung uses these terms, the Self is larger, more inclusive than the ego because the ego is the center of the positive, daylight portion of the psyche, and important as that be, it is less, much less, than the whole. Let us imagine a person of well-developed ego, clear-headed, articulate, decisive, the kind of person who seems to know his own mind and who seems to have ready access to all that he does know. But each of us, Jung said, transcends his own ego. For instance each of us has a shadow, that is a negative side, the ego's more or less disloyal opposition.

Not even the very best behaved little girl is just sugar and spice and everything nice, and she is ill served by those who tell her that that is her nature. Self-knowledge for each of us consists in an awareness of the ways we think and feel, of what we value and what we fear and hate. But even the expression "self-knowledge" is mischievous, suggesting as it does a completed state of knowing. But what each of us needs is more skill and sensitivity in knowing, in sensing, in intuiting. We vary from each other in the degree to which we are tuned-in to ourselves. Do we not all know persons who seem utterly self-deceived, unable to recognize the most fundamental truths about themselves, facts obvious to everyone about them except only those closest to the facts themselves?

We make a giant step forward, (I believe with Jung) when we give over trying to be perfect in order to concentrate upon being whole, or more nearly whole and, in that fine current expression, together. To get it together: yes, that, surely, is what this is all about.

Each of us is a self of many parts, many dispositions, tendencies, capabilities, including some so horrific we will scarcely allow ourselves to admit them. The gentlest of us sits atop the fiercest aggressions; the most masculine of men have somewhere a most feminine nature within; the most upright and seemingly fearless are at the same time vicious and cowardly. I emphasize the negative here only because it is the hardest for us to see in ourselves though not, of course, in others, generally.

Well, then, development in this sense consists in the incorporation, the realization, of the commonly hidden and secret parts of our own natures. And the developmental process seems to be characteristically and profoundly dialectical. There is reason to think that the human self tends toward compensations for the exaggerations and inflations and one-sidednesses that are our continual lot. But the great matter is to achieve ever-greater awareness by the signals that reach us from our organism, our inner states, our dreams, and from other persons, so that we may consciously assist in this dialectical movement.

There is an important sense in which the relatively well-developed and self-developing person -- keeping in mind that the participial form is the more important -- is a large and enlarging person. How many persons there are who are perfectly all right as far as they go -- but alas this isn't very far at all. There just isn't a whole lot to them, of them, in them -- at least not yet. But certain other personalities strike us as commodious -- I don't now mean, just having well-stuffed heads, but in other ways than just the intellectual -- commodious in interests, in sympathies, in understandings, in outlooks, in insights, in grasp, in reach, in depth. They have a certain magnitude, a certain sweep. It is partly that they seem to have incorporated a considerable amount of life. Socrates would not allow anyone to call him wise, but only a lover of wisdom. Anyone who thinks of himself as having attained wholeness thus testifies to how far he has to go, and yet the direction is right.

At this point, a predictable and understandable question is: But what has all this to do with education? What indeed, if education is taken to be identical with training in the three r's, transmittal of a modicum of facts about the world, plus eleven or twelve years of child care. But suppose education is growth, as John Dewey spent about seventy years saying in a variety of ways -- not growth toward a fixed goal, but growth in the interest of more growth?

One's education has become inoperative when one has become stalled, arrested, fixed. Nothing is so ridiculous, but also pitiful, as the human being who has become merely mechanically repetitive, his responses utterly predictable, and therefore frequently inappropriate to the unique character of the particular occasion. He who says at every pause, "Barkus is willing" is no longer genuinely human: he is a jack-in-the-box, a clockwork man. But notice also that such a demi-person may know a great deal. He may be erudite, even; scholarly, encyclopedic. In short, he may be admirable at passing examinations. And consequently he may be called "highly educated," certified as being in possession of a large number of inert ideas.

So, I think, the question that should be ever in the mind and heart of the teacher is with respect to the effectiveness of his own activity in promoting growth and development, and if you ask whose, my first and best answer will be: his own. This, by the way, is, I think, the nub of the relation between teaching and research, a topic often debated in higher education circles. Other things being even approximately equal, the researcher -- using that word very broadly -- is the best teacher, not so much because he knows more, as because he is, by definition, in the process of seeking and sometimes coming to know, and thus, no matter how irrelevant his subject matter be for his charges, he presents the model of a person alive, growing, developing.

Jung has said:

"No one can train the personality unless he has it himself. . .
Personality is the supreme realization of the innate idiosyncrasy of a

living being. It is an act of high courage flung in the face of life, the absolute affirmation of all that constitutes the individual, the most successful adaptation to the universal conditions of existence coupled with the greatest possible freedom for self-determination." (Development of Personality, p. 171.)

That is a remarkably condensed statement and deserves some elucidation and comment. For one thing I think the word "trains" is wrong -- for all I know it may even be a bad translation. I would be inclined to substitute an expression like "help in the development of." But the basic point is that, however it be with purely intellectual matters, in personality development it does seem quite impossible for one person to be useful to another beyond the point of his attainment. Hence, the emphasis I have already put upon the development of the teacher's self. There is, therefore, contrary to some supposition, nothing eo ipso selfish about a strong concentration upon one's own self, because the effectiveness of all of one's genuine relationships flows out of this.

Next, observe the word "idiosyncrasy." It is rather a startling word, but we need to be startled by the very radicalism of the idea. Obviously idiosyncrasy here does not designate quirks or mannerisms or trivial eccentricities, but the characteristic individuality of the individual. The great point, often missed, is that the more fully one is developed, the more distinctive he or she is. People still living close to unconsciousness are hard to tell apart. They do not have much that could be called personality, which of course is true too of babies, whose individuality is mainly potential, taking a mother's intuitiveness for recognition. But at the other extreme stand the great personalities, those of whom we say that they are utterly unlike anybody else, never to be confused with another, possessed of a unique style and manner and wholeness.

Jung speaks of its achievement as an act of high courage, for the safe and easy way is of course to be like everybody else, a conformist, one who does not stand out from the crowd. (Think of the teenager devastated by the thought that his or her trousers or hair might be an inch too short or too long.) The developed person is one who is a risk-taker: he dares to be alive, different, conscious. He dares to face what he is.

The conditions for living are indeed universal: no one becomes distinctive by refusing to eat or breathe, but the developed person is the spontaneous person. No one is so predictable as the neurotic. This is because he is, by definition, not his own master. He is obeying a law external to his own real being. But the developed, integrated person is unpredictable. He is full or surprises, for he alone is free; free, that is, to decide for himself.

This is why, in a genuine and full developmentalism, the teacher cannot proceed with "behavioral objectives," for this would entail *imposing* ends upon other persons, thus depriving them of their freedom and stifling, curtailing, suppressing their self-development. This point was marvelously made, I think, by Margaret Mead, when she said, ". . . by working toward defined *ends* we commit ourselves to the manipulation of persons and therefore to the negation of democracy. Only by working in terms of values which are limited to defining a *direction* is it possible for us to use scientific methods" -- she was speaking at the time of social scientists -- "in the control of the process without the negation of the moral autonomy of the human spirit." (in G. Bateson, *Steps Toward an Ecology of Mind*, p. 133.) Teaching for development is the kind of teaching constantly aimed at facilitating the pupil's assuming ever greater consciousness of and control over his own development. But this kind of developmentalism is also, in a sense, optimistic. Not in a pollyanna way, of course, but in the way wherein one believes that each person has his own destiny, his own entelechy, his own individual potentiality. Finally, then, education is not at its heart behavior modification or social engineering or socialization or manipulation or conditioning. It is a person-to-person communication, a two-way transaction between indefeasible selves. The teacher is teaching only as long as she or he is learning -- not just learning subject matter from books and lecturers but learning from pupils. When the teacher ceases learning in that way, she is ready to be replaced by a teaching machine, which is cheaper and much easier to repair. Teaching is, as Tolstoy said of art, a matter of infecting, benign or malign. Stuck myself, I willy-nilly teach stuckness; and developing, I help others develop.

But what is this? Having endorsed a developmentalism that tries to transcend the iniquities of dichotomous classifications to achieve a pervasive skill in self-dialectic in the interest of a large and relatively whole selfhood, have I proclaimed the separation of developers and non-developers? Don Giovanni shrieked as he plunged into hell; I at least am permitted a whimper.

CHAPTER 12.

THE PRESENTATION OF SELF AND PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION.

JAMES L. CATANZARO.

Background.

It has become obvious in our century that there are a number of defensible philosophical perspectives on education. Much time has been spent discussing and defending each. The result of this endeavor has been, however, a recognition of the limited, relative status of each. Despite this recognition the socio-psychological origins of philosophies of education have not been widely considered as significantly casual. Each position has been critically evaluated but largely from a traditional philosophical vantage point or from the perspective of a fad current in the academic community. This inattention to socio-psychological constructs may simply be explained by parochialism or perhaps the relative youth of the social sciences. Whatever the case, it is clear that philosophy is not done in a vacuum, particularly philosophy of education. And the context of philosophy begins with social reality.

It is my contention that the social contexts of philosophers of education are not merely important but significant. There is, in other words, a correlation between one's educational outlook and social milieu. Philosophies of education as idea and value systems arise out of the philosopher's socialization experiences and those typified around him. To understand the origins of a philosophical position one must therefore discover the social reality out of which it stands. This means that more than the rational cogency of a position must be appreciated; it may well be the product of justifying logic rather than logic-in-use anyway. The selection of supporting data may also be directed by an assumed mindset. The argument then reduces to this: positions on education are relative to certain sets of experiences and are effectively understood as relative when these experiences are accounted for. Put differently, becoming self-conscious of our Fragestellungen will render our positions contextually authentic.

The Process of Socialization.

Socialization is the internalization of social reality. It provides a basis for selection of perceptions, definitions of objects and events, and for social behavior. Once internalized social reality is externalized through language. In fact, it is through symbolic reality that we specify the "significant others" and also the "self." Language helps us clarify how the self is acted upon by others and how it acts toward others. What language symbolizes, more precisely, is our perception of the reaction of others to our behavior. Our self-image is thus traceable to our perceptions of the perception of us by significant others. Of course this is a reciprocal relationship. We soon learn that the way we present ourselves often determines the response of others. Language assists in measuring the response as well as in making the presentation. These reciprocal relationships invariably take on standardized forms, often according to models seen about us. Socialization therefore is culturally prescribed; at times it is institutionally prescribed. The question is: How does a philosophy of education derive from a given socialization process? How does it arise from the reciprocal relationship of presentation-response-presentation-response-presentation?

There are a number of steps to the development of a philosophic perspective. These steps are part of the process of socialization itself. There can be no other starting place than social reality. Man fits no ecological niche which guarantees safe passage through the many years of infancy, youth and adolescence. If the human infant is to arrive at adulthood and with the skills and strengths necessary to further survival it will be because of family and community, not nature. The many physical environments man has chosen on the globe hardly contribute to his perpetuity. Poor instinctual endowment cannot be relied on to secure life either. Only in a group can he make it. And to be in group requires an understanding of its demands -- most of all, a self-understanding in terms of group behavior-rules. Here we all begin and here the philosopher begins.

In the act of philosophy the world is described from the context of the patterns derived from many, many presentations of the self and the many, many responses they elicited. The act begins, after years of practice with such reciprocal arrangements, in making another presentation seeking more response. Of course each person is not simply the product of presentation and response. It is undoubtedly the case that we have been effectively conditioned by the process. But our conditioning has been guided by observing routine performances. Every day people, significant-to-us people, evince practical social competence by handling any number of situations through accepted practices. As we mature we become proficient in these practices and we note their ratio of success to failure. We see they provide security and group approval. These routine performances are not always directly visible to us, however. Often we encounter them not so much as living examples but, abstracted and typified, as rules for survival, laws of the community or in myths. Whatever the case, they become something more. They become ideals by which to measure behavior. In fact these behaviors may become so typified that they are institutionalized.

When the philosopher speaks it is clear that he stands within a social and cultural framework. He speaks of and from a social reality. He speaks out of the typified social behavior he has witnessed or learned of as values. He thereby renders his world rational. This is, however, a difficult job. Social realities are not always accessible and certainly not always well-formed. It is particularly difficult for the philosopher of education. He has to account for the values and practices of education as an institution as well as ideas born in social engagement. It is precisely this difficulty, however, which may facilitate creative, critical approaches. The problem of bringing together reflections on many varied and variegated social experiences is great. Accommodating norms held as values, held before the self-conscious and cognitive levels, is even more troublesome. Behaviors are open to scrutiny. They can be experimented with. Reflections on them are therefore within reach of scrutiny and experimentation. But ideals held as norms, expressed in myth or symbol, are not so accessible. Since they are anonymous they appear as part of the structure of the universe or from the gods. Here the philosopher must rely on the tools current in the academic community. Philosophy is not just the product of presentation and response and the observation of routine performance. The philosopher qua philosopher is a learned man. He brings to bear innumerable perceptions of the community of learning.

Philosophy of Education and the Presentation of the Self.

Philosophy is a natural culmination of the process of socialization. It is the task of ordering one's total acculturation through sharpening the language of social reality. The language which structured and prescribed the world about the philosopher as citizen is now analyzed and redrafted. Philosophy then is a formal discipline using the philosopher's socialization and acculturation as material.

The question is: How then do we begin to think philosophically of education? The answer lies in our ability to understand social realities. In particular it rests on the ability to see our social order, once defined, in relation to the social reality of a given group. Education is approached philosophically then by a careful analysis of the socialization process or processes common to a given community from the philosopher's Weltbild. At the point of comprehending that process the philosopher begins asking several basic questions: (a) Is the given process of socialization resolved and complete? Are there areas where the process is in self-conflict or has not been fully carried out? (b) Is the process precisely articulated? Is the language used exactly descriptive of the process and fully expressive? (c) From the philosopher's own social reality, what new or different directions, consonant with the process, can be explored through education? (d) Again, given the authenticity of the process materially, what future development does it suggest? (e) Accepting certain defined ideals, what changes in the process or its articulation are suggested? And finally, (f) What new perspectives can be gained through untimely questions? This final question-set really provides the hope of philosophy of education.

Education is part and parcel of the process of socialization. It can serve a social order best when it truly understands that order. But if that order is to be carried ahead it must be by asking not the obvious or even the penetrating question. It must be by one who, as Nietzsche once observed, "constantly experiences, sees, hears, suspects, hopes, and dreams extraordinary things; who is struck by his own thoughts as if they came from outside, from above and below, as a species of events and lightning-flashes peculiar to him...." As Jacques Monod has pointed out in reference to the biosphere, discoveries may not conflict with established scientific knowledge but they may also not be predictable from it. What is needed then is the unique question which catapults us ahead of our present understanding.

CHAPTER 13.

EPISTEMOLOGY, MIND AND SOCIAL INVENTION.

KENNETH V. LOTTICH.

Epistemology, the question of what constitutes the sources and limits of human knowledge, is based on theory of mind as well as the psychological problem of learning. But, since it is impossible to delve deeply into this area of psychology in a short paper, we shall confine our interpretation largely to the expression or, as some would say, the effects of "knowledge" the search for this human index of reality -- or what passes for the real. To paraphrase (perhaps to annihilate) the words of the poet, one may repeat here:

"The Primrose by the rivulet's brim
A Primrose was, no more, to him.
He does not see its starry eye,
Its message fair of that on high;
He is a most insensate clod
Who never deigns to quest for God."

Professor Falk has said that knowledge is the teacher's stock in trade. It is impossible for a teacher to function at all, except on the basis of some assumption, opinion, or well-established philosophy about the nature, sources, reliability and limitations of this index of reality as the human mind finds itself able to grasp it. Everyone recalls William James' expression of the infant's dilemma in coming to grips with the "big, blooming, buzzing, confusion" that immediately on birth begins to assail his senses (and probably his mind itself). The baby must -- if he is to become "human" -- become oriented, or orient himself, to the "human" dimensions of space, time, cause-effect, things, and, of course, his own self-identity. The epistemological problem we wish to investigate is not considerably different from that facing the young child in his attempt to secure a foundation for subsequent life activity.

Four rubrics suggest themselves in this search for understanding of the problem of knowledge: espitemology. These are:

A. The Problem of Mind

B. Alternate Modes of Viewing Reality

C. The Sources of Ideas

D. The Problem of Civilization

Chester A. Lawson, of Michigan State University, offers some assumptions about mind that, it is believed, can be of utility here. Professor Lawson views the mind "as a mental universe that roughly corresponds with the physical universe." (LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND THE HUMAN MIND. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958, p. 2). A few of his assumptions about the nature of mind follow:

(1) Even though the mind is related to and dependent on the activity of the nervous system, the mind can be conceived in terms other than those associated with nervous function;

(2) The mind, so conceived, is composed of units, designated as unit-thoughts;

(3) These unit-thoughts are related or organized into a structure and also are related functionally or operationally to produce a pattern of thought processes;

(4) Language, either written or spoken, reflects at least in part the unit-thoughts and their relations, so that by analyzing language one can discover the structural and operational relations of thought and hence the structure and operations of the conscious mind;

These hypotheses, and others derived independently, will be appropriated for our discussion.

Butler (FOUR PHILOSOPHIES) suggests three ways of viewing reality:

(1) the agnostic;

(2) the skeptic;

(3) "affirmation" -- some knowledge is possible as a matter of course, perhaps an admission of Lawson's "mental universe" concept;

To Butler's analysis we may wish to add another position -- to the degree that its relevance is not already covered by his (3) namely:

(4) an "assumption" theory -- i.e., a series of dynamic assertions or assumptions, which, when and as accepted gradually obtain the force of actual reality; indeed, for all we know, or can know, they may constitute reality.

Furthermore, (4) established a category of the greatest utility in viewing the problem of civilization -- to be considered shortly.

But to return to Butler for another moment. Here is likewise categorized the conventional sources of ideas. These are:

(1) through revelation;

(2) by way of some species of authoritarianism, e.g., history, sacred literature, the leader, a philosophic system;

(3) intuitionalism -- through a sudden flash or inspiration, cf. Gestalt psychology by which the whole is apprehended when only parts are visible;

(4) by reason, the rational mind -- here Authoritarianism is a frequent concomitant;

Or

(5) through experience (and the empirical, the sense perceptual, may be joined with some aspects of rationalism).

Here it appears that categories (2) and (3) offer the more fruitful opportunity for adaptation to our discussion of epistemology and mind.

Aside from epistemology and mind itself, the problem of the development of human civilization becomes the most significant in our search for a theory of knowledge. For, when the question of how civilization arose is asked, the human role and knowledge are necessarily involved. This is perhaps only an enlargement of the original problem which deals with the origins of knowledge per se. In connection with this analysis another paper by the writer, "Some Distinctions between Culture and Civilization as Displayed in Sociological Literature" in SOCIAL FORCES, Vol. 28, No. 3 (March 1950), pp. 40, 250, becomes pertinent. By recourse to a schematic diagram several levels of "life" and the developing "civilization" are shown; level I denominated to "Inorganic" subtends a culture area demarcated by the Infra-Alpha line and is captioned "A complete absence of behaviour characterized by reliance on instinct, culture, or civilization," -- for most purpose a "life-less" area as well; level II, which may be called the "Organic" and is ceilinged by the Alpha line, a dividing line based on a variety of factors usually reduced to certain socially accepted invention. It may be labeled an area characterized by Animal Drive and/or Instinct only. (A minority of anthropologists consider this stage as indicative of the existence of an "animal culture." In fact the term culture itself most frequently is considered a human phenomenon, the incidence of "culture" stamping the human animal as a species set apart.)

The third and fourth levels may be identified as the "Superorganic" and "Ex-organic," the summit stage representing on the one hand an extension of the Superorganic stage, on the other something qualitatively different that its only relation to the former is analogous to the parallel of a foundation and house. Yet, actually, we are now concerned with the Superorganic alone, for it is in this consideration that mental life and epistemology are implicated. The term Superorganic has been used with the greatest frequency by Professor Alfred L. Kroeber and his famous article of the same name appearing in THE AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, Vol. 19 (1967), pp. 163-213, blazed new trails and offered a theory of culture that in its allusion to the genesis of knowledge appears to be barometric indeed in our attempt to define more clearly the origins of symbolic life. Speaking of man's achievement of a cultural heritage or non-biologic heredity, Kroeber says (and in the process virtually involves a new conception of heredity and biology):

(For) . . . a new factor had arisen which was to work out its independent consequence, slowly and of little apparent import at first, but gathering weight and dignity and influence, that was no longer wholly dependent on any agency of organic evolution, and that, however rocked and swayed by the heredity that underlay it, nevertheless floated unimmersibly upon it. Thus Kroeber explains the dominance of social and/or cultural invention.

But there are many theories as to the actual thresholds of man's cultural life -- the passage from the simple Organic area to that of the Superorganic. Such observations fall under three main categories:

(1) a reliance on biological bases to account for the development of the superorganic;

(2) the recognition of certain material and/or non-material determinants;

Or

(3) the utility of social inventions, or assumptions as to the constituents of reality to account for a demarcation line -- a line, which -- as we have said -- the animal never passes.

C. M. Case says that culture is only an expression to denote "the tools, symbols . . . possessed by human beings." ("Culture as a Distinctive Human Trait," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. 32 (1927), pp. 906-920.) Ford says "Culture is that complex whole which include artifacts, beliefs, art, and all the other habits acquired by man as a member of society . . ." (Quoted in Ralph Linton, THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN THE WORLD CRISIS. New York: Columbia, 1945, p. 78). Obviously, the invention -- or apprehension -- of language is one of these most epochal habits. Other commentators, speaking of the development of civilization out of simple culture, stress the role of each of the following, oft-times in mutually exclusive fashion:

(1) the invention of writing;

(2) the growth of the temple -- city -- and urbanization (Dawson, Kluckhohn, Kelley, Odum);

(3) the development of "logical presuppositions" (F. S. C. Northrop);

(4) the invention of engines, muscle, steam, and gasoline (Childe, Radcliffe-Brown, White);

(5) super consciousness or Post-Individuality (Heard, White);

(6) challenge-response situations (Toynbee); and

(7) artificial control of the sex drive (Huxley).

Even a new front, the Psychological, is suggested by some sociologists and social scientists including Sorokin, Heard, Toynbee, and Northrop admit such a mutation to crown the present stage of civilization. This, of course, represents the fourth level, the Ex-organic, but except to mention its possibility we shall pass on more directly to our second section.

II. A solution to the problem of Epistemology through "Natural Order." An analogy (or correspondence) between the mental world and that of universe itself has already been mentioned. Lawson has divided mind -- or rather collected mind -- into three functional entities, which, of course, in actual operation become one vehicle. These are Mind I (simple perception or the locus of immediately-perceived-thoughts); Mind II (the memory); and Mind III (the quality of mind that produces abstractions -- the separations, or isolates, of unit-thoughts of Mind II). Although the agnostic takes great pains to teach the impossibility of apprehension of any real knowledge and the skeptic is lukewarm here, knowledge has been said to exist and to be apprehendable by affirmation and by assumption. This is the knowledge that exists through the "natural order" of the three minds: it is either real or serves the same function as a given reality would. It is a product of social invention however much this social or cultural invention has been predicated by the unique ordering quality of mind itself. Various analogies may be said to exist to buttress this conclusion. Thus perception, memory and abstraction have their counterparts in Conception, Agreement, and Pattern. Each of these may be in like order associated with (1) the individual; (2) the tribe; and (3) the cosmopolitan group, although some interpreters will prefer to organize these categories in terms of (1) tribal; (2) "national;" and (3) universal.

At any rate the role of invention becomes the paramount agency in the creation of either hierarchal system -- for each serves the same purpose. The role invention is based on its reliance on the greatest figures produced by humanity, the Promethean men (Sheldon's expression) or through Charismatic leadership (Weber's phrase). While individual leaders are indicated their contributions have reflected a supreme interest in the common wealth and their inventions have stood time-tests as well as being significant in the area of production of moral standards and judicial pronouncements. While the most heraldic of these figures are, like the builders of many of Europe's sublime cathedrals, unknown and unsung, others in the realms of government and religion spring instantly to mind. Thus Lycurgus, the legendary Spartan lawgiver, Buddha, Lao-tse, and Jesus hardly need to be mentioned as, such is the power of their dynamic assertions and so in harmony with the conception of mind suggested in this paper are their contributions that they are "automatically" associated with the concept of cultural invention.

A further elaboration of the "natural order" of the mind is man's use of the three-legged hope or the triad -- a mental maneuver that appears over and over in connection with the contribution of the seminal minds and in the daily operation of the human intellect. Substantiation of this device is everywhere: in the syllogism of the scholastics, in Plato's immortal beds, in the dialectic of Hegel, Marx, Whitehead and Toynbee, in the Pythagorean theorem, and in the multiplication of a binomial. The Egyptian pyramid, the Holy Trinity, and the three orders of Platonistic society suggest the same source. Hypothetically it may be assumed that the origin and correspondence of the significance of these lies in the order of the mind itself and/or in the sequence of nature: the seed, the plant, the fruit which begets the seed again, or in early man's observance of heavenly bodies. Even in summary the rule of three suggests its significance in terms of human convention and mental process.

A. The mental analogy: Perception, Memory, Abstraction

B. The symbolic analogy: Conception, Agreement, Pattern

C. The human analogy: Individual, Tribe, Cosmopolitan State

Or

C. The tribal, the national, the universal.

To recapitulate: The role of invention, social as well as concrete or material, satisfies at least two of the conditions under which knowledge may be viewable -- affirmation and assumption. In the words of James Branch Cabell "Man is the only animal who plays the ape to his dreams." Certainly the existence of parallels in the mental world can be detected as easily in the material realm. And, if "proof" is demanded the correspondence of the mental relationship as exhibited through various languages proffered by man should at least partially suffice. If language is equivalent to mind (as has been alleged in this paper) the problem becomes one of comparatively easy solution -- or rectification.

Part III of this sequence is headed Testing for Correspondence and is most particularly indebted to the interpretation LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND THE HUMAN MIND by Lawson and to the works of Suzanne Langer: PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY and FEELING AND FORM.

The correspondences to be traced are four (although space will forbid more than a brief encounter for two of these). These are:

A. Language -- Prose

B. Language -- Poem

C. The Arts: Music and Architecture

D. The Film -- a Dream Mode.

The prose world offers perhaps the simplest substantiation of correspondence with mind although, naturally, selected examples must be chosen. Moreover, the elemental mind is the one that exhibits correspondence, not the polished and artificial mode of the essay or "classical" rendition. The subconscious, or unconscious, takes precedence here over the "educated" or trained for its framework is, although more obscure, the more easily apprehended (through perhaps the "natural order" of the mind itself). So works by Joyce, Proust, Faulkner, Fitzgerald, and lately Heller, Salinger, and Golding may be indicated although the tracing, except in the case of LORD OF THE FLIES (Golding) will be eschewed.

But Golding, although frequently in a more straightforward form, indicates this relationship between language, mind, and knowledge (epistemology) clearly enough and offers a fine exercise in the determination of the positions in philosophy as well. Four main characters appear in FLIES and each portrays a clear-cut role, philosophically-speaking. Jack, the natural leader, is Authoritarian and indeed an Authoritarian of the Fascist mode. At the other extreme we find Ralph, the democratic leader, although the weakness of democracy is inherent in his position and eventual plight. When he holds the "Conch," symbol of civilization, however, things go well for a time until inherent evil symbolized by a decaying boar's head and a dead airman begins to take over. The "logical presuppositions" of culture are whittled away and both Simon, the Idealist philosopher, who attempts to bring to the campfire (or den) a rationalistic explanation of the horrors that seem to beset the camp, and "Piggy," the downtrodden but good and wise friend of democracy's Ralph, whose realist position has alienated the tribal dissidents congregated under Jack's standard, are slain. The book is cast in the form of a childhood romance (in satire of Rousseau's beneficient naturism) but its overtones and symbols reflect as clearly the problem of evil in the adult world. The "Lord of the Flies" is of course Beelzebub and Golding's epistemology is based on the thesis that on this planet man is the intruder. FLIES has reached over one million readers in the past several years; its attraction for the under-graduate mind is assumed to spring from its elemental truth or virtual-linguistic presentation. Were space available further interpretation of the virtual life novel with relations to Faulkner's SOUND AND FURY and Joseph Heller's CATCH 22 would be essayed.

Moving swiftly to poetry, however, three writers have been chosen for exposition as they too tap the subconscious, elemental, or unconscious mode -- the basic source of mental life and hence the only possible source of an epistemological framework. Coleridge, Poe, and William Blake thus offer some assistance in the attempt to unravel the secret of human mental-linguistic life. To begin with let us consider the fragment titled "Kublai Khan," written by Coleridge as an aftermath of hallucinatory indulgence and broken in midstream by an unexpected visitor.

"In Xanadu did Kublai Khan
A spacious pleasure dome decree,"

These lines suggest tribal leadership in its urge to social invention.

"Where Alph, the sacred river ran"

Here is shown the picture of primitive magic which Kublai intends to confute.

"Through caverns measureless to man"

This, of course, is the mind, Plato's caves, with its limits and inadequacies.

"Down to a sunless sea."

As does William Golding, the poet views human life as a contradiction and impossibilities without the framework to be established by Kublai -- the role of the Charismatic leader with his social invention to confound man's dark heritage.

Poe deals almost exclusively with the occult or elemental. Mention may be made of his "Haunted Palace," a view of mental life and its degradation which Faulkner in the prose world likewise essays. "Eldorado" in its simple form, however, points to human predicament;

"Gaily bedight, a gallant knight
In sunshine and in shadow"

(in several verses his encounters with the futility of life are recounted; he now meets a Shadow -- key or intermediary).

"Over the mountains of the Moon
Into the Valley of Shadow
Ride, boldly ride," the Shade replied,
"If you seek for Eldorado."

Another poetic venture is even clearer in its reflection of the hereditary basis out of which humanity has ascended through his strange, innate capacity for social invention. "The Sea Around" requires no explanation:

"I dreamed that I entranced beheld
An ocean thoroughfare;
Each lane was dripping with romance
And all the trees lay bare.
The little snails wore cobweb veils --
I counted up to ten.
The prawns were lady princesses
And schools of fish were men."

William Blake's "Tyger" deals with the basic problem of man: his heredity. Blake's awful question, "Did He who made the lamb make thee?" in capsule form covers the same area chosen for presentation by Golding's FLIES.

The Arts: Music, Architecture, the Film

Constricted space prevents only a brief mention of any area further than language other than the film. The wedding of words and musical expression, the architectural dictum that "form follows functions" with its insistence on an accurate definition of both, the use of musical symbolization (other than the musical symbols themselves) and the leitmotiv of Wagner as well as the basic demand for architectural unity all offer fertile fields for interpretation and expression of epistemological principles. We shall have to forego this.

But the film, a relatively new medium, offers perhaps the most in an interpretation of the mental and hence the epistemological process. For the film is presented in a "dream mode" -- and there is little doubt that this is the authentic expression of the human organism. Through the social control exercised by social invention and organization (and even the working of the mind itself to organize sensation in what may be -- or has come to be -- meaningful bundles) human minds -- and souls have been placed in beneficient straitjackets. The mind proper knows no such constructions and here we can refer once more to language in its purer form. However much has been said about language though does not render prose and poetry as effective media in presenting the virtual life in the sense that the film is able to capture -- or apheosisize -- the reality that the mind is able to apprehend, true or untrue as this may be in terms of what actually is "out there."

The film has the ability to -- or quality of -- seeing life without the restrictions of space and time: the very qualities of mind without its social controls. Like Goethe's FAUST the viewer-auditor becomes omnipotent; he is here; he is there; he is everywhere; and at one and the same time. Time and space are telescoped; even the greatest of literature can hardly do this although Proust and Joyce come close to it. The beauty of the film is in its facsimile representation of thought itself; albeit manipulated by a director, camera-man, and cutter. Yet their manipulation is not necessarily strictural to the viewer whose own mind is able to review or rearrange sequence to suit his own needs. Popularly, it is said, that viewers tend to "identify" with the film or with film characters. This is, of course, true but is a childish understatement. The viewer enters the film and his mind roughly parallels the action of the film. Thus it is not without significance that cinema halls are dark? So is the mind. Past, present, future, those arbitrary rubrics devised by man to induce sanity and order need not apply within the confines of the cinema house. There are flashbacks, montages, dream sequences, and futuristic adventure. It is obvious that no two people can understand the film in the same way for each must tend to superimpose his own version of truth on the events presented as indeed was actually the case in the case of the recent Japanese film, "Rashmon," in which four views of reality were offered in the picture itself. Correspondence between the film mode and what may well be the mental mode is too great to be lightly dismissed. (Since there is no space for any reference to television, this opportunity for another communication correspondence will have to be by-passed but obviously, much should be said on this.)

As Suzanne Langer says, "Language is without a doubt the most momentous and at the same time, the most mysterious product of the human mind." (PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942, p. 102.) Sapir has said "Language (is) . . . . a tendency to be real by symbolism." (IBID, p. 108.) The film thus demonstrates the validity of both these statements. As a reflection of the mystery of the human mind it is able to present images "out of space, out of time," and its influence on the human mind is such that many interpretations arise from the subjective manipulations and juxtapositions of its content -- depending, of course, on the individual human mind itself.

The recent, "Last Year at Marienbad," produced by France's Alan Renoir offers one of the best illustrations of the quality just mentioned. Here at the outset one views, through many strange angle shots portions of the decoration and facade of a rather gloomy castle or main edifice of a famous European spa, identified as Marienbad (actually Nymblhenburg Castle, a few miles outside Munich), while a sepulchral voice comments on the decadence and ruin that apparently now characterize this setting. When persons appear they are not clearly identified and move singly and in groups in a most mysterious fashion. The dialogue, if such it may be called, gets nowhere. As the film shifts among past, present, and future one cannot quite be sure which mode is actually present at a given time.

The statute (of Charles IV of Bohemia) is subject to various interpretations but perhaps its chief use is to anchor the scenes depicted in some kind of reality -- or even more likely to suggest some commitment to manners or morality (which probably the main characters lack). All in all "Last Year" suggests through its peculiar mental images (1) the transitory nature of life; (2) the inevitability of change; (3) the insignificance of individuals in a sea of overpowering events; (4) the difficulty of knowing anything for certain -- as in Rashmon several views of a possible reality are given; or (5) the decay of old systems of thought and the metamorphoses of the new phoenix-like out of the demolition of the past. (The film too can be said to deal with ideologies but this interpretation -- and its meaning to contemporary European, or cosmopolitan life -- cannot be followed in the space here allowed. "Last Year," baffling and obscure, offers a picture of mind that is in perfect character with the view of knowledge which we have attempted to present in this short paper. And, in recapitulation now we must emphasize again the sequence of the "natural order" through which it has been suggested that epistemology, the rationalization of the existence of knowledge, appears. These are: (1) invention; (2) agreement; and (3) pattern or selection, or, in reverse, reality, knowledge, and education.

We do not lack testimony as to the existence "raptus" -- to employ a term that will be familiar to readers of Beethoven's life -- that descended upon Richard Wagner also, submerged and transformed him, when he was in the thick of composition. Herr Weissheimer has told us how, in Biebirch in 1862, he chanced to interrupt Wagner during the final composition of der Meistersinger:

"I knocked at his door, and as he did not answer I assumed that he had gone to the hotel to dine. I was just on the point of seeking him out there when I heard a commotion inside. I knocked again . . . . (Here follows a report on Wagner's trance)."

Indeed Wagner used the piano now and then, as all composers do, to try out audibly what he had already put on paper. But the piano sometimes served a further purpose in his case: the sound of the music somehow helped him to recall, from the background of his memory, passages, and the connecting matter between them, that he had shaped for himself in weeks or months or years gone by, as he had brooded over the characters and episodes of his work. It helped him, in fact, to get into the "cataleptic" state that is necessary for artistic creation of the finest kind. We have Wagner's own clear and plain testimony to this effect. He told Cosmina in 1874 that "When I sit down to the piano it is only to recall things; no new idea

129.

occurs to me there." (Richard Graf du Moulin Eckart, Cosmina Wagner (Munich: 1929, 1931), Vol. I, pp. 704-705.) As quoted in Louis Gottschalk, UNDERSTANDING HISTORY (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 294. This illustration of the transcendental nature of ideas and their recall through stimulus is quite reminiscent of Plato (Meno) although we have, in this paper, stressed a more mundane source for the pristine conception, namely, the intricacy of the mind itself, being governed by (1) its inherent force, and (2) its stored experience.

CHAPTER 14.

"HOW DO YOU KNOW YOU KNOW?" -- THE QUESTION NOBODY ASKS.

BERNICE GOLDMARK.

For two years prior to this one I worked in a special program educating teachers "at the front." The entire teacher education year was spent in the public school classrooms, participating in the appalling realities of public education. I could write volumes about my experiences during those two years, but my concern at present is with the apparent failure of philosophers of education to influence education in the classroom.

My indictment of philosophers of education is based on the assumption that there is a distinctive task that philosophers of education have in the process of education, and that this task is to teach teachers to ask specific questions that we call "philosophic." That is, while scientists, historians, mathematicians, artists, ask their special discipline questions, and thus conduct their inquiries, philosophers should be asking their special questions and conducting philosophic inquiry with their students. These philosophic questions are "second order" questions about the first order discipline inquiries: what are the assumptions made about man and reality? what is valued as good? what is the criterion for truth? how do you know you know?

The failure of philosophers of education to ask these questions, and to teach teachers to ask these questions, stems in part from the preoccupation of philosophy of education with analysis of language and word "meanings," and, in part from its romance with psychology which produces an admixture of categories, assumptions, and values that result in confusion rather than clarity in education. Unfortunately, the major directions in education today are based on the first order inquiries of psychology, rather than on the second order inquiries about discipline inquiries, resulting in very limited learning, authoritarian control of knowledge, and for the student, cognitive and aesthetic emasculation. In this paper I will focus on only one philosophic question that has been neglected in teacher education, and, therefore, in the education of children, the question, "How do you know you know?"

Traditionally, education focused on what should be known. Knowledge was seen as a product, able to be selected, organized, and transmitted to others. Dewey's concepts of knowledge broadened the concerns of educators from the limited "knowing that" to "knowing how," and schools taught methods of doing and making as well as static bodies of knowledge. However, other concepts of knowledge that Dewey expounded failed to influence the direction of education significantly. Knowledge as a reconstructable product of inquiry, and the social uses of knowledge have not become major concerns of the schools. While students may learn to ask how the scientist, mathematician, historian or artist obtains his knowledge -- what methods of inquiry he uses -- students do not learn to ask how this knowledge is warranted. While students may learn to examine the statements of the discipline inquirers, they do not learn to question the grounds of the statement, nor do they learn to compare and evaluate alternative grounds.

As Vandenberg states, any theory about teaching and learning depends upon a conception of knowledge "operative before (empirical) inquiry and presupposed by the inquiry." (1) He goes on to say:

"in educative learning the pupil not only learns things but obtains the warrant for believing that what he learns is what he is entitled to know." (2)

More than this, however, the pupil obtains the warrant for believing that how he knows is the way in which he is entitled to know. The moral significance is clear. As Lewis says, "To know is to apprehend the future as qualified by values which action may realize." (3) "Knowledge is not a descriptive but a normative category. . . ." (4) The value judgments implicit in one's view of what can be known and how it can be known for desired futures direct all of education theory and practice. These value judgments, however, are rarely made explicit so that they can be examined critically and reconstructed.

It is not too strong to say that children are brainwashed to (1) know, and (2) believe what is prescribed for them to know and believe, and (3) believe in the ways of knowing and believing prescribed for them. O'Neil and Demos state:

"The ultimate goal of brainwashing is a belief-system which can be characterized in four ways. (1) It is comprehensive (providing a rational basis for action in all significant instances). (2) It is terminal (in the sense of being both fixed and enduring). (3) It is self-confirming (in the sense that it affords subsequent psychological access only to those experiences which sustain and reinforce its own assumptions). (4) It provides an invariable source of both intellectual (ideological) orientation and emotional commitment." (5)

Whether or not the schools are successful in achieving these goals, as we look at the directions in education today, it becomes astonishingly clear that these ultimate goals are held, albeit covertly. Moreover, classrooms conform to the four basic ways in which O'Neil and Demos say a "total brainwashing situation" can be characterized: (1) "a deliberate attempt to bring about a significant modification in basic beliefs" by (2) "precipitating drastic modification in the underlying pattern of personal values" (3) seeking to "realize this moral reform indirectly by manipulating behavior" and (4) relying "primarily upon self-induced changes brought about within a totally controlled learning environment." (6) Although O'Neil and Demos claim that the brainwashing situation is based upon "a type of operant conditioning in which situational variables are manipulated to create the kind of consequences which act to control both the nature and strength of subsequent behavior," manipulation for the control of subsequent behavior is observable in all styles of classrooms, whether the term "operant conditioning" is used or not. For, so long as students are limited to single ways of knowing, so long as what they know and how they know it is prescribed authoritarianly, so long as they are disallowed questions about the grounds of knowledge and a critical examination of alternative grounds, just so long are they manipulated for the "control of subsequent behavior" and for the acceptance of a prescribed belief system.

If we examine the directions of education that are observable in public classrooms, the absence of philosophic inquiry, and the dominance of imposed psychology theories justify the use of the term "brainwashing" for education.

One major new direction in education is the "engineered classroom." Sometimes called "operant conditioning," and sometimes "behavior modification," the type of education referred to by the euphemism "engineered classroom" is education based on the model of behaviorist psychology applying the principles of stimulus-response learning and rewarded successes. Knowledge is a standardized, static product. Selected subject matter to be learned is broken down into small, sequential steps, and fed to the learner in doses. The methods of learning are also standardized. All children proceed from part to part until they have "covered" a whole. They learn linearly and sequentially. Moreover, they learn passively and unquestioningly. Knowledge is accepted and believed according to the warrants accepted by the different discipline inquiries. Children do not even inquire in the ways in which scientists, mathematicians, historians, or artists inquire, but, rather, learn to accept knowledge, methods, assumptions and values without (1) knowing that they are accepting single sets knowledge and beliefs, (2) learning that other possibilities exist, (3) learning to explore other possibilities, (4) learning to create new possibilities. Both "knowing that" and "knowing how" are regarded as habit formation. Knowledge is absolute and authoritarian. Warrants and grounds, assumptions and values are never acknowledged, no less considered or inquired into. This type of education, if consistent and successful, comes closest to the characteristics of a brainwashing situation set forth by O'Neil and Demos.

A second trend in education is called the "open classroom." Under this rubric are a variety of patterns -- and lack of patterns -- based on different psychology theories. In its original conception in Great Britain, the "open classroom" was based on the descriptive (read "prescriptive") developmental theories of Piaget. The classroom is organized, and the curriculum constructed so that children can be helped through the stages of development that Piaget set forth as norms. In this view of learning, knowledge is as fixed and absolute as are the stages of the learner's development. Piaget's world is stable independent of the learner's perception; it is organized and lawful. As with the "engineered classroom" education, the learner needs only to proceed through the prescribed operations to arrive at prescribed knowledge-products. The ways of knowing are equally rigidly prescribed, as learners are taken through stages of learning from sensori-motor experiences, to the final (and most valued) "formal operations" stage. Children learn to accept the ways of knowing and the knowledge that are built into the "programs" and "systems" that they use. No questions about the claims made, the conditions justifying the claims, the warrants for belief are raised. Again the values and beliefs are controlled because the knowledge and the ways of coming to know are controlled.

In American classrooms the variety of "open classrooms" almost defies categorization. However, we philosophers are not about to allow educators to escape the responsibility of their behavior under the holy banner of "individuality." There are some major characteristics that can be identified and examined critically amid the profusion of individualized styles and adaptations. Two dominant positions emerge from the confusion of "open classrooms." The first of these follows the model of the cognitive psychologists. Learning is seen as a process of restructuring one's cognitive structure. The self, existing in a field (life-space) changes when learning occurs. In this interaction-of-the-person-and-his environment theory knowledge is seen as dependent upon the individual's purposes which determine his interpretation. Because knowledge is knowledge only as it is incorporated into one's personal cognitive structure it is idiosyncratic. Considerable emphasis is put on how one knows rather than on the "substantive structures" of the disciplines. (7) Phenix says:

"It is more important for the student to become skillful in the ways of knowing than to learn about any particular product of investigation. Knowledge of methods makes it possible for a person to continue learning and to undertake inquiries on his own." (8)

Knowledge of methods, however, tells you only how the inquirer operated -- how he organized his means-ends relations to arrive at "X" conclusion. It does not tell you anything about what he accepts as the warrant for his conclusion and methods. Thus, if one has knowledge of the methods by which a physicist arrives at his conclusions, one presumably can "continue learning" and inquiring with the tools of physics and formulate new conclusions according to the conditions prescribed by the inquiry called "physics." Such conclusions, and ways of arriving at them, however, are still limited to first order operations, still controlled by the prescriptions of the discipline, and still directed by a single set of values and assumptions. Again, the student does not ask how he knows he knows.

The second dominant position in American "open classrooms" is that based loosely on the psychology theories of the Humanistic Psychologists -- Maslow, Rogers, Existentialists, Phenomenologists in some cases. Although these are often strange bedfellows, the classrooms can be identified by four characteristics. (1) An emphasis is given to "individualized instruction;" (2) children are given choices and are involved in decision-making; (3) there is considerable activity and learning by doing; (4) attention is given to improving the "self-concept" of the learner. Although these four characteristics are incorporated in some measure in these "open classrooms" and held to be desirable, they are based on very different concepts of knowledge.

(1) "Individualized instruction" is achieved by the use of programs, books, or workbooks in which knowledge as a product is important. Knowledge is given in a body, and is, moreover, singular, uniform, static, and

non-controversial. Despite its name, this method of instruction is very much like the "engineered classroom" with knowledge dispensed in small, sequential steps. Only the rate of instruction is individualized, not the method nor the product.

(2) Where children are involved in decision-making processes, knowledge is seen as the product of inquiry. Often, the process of inquiring is more important than the conclusion arrived at, although children are not always apprised of this value judgment. Again, however, a single process is imposed on children. Decision-making through inquiry and reason are pushed as values and few alternatives are considered, no less evaluated.

(3) In the learning by doing aspects of the "open classroom" students are coming to "know how," rather than to "know that." There is little reflection or intellectualizing about activities. McLellan says, after Ryle:

"Knowing what one is doing is a way, a mode, a style of doing something. It is not doing and something else internal and unobservable." (9)

However, if there is no "something else" after the doing there is little hope for deliberate, organized reconstruction of experience. "Knowing what one is doing" could serve to limit one to activities analogous to the activities engaged in. That is, without a retrospective analysis, a "something else" going on in the process of doing and knowing what one is doing, it is unlikely that methods can be expanded beyond the types of activities that are analogous to those one knows.

(4) Where efforts are made to improve the self-concept of the learner, either by general treatment by a teacher or by special activities designed to focus on the self as viewed by others, knowledge is seen as a personal perception of the world and the perception of others. Much of the process described by the humanist psychologists is vague because of a distrust of definitions, theories, and systems. Loosely, however, the belief is that if a person has a positive concept of himself he will be open to knowing in many different ways, and will be able to integrate his knowledge into his personality and thus improve his self-concept further. In the language of the phenomenologists, reality is "an object of consciousness;" knowing and perceiving is perspectival, and education is concerned with the "conscious search for new perspectives by the learner." (10)

"Learning, however, must be on some level self-initiated, since it involves the conscious search for new perspectives by the learner. He is the one who must effect relationships among his manifold experiences; he is the one who must impose configurations upon his own life-world. . . . It would appear that he needs to become aware of how he himself has constituted meanings in the course of his living. . ." (11)

Greene says further that "all depends on the rediscovery of consciousness -- on the individual's awareness of his own perceiving, his own believing, his own thinking, in sum -- of his own reflective life." (12)

The American style "open classroom" is characterized by a confusion of concepts of knowledge, and thus by a confusion of assumptions and value claims. I have described four observable aspects of the American "open classroom" to illustrate this confusion. Any one of these taken separately, or in any combination, is still subject to the same criticism I levelled at other education styles. All fail to teach children to ask philosophic questions about knowledge and ways of knowing. Grounds and warrants are never questioned. Single modes are imposed when different tasks are undertaken, and no attempts are made to compare alternative modes, to evaluate them, or to reconstruct them. In brief, children "do" and "learn" without awareness that what they do and how they do it is only one alternative -- without inquiry into their own behavior. The failure of philosophers of education to emphasize the philosophic questions, such as, "how do you know you know," so that teachers can learn to emphasize them with children, has resulted in very limited and controlled knowledge. Let me elaborate further.

In what sense can we say we know anything, if we do not know how we know? What qualifies as "knowledge" depends upon the system in which it is given meaning. That is, we know only "because the mind is prepared to judge it real or unreal according as it bears or fails to bear certain marks. . ." (13) To even take note that there is a "something" to know, is to impose criteria for "something" and "nothing." Thus any knowledge claims are based on criteria of a system imposed which warrants a claim. As Lewis explains, what we know depends upon "predetermined principles of interpretation, the criteria of our distinguishing and relating, of classification, and hence the criteria of reality of any sort." (14)

Any knowledge, or ways of knowing, imposed on students, limits the student to the criteria, categories of classification, and principles of interpretation of the system in which that knowledge gains the status of knowledge. Such knowledge is authoritarian. Students are not even aware that the knowledge they are required to accept is only an alternative interpretation. Thus they believe that what they know is.

What is even more frightening, however, is that alternative systems warranting knowledge impose value judgments in the process. Knowing is a signification of "if...then..." relations -- the creation of symbols of futures. When knowing is restricted to the criteria, categories, and principles of interpretation of a single system, then futures are determined accordingly. Students who are denied the opportunity to evaluate alternative possible futures, are subjected to a value system selected by an "authority." How can we justify an education system that imposes knowledge, and, therefore, imposes also values, beliefs, and futures? How can we justify an education system that deceives students into believing that they know, when in fact they only know what they are told to know? How can we justify an education system that by limiting knowledge and ways of knowledge, makes knowledge effete?

I suggest that philosophers of education need to teach teachers to ask philosophic questions so that they can, in turn, teach children to ask philosophic questions. This can be done by (1) asking of any first order statement, of anything "known" or any way of knowing, what system gives it status as knowledge or method; (2) examining the criteria, categories and principles of relationships of the system, and comparing them with those of other systems; and (3) evaluating the consequences of the knowledge and method for desirable futures and the futures themselves for their continued desirability. Only as students become accustomed to not only "how do I know I know?" but also, "how should I come to know?" will "philosophy itself...work some alteration of the active attitude by which the given in experience is met and moulded." (15)

Documentations.

1. Vandenberg, Donald, ed., Theory of Knowledge and Problems of Education, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Ill., 1969, p. 233.

2. Ibid.

3. Lewis, C. I., An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, Open Court Publishing Co., LaSalle, Ill., 1964, p. 4.

4. Vandenberg, op. cit., p. 10.

138.

5. O'Neil, William, and George Demos, *Education Under Duress*, LDI Books, Los Angeles, Ca., 1971, p. 5.

6. *Ibid*.

7. Elam, Stanley, ed., *Education and the Structure of Knowledge*, Rand McNally, Chicago, Ill., 1964, p. 9.

8. Phenix, Philip, *Realms of Meaning*, McGraw Hill, New York, 1964. p. 11.

9. McClellan, James E., "Propositional Knowledge and Cognitive Action," in *Theory of Knowledge and Problems of Education*, Donald Vandenberg, ed., University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1969, pp. 197-208.

10. Greene, Maxine, *Towards a Reciprocity of Perspectives*, paper read at annual meeting Philosophy of Education Society, San Francisco, April, 1972.

11. *Ibid*.

12. *Ibid*.

13. Lewis, C. I., *Mind and the Work Order*, Dover Publications, New York, 1956, p. 231.

14. *Ibid*.

15. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

CHAPTER 15.

A POSSIBLE EPISTEMOLOGY AND SOME OF ITS EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS.

JOHN B. CONNELY.

We are all familiar with a dictionary definition of epistemology. It is the subject that treats of the "origin, nature, methods and limits of human knowing." Most of us, I assume, would also agree that we all willy-nilly have an epistemology, whether or not we want to, are aware of it, can accurately or adequately describe it, or even feel any need to do so.

The consequences of the centrality of epistemological questions and formulations to educational problems, however, seem far from overwhelmingly apparent to many, if not most, professional educators and lay people. There seems little cognizance of how epistemological queries bear directly on mundane educational matters. But if knowledge assertions are part of the warp and woof of an educational endeavor, then epistemological questions such as the following would seem relevant. What is knowledge? What does it mean to know something? How is knowledge developed? What is the relationship between knowledge and experience, and between knowledge and reality? How can it be determined what has been learned? And, how can it be determined whether one's knowledge is true or probable?

In an attempt to provide a means of being able to discuss such questions and their implications, I have chosen a number of General Semantics' formulations in order to develop an epistemological construct.

(1) Reality exists and is experienced as a territory or complex matrix of ordered relationships, e.g., before, after, more, less, above, below, left, right, here, there, part and whole. (1)

(2) A map is an asserted structure of ordered relationships. (2)

(3) A map may have a structure similar to or dissimilar to the structure which was, is being or may be discovered in some particular territory. (3)

(4) Two similar structures will have similar 'logical' characteristics. Thus, if in a correct map, Dresden is given as between Paris and Warsaw, a similar relation will be found in the actual territory. (4)

(5) Maps are developed through an abstracting process. Abstracting is the selecting or noticing of some particular order or relationship from among the totality of stimuli available at any one time. It thus involves the overlooking or disregard of other equally present stimuli. (5)

(6) Maps can become more adequate and more accurate by exploring the territory in manifold ways. By abstracting different relationships, all partial, eventually through explicating and summarizing, maps develop while yet remaining specific and partial. (6)

(7) This process can be described as a retroactive feedback cycle in which the map can be both the results of the process and an instrument by which further inquiry or reaction may be directed and evaluated. (7)

By using such a construct a number of epistemological questions can be provisionally answered. Knowledge is a predicated structure of ordered relationships. It is analogous to a map or a series of maps. To know something is to have internalized such a structure. Knowledge is developed through a cyclical process which is one of an emerging clarity or precision within an apprehended whole. The interaction between knowledge and experience is twofold. Experience serves as the matrix from which relations can be abstracted which can then be connected so as to form a knowledge structure. Experience also serves as the field against which various aspects of knowledge can be compared in an effort to infer the degree of correspondence between the knowledge structure and reality. The relationship between a knowledge structure and reality is then one of the possibility of similarity of structure.

The implications of the map construct for a theory of learning are of central interest. Learning becomes perceiving relationships and building an ordered structure from these relations by means of a cyclical, developmental process. To posit such a process enables us to ask several questions. Which specific relations can or should be used? How are they to be linked: causally, chronologically, topically or logically? In a larger sense what should be the logic(s), i.e. rules of coherence, of the structure within which the individual relations are ordered? How extensive and/or dense should such a structure be? Is there a priority as to how learning is to proceed, or whether structural knowledge or knowledge of particular relations is of greater import? By what standards can it be evaluated that the developmental cycle has progressed far enough, i.e. when or at what point can a knowledge structure be considered adequate?

What would reading be? Within such a construct it would appear that reading must be some sort of ability to translate symbols into a structure of relations which ostensibly is similar to the structure intended by the author. Reading is primarily, then, the perception of this structure of relationships and not the pronouncing of words nor strings of words nor even knowing the meaning of each word per se. Since such a structure may extend well beyond a relation posited by a sentence, reading would seem to be perceiving not only the relation posited by a sentence but that by a paragraph, paragraphs, sections, chapters, and, indeed, by an entire book. If this is so, to what extent does reading depend on concomitant learning? A section, chapter, or book cannot be read instantaneously. Before one can say that he has read something, if by read he means translated the symbols into the structure they represent as a group, the various parts which constitute the whole must have been translated and learned to some extent so as to be able to construct the whole which is in of itself not directly perceivable. Reading beyond simple statements, therefore, would appear to involve some learning, perhaps to an extensive degree.

How can it be determined whether a knowledge structure has been developed? In common parlance there does not seem to be too much difficulty in defining learning -- something has been learned when it can be done. You have learned to play the piano when you can play the piano, albeit there are different levels of achievement. In a like sense, if knowledge is apprehension of an ordered structure, that knowledge can be said to be learned when a given person is, in fact, able to demonstrate his awareness of that structure. The extent of his knowledge can be judged by the extent to which the specific structure is known to him. The *sine qua non* of an evaluation of learning thus becomes a definition of what will be acceptable as representative of the degree of learning desired. In terms of the epistemological construct espoused in this paper, knowledge is defined as a variety of relationships ordered in some structure; therefore, learning can be demonstrated to the degree one can evidence that he has internalized certain relationships and the ability to order them in the desired order.

How can it be determined whether what one has learned is true or probable? In theory the solution is simple. One's knowledge structure is true to the extent its structure is similar to that of reality. In practice there are at least three major problems and a host of difficulties. One problem is that part of the knowledge structure does not correspond in any simple fashion with experience, e.g., generalizations, scientific constructs, and judgments. The second problem is that much of the knowledge structure deals with experiences which are not reproducible such as those in the past or the future. The third problem is that the reality by which the knowledge structure is to be tested is itself only indirectly known through our experiences. A determination of truth thus becomes a question of the degree of probability produced by corroborative evidence. Thus, much of the knowledge structure can be considered as a prediction that if it were possible to check the posited correspondence, the believed structure would be true. In as much as the corroborative evidence which is asserted to increase or decrease the probability of a given statement is also a product of the same process by which the statement to be evidenced was produced, the problem of proving what one believes may become itself a task at least as difficult, if not more so, as learning the knowledge in the first place.

What would thinking be? It is not an activity apart, but rather the activity by which or through which the knowledge structure is originated, developed, used and tested. A person is thinking when he is abstracting relationships from the symbolic or non-symbolic stimuli of his environment. He is thinking when he is constructing a knowledge structure from those perceived relationships. He is thinking when he seeks to evaluate what he has learned and the order in which he has arranged it. He is thinking when he seeks to ascertain the degree of probability of what he believes and what methods and evidence could aid corroboration. Finally, to begin again, he is thinking when he is abstracting relationships from the symbolic or non-symbolic stimuli of his environment -- which not only initiates the whole cycle, but acts as feedback by which to check what has already been learned.

Conclusions.

Learning is active, purposive, and individual. Groups do not learn. Someone cannot learn for someone else. Learning does not occur due to exposure, because relations must be abstracted from available stimuli and integrated into a knowledge structure. Only an individual can do this, and he can do it only if he is aware and motivated. An individual can learn from books, teachers or his non-verbal experiences; but knowledge cannot be forced upon someone, only he can abstract and put what was abstracted into some sort of structure. Learning is not linear programming. It is a developmental, retroactive feedback cycle where what has been learned directs what is to be learned, and what is being learned may modify what has been learned. It is the progressive clarification or relationships within a framework or structure which may also grow more definite or may be modified as learning progresses. Therefore, the concepts of teaching as transmission and learning as mainly symbol or stimuli retention are largely inapplicable to human learning.

Thinking cannot be separated from learning and evaluating. One learns to think better by thinking about something, i.e. by learning. The effort to teach students to think by teaching them to be critical may run the risk of merely propagandizing against one set of authorities which may leave them vulnerable to another, e.g., their peers. Or the effort may leave students doubting all authority, even that of coherent thought and of corroborative evidence. Adequate thinking is the result of adequate learning and in turn enables adequate learning to occur. Thus, adequate thinking is the manner in which any subject may be learned whether it is fishing, auto mechanics or the history of ancient Babylon.

No specific curriculum would, therefore, seem to be espoused, but rather a number of concepts by which to evaluate whichever curriculum is suggested. A curriculum should be, in itself, a coherent structure of stimuli, techniques, materials and goals. In this sense survey courses and attempts to mix various subjects may run the danger of becoming a mere collection of cookbook recipes and isolated facts when the structure within which they are meaningful is removed or when the structure becomes so loose that it is only apparent to someone who already knows the subject, e.g., a social science curriculum where parts of a variety of subjects have been lifted out of their logical context and juxtaposed; or a world history course in which the course becomes the memorization of bits of data which have no particular relationship to one another. This is not to say that a curriculum must be created for each learner, but that a curriculum should be a series of planned, articulated experiences by which the learner can progress to some goal. It may well be that one curriculum does not fit the learning abilities or needs of all children, yet a poor curriculum may fit the needs of no one.

Finally, teaching can be defined as the activity of helping someone construct a knowledge structure. In as much as learning is a personal, purposive activity, the teacher can only offer stimuli and encouragement and evaluate responses. Learning is up to the learner. Yet to the extent that learning is a function of what stimuli are available, its meaningfulness to the learner and of the appropriateness and meaningfulness of the feedback received, every teacher bears a responsibility for the learning which occurs within his students. There may be no happy solution as long as education is primarily a group phenomena; and even if such learner had a tutor, this could not achieve equal learning for all, because all are not equal in abilities and experiences and motivation. Still, if a teacher knows what he is about, he can maximize the possibility of achieving his goals given the materials at hand. No one can do more and many do less.

If we conclude as Mencius, the ancient Chinese sage, concluded long ago that the mind works according to its own notion of the way it ought to work, then a partial solution to the supposed antagonism between subject and matter and the needs of individual learners would seem to be to teach all courses so as to encourage epistemological understanding. For no matter what a person learns, everything cannot be learned as a youth. Learning goes on as long as life. Since learning is a function of each individual and his prior learnings and his interests and desires, what is learned at one age may seem less than adequate at a later time. And if all learning could occur during youth, and if each youth could learn so exquisitely that nothing once learned need be better understood later in life, even then the future is too problematical to assuredly ascertain what everyone or anyone needs to know. The goal of schooling would be to use whatever materials are at hand to facilitate the development of each person's epistemological skills. This in no way would make learning easy, nor do away with subject matter. On the contrary, it would involve a serious effort to learn well, and learn at great length. But the goal would be beyond learning a subject for that subject's sake; it would be no less than the use of learning to facilitate the development of the learner's ability to learn and to live in, evaluate, and, if desired, intelligently modify the world in which he finds himself.

Documentations.

1. Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics (International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Company. Distributed by the Institute of General Semantics, Lakeville, Conn., 4th ed., 1958), pp. 188-191.

2. Ibid., p. 750.

7

145.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 376.

6. Ibid., p. 375.

7. Harry L. Weinberg, Levels of Knowing and Existence (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 257-265.

CHAPTER 16.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAPACITY FOR AESTHETIC REACTION THROUGH AUTONOMOUS CHOICE.

CATHARINE PHILLIPS FELS.

The decision-making implicit in any aesthetic production is easier to perceive than in the aesthetic "reaction-to-the-object" situation. It is the thesis of this paper that it is, nevertheless, not very different in nature; or, perhaps more accurately, that the two kinds of decision-making overlap, having considerable areas of similarity. Practice in one kind of aesthetic decision-making then, has relevance to the development of abilities in the other kind.

If this seems too obvious to call for discussion, one can defend the undertaking by pointing out that "Art" is often taught to children with the decision-making removed. The teacher passes out mimeographed chicks and says, "Color them yellow," or mimeographed hearts and cupids and says, "Paste them on a doily." At its worst, this is what art educators bewail as "recipe" teaching.

At the other end of the spectrum is art appreciation at the college level that is taught like art history. Art history is a respectable scholarly field, but its study does not necessarily lead to aesthetic encounter with works of art. It may be helpful for some, but historical data can get in the way of the aesthetic perceptions of others. This may well be because the historical information leads them away from personal decision-making into paths of thought leading away from the work of art rather than intensifying the focus of attention on it.

Artist and viewer must make similar decisions at the beginning of an aesthetic encounter. The artist must decide what kind of a work of art he will make. The viewer, who has a slightly different decision, since some limits are already set for him by the artist, must recognize what class of art he is viewing. The recognition is a decision. If the viewer cannot classify in any way whatever he will not be able to recognize the work of art as art. (We should distinguish between art, which we define as man-made, and natural objects of aesthetic encounter, such as sunsets.)

This first decision is in answer to the question, "What is it?" For a viewer to have an aesthetic encounter he must decide that the answer is, "It is art." Often at the same moment he decides what kind or class of art.

The first decision the artist makes is in answer to the question, "What class of art will I make?" If an artist is long established as a painter or sculptor this decision may have been made in the past and does not seem to be necessary over and over again. Even though habit may make the decision, it is nonetheless made. At the beginning of each new work there is a possibility that the artist may choose another path. Our culture is so heterogeneous that many artists do choose another path than they have previously taken. That this is so clearly the case emphasizes the action of decision-making in the aesthetic processes of production.

The significance of this decision as to what class of art it is, or what class of art it is to be, is that it is the first necessary incident in aesthetic experience. Recognition of the aesthetic nature of an experience can come later in the encounter in certain instances. For example, the discovery that anthropological or archaeological material that was primarily interesting for sociological or historical significance also has aesthetic quality. The discovery has the nature of decision-making; it is at the point of making this discovery that aesthetic experience begins.

For the process that follows to be aesthetic, whether it is perceptive or productive, this decision needs to be an autonomous one -- made by each person for himself out of his personal experience of the situation. The artist who decides to make a work of art in a certain style or class because that style is "in," is selling well, or is receiving recognition at the big museums, is not making an autonomous decision. The decision has been influenced by events that are irrelevant to the work of art. However, when a work of art is commissioned, the limitations put on it by the patron are hardly irrelevant. The initiative decision in the case of commissioned work is made by the patron.

In a reality situation between patron and artist, decisions on a commissioned work are often made cooperatively. A good description of such a relationship is given by Henry Adams about his relationship with the sculptor, Augustus St. Gaudens. (1) (Interestingly enough the Adams Memorial is the work St. Gaudens is remembered by.) The decision made by

Adams were important. It is not unlikely that Adams was by far the greater aesthetician. It seems probable that St. Gaudens was technically an able sculptor, but not a person capable of great aesthetic decisions. However that might be, it illustrates the area of primary decision-making rather well.

Following the decision that the experience does indeed fall into the classification "aesthetic" the viewer or artist decides, imperceptible or unconscious though that decision may be, to take an aesthetic stance. The aesthetic stance is different from a cognitive stance or a stance that could lead to action and, notably, from a judgmental stance.

Mystical descriptions of what a creative stance is are numerous. However, Theodore Reik, a non-mystic psychiatrist, describes it as "Listening with the Third Ear." (2) In Reik's profession that means hearing selectively, simultaneously putting together thoughts, ideas, and expressions in a relationship different from the everyday sequence, but relevant in a psychiatric context. J. P. Guilford ascribes to the "creative personality" several characteristics that resemble Reik's description. (3) He says that the creative person has the ability to combine disparate parts into a new unity, to derive many ideas from one, to make links and connections between ideas ordinarily regarded as unrelated, to be at ease with ambiguities, to be interested in the unusual, and the like. Abraham Maslow speaks of many of these same characteristics as belonging to the self-actualizing person. (4)

Both artist and viewer take the creative stance -- one of taking in the material available from as wide a perceptive horizon as possible, exercising an intelligent, relaxed integration of the ideas presented, bringing the total life experience into potential relationship with the aesthetic encounter.

The aesthetic stance is similar for artist and viewer. The artist, however, has an intention of action; he maintains the aesthetic stance throughout the action if all goes well. The viewer assumes the perceptive aspects of the stance. Part of the viewer's aesthetic-perceptive experience consists of following the path of action taken by the artist while making the work of art. The viewer does not follow physical motions except to the degree that eye motions do this -- a minor though essential part of the artist's physical movements. What the viewer follows is the path of the effects of the artist's decisions. Once this is understood it is clear that a viewer does indeed take an aesthetic stance in a sense quite close to that of the artist. Although he need not grasp intellectually exactly what was done by the artist in his craftsman's role, he follows the artist's action in a very real sense with his eyes. What he sees as an aesthetically perceptive viewer is the effect or result of the artist's decisions.

Judgments and feelings often get in the way of taking an aesthetic stance. To approach a work of art with a judgmental stance prevents the viewer from comprehending the aesthetic quality of the unfamiliar and of those things that touch on prejudices or biases. Often a judgmental stance is taken on the assumption of "standards." It used to be said of contemporary art -- and often is still said -- that, "There are no standards any more." This meant a list of "correctnesses;" pictures should have correct perspective, proportion, and color harmony or they are "wrong." The viewer must take a judgmental stance to decide whether the work of art is right or wrong. If a work of art makes the person feel uncomfortable it is wrong. That the artist intends to make us feel uncomfortable does not occur to this viewer who is hoping for art that evokes comfortable feelings, not art that challenges feelings.

Jacob Epstein, the British sculptor, tells a story about John Galsworthy's visit to a gallery where Epstein's "Ecce Homo," was displayed. Epstein, an expressionist, shows a suffering figure, emphasizing the physical agony of the event. Galsworthy and Epstein did not know one another. Galsworthy raved against the sculpture calling it blasphemous, ugly, vulgar, cruel, sacrilegious. When he left, the gallery owner apologized to Epstein saying that he would have thrown the man out if he hadn't been Galsworthy. Epstein said, "Not at all, don't apologize. He got the point."

My point is different. Galsworthy did realize, in a way, but not clearly and consciously, that Epstein was pointing out that the incident central to the Christian religion is a cruel and inhumane incident. Galsworthy did not have an aesthetic encounter and he did not take an aesthetic stance. He took a judgmental stance and passed a negative -- probably an ethical -- judgment on the work of art. Though he felt the artist's idea, he did not recognize it, perceive it, or receive it intellectually. Aesthetic perception may begin with feeling, but it does not end there.

The role of feeling in aesthetic encounter is basic. Both artist and viewer as they approach the encounter, one to produce the work of art, the other to consume it, so to speak, need first to experience their feelings -- their emotional reactions -- then to observe those feelings and acknowledge them. It is necessary then to ask: "Are these feelings relevant to giving or receiving whatever communication is intended?" If the emotions are in the way and cannot be "handled" by the artist or viewer no aesthetic encounter can take place. This "handling" probably consists of shelving for future reference or simple recognition that the feeling is not relevant.

That Picasso announced himself to be a communist on several occasions, or that he had several wives and mistresses, are facts that are totally irrelevant to grasping the aesthetic import of a Picasso work. These facts may come to mind, but they can be shelved as irrelevant. This problem is the viewer's.

To parallel this irrelevancy for an artist the example of sentimentality in so-called Western Art might be cited. Quite a few artists of excellent technical accomplishment have not been able to attain any objectivity over their sentimentality -- an emotional response -- towards the Old West (capital "O" and capital "W"). The resulting incorporation of this sentimentality, a petty emotion,* in the work of art causes the production of a work of limited aesthetic appeal -- limited, in fact, to those viewers who share the sentimentality. Emotional incorporations, if they are not sentimental, are aesthetically relevant as, for example, in the Epstein "Ecce Homo."

The manner in which a viewer must suspend judgments and irrelevant emotions and be able to summon relevant imaginings was brought to mind when I met a young woman in a New Mexico cliff dwelling where American Indians, in about 1300, built their home high above a mossy canyon. She looked around in the cave and said, "I wouldn't like to housekeep here." She stayed less than five minutes, not for a moment thinking about nor trying to grasp what life was like in Medieval America. It might not have seemed so sad if it had not been such a difficult climb to get there! The cliff dwellings are art -- architectural art. The person who assumes an aesthetic stance can have an aesthetically satisfying and interesting experience. A vigorous act of imagination, or what I call an active aesthetic stance is required to gain a significant experience.

How does this relate to the art that children do in school? First, to follow the artist's -- sculptor, architect, painter, or printmaker -- decision-making path gives the viewer an understanding, a "live" experience of the work of art. Art needs to be thought of in terms of making decisions leading to action. If children are to understand this they must make the decisions in doing their own art and feel responsibility for what occurs. E. B. Feldman has said that everything humans make has interest simply because humans make it. (5) I would amend that somewhat to say that everything humans make has interest because humans chose to make it, decided to make it, decided how to make it.

Our present purpose is to educate human beings to be capable of making aesthetic decisions and to follow the results of artists' decisions in works of art. The immediate need in education is for teachers to understand that art is taught (and learned) by presenting children with choices, helping the child to become a person who chooses -- who acts on free and autonomous choice. A child does not naturally choose at one time from the whole spectrum of school art supplies; neither must a child do the same thing as every other one of a class of thirty-odd youngsters. Viktor Lowenfeld points out the importance of children feeling that their art is their own, but writes only of teachers' interference. The idea of choice for the child does not occur to him. (6)

The crux of teaching art -- I am largely concerned with the philosophy of teaching art in the elementary school -- is that the children feel that they are truly the choosers (of what they will do) and that they feel responsible for the art they do. Teachers in elementary schools need not have extensive art training. After all, the children do the art; teachers need not and should not. Most adults, with a little self-confidence, can do what third-or fourth-graders do. Teachers today do need to realize that art is the exercise of personal autonomy and free choice in the area of visual expression. Anything else simply is not art.

Documentations.

1. Henry Adams, *Education of Henry Adams*, Modern Library, New York.

2. Theodore Reik, *Listening with the Third Ear*, 1948, Farrar.

3. J. P. Guilford, "Creative Activities in the Arts," *Psychological Review*, 64, 1957.

4. A. H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, Harper & Brothers, N. Y., 1954.

5. E. B. Feldman, *Becoming Human Through Art*, Prentice-Hall, N. J., 1970.

6. Webster, New World Dictionary. Sentimental: 2. affectedly or superficially emotional; pretending but lacking true depth of feeling...

CHAPTER 17.

EDUCATION AND THE POP PHILOSOPHERS -- TRICK, TREAT, OR TRASH.

HAYDEN R. SMITH AND DAVID K. GAST.

"Great men are not always wise: neither do the aged understand judgment." Job 32:9.

Introduction.

The title of a Cosmopolitan article asked "Andy Warhol -- Trick, Treat, or Trash?" The same intriguing question might be posed concerning the contributions of the so-called "pop" philosophers. To separate the trick from the treat, the treat from the trash, and the trash from the trick, is a difficult undertaking.

Who are the Pop Philosophers? A definition is difficult. Loosely defined it would be those individuals whose music, literature and life-style seem to have great popular appeal to the youth of the "now" generation. This group would include such individuals as Joan Baez, the Beatles, Bob Dylan, Janis Joplin, Arlo Guthrie, and James Taylor. There is little doubt that young people are learning from, and being influenced by, this strange counter-culture. For our purposes, the primary question was: What is the effect these purveyors of "pop" and counter-culture have upon students, teachers, and schools? Of secondary importance is whether these pop philosophers, in their life styles, poetry, music, and writings, are really wise men and seekers of truth?

In measuring the effectiveness of a teacher to teach one criterion is highly regarded, the ability to communicate with students. Can a teacher be effective when he has completely closed his eyes and mind to a whole world of ideas that are turning the minds of young people inside out? It is an assumption of the writers that a teacher's effectiveness is undeniably linked to an understanding of the students' cultural milieu.

A teacher need not condone, approve, nor disapprove the behavior of the "now" generation. However, it is imperative that he listen, observe, analyze, and be acquainted with this often strange pop culture if he is to effectively communicate with young people. Awareness and interest may indicate understanding and may aid in channeling aberrant, self-destructive behavior into directions of desirable growth. Here is a whole new world of subject matter, one in which relevancy, involvement, and sensitivity are the passwords.

All of us, long ago, passed through that difficult stage known as "adolescence," a fact some teachers conveniently ignore. The searching, the striving, the fads, the fancies, were true reality to us then, just as they are to young people today. However, if the problems seemed complex to us in that long ago, they have been compounded a hundred-fold by technology, affluence, and mass media. As adolescents and young adults we were called upon to stake out the wilderness of our own travail within the confines of that world which nurtured us. In the process, much as young people today, we developed a deep distrust for easy answers and an adult world which insisted we "think for ourselves" and then provided all of the answers. It is in this deep sense of mistrust in ready-made answers that young people yield to the temptation of other answers and seemingly "undesirable" influences -- be it pop, pot, yippy, or hippy. And so youth, in their age of dissent, struggle through a wilderness of self-searching which can involve absolutely anything -- religion, pot, Zen, sex, sensitivity, existentialism, and even cynical conformity or non-conformity. Perhaps, these are only momentary modes of lostness which might eventually provide the genuine means by which an individual finds himself.

I. The Pop Philosophers.

The intent of this paper was to gather information concerning a few individuals who seemed to be influential in the youth culture and to determine, if possible, their influence upon teachers and schools. Secondarily, it was hoped that by gathering this information, analyzing it, and disseminating it in an easily readable form, teachers would become interested in this "pop" culture and make some attempt to understand it.

No specific criteria were established for selecting the "pop" philosophers. In most cases selection was arbitrary and the primary criterion, with some exceptions, was popularity among youth as evidenced in newspapers, magazines, radio, T.V., and music. Advice was sought from students, and others, as to who might be considered "pop" philosophers. The original list of ten was increased to twenty-six and is by no means complete.

The inclusion of some of these individuals is open to question. Eldridge Cleaver was included because of his influence in the civil rights movement and Black militancy. While Hugh Hefner is also questionable, he was included because Playboy Magazine has been an influence upon young and old for a considerable length of time (five million circulation). Probably the most questionable inclusion is Eric Hoffer whose popularity among the "now" generation is practically nil. However, he does represent the conservative element and his Horatio Alger rise to fame, without formal education, provides an interesting parallel to the rise of many of the "pop" stars. Inclusion of the Jesus People is also questionable because this movement is just beginning (circa 1967). With this group only one name appears currently prominent, that of Duane Pederson, author of the Jesus People. However, we feel that this group may ultimately have a considerable influence upon youth.

Marshall McLuhan, while he is establishment oriented, was included because his writings deal with media, non-linearity, and technology as it affects environment and consciousness, all concerns of the "now" people. Important current thinkers like Herbert Marcuse, Theodore Roszak, Norman Brown, Charles Reich, Alan Watts, Paul Goodman, and others were not included because of limitations of time.

After the list was selected, the next step was to build a "fact sheet" on each of these individuals. The fact sheet included: year and place of birth, family life, father's occupation, socio-economic level, level of education, background material, apparent problems, life style, behavior, and values, key words, and areas of influence on youth, schools and teachers. Of these categories, beliefs, values, life style, and areas of influence were the most difficult to establish. However, in these categories, while much is speculative, an attempt was made to base them upon available information.

Material concerning these "pop" philosophers was difficult to come by. Standard sources such as professional journals and books have ignored these individuals with the exception of a few, i.e., the Beatles. Sources consulted were newspapers and popular magazines (Playboy, Esquire, Look, Life, Time, etc.). The most timely sources are the innumerable and often ephemeral underground newspapers, sources which are unavailable in most libraries. The major papers include The Berkeley Barb, The East Village

Other, the San Francisco and Southern California Oracles, the Los Angeles Free Press, the San Francisco Free Press, and the Hollywood Free Press. (To locate these publications write: Underground Communications, Inc., P. O. Box 211, Village Station, New York, N. Y.) Hours were spent browsing through bookstores to locate other publications.

After compiling this plethora of information, the crucial question remained, what to do with it? At first, we attempted to fit the individuals into neat little categorical pigeon holes. There would be folksingers like Bob Dylan, James Taylor, Joan Baez, Pete Seeger, and Arlo Guthrie. There would be poets like Allen Ginsberg, Rod McKuen, William Carlos Williams, and there would be rock singers like Elvis Presley, the Beatles, and the Moody Blues. There would be entertainers like Janis Joplin, Lenny Bruce, and others. There would be social critics like Eldridge Cleaver, Abbie Hoffman, Jack Kerouac, and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. The idea of categories was abandoned because each individual fell into several different categories, be it musician, poet, entertainer, and social critic.

We then attempted to classify the individuals into eras (10 year periods) and peak years of influence, 1940-1950, 1950-1960, and 1960-1970. The major difficulty with this type of classification was that the age span between individuals ran from twenty years of age to over seventy. Furthermore, the influence of some spanned the early part of this century (William Carlos Williams was born in 1883 and James Taylor was born in 1948.)

Thus, while no classification or categorization was easily apparent, some patterns seemed to exist. In an attempt to observe patterns, a composite fact sheet was prepared for easy data referral (see Figure 1). From the composite fact sheet, several figures and tables were prepared.

The birthdate time-line figure (see Figures 2 and 3) was divided into those individuals born before 1940 and those born after 1940. The time-line reveals that of the twenty-six individuals whose birthdates were available, seventeen (65 per cent) were born prior to 1940 and nine (35 per cent) were born after 1940. The age span between the oldest and youngest was sixty-five years. Excluding Williams, Hoffer, and McLuhan, the age span was twenty-eight years. The average age differential within the pre-1940 group (excluding Williams, Hoffer, and McLuhan) was about seven years. The age differential within the post-1940 group was a little over one year.

These data indicate a closer age affinity between the post-1940 group than that of the pre-1940 group. Using birthdates as a reference point, two-thirds of the "pop" philosophers fall into the over-thirty bracket. This would tend to dispel the myth within the pop culture that no one over thirty can be trusted. It could also mean that youth have no knowledge of, or respect for, the genesis of ideas. Or it could simply mean that most over-thirties are acknowledged to be establishment oriented.

Again using the pre and post-1940 group designations, tables were prepared to summarize the categories of family life, socio-economic level, and father's occupation (see Tables I, II). Sub-categories were also included: normal, abnormal (family life), upper, middle, lower (social class), professional-business, white collar, and blue collar (father's occupation).

NAME	BIRTHPLACE - DATE	FAMILY LIFE	FATHER'S OCCUPATION	SOCIO-ECONOMIC LEVEL	EDUCATION	PROBLEMS	LIFE STYLE	KEY WORDS	MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION	AREAS OF INFLUENCE ON YOUTH	AREAS OF INFLUENCE ON SCHOOLS
Joan Baez (Harris)	Staten Island, N.Y. - 1941	Normal, frequent absences of father, understanding mother, a teacher	Physicist, Ph.D., Mexican, UNESCO	Middle-middle	High school some college	Transiency, much moving, foreign countries, very sensitive, Mexican-Amer.	Folksy, non-conformist, natural	Non-violence, protest, Gandhi, folk music	Recordings, concerts, compositions	Non-violence, protest, guitar, folk music, non-conformity	Music, social studies
Beatles: George Harrison	Liverpool, England - 1943	Much poverty, on welfare, four children, understanding Mother	Bus driver	Lower	Through 5th form, grammar school, Liverpool Institute (city's top school)	Early dislike of school, much trouble with authority, non-conformity, flashy clothes, identity crisis	Non-conformist, long hair, drugs, sex, alcohol, now a confirmed mystic, flashy, bizarre	Poverty, non-conformity, long hair, teddy bear, mysticism	Recordings, concerts, compositions	Hair style, clothes, drugs, sex, alcohol, music mystcism	Music, dress codes
Beatles: John Lennon	Liverpool, England - 1940	Poverty, father deserts, mother struggles, John raised by aunt	Waiter, seaman	Lower	Through 5th form, grammar school, some art school	Broken home, rigid aunt, bullying, fighting, stealing, early sex, alcohol, and drugs, bright, identity crisis	Gang leader, fighter, cruel, aggressive, drugs, non-conformist, materialistic, a thinker, bizarre	Tragic childhood and as a young adult, Yoko, primal scream, religion, mysticism	Same	Same	Same
Beatles: Paul McCartney	Liverpool, England - 1942	Poverty, father mostly unemployed, Mother a nurse, dies when Paul is 14 years old	Salesman, some musical background, had a band	Lower	Through 5th form, grammar school, Liverpool Institute, top student for a while	Early penchant for trouble, gangs, fights, stealing, sex, drugs, alcohol, brightest of four, identity crisis	Similar to others, struggle against poverty, creative, much musical talent, good organizer	Unmotivated in school, hedonist, creative	Same	Same	Same
Beatles: Ringo Starr	Liverpool, England - 1940	Poverty, father deserts, Ringo age 3, mother worked in bakery, as barmaid, tragic childhood, much illness until 14	Baker	Lower	Through 4th form, modern school	Broken home, continuous series of illness until 14, little schooling	Similar to others, not physically strong, most likeable of group	Tragic childhood, sickness, dreams	Same	Same	Same
Lenny Bruce	New York - 1925	Broken home, divorce, father a n'erdowell, mother a waitress, musical talent, Jewish parents		Lower	6th grade	Broken home, poverty, drugs	Non-conformity, drugs, show-business, comedian, satirist, social critic	Drugs, obscenity, satire, censorship, frankness	Recordings, night clubs	Obsolete taboos, anti-establishment, satire, obscenity, censorship	Censorship, obsecenity, literature, social studies

NAME	BIRTHPLACE - DATE	FAMILY LIFE	FATHER'S OCCUPATION	SOCIO-ECONOMIC LEVEL	EDUCATION	PROBLEMS	LIFE STYLE	KEY WORDS	MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION	AREAS OF INFLUENCE ON YOUTH	AREAS OF INFLUENCE ON SCHOOLS
Richard Brautigan	Tacoma, Washington - 1935						Non-conformist, early hippy, ecology, naturalism	Ecology, nature, Haight-Asbury, "Trout Fishing in America"	Poetry, books, personal appearances	Ecology, nature, non-conformity	Literature, ecology
William Burroughs	St. Louis, Missouri - 1914		Businessman	Upper	B.S., some medical school		Non-conformist, early "beat," drugs	Ginsberg buddy, Tangiers	Writing		
Eldridge Cleaver	Little Rock, Arkansas - 1935	Abnormal, divorce, Watts	Father, a waiter, Santa Fe; mother, teacher and janitress	Lower	High school (in prison)	Broken home, drugs, stealing, all of teen age years in prison	Black militant, protest, violence, exile	Violence, militancy, drugs, rape, assault	Lectures, books	Black militancy, violence, non-conformity	Integration problems, social studies, literature
Bob Dylan	Hibbing, Minnesota - 1941	Normal, well-balanced middle class family	Merchant	Middle	High school, average student, much interest in music	Wanderer, identity crisis	Happy wanderer, folksy, somewhat a non-conformist, sincere, for the underdog, protester, social critic, charisma, musicianship	Folk music, folkrock, protest songs	Recordings, concerts, compositions	Folk music, songs of protest, guitar	Music
Lawrence Perlinghetti	Yonkers, New York - 1920				Ph.D. Sorbonne		Hippy style, non-conformist, drugs	City lights, bookstore, censorship	Publishing,		Censorship
Allen Ginsberg	Newark, New Jersey - 1926	Good father, scholarly home, mother a Russian emigre, goes insane when Allen is a child	Teacher of English (40 years) well-known lyric poet, very liberal	Middle	B.A. Columbia, and grad. work, good student	Loss of mother, homosexuality, obesity, drugs, sex, alcohol, identity crisis	Guru of the Beats, non-conformist, non-violent protest, a flower child, love, critic, and mystic, sensitivity	Mind-expanding drugs, nudity, gay liberation, underground, flower people, "Howl," Zen	Writings, poetry, readings, lectures	Non-conformity, non-violent, sensitivity, drugs, poetry, homosexuality, mysticism, Zen	Literature poetry, censorship, social studie
Arlo Guthrie	New York, New York - 1947	Father a musician, mother a dancer, show-business family, constant turmoil, marital problems	Musician (hospitalized 15 years with Huntington's chorea)	Upper-lower	Through high school, some college	Transient family, less than normal household, marital bickering, father's disease	Happy wanderer, folksy, excellent musicianship, protest songs, plea for the simple life, nature, brotherhood, anti-establishment	Folk music, talking blues, protest, guitar	Recordings, concerts	Naturalness, simplicity, songs of protest, guitar music	Music

NAME	BIRTHPLACE - DATE	FAMILY LIFE	FATHER'S OCCUPATION	SOCIO-ECONOMIC LEVEL	EDUCATION	PROBLEMS	LIFE STYLE	KEY WORDS	MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION	AREAS OF INFLUENCE ON YOUTH	AREAS OF INFLUENCE ON SCHOOLS
Hugh Hefner	Chicago, Ill. - 1926	Normal, devout Methodists, rigid fundamentalist beliefs	Accountant	Middle	B.A. in Psychology, U. of Ill., 1949	Repressive, puritanical atmosphere	An introvert rebelling against obsolete puritanical taboos, freedom individuality, non-conformity	PLAYBOY, bunnies	PLAYBOY - what else?	Protest against sexual taboos, censorship, non-conformity	Literature, censorship
Eric Hoffer	Bronx, N.Y. - 1902	Normal lower class family, until mother's death when Eric is 7 and he goes blind until age 15, parents are German immigrants	Carpenter, laborer	Lower	None	Poverty, mother's death, blindness, lack of schooling	Blue-collar Plato, spokesman of laborer, establishment, Horatio Alger, hardwork, success, love and faith in America	Dock worker, true believer	Writings	None	Reinforces established beliefs
Abbie Hoffman	Worcester, Mass. - 1936				M.A. Psychology		First of the "Yippies", violence, protest, drugs, anti-establishment	Violence, trash, obscenity, Chicago 8, 40 arrests	Writings, protest marches	Protest, violence	
Jesus People (Lovers, Freaks, Jumpers)	Circa - 1967			All levels	All levels	Drugs, disenchantment, seeking answers, identity crises	Hippys, street people, beat generation style, Jesus Christ super-star, absolutes	Savior, redemption, the answer, fundamentalists	Writings, revivals, communes, word of mouth	Many join as antidote to drug culture	
Janis Joplin	Port Arthur, Texas - 1943	Oldest of three, mother a registrar at business college, stable family life	Factory worker	Lower	High school	Awkward child, feelings of rejection, drugs, sex, Haight-Asbury, identity crisis	Freedom of the spirit, get-it-now feeling, hedonism, alienation, bawdy	Hippy, free spirit, drug overdose	Recordings, concerts	Alienation, hedonism, freedom, drugs, non-conformity	Music
Jack Kerouac	Lowell, Mass. - 1922	Oldest of three, stable Catholic home	Poolroom, bowling alley worker, printer	Upper-lower	High school and work at Columbia (athletic scholarship)	Wanderlust, first of the beat generation hoboes, identity crisis	Freedom to wander, drop-out from conventional society, search for self, non-conformity	Wandering without roots, disaffiliation, Zen	Books	Spirit of discontent, turn-back on society, drop-out, freedom, non-conformity	Literature
Marshall McLuhan	Edmonton, Canada - 1911	Normal, parents Scotch-Irish, well educated, mother an actress, brother a minister	Salesman (real estate estate and insurance)	Middle	Ph.D. Cambridge	Brain tumor operation, 1967	Conventional, non-linear writing style, concerned with effect of media on people	Medium is the message, electro-sophy, electronic, all-at-once	Books, writings, lectures	Has some answers to their non-linear, absurd world, the why of the generation gap	Media

NAME	BIRTHPLACE - DATE	FAMILY LIFE	FATHER'S OCCUPATION	SOCIO-ECONOMIC LEVEL	EDUCATION	PROBLEMS	LIFE STYLE	KEY WORDS	MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION	AREAS OF INFLUENCE ON YOUTH	AREAS OF INFLUENCE ON SCHOOLS
Rod McKuen	Oakland, California - 1933	Broken home, father deserted before Rod was born, mother works as waitress, telephone operator, dance-hall hostess	Stepfather, a construction worker	Lower	4th grade	Drifter, a loner	A happy wanderer, simple life, natural, sensitivity, warmth, feeling	"Listen to the Warm," Sloopy	Recordings, poetry, movie scores, personal appearances	Message of warmth, simplicity, tenderness, naturalness, poetry	Poetry, ecology,
Moody Blues: Justin Hayward, Mike Pinder, John Lodge, Ray Thomas, Graeme Edge	England (about time of Beatles) 5-man musical group	Little biographical material available					Well-knit group of nature lovers, writers, poets, music of spirit, religion, contemporary problems	Fill void left by Beatle breakup, much depth and insight	Recordings, concerts	Mellowing and maturing of Beatlemania heighten religious interest	Music
Elvis Presley	Tupelo, Miss. - 1935	Poverty, normal, but poor family, religious, rigidity	Laborer	Lower	High school	Apparently none, loud clothes, long hair, liked school	Normal, religious background, basically an entertainer	Wiggle, hair style, "I wanna hold your hand."	Recordings, concerts, movies	Youth music, rock, and style	Music
Pete Seeger	New York, New York - 1920	Parents both professional and gifted; mother, a teacher and violinist; stable family; outstanding family history	Musicologist - professor	Middle-middle	Two years Harvard, one year art school	Normal, a wanderer	Spokesman and singer for the oppressed, depressed, dispossessed, songs of protest, against war and bigotry	Folk music, guitar, "We shall overcome," "Where have all the flowers gone?" blacklisted	Recordings, concerts, compositions	Populariser of folk music, guitar and banjo	Music, social studies
James Taylor	Boston, Mass. - 1948	Wealthy, normal, upper class, 4 children, mother has much musical talent, opera singer, all have musical training	M.D. (Dean of Medical School, Chapel Hill)	Upper-middle	High school (in mental institution)	Drop-out from military problems, nonconformist, drugs, mental problems, attempts at suicide, identity crisis	Simplistic message of return to reality, nature, folk music, antidote to drug-ridden "rock" culture, maturity of the "now" generation, sensitivity, balladeer	Military school, suicide attempt, country casual	Recordings, concerts, films	Return to reality, maturation of the "now" culture	Music, social studies
Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.	Indianapolis, Indiana - 1922	Normal family life, parents are German-Americans, liberal family	Architect	Middle-middle	B.S. (Biochemistry), Cornell - U. of Chicago	Apparently none, prisoner World War II	Humanism, anti-war, science and technology, satire of contemporary problems	Humorous satire, large family, 3 of own, 3 adopted	Books	Satire, sensitivity, human problems	Literature

NAME	BIRTHPLACE - DATE	FAMILY LIFE	FATHER'S OCCUPATION	SOCIO-ECONOMIC LEVEL	EDUCATION	PROBLEMS	LIFE STYLE	KEY WORDS	MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION	AREAS OF INFLUENCE ON YOUTH	AREAS OF INFLUENCE ON SCHOOLS
Andy Warhol	Pittsburgh, Pa. - 1928	Poverty, Czech parents, normal lower class family, much struggle	Coal miner	Lower	B.A. (pictorial design) Carnegie Tech.	Blah personality, introvert	Creative, free-spirit, non-conforming, pop art, Underground films, against obsolete taboos	Ugly, asexual, pornography, trick, treat, or trash? society for cutting up men!	Pop art, Underground films	Pop art, Underground films, pornography	Art
William Carlos Williams	Rutherford, New Jersey - 1883 (d. 1963)	Normal, middle class home, father - English, mother - Puerto Rican (French-Basque descent), intellectuals, liberals, Unitarians	Businessman	Middle-middle	M.D. (additional grad. work in Leipzig)	Apparently none	Basically, a literary figure, avant-garde poetry, literature, emphasized pragmatic, dynamic aspects of nature and American life	Whitman, avant-garde, awards, American literature, Ginsberg	Books, poetry, lectures, teaching	Early forerunner of "beat" scene, naturalness, sensitivity	American literature

Figure 1

Pre-1940 Birthdates


Williams
Hoffer
McLuhan
Burroughs
Ferlinghetti
Seeger
Kerouac
Vonnegut
Bruce
Hefner
Ginsburg
Warhol
McKuen
Presley
Cleaver
Brautigan
Hoffman
1883
1905
1911
1914
1920
1922
1925
1926
1928
1933
1935
1936(?)

Figure 2

Post - 1940 Birthdates


Starr
Lennon
Baez
Dylan
McCartney
Harrison
Joplin
Guthrie
Taylor
Jesus People
1940
1941
1942
1943
1947
1948
1967

In the pre-1940 group some data for these categories were unavailable. As to family life, the data available on thirteen of the seventeen individuals revealed that eight (sixty per cent) had a normal family life (including childhood) and five (forty per cent) had an abnormal family life and childhood. Data on social class were available for fourteen of the individuals. Of these, one was upper class, seven were middle class (fifty per cent), and six were lower class (forty-three per cent). As to the occupation of the father, data were available for fourteen individuals as follows: five were professional-business (thirty-six per cent), three were white collar (twenty-one per cent), and six were blue collar, or laborers (forty-three per cent).

Table I

Pre-1940 group, Family, Socio-economic level, Father's occupation

	Family Life		Social Class			Occupation		
	Normal	Ab-normal	Upper class	Middle class	Lower class	Profes-sional Business	White Collar	Blue Collar
Bruce		x			x			x
Brautigan								
Burroughs			x			x		
Cleaver		x			x			x
Ferlinghetti								
Ginsberg		x		x		x		
Hefner	x			x			x	
Hoffer		x			x			x
Hoffman								
Kerouac	x			x			x	
McKuen		x			x			x
McLuhan	x			x		x		
Presley	x				x			x
Seeger	x			x		x		
Vonnegut	x			x			x	
Warhol	x				x			x
Williams	x			x		x		

No definite pattern emerges from the data in Table I. What is indicated is that the pre-1940 group of "pop" philosophers may have had either a normal or abnormal family life, and while they are not likely to come from the upper class, they will be either from the middle or lower class. Moreover, while the father is more likely to be a blue collar worker than a white collar worker, he is just as likely to be a professional or business man.

Table II

Post-1940 group, Family, Socio-economic level, Father's occupation

	Family Life		Social Class			Occupation		
	Normal	Abnormal	Upper class	Middle class	Lower class	Professional Business	White Collar	Blue Collar
Baez	x			x		x		
Dylan	x			x		x		
Guthrie		x		x		x		
Harrison	x				x			x
Joplin	x			x				x
Lennon		x			x			x
McCartney	x				x			x
Starr		x			x			x
Taylor	x		x			x		

In the post-1940 group, data similar to Table I were available for all nine individuals (see Table II). Six individuals had a normal family life and childhood (sixty-six per cent) and family life for three would be considered abnormal (thirty-six per cent). While one came from the upper class, four (forty-three per cent) came from the middle class and four (forty-three per cent) from the lower class. The father's occupation of three of the individuals (thirty-three per cent) fell into the professional-business category and six (sixty-six per cent) of the father's occupations were in the blue collar class.

The data in Table II reveals that most of the individuals came from a normal family life background, were either middle or lower class, and their fathers were either professional-business or blue collar workers. None of the individual's fathers could be classified in the white collar category.

Combining the data of Tables I and II reveals that fourteen (sixty per cent) out of the twenty-three individuals for whom information was available, had a normal family life and childhood. Also, only two (eight per cent) came from upper class homes, eleven (forty-eight per cent) were middle class, and ten (forty-four per cent) were lower class.

In terms of group data, family life, social class, and father's occupation do not appear to be causal factors in the emergence of these individuals as "pop" philosophers.

Table III, for the pre-1940 group, is a compilation of levels of education and a number of key words found in the "now" literature which refer to these individuals. The level of education ranges from none to Ph.D. (On this item data were available for fifteen individuals.) One individual had a fourth-grade education, four (twenty-seven per cent) had a high school education (two with some college) and nine (sixty per cent)

Table III

Pre-1940 group, Level of Education - Key Words

	Education	Anti-war	Anti-establishment	Beat Scene	Drugs	Violence	Non-Violence	Ecology	Protest	Non-conformity
Bruce	6th grade	x	x	x	x				x	x
Brautigan		x	x	x	x		x	x		x
Burroughs	B.S. +		x	x	x		x			x
Cleaver	High school		x			x			x	x
Ferlinghetti	Ph.D.	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x
Ginsberg	B.A.	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x
Hefner	B.A.								x	x
Hoffer	None						x			
Hoffman	M.A.	x	x	x	x	x			x	x
Kerouac	High school some college		x	x	x		x			x
McKuen	4th grade	x	x				x	x	x	x
McLuhan	Ph.D.									
Presley	High School									x
Seeger	High school some college	x	x				x	x	x	x
Vonnegut	B.S.	x	x				x	x	x	x
Warhol	B.A.		x				x		x	x
Williams	M.D.						x			x

had a college education plus. With this group it can be hypothesized that higher education may have been a causal factor in their emergence as "pop" philosophers. The frequency with which the key words related to anti-war, anti-establishment, "beat," drugs, ecology, protest, non-conformity, and non-violence occur, seem to be indicative of their beliefs, values, and life style.

Using the same categories as in Table III, Table IV was prepared for the post-1940 group. Of the nine individuals listed all had a high school education and two had some college work. Of this group, seventy-eight per cent were involved with drugs at some time or other (it is possible that this figure is 100 per cent). All would fall into the "non-conformity" category and none in the "violence" category. Overall, the key words, with the exception of violence are fairly representative of the thinking of this group. With this group, higher education does not seem to be an important factor.

Table IV

Post-1940 group, Level of Education - Key Words

	Education	Anti-war	Anti-establishment	Beat Scene	Drugs	Violence	Non-Violence	Ecology	Protest	Non-conformity
Baez	High school some college	x	x				x	x	x	x
Dylan	High school	x	x				x	x	x	x
Guthrie	High school some college	x	x		x		x	x	x	x
Harrison	5th form		x	x	x					x
Joplin	High school	x	x	x	x		x		x	x
Lennon	5th form		x	x	x					x
McCartney	5th form		x	x	x					x
Starr	4th form		x	x	x					x
Taylor	High school	x	x		x		x	x	x	x

Combining the data of Tables III and IV reveals that three individuals had a sixth grade education or less, thirteen (fifty-four per cent) had a high school education, and nine (thirty-seven per cent) had a college education. For the group as a whole, because of the wide range of education represented, educational level does not appear as an influential factor in their emergence as "pop" philosophers. The key words, with the exception of "violence" seem to describe the total group.

Tables V and VI were an attempt to compile information concerning the media of communication used by these individuals. For the pre-1940 group (Table V), print was the major medium of communication. Of the seventeen individuals, eight were involved with lectures, four with personal appearances (night club performances), three with poetry, four with recordings, four with some form of teaching, four with T.V. and films, only three with music, and fifteen (eighty-eight per cent) were involved with print.

Of the nine individuals in the post-1940 group (Table VI), all were involved with concerts (using concert in a broad sense), seven wrote their own music, all were involved in personal appearances (night club performances) and recordings, seven wrote poetry (considering lyrics as a form of poetry), three used T.V. and films, and all were involved with music. None of these individuals used either lectures, print, or teaching as communication media. Music seems to be the dominant medium of this group and communication is facilitated through recordings, writing their own music, and giving concerts and personal appearances.

Comparisons of media used between the two groups show a dramatic shift from the more traditional use of print to communicate, to the use of music and poetry as major media of communication. With the "now" generation's involvement in non-linearity and emotionality this shift

Table V

Pre-1940 group, Media of Communication

	Concerts	Compositions	Lectures	Personal appearances	Poetry	Print	Recordings	Teaching	T. V. Films	Music
Bruce			x	x		x	x			
Brautigan			x		x	x				
Burroughs						x				
Cleaver			x			x				
Ferlinghetti					x	x				
Ginsberg			x		x	x		x		
Hefner						x				
Hoffer			x			x				
Hoffman			x			x				
Kerouac						x				
McKuen	x	x		x	x	x	x		x	x
McLuhan						x		x		
Presley	x			x			x		x	x
Seeger	x	x	x	x			x	x	x	x
Vonnegut						x				
Warhol				x		x			x	
Williams			x			x		x		

Table VI

Post-1940 group, Media of Communication

	Concerts	Compositions	Lectures	Personal appearances	Poetry	Print	Recordings	Teaching	T. V. Films	Music
Baez	x	x		x	x		x		x	x
Dylan	x	x		x	x		x		x	x
Guthrie	x	x		x	x		x		x	x
Harrison	x	x		x	x		x			x
Joplin	x			x			x			x
Lennon	x	x		x	x		x			x
McCartney	x	x		x	x		x			x
Starr	x			x			x			x
Taylor	x	x		x	x		x			x

is a predictable one. Moreover, increased improvements in electronic paraphernalia may have facilitated this shift. From the above it can be conjectured that the pre-1940 group did much of the theorizing (using print) concerning the "pop" culture and the post-1940 group put theory into practice through music and poetry assisted by electronics. In other words, the dissemination of the philosophy of the "pop" culture has been greatly facilitated by the newer electronic media, i.e., recordings and T.V. With the current generation, while print is not rejected, music and poetry (lyrics), aided by electronics, seem to be an influential factor.

The intent of this section was to present a compilation of the data collected in an attempt to determine if certain patterns and causal relationships exist among these so-called "pop" philosophers. Only a few very limited generalizations can be drawn. The pre-1940 and post-1940 designation in terms of birthdates appears useful for analysis. Because some of these individuals were either born during or after World War II, this has been looked upon as a causal factor in much of the youthful protest, dissent, and aberrant behavior. While this may be partially true, the data show that most of these "pop" philosophers were pre-World War II depression babies and some date back before World War I. Further analysis reveals that while the "pop" culture may be regarded as movement only for those under thirty, the majority of the individuals who seem influential in the movement came from the over-thirty group. Moreover, the over-thirty group are better educated (have more formal education) and have committed their ideas to print. On the other hand, the under-thirties appear to be much more at home in the world of music and song and seem less concerned about education beyond the high school level.

Conditions of family life (normal or abnormal), for the group as a whole, do not appear as causal factors in their emergence as "pop" philosophers. Sixty per cent of the group had a normal family life. Individuals may come from the middle class or lower class (equally divided) and their fathers may be business-professional or blue collar workers. In other words, in the total group context, family life, social class, and father's occupation appear not to be causal factors. While the current consensus appears to be that the majority of protesting youth come from middle class homes, many of their leaders come from the lower class.

The dramatic shift from print as the major medium of communication to music and poetry (lyrics) is much in keeping with the McLuhan theses. Print is linear and cognitive whereas much of today's environment, aided by electronics, is non-linear and affective. Media then become processes, environment, and content which do things to people. There is ample evidence that the thinking and behavior of young people is concerned mostly with the non-linear, affective domain of emotionality and feeling.

Any attempt to derive causal factors from a complex hodgepodge of people, facts, and events is exceedingly difficult. Since events and movements are the result of multiple causal factors, an individual may be a factor only in relation to the total group movement and to the time he arrives on the contemporary scene. Any allusion that these "pop" philosophers are solely responsible for the "now" culture is not only absurd, but impossible. However, it might be said that at this particular moment in history, because of certain events and conditions, the world was ripe (perhaps not ready) for the emergence of these so-called "pop" philosophers. Who knows? If there had not been the Beatles, Allen Ginsberg, Bob Dylan, Jack Kerouac, and others, we might have had The Insects, Allen Goldberg, Bob Milan, Jack Polanski, or someone else.

However, the above tends to over-look the unique contribution of the individual: the charisma of Ginsberg, Dylan, and Baez; the creativity of the Beatles, Seeger, and Guthrie; the softness and tenderness of McKuen and Brautigan; and the deep, mystical insights of the Moody Blues. Obviously, their popularity was, and is, largely a result of their individual uniqueness. However, they would have remained relatively unknown had not conditions prevailed which were conducive to their arrival on the "pop" scene.

II. Revolution and the Now Generation.

Revolutionaries may be trouble-makers, but trouble-makers are not always revolutionaries. One who actively espouses a cause and works ceaselessly to bring about change which favors that cause, regardless of consequences, is a revolutionary. On the other hand, the trouble-maker may espouse many causes and hold none with any degree of sincerity or conviction. When stress or real opposition appears he usually retreats to safer surroundings. Today's youth are both -- some are sincere revolutionaries and others enjoy the whims and fads of a free wheeling, youthful existence. Yet, be they true revolutionaries or gadflies, the results are there -- to disturb, shock, frustrate, disrupt, and tweak the noses of their elders. With the pomposity that age all-too-often brings, we are shocked, disturbed, frustrated -- and we don't like it! Unfortunately, while our benevolence permits us to indulge these youthful fancies, it often blinds us to the true meaning of what is really happening.

So much has been written about the current generation of youth that it is often difficult to distinguish between fact and fiction. Many of the terms used, while seemingly self-explanatory, defy specific definition. Some of the familiar terms include: generational conflict, generation gap, pop culture, now generation, consciousness III, sub-culture, counter-culture, beats, hippies, and the like. What these terms seem to describe is a large amorphous mass of people ranging in age from early adolescence to young adulthood. Just how to classify the over-thirties who cling to the beliefs and behaviors of the "pop" culture is also difficult. For the "now" generation of youth with their presentism and non-conforming existentialist stand, certain words seem accurate in their description. These words would include protesters, anti-establishmentarians, love and flower children, peaceniks, dissidents, freaks, social outcasts, drop-outs, delinquents, and what have you?

If what this generation represents is a counter-culture, and there is considerable evidence to support this, there also exists a number of sub-cultures, or better yet, sub-counter-cultures. Some of these cultures are easily recognizable and seem to have carefully defined goals, behaviors, and values. The Black movement, the Chicano movement, and Women's Lib are easily recognizable. On the other hand, some defy accurate definition. How do you accurately define the commune movement, the street people, the Jesus Jumpers, the hippies, the yippies, the flower children, the drug culture, and the environmentalists? Using American Indian metaphors, some writers discuss the existence of "nations" within the total nation such as the Black Nation, the Woodstock Nation, and in opposition to the above, the Wallace Nation.

The first of these nations is self-explanatory. The second takes its name from the massive musical and political "be-in" held in New York in 1969. This nation represents most of the "now" generation of youth and consists of radicals, hippies, and a conglomeration of non-conforming youth. The Wallace Nation, as a counter-force, embodies the behavior and ideas of Governor George Wallace of Alabama. Its adherents would be largely conservatives, middle class whites, and the upper strata of labor, the hard hats.

According to Revel (1970), a French writer, each of the above nations has its own combat arm -- Black Panthers for the Blacks, Weathermen for Woodstock, and Minutemen for Wallace. Moreover, each group seems to have its own spokesmen, literature, language, life style, and art forms.

In the preceding section of this paper an attempt was made to come up with a loose composite of just what a "pop philosopher" is. In attempting to describe this group, many ~~of the~~ elements within the "pop" culture were also described. The Woodstock Nation seems to be most representative of the constituency over which these so-called "philosophers" hold sway.

It has been estimated that the total number of adolescents and young adults (ages 13 to 25) in the United States number over thirty million, of which six million are in college. That all of these youth are non-conformists, alienated, and generational dissidents cannot be established. However, if but one-half to one-third fall into this category, then their numbers are significant. Whether they represent the majority or minority of youth is open to question. Most sociologists maintain that the majority of these disenchanted youth come from middle class homes. While some of their leaders ("pop" philosophers) have middle class backgrounds, a number of them have come from the lower classes. Although the problems facing the lower class and minority elements in society may have precipitated generational discontent, the counter-cultural revolution cannot be said to be a lower class protest movement.

The entity Woodstock Nation (which is not an entity in the true sense) took form and shape on an August weekend in White Lake, N. Y., in 1969. Here over 200,000 "groovy" youth gathered on 600 acres in the shadows of the Catskills for a "happening" of love, drugs, and music. Under primitive conditions and inclement weather, this mass of humanity lived, sang, and played together for three days without a single act of violence. Abbie Hoffman describes it as "not just a musical festival, but a way of living and surviving in a Pig nation." While three youth died from overdoses and thousands of accidents occurred, it was hailed by some as the second coming, the millenium, the promised land. For local residents, the police, the nurses and doctors, it was something else.

If this conglomeration of hippies, radicals, and non-conforming youth is representative of the "now" generation of youth, what were their beliefs, values, and life-style? In an interesting, but controversial book, The Greening of America (1971), Charles A. Reich designates the three distinctive life-styles in America as Consciousness I, II, and III. Consciousness I is the rugged individualist type, the pioneer, the farmer, and the tycoons of business and industry. Those of this consciousness are a rapidly disappearing species. Consciousness II is the corporate life-style with man living in, and for, a system controlled by private and public power. Consciousness III is the new kind of youthful awareness and life-style that spontaneously exploded onto the scene in the early sixties as an antidote to the repressive, self-defeating, conforming life-style of the corporate man. Therefore, according to Reich, Consciousness III is representative of the beliefs, values, and life-style of the non-conforming youth culture (some wag has called it the Third Reich).

The difficulty with Reich's analysis is that it over-simplifies and categorizes the highly complex phenomenon of consciousness into three water-tight compartments. Moreover, the spontaneous generation of the new youth culture is open to question. Perhaps, the most serious objection to Reich is that because the youth culture is consonant with _his_ life style, he becomes an apologist and protagonist of youth, without regard for other styles of consciousness.

In the _Woodstock Nation_ there appear to be all of the elements of Reich's Consciousness III. The major difficulty is that the _Woodstock Nation_ does not exist in any objective sense that lends itself to a critical analysis. If it were a nation in the traditional sense with a fixed location, officers, offices, and a written code of government and beliefs, then analysis would be facilitated. However, the youth of Woodstock seem to possess certain characteristics in the form of personal quests:

1. The quest to be _free_ -- to build one's own philosophy, values, life-style, and culture.

2. The quest for self-realization -- to be human, to be whole, to search for one's identity, and to aid other selves in this search.

3. The quest for a non-violent, non-competitive, non-aggressive community of selves (the extended family relationship).

4. The quest for openness, frankness, and freedom to be involved in all human experiences.

Expressions of these characteristics are informal and sometimes bizarre, and are found in clothing, long hair, non-violent protests, alienation to the world of work and careers, fiscal irresponsibility, communal existence, return to nature, sexual promiscuity, use of drugs, be-ins, love-ins, and social gatherings such as rock festivals.

While the clothes and hair of the "now" generation may be expressive of freedom, non-conformity, and comfort, they also serve as identifiable symbols to distinguish those within and without the community. Since any experience is valid that promotes self-consciousness, then drugs are viewed as providing helpful assists to that understanding. Moreover, because words are the tools of the logical, cognitive, corporate unfeeling man, they are, therefore, incapable of promoting self and it follows that only words set to music (poetry) are truly expressive of the human self. Thus, music and poetry become the principal means of expression.

Besides the Woodstock Nation, other "Nations" could be included, such as Women's Lib, the Chicanos, and the Gay Liberation Front. In addition, one must reckon with another nation, a huge mass of people, often alluded to as the "silent majority," which seems to be neither silent nor a majority. It consists of a large group of citizens who are neither black, nor young, nor especially intellectual. Often at the same time they are reactionary, progressive, and vaguely liberal. In other words, this group includes a wide variety of opinion with little cohesiveness and may lend support to either conservativism, reaction, or extremism. Central to this group's thinking is a morbid fear of violence and a strong belief in peaceful protest and even stricter adherence to law and order.

While noticeable differences are in evidence between groups, a commonality does exist especially among all of those under thirty. The common bond seems to be one of non-conformity and anti-establishment behavior. The united strength of these groups is evidenced by their protest marches, gatherings, and general civic demonstrations which may, or may not, be peaceful.

Within the protest movement is the ever present religious element. The needs of the spirit are being satisfied by the adoption and the hit-or-miss practice of Oriental religions, by a return to the Indian cult of natural foods, to astrology, and a rediscovery of Christianity. On any campus corner can be found Buddhist monks from Oregon or Arizona, and Street Christians, Jesus Freaks, and Jesus Jumpers from all over America. The Jesus People have founded several hundred communes with their own rules, regulations, literature and newspapers. While there is a great diversity among these groups, and a new one is invented each day, they are firm in their belief of Jesus Christ as Saviour. Moreover, the Jesus movement represents an antidote to the drug culture and inveighs against promiscuity and homosexuality. Giving up the permissiveness and freedom of the drug culture for the personal restrictions and absolutes of the Jesus culture presents an interesting psychological dilemma in the midst of the revolution. Perhaps Alvin Toffler (1971) is correct in his view that future America will be characterized by many autonomous life-styles.

On a given day in California, young men and women emerging from their commune may walk through the forests singing and playing their guitars and flutes and lie down in front of a bulldozer to prevent trees from being uprooted. They are strong in their belief that nature belongs to every man, and knowledgeable in the realization that an oil slick on the ocean affects one's own happiness. This implies the existence of a political awareness that calls for a reshaping of intra-social relations, a new kind of co-proprietorship. The ecological revolution is just one off-shoot of a more complex moral and cultural revolution.

The human being is a wonderfully adaptive creature -- a creature that tends to mirror his environment. In youth, we are even more adaptable, more flexible, and more creative. Long ago, we readily jumped on the band wagon of anything that was appealing, exciting, and promising. Today's youth have looked at the world about them, the kind of adults it has produced, and they don't like what they see. Much of their youthful vision reveals that they not only dislike their corporate state environment, but they refuse to have anything to do with it. It is a world that places little value on feelings or relationships with others. It is a materialistic, machine-like, technological world which cuts people off from their own feelings and selves. It is a world which refuses to care for people or permit meaningful experiences with others, and inhibits people in learning about themselves. It is a world which regards everything in the environment as a thing -- to be manipulated, to be experimented with, to be exploited. To youth, it is a world something less than human -- a world they refuse to enter. Unfortunately, many of their perceptions are bizarre, even wrong perhaps -- but not all wrong. Some of the "not-to-be-trusted-over-thirties" are beginning to get the youthful vision of America into focus.

And so the "now" youth, urged on by their gurus, mystics, pop artists, and poets attempt to build a brave "Now" world which is more human, sensitive, loving, simple, and natural. In their search for an identity which they wish to mirror, they strike out into drugs, promiscuity, protest, and become social drop-outs. While much in the pop culture may be good, it becomes so enmeshed with that which is self-defeating that the positive is often unrecognized and unappreciated. Some youth eventually learn from their mistakes to discriminate, if not too late, between that which is self-destroying and that which is self-promoting.

When the fathers and grandfathers of today's youth were growing up, they too saw blind spots, ugliness, and weaknesses in the adults about them.

However, they always seemed able to project themselves into existing, acceptable adult models with only minor changes. The "now" youth uncompromisingly reject acceptable existing models for those which are fleeting, ephemeral, and untried. Moreover, they seem to be totally incapable, either philosophically or psychologically, of becoming any of the adults they see around them. Of utmost importance to youth, it seems, is the fact that the new models are the antithesis of the established ones and this unqualifiedly makes them good.

The political success of the great number of protests and disturbances by youth has led some writers to discuss these movements in terms of a revolution. It is a revolution if loosely defined as a radical change from one set of values to another. If such a definition is acceptable, then, especially among youth, we have had, and will continue to have, a revolution. On the other hand, if revolution is considered in the traditional sense as the forced, sudden shift of political and economic power from one group to another, this has not occurred in the United States.

Revel, in his book, Without Marx or Jesus: The New American Revolution Has Begun (1971), maintains that "The revolution of the twentieth century will take place in the United States. It is only there that it can happen. And it has already begun."

Revel asserts that there are five interrelated aspects of revolution: political, social, technological, cultural, and international. Moreover, if one of these aspects is missing, the others are incomplete. All of these are evident in the U.S. and what portends well for their success is that they are occurring within a constitutional structure. The fires of revolution are usually fed by the problems that beset mankind: war, poverty, inequality, population explosion, and freedom. All of these elements are present in the American protest movement. Revel strongly believes that revolution will succeed in the United States because all of the concomitants for success are present: prosperity, growth, technology, research, changes in behavioral standards, reaffirmation of individual freedom, and pluralism -- the existence of a diversity of sub-cultures.

The demands of the youthful revolution are characterized by cries of equality of sexes, races, and all age groups; by rejection of authoritarian relationships, nationalism, big business, consumerism, materialism, and the like. It demands a reappraisal of economic and technological goals in the light of consequences along with individual and cultural freedom unhampered by an obsolete moral censorship.

According to Revel, the incentives for revolution are strong and identifiable as evidenced by their cohesiveness, by the great number of Americans that support them, and by the changes in depth that they have already achieved in the sensitivity, conduct, habits, thoughts, and acts of Americans. America can thus be described as being in the first stage of revolution.

Basic to the youth revolt seems to be the rejection of a society motivated basically by profit, dominated exclusively by economic considerations, and ruled by competition and aggression. Parenthetically, some of the leaders within the youth culture who mouth anti-establishment slogans, are guilty of the same practices they protest against. On the positive side, many youth hold strongly to the belief that man has become a tool of his tools and he must break these bonds and become a true human being. While the hippies characterize a vivid awareness of this sense of lost identity, their drop-out solution is no solution for society. Rather, it is a social cop-out, an escapism that often leads to social parasitism. That "the best minds of my generation" should put themselves out to pasture is not only a sad commentary on society but on the individual as well.

If, indeed, there is true revolution in America, and many of the elements are present, what hope does it offer for the future of mankind and the world? It does offer radical, moral, and practical opposition to war and all of its concomitants. In opposition to nationalism it joins cultural, economic and technological power. It offers an affirmation of equality and human liberty for all in place of archaic prohibitions and a nuclear holocaust. We are faced with the dilemma of having built a world which contains the seeds of its own instant destruction, a world which cannot be saved by destroying it, and one which cannot continue as it is. This so-called "revolution of youth" may offer an acceptable alternate solution: the acceptance of a technological civilization as a means, not an end, to aid in the ability to reshape civilization without destroying it.

III. Education and the Pop Philosophers.

That the "pop" philosophers have influenced the beliefs, values, and life-styles of today's youth is amply supported in the literature. While individuals may have made certain unique contributions to the culture of the "now" generation, the influence of these "pop" philosophers is a group influence with deep roots in the past, as well as in the present, and manifests itself in a contemporary counter-culture.

As parents and teachers it is disturbing and disquieting that youth do not admire nor respect us as elders. However, this is a natural concomitant of perceiving adult roles as totally irrelevant to a world which youth envision themselves as inhabiting. Much of this myopic role perception is further compounded by a formalized education whose aim is to turn out only "standardized" products. Thus, for youth the old models are obsolete and the schools are irrelevant because they fail to offer meaningful preparation for survival now and in the future.

Why is there so much disagreement between parents and children and teachers and students as to life-styles? Years ago parents and teachers called the shots and their charges obeyed. Today's youth differ with their teachers and parents about war, politics, dress, philosophy, the system, and the kind of world we ought to live in.

The "now" people claim to be understanding and forgiving of their elders because they realize what so many of their parents and teachers refuse to acknowledge: that they are more knowledgeable and better informed than most adults, including some teachers. And there are substantial figures which indicate that today's youth are better educated than their parents -- over sixty per cent of those enrolled in college come from families in which the father at best had completed a high school education. Perhaps, the fundamental cause of the conflict between parents and their offspring is the education differential. Young adults may lack the experience of their fathers but experience does not necessarily generate desirable knowledge. While the above may be true, how does one explain the conflict in the classroom in which the education differential is preponderantly in favor of the teacher? Could it be that some teachers have ceased to learn, refused to change, and have become insensitive and inflexible as some parents? There has always been, there will always be a generation gap, it can only be bridged by knowledge and understanding -- the chief ingredients of teaching.

Why students fail, why teachers fail, and why schools fail, have long been topics of intensive discussion. This is the subject of a book by Lembo entitled, Why Teachers Fail (1971). In this short paperback, Lembo attempts to cite reasons for teacher failure within the total school context and puts forth suggestions for alleviating some of these failures. The main thrust is that it is not students who fail, but the schools who fail students, i.e., fail to meet their needs. While the above charge is not new, it is especially relevant for this paper.

Of the indications for failure, Lembo lists: overt drop-outs, stay-in drop-outs, non-promotion, poor preparation, cheating, need for psychiatric help, suicide, and rioting. Of course, a number of other indications could also be listed. The author, while recognizing the many complex factors that affect student performance (physical, psychological, economic, sociological) puts forth a strong argument that the basic cause of student failure is in the schooling process itself. Therefore, when students fail it is the practices which teachers and administrators individually and collectively employ that are at fault.

What are some of the destructive practices found in the school? They are (a) the employment of a predetermined set of learning conditions to manipulate each student's learning; (b) an emphasis on subject matter, materials and learning approaches which are irrelevant to students' lives; and (c) an unwillingness to value students' concerns and personal needs over the processes of competition and administrative efficiency. These three practices, and especially the last two, are related indirectly to the concerns of this paper.

Unfortunately, formal education has long perpetuated the myth that "adults always know best." A natural concomitant of such a philosophy is that teachers, as experienced adults, know what is good, true, and beautiful, and can therefore design a curriculum of facts, concepts, and ideas which _they_ perceive to be good, true, and beautiful. On the other hand, many students perceive what the schools offer as trivial, irrelevant, and divorced from the reality they know and live in. For example, the "pop" culture is part of the reality that students know, but most teachers are woefully ignorant and uninformed as to its very existence. Moreover, if the premise of relevancy is acceptable, then the goals, content, and processes of education must be relevant to the concerns, feelings, and values of the learners. It also follows that because students are more knowledgeable as to their own concerns, feelings, and values they should be significantly involved in determining the kinds of experiences which the schools make available. Any teacher who refuses to become informed of the "pop" philosophy is as obsolete as the 400 horsepower automobile, the fraternity handshake, and the wire recorder. Many teachers are unaware that their intolerance of the "pop" culture may indicate a rejection of youth in general.

There is a plethora of material concerning the schools continuous pursuit of irrelevance and trivia. This is further compounded by a purposeful distortion of reality -- a reality the students know but the school ignores. War, poverty, pollution, protest, sex, inequality, and the like are reality to the student -- why sweep them under the rug? Hiding behind mountains of trivia, teachers give little thought as to starting where the students are. Where are they? -- deeply enmeshed in the "pop" culture which bespeaks identity crises through drugs, pollution, poetry, protest, and violence. They are also deeply enmeshed in a schizoid culture which is undergoing a sea-change of social mythology brought on by technology. This awesome and indeterminate place is where teachers must begin. We must begin with the what is now and work toward the what should be. The major problem is that our notions of what should be must also undergo change. If we continue to hold to absolute ends, we render ourselves useless as facilitators.

The counter-culture of the "now" generation derives its origins from deeply within the middle class structure. Most of its adherents come from middle class homes, the offsprings of stable families, good average incomes, and from families in which education is held in high regard. At one time drop-outs were primarily lower-class youth. The reason seemed to be that schools were forcing these disadvantaged youth into a middle class mold which was incompatible with their own value systems. While the battle over middle class values still continues, and the above assumption may still be true -- what about the upper and middle class drop-outs who totally reject the system that nurtured them? Perhaps there is something wrong with the system for all classes of youth?

Much current educational literature is being devoted to changing the process of education with an emphasis upon humanizing, sensitivity, flexibility, inquiry, and the like. Few scholars have made any serious attempt to understand and analyze the strange, non-conformist "pop" culture with which "now" students are involved. To know this culture is a necessary ingredient of starting where students are in the hope of aiding youth to seek answers beneficial to the whole human condition. Unfortunately, even as adults, we cannot agree as to where they should be. We do know that the self-destructive behavior of drugs, promiscuity, and filth is not where youth should be. We also know that many of the "now generation" are beautiful human beings, sensitive, compassionate, and loving -- and it may be that is where we should be. We have long believed that the ultimate aim of life has been the complete development of the human potential -- self-realization. Perhaps, in a strange way, some of the Pop Philosophers and their adherents have found the way?

If the beliefs, values, and life-styles of youth have undergone considerable change, how have these changes affected the schools and teachers? There is considerable evidence that the schools, the curriculum, and teachers are changing. These changes provide some evidence of the success of youthful protest. While changes in dress code, rules and regulations, subject areas, and teaching procedures are indications of change, the true meanings of these changes must be held in abeyance. Are they merely temporary capitulations to the whims of youth or are they based upon genuine concern for the student as an individual seeking to discover self, to know other selves, and to improve the society he must live in? As yet, this question must go unanswered.

That the schools are livelier places, more concerned with students as individuals, concerned about current social problems, and that there is greater student involvement, can be amply documented. "No bells ring," flexible scheduling, revolving schedules, modules, team-teaching, learning packets, and inquiry methods, are all part of the evidence of change. But one must be wary of chalking up such changes as mainly coming about through the influence of the counter-culture.

While the influence of the "now" generation has affected all subject areas, it is literature, social studies, and music (the guitar is now a respectable instrument) that have been profoundly affected. The problems of censorship and community taboos still remain but there has been much progress in these areas. Family living (including health and sex education) is now an integral part of most curriculums.

The need for teachers to become acquainted with and understand the "pop" culture has already been stated. The major problem seems to be to distinguish between the "trick, treat, and trash" aspects of the culture. A snap judgment that all is trick or trash may overlook the treats, preclude understanding, and forestall communication. Teacher knowledge of the "pop" culture is desirable not in a Machiavellian context, but rather as a genuine means of understanding the "now" generation youth.

Several suggestions may be helpful to teachers:

1. Keep an open mind -- while much within the youth culture may be personally distasteful and undesirable, it does represent the values, beliefs, and life-styles of many of the current generation of youth.

2. Do not be shocked -- recognize that some of the literature, the behavior, the language, is purposely designed to shock, to "put-on" or deceive the uninformed, and to test one's sincerity.

3. Look for the treats, de-emphasize the tricks, the trash; much of what youth say and do is worth observing and listening to.

4. Foster critical thinking skills by encouraging students to critique both the "establishment" and the counter-culture. Both cultures have their "tricks" and their "trash" and criticism should be a double-edged sword. The teacher who treats the status quo culture as sacrosanct is basically little different in attitude from the student who totally rejects the "establishment."

5. Utilize the poetry, the literature, the music, and the philosophy of the pop philosophers as starting points, or reference points for students. The student's concern for relevancy is real. Further, if one assumes the process of learning is psychological rather than logical, one must start with what the learner knows and values.

6. Be honest with yourself and your students. Many teachers, out of insecurity, eagerly jump on the bandwagon of pop culture. They become adept at spreading hip platitudes and mouthing "in wisdom." They are careful never to be critical of the idols of youth culture. To some degree, "talking and acting out" the youth language will increase communication, but the majority of young people can, and will, spot a phony. A teacher will be most effective in the long run if he is honest about his own values, perceptions, and even his hangups.

One can make a good case against the "now" generation. Simply they are unaware, or uninformed, as to the true facts of life; they are naive, not reality oriented, and they owe their very existence to a highly affluent, permissive, technological society. They can be faulted for their political naivete, their often child-like non-violent stand, and absolute rejection of many of the positive values in American society. We can make fun of their raucous rock, gibberish poetry, confused Orientalism, and adulterated primitiveness. We can jeer at their simplistic confidence in the universality of love to solve all problems. And it becomes frightening when one strongly believes you can have absolute freedom without infringing on the rights of others. However, the strength of these beliefs lies in the strong convictions by which they are held. Their refusal to be regimented and to conform indicate an old spark of the American spirit. The universality of love and humanness they espouse are positive manifestations of an American ideal.

Documentations.

General. 1. Aldridge, John, *In the Country of the Young*. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

2. Berman, Ronald, *America in the Sixties: An Intellectual History*. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

3. Friedenberg, Edgar, *The Vanishing Adolescent*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1967.

4. Lembo, John, *Why Teachers Fail*. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1971.

5. Reich, Charles, *The Greening of America*. New York: Random House, 1970.

6. Revel, Jean Francois, *Without Marx or Jesus: The New American Revolution*. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1971.

7. Roszak, Theodore, *The Making of a Counter Culture*. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1969.

8. Toffler, Alvin, *Future Shock*. New York: Random House, 1971.

9. Wolff, Kurt and Barrington Moore, Jr., *The Critical Spirit* (Marcuse). Boston: Beacon Press, 1967.

Selected. 1. Baez, Joan, *Daybreak* (autobiography). New York: Avon Book Div., 1970.

2. Brautigan, Richard, *The Abortion*. New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1971.

3. _________, *Confederate General*. New York: Grove Press, 1964.

4. _________, *In Watermelon Sugar*. San Francisco: Four Seasons Foundation, City Lights Books, 1968.

5. ________, *The Pill Versus the Springhill Mine Disaster*. San Francisco: Four Seasons Foundation, City Lights Books, 1968.

6. ________, *Trout Fishing in America*. New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1967.

7. Bruce, Lenny, *How to Speak Dirty and Influence People*. Chicago: Playboy Press, 1965.

8. ________, *The Essential Lenny Bruce*. New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1967.

9. Cleaver, Eldridge, *Soul on Ice*. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1968.

10. ________, *Post Prison Writings and Speeches*. New York: Vintage Books, 1969.

11. Davies, Edward, *The Beatle Book*. New York: Cowles Book, 1969.

12. Scaduto, Anthony, *The Beatles*. New York: New American Library, 1968.

13. Dylan, Bob, *Tarantula*. Riverside, N. J.: Macmillan Co., 1971.

14. Kramer, Daniel, *Bob Dylan*. New York: Citadel Press, 1967.

15. Thompson, Toby, *Positively Main Street*. New York: Coward-McCann Inc., 1971 (Dylan).

16. Ferlinghetti, Lawrence, *Back Roads to Far Places*. Philadelphia, Pa.: New Directions, 1971.

17. ________, *A Coney Island of the Mind*. New York: New Directions Publishing Corp., 1958.

18. ________, *Her*. Philadelphia, Pa.: New Directions, 1960.

19. ________, *Pictures of the Gone World*. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1955.

20. Ginsberg, Allen, *Airplane Dreams: Compositions from Journals*. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1968.

189.

21. ________, *Howl and Other Poems*. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1956.

22. Kramer, Jane, *Allen Ginsberg in America*. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.

23. Merrill, Thomas, *Allen Ginsberg*. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1969.

24. Hoffer, Eric, *The Ordeal of Change*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1963.

25. ________, *The Passionate State of Mind*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1955.

26. ________, *The Temper of Our Time*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1967.

27. ________, *The True Believer*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1951.

28. Tomkins, Calvin, *Eric Hoffer An American Odyssey*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968.

29. Hoffman, Abbie, *Steal This Book*. New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1971.

30. ________, *Woodstock Nation*. New York: Vintage Books, 1969.

31. Landau, Deborah, *Janis Joplin, Her Life and Times*. New York: Paperback Library, 1971.

32. Pederson, Duane, *Jesus People*. Pasadena: Compass Press, 1971.

33. Kerouac, Jack, *On the Road*. New York: Viking Press, 1957.

34. ________, *The Dharma Bums*. New York: Viking Press, 1958.

35. McKuen, Rod, *Listen to the Warm*. New York: Random House, 1967.

36. ________, *Stanyan Street and Other Sorrows*. New York: Random House, 1966.

37. McLuhan, Marshall, *Understanding Media*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964.

38. ________, The Mechanical Bride. Boston: Beacon Press, 1967.

39. ________, The Gutenberg Galaxy. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1962.

40. Hopkins, Jerry, Elvis. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971 (Presley).

41. Vonnegut, Kurt, Player Piano. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966.

42. ________, Slaughterhouse Five. New York: Delacorte Press, 1969.

43. ________, Welcome to the Monkey House. New York: Delacorte Press, 1968.

44. Warhol, Andy, A. New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968.

45. ________, Andy Warhol's Index. New York: Random House, 1967.

46. ________, The Blue Movie. New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968.

47. Williams, William Carlos, Autobiography. New York: Random House, 1951.

48. ________, The Collected Later Poems. New York: New Directions, 1963.

49. ________, In the American Grain: Essays. New York: New Directions, 1956.

CHAPTER 18.

NONSENSE AND AESTHETICS.

CLYDE E. CURRAN.

The purpose of this paper is to explore a limited segment of the artist's world that careful contemporary students of aesthetics have frequently labeled "nonsense." To be more precise, what aestheticians, with philosophical training, have quite accurately called "nonsense" are the metaphorical, ambiguous and paradoxical statements artists make when they speak or write about the immediate, personal experiences they undergo as they work or as they reflect upon their work and the work of their colleagues. The statements of some critics, limiting critics to those who designate specific works as art or not art, would also be included. My intention in this discussion is not to undertake a criticism of writings by artists but to use their statements to reach into concrete works or experiences that lie behind these statements. When these are confronted, it seems to me, a paradox arises that threatens aesthetic theory.

Before presenting this paradox and elaborating upon it (it will not be dispelled for I don't see how it can be), I would like to comment on a book that has given me the setting within which I have placed the present discussion. This work is R. G. Collingwood's *The Principles of Art*. The distinction he draws between art, craft, beauty, witchcraft, etc., brings clarity to terms that even in respected writing are vague. (As I wrote this I had in mind such discerning art historians and critics as Herbert Read and Hilton Krammer.) Collingwood's analysis of the word "art" makes most writing in which the word appears seem clumsy. This, however, is not his most significant contribution. As his principal point of departure, he sidesteps usual procedures with their reliance on principle as a starting point and goes directly to the practice of art for the material out of which he builds. He immediately converts his observations into ideas which he then submits to analysis, thus keeping his philosophical balance. Collingwood is the only philosopher I know of who goes as far as he does in the direction of building upon and continuously referring to specific operations and thoughts of practitioners and not generalizations drawn from common properties attributed to operations or principles which are used to interpret specifics. Most philosophies of art bow to practice but despite claims to the contrary they start from convictions that have been nurtured either in metaphysics and epistemology or in value theory and logic. Even empirical descriptive theories, when their principles are initially stated, abandon practice so the difficult job of elaborating upon principle may be attended to.

John Dewey's philosophy of art is a good example of this last kind of theory. His writing is a particularly good illustration because of his unusual sensitivity to art and his stated commitment to the study and control of experience as it occurs. A theory of practice such as Dewey's places art within a full-blown epistemologically oriented philosophy of experience. This is not quite accurate. It is not possible, within Dewey, to conceive of art except as a quality of experience. In his theory of art he differentiates art as an experience from, for example, science as an experience. He cannot, however, consider art except as a form of experience the dimensions of which he sets out in his description of experience. There seem to be crucial experiences, however, which belong to art that cannot fit into Dewey's descriptive theory. For example, degrees of unusual clarity in perception that appear to come, in a way that is not understood, from drawing or painting, and are taken for granted by painters. Such vision is considered by painters as crucial to their work. The painter's way of seeing, the nature of which painters do not agree upon (but they do agree that it does exist) is partially or totally lacking in a person who does not paint. The best that can be expected from the non-painter is a pale facsimile. If the testimony of painters is listened to, they say that they and their colleagues see, when looking at the same canvas, different paintings than non-painters, and consequently enjoy a qualitatively different esthetic experience. It is possible in Dewey's theory to account for painters having experiences that give them a different, even more discerning perception than the layman; but when a qualitatively different aesthetic is attributed to those so experiencing, a seeming mystery is raised that cannot be encompassed within this theory. Once experience is defined in Dewey's biologically based descriptive theory, a broad area of the arts and history of aesthetic theory lends itself to interpretation, but as his principles develop and tighten, usage is supplanted by philosophical principle as the point of departure.

I do not need to be reminded that a single sample of nondemonstrable surmises by painters will not adequately illustrate that Dewey's theory for all its attention to practice is limited. This sample is but one of a whole array of concerns painters are beginning to call attention to. (Statements by painters will be brought into the latter part of this discussion.) The paradox highlighted by what painters treat as art will be more fully developed later. Its nub, however, centers on statement. Painters, particularly since nineteen forty-five, are repeatedly asserting that what is essential to art, the aesthetic experience, cannot be contained in verbal statement. The ineffability of this quality results not from vagueness or mystery in the experience. Reports from those who claim to have such experiences tell about its concreteness, clarity and unqualified understandibility. If reporters of such experiences are pressed for an explanation, when they give one, they imply that what they have experienced exists upon a level that does not lend itself to verbal statement. There is nothing new in this (consider definitions of poetry by poets) but the setting in which it is placed, the urgency and insight brought to it by modern artists coupled with what seems to me to be an unmet challenge to aesthetics, shakes the dust of an old dilemma.

When Collingwood explores usage while advocating such procedure as the only adequate approach for aesthetic theorists, he extends an invitation to aestheticians to take a road that would lead to a more complete examination of the paradox painters and other practitioners of art are beginning to pose. It is pertinent at this point to see how Collingwood broadly outlines his art theory for within a segment of this the present discussion is couched.

Collingwood, in his The Principles of Art, divides a philosophy of art into two parts, usage and definition. He says a theory of art may go wrong when not informed by usage or break down at the level of precise statement. The first failure is illustrated in the writings of theorists who are tidy with words and phrases developing their discourse with admirable clarity, but don't know what they are talking about. Their work suffers from irrelevance. There are those, on the other hand, who know what they are talking about but fail to articulate adequate definitions. Theirs is the plight of talking nonsense about what they know. Such a failure is illustrated by the informed painter who makes confused statements about art.

As Collingwood elaborates upon the co-relationship between usage and definition, he repeatedly alludes to an idea that is central to our discussion. He suggests that western philosophies of art have often been what he calls "technical" and "intellectual." He means by this that they have either exploited definition, without carefully examining usage, or taken a theory of craft for a theory of art. Although he does not argue this, it is not his business to do so in The Principles of Art, he does, in building his definition of art, illustrate the point by turning his attention to Aristotle and Plato. It is his contention that western philosophers have frequently gone astray by constructing upon the "aesthetic" theories of Aristotle and Plato. These theories and the problems they pose have been taken by western thinkers as a basis for a philosophy of art. He maintains that this is an error for neither Plato nor Aristotle developed a philosophy of art. Theirs, according to Collingwood, was a philosophy of craft. While treating their philosophy of craft as a remarkable invention, he argues that errors result when it is considered as a philosophy of art. Collingwood calls craft "the power to produce a preconceived result by means of consciously controlled and directed action." He distinguishes art from craft in a number of ways, all hinging on a central idea -- purpose. In art, purpose is not and cannot be preconceived but comes into existence while art is being produced. He designates "technical" theories as philosophies of craft taken to be philosophies of art. One of his examples of the technical theory of art is the theory proposed by contemporary psychologists in which: "To the psychologists, the audience consists of persons reacting in certain ways to stimuli provided by the artists; and the artists' business is to know what reactions are desired or desirable and to provide the stimuli which will elicit them." "Intellectual" theories result when thinkers draw their material for discourse from statements made by other thinkers and neglect usage. This last thought is incidental in Collingwood, but what it suggests, the indispensability of usage to theories of art is critical for the present discussion.

At this juncture, what constitutes usage and how it is to be tapped are questions that need to be asked. Because the suggestion that usage serve as one of the cornerstones of a theory of art comes from Collingwood, it is instructive to see how he handles these questions. He gets into usage in two ways. First he selects crucial words for analysis that refer to occurrences that can be, have been and are being experienced. Sometimes these words refer to experiences common to practitioners of arts but usually they point to experiences that are common to everyone. Technique and craftsmanship are examples of two such words. Occasionally his crucial words refer to facts. When making use of facts, he introduces enough documentation to show he has not spun the fact out of his reveries. The cruciality of a word is determined by whether in Collingwood's judgment it bears upon his topic, a definition of art. He is not arbitrary, however, in his selection of words to define. A good part of his arguments support this procedure. His second approach to usage for want of a better term could be called "observation."

He does not report on observations he has made, in the manner of the clinician, but his sensitivity and telling use of illustration reveal an unusual penetration into the practice of artists. He makes repeated use of a reference to painting that illustrates this particular form of "observation." (Most of his illustrations are from poetry.) In a discussion of landscape painting, Collingwood points out that a painter does not see an object, a tree for example, then draw it. It is the other way around. As he paints, he sees the tree. A discussion of the issues that surround such a statement would take us far from our course. What he does, it seems to me in building with such illustrations is to show his authentic and authoritative understanding of the arts. His aesthetic theory is an example of the advocacy that a philosophy of art should be anchored in usage.

With just this short excursion by way of Collingwood into usage, the questions upon which this discussion hinges can be asked. If Collingwood had spent the major part of his career in the practice of art instead of philosophic study, would his "observations" have given him a perspective that would have significantly altered his thinking on art? Keep in mind that he considers usage as a base from which principles are molded. Collingwood suggests that a more intimate familiarity with usage would have changed his perspective. I would like to state this question in a more general form. Do "artists" penetrate an area of usage that is closed to laymen including philosophers of the aesthetic? Not all "artists" so-called produce art. Granted, however, that some do make objects that engender art, does the making of these objects and the experiences that coexist in the making open up a phenomenon which is usually called aesthetic that is shut off from those who do not make such objects? A series of questions come to mind immediately when this last question is posed. Are there different kinds of aesthetic experiences; those generated by nature, for example, as contrasted with those generated by art? Are those that stem from art (for the sake of making a distinction in this context they will be called "art experiences") dependent upon making art objects? Is it possible that some people, including most theorists of the aesthetic, do not have and have not had "art experiences?" If philosophers have had only general aesthetic experiences and not "art experiences," can they write a philosophy of the aesthetic which claims to probe art proper that does not suffer from irrelevancy?

Several things need to be said about these questions. They do not lead to inquiry. It is not possible to determine whether artists have hidden personal experience, crucial to understanding art, that ordinary people do not have. These questions ask for an examination of an area that cannot be properly handled within the bounds of rational search. They even imply that most theories of art suffer from irrelevancy. Yet I believe that what is suggested in these questions is true.

The "evidence" that has convinced me was not sought but came to me over a period of years in a sporadic way while I was intensively studying painting. The program I was engaged in has three phases: an unusually concentrated study over the last five years of paintings, especially those done since nineteen forty-five; the reading of commentaries on painting by master modern painters; and a heavy involvement in painting. During this period a small but important awakening occurred. It first became apparent as I looked at paintings. I have been going into galleries regularly for the last thirty-five years developing what could be called a discerning but limited lay interest in the visual arts. Shortly after I had started my intensive studies of painting I noticed I was seeing paintings differently from the way I had before. A more discriminating understanding of formal problems such as design could be expected and did result but this was not what impressed me. It was as if I were no longer seeing paintings with the mind and eye, but with the large muscles. This seeing with the muscles (the awkward word "feeling" is more precise) would come and go, not as a result of my willing it but as if through the operation of some force that lay entirely outside of my conscious control. There is nothing obscure, or vague, or mysterious about this experience. I might add that there is nothing exclusive about this experience. I have become convinced the reason most people do not have such an experience is that they do not steep themselves in painting. Seeing with the muscles becomes vague, obscure, and mysterious only when an attempt is made to convert it or that which is crucial to it into accurate verbal statements.

One of the side effects of "seeing with the muscles" came as a mild shock. I found it was almost impossible to say something sensible about the pictures that had been experienced in this way. Even describing the more obvious formal properties became difficult. If I talked to someone about a picture that was felt with particular depth, a description of how it was put together formally seemed completely irrelevant, yet even to do this was a nearly impossible task. Those pictures which were not seen by the muscles, this included almost all that were looked at, offered no problems at all. If I knew what the painter was doing, I could describe it with fluency, even offering a critical appraisal.

Seeing with the muscles accompanied by a curtailment in the ability to talk sense about those pictures which impressed me the most would not alone have convinced me that the above questions probe an obscure, but, what seems to me to be a crucial, truth. Something else occurred. A number of statements by painters I had read several years ago, upon re-reading, after having the experiences with painting mentioned above, began to make unusual sense. I realized after the second reading that my first impressions were totally wrong. Furthermore, if I had not painted and studied paintings, I would not have known what they were saying. These profound utterances were like inside jokes. They had the effect of reactivating "feelings" (a poor word but I do not know a more descriptive one) previously experienced. If a person had not at some depth involved himself in painting, this wisdom, which goes directly to the heart of the aesthetic, would in printed form appear to be cryptic and confusing.

The following illustration may make this idea somewhat clearer. While Richards Ruben (a southern California painter now in New York) and I were talking about his work he said, "Color is substance." I recall at the time he made this statement he seemed to be putting unusual stress upon what appeared to me to be obvious. I took the assertion that color is substance to mean that among the properties of design which would include line, shape or image, texture, contrast, etc., that color was fundamental, i.e., all attributes of design when employed in painting are subservient to color. While this interpretation is plausible, it is completely beside the point Ruben was making. Because of the unusual stress he placed upon his terse ejaculation, I remembered it. Several years later while working on a painting, his meaning became clear to me. There is no way of conveying this "knowledge" by verbal statement. If a person learns it, he learns it on his own through direct and concrete involvement. He cannot have it passed on to him through any symbolic form. I have been very careful in choosing the words in this last sentence. I will not try to elaborate on Ruben's "Color is substance," but I would add just one thing. If painting has a soul, that soul is color: that elusive yet tangible, that ethereal yet concrete stuff which has never been adequately treated in any intellectual scheme and which when handled by a sensitive painter can stir the deepest and most profound aesthetic experiences men can enjoy.

The personal experiences I have related seem to be quite common among painters. I judge this to be so because of the conversations I have had with painters in which they tell about such experiences, and the writing painters have done that reports on incidents similar to the ones just presented. For two years New York artists published a journal called "It Is," in which the preceding personal anecdotes coincide with underlying premises that served as the base for this publication. This scattered information suggest careful study would show what has been reported as personal is universal among painters. Only the roughest empirical evidence could be mustered in support of this contention, however. In this discussion I am making the assumption that many painters and of course other working artists have experiences similar to mine. To argue in support of this assumption, a job I will undertake at another time, this assumption would have to be examined.

Granted the "limited universality" of what has been related as personal experience, it is now possible to state more completely the paradox mentioned in the opening paragraph. Remember "art experience" was previously described as resulting from making art objects. "Art experience" can and often does make available to the experiencer "knowledge" that is in the usual sense of the word not "knowable." This means that those who have "art experiences" enter into relationships with painting which, while acutely vivid, defy explanation or conversion into idea or statement. The present discussion rests on the theory that the knowable is stateable.

Not only do those who have "art experience" become acquainted with a form of "knowledge" which is the most valuable, precise, vivid, and concrete phase of their work, they also realize they cannot talk sense about it. (The words "valuable," "precise," "vivid," and "concrete" in the preceding sentence are metaphorical.) Try to get an experienced artist to explain his work. He will refuse. This can be said without equivocation and without knowing the artist. There are many reasons for this, but the central one is that insofar as he has even the remotest intention to produce art, the heart of his work is simply not explainable. (Craftmanship, however, lends itself to precise verbal statement. Technique, which is always involved in art, also can be adequately written about.)

A great many artists, I would say all artists if they mature artistically, realize that insofar as they deal in "art" they are handling an ineffable thing. They do not, however, remain silent. Literature on art by artists is abundant and most often pretentious and fuzzy. Yet within this mass of extravagant verbage are the terse, revealing observations referred to previously. Some painters have put into words insights that lay open large portions of "ineffable knowledge." (Motherwell, Alberts, Dubuffet, and Tworkov are a few well-known figures among the many contemporary artists who have revealed their acquaintance with "ineffable knowledge" through the things they have written.) That some painters today have acquired enough verbal astuteness to make telling inroads into the ineffable is somewhat ironic. The most profound things being said today on painting are being said by painters, yet they communicate only to those who already "know" what they are talking about.

How is the hogwash to be separated from the wisdom? An individual may be an expert in logic, a skilled student of linguistics, a competent scholar of aesthetics, an art historian or critic; unless he has had "art experience" he will not be able to separate the wisdom from the slush, for some hogwashers turn a fine phrase.

The point has been reached in attempting to make sense out of what falls beyond sense to introduce a definition of art. The preceding has suggested that verbal statements, if they point to art, carry meaning only for those who, having experienced it, know what art is. Yet the reason for doing this paper is the conviction that the crucial ineffable area which lies at the center of art can be made somewhat more available to art theory than it has been in the past.

The following approach to definition will serve to locate art, i.e., treat it within the context of subject and object and also in a sentence to point out a few things art is not. Because nowhere in the following will art as such be defined, these assertions are called predefinition.

1. Definitions of art that encompass all the arts will suffer from irrelevancy. (I am at this point introducing another major unexamined assumption.) The following predefinition concerns art in painting. Some of the attributes of art in painting are simply not applicable to any other art form. (The immediate response to color forms in "geometric" painting, for example.) A dimension of art in painting exists in a unique and individual form that is obliterated when placed within a generalized definition of art.

2. Art is not craft.

3. Art is not representation.

4. Art as such has no relationship to beauty. Brief elaboration is needed here. Collingwood develops this idea at length. Plato is considered by him as the chief western philosopher of the beautiful, the beautiful being that which is desired or loved. A study of or the fact of love will not reveal what is essential to art.

Henry Moore, an artist who had no use for metaphysics, has written about beauty in art. Out of the depth of his experience, he came to the realization that beauty and art do not coincide. This is what he says:

"For me a work must first have vitality of its own. I do not mean a reflection of the vitality of life, of movement, physical action, frisking, dancing figures and so on, but that a work can have in it a pent-up energy, an intense life of its own, independent of the object it may represent. When work has this powerful vitality we do not connect the word 'beauty' with it."

"Beauty, in the later Greek or Renaissance sense, is not the aim in my sculpture."

"Between beauty of expression and power of expression there is a difference of function. The first aims at pleasing the senses, the second has a spiritual vitality which for me is more moving and goes deeper than the senses."

"Because a work does not aim at reproducing natural appearances, it is not, therefore, an escape from life, but may be penetration into reality, not a sedative or a drug, not just the exercise of good taste, the provision of pleasant shapes and colors in a pleasing combination, not a decoration to life, but an expression of the significance of life, a stimulation to greater effort to living."

Moore's observations are of the kind that penetrate the ineffable.

5. Taking our cue from Moore, it can be said that art is not decoration, or made to please the senses, or a matter of good taste.

6. Art is located in a relationship between subject and object. Without an object which has the potentiality to stimulate "art experience" there is no art. That art objects do exist is not a theoretical concern but a matter of fact.

There is no art either without a subject who is enjoying "art experiences." ("Art experience" has been described as resulting from making art objects.) That there is such art experience is a fact to be established. Rough observations seem to show "art experience" does exist. Two further things need to be said about it. First it does not seem to be present while an artist is working but only when he finishes and then looks back on what he has done. While I do not think it will ever be possible to determine all that accounts for "art experience," one thing seems clear. The hours and hours of unusually strong focus of attention required in making objects of art, paintings in this paper, which goes on for years and years, effect a qualitative change in the perspective of the artist. This seems to come into play not at the time he is working, but when he contemplates what he or others have done. In this paper I have assumed that art exists only in the "art experience." Keep in mind this assumption as treated here applies only to painting. In literary art, emotions are articulated that are common to all people. If a novelist or dramatist introduces exclusive emotions into his work, to the degree that these penetrate, it will suffer as art. It is the literary artist's job to make clear common emotions. Stated more precisely, writing fulfills one essential attribute of art when it articulates common emotions. Collingwood develops this idea at length. This is not true of "art" in painting. On this crucial point this discussion departs from Collingwood. In art in painting, what is experienced is indeed uncommon. Second, when "art experience" is present among those individuals who do not make art objects, it comes as a result, not of reading about art, regardless of how well the reading is done or how wide the coverage, but as a result of long and penetrating looking at pictures. While "art experience" is not subjective, i.e., generated out of the innards of the subject, there must be an art object present; it is personal and idiosyncratic.

People may go through art galleries looking at what the most competent critics coupled with the testimony of history designate as fine art, but "art" will not be there unless they have "art experience." These people may love what they see and in so doing be profoundly moved, they may be enthralled by the skill in the work they are witnessing, they may make accurate and profound observations about the historical influences that have contributed to the development of particular works, they may successfully relate specific pieces to philosophical theories of aesthetics, an occupation that requires unusual rigor; they may do all these things, yet "art" may not be present.

A work of art may be beautiful, contain craftsmanship that is skillfully representational, be a model of good taste, and be ingratiating on every count. Keep in mind, however, that it is not the fact of its beauty, craftsmanship, skill in representation, good taste, or sensual delight, that make it a work of art.

With this predefinition before me, it is now possible to introduce some general observations. Remember these are suggested by "art" which is here considered as ineffable. In this section of the paper, statements of artists, referred to in the first paragraph, will be presented.

Some general characteristics of art:

1. Art is non-progressive. This holds for the work of individual

artists as well as for history. What an artist learns at one time in his career, unless he is in the initial stages of acquiring his craft, does not necessarily bear fruit at another. Neither do the "achievements" in one particular historical period enhance a later one. The best statement I know of on the non-progressive attributes of history as it relates to art is one made by Collingwood in a theoretical work on history. He says:

"To the historian accustomed to studying growth of scientific or philosophic knowledge, the history of art presents a painful and disquieting spectacle, for it seems normally to proceed not forwards but backwards. In science and philosophy, successive workers in the same field produce, if they work ordinarily well, an advance; and a retrograde movement always implies some breach of continuity. But in art, a school once established normally deteriorates as it goes on. It achieves perfection in its kind with a startling burst of energy, a gesture too quick for the historian's eye to follow. He can never explain such movement or tell us how exactly it happened. But once it is achieved, there is the melancholy certainty of decline. . . . So far as there is any observable law in collecting art history, it is, like the law of the individual artist's life, the law not of progress but of reaction."

Because practically all art criticism uses the language of development, it is easy to fall into the habit of thinking about the development or regression of a particular artist or group of artists. Critics, as critics, however, do not respond to art as it has been predefined here. What critics relate to is that tangible set of complexes which in current art journal jargon is called the "aesthetic of the artist." Included in the "aesthetic of the artist" is technique, personal sensitivity as it comes through in work, habits such as the use of color, obvious or subtle mannerisms which can be used to classify an artist in a particular school, etc. The word "aesthetic" as used by most critics, while having nothing to do with art proper, does cover an important segment of the production of artifacts which is indeed subject to the preconceptions (sometimes called principles) critics bring to their job, including the concept of progress.

Art, however, is not open to understanding by way of the concept of progress.

An illustration of this can be found in painters who, like Joseph Albers, or Motherwell, work in series. Sometimes a series will cover a period of thirty years. The first painting in a series is usually the best.

2. Art is not subject to evaluation by principle. Art simply is. It is not greater than or less than, more like or unlike anything.

"Art in painting is not the subject but an unknown quality, transcendent, without definition and unpredictable." (Edgar Ewing)

"Everyone who is professionally concerned with value judgments in this field knows how embarrassing it is to be pinned down by demands for explaining why some works are acceptable, others not. It is a question of feeling, of responding, which may be as instinctive on the part of the critic as was the original act of creation on the part of the artist." (Allen Weller)

3. When an artist finishes a work he does not know what he has done. Nor does he know whether or not art is present. (Bear in mind that art is not ethereal.) Some painters study their work for months after they have finished it to discover its content. Although I have heard painters say this often, I have only been able to find one piece of writing on this idea. This is by Picasso:

"How can you expect an onlooker to live a picture of mine as I have lived it? A picture comes to me from miles away: who is to say from how far away I sensed it, saw it, painted it; and yet the next day I can't see what I have done myself. How can anyone enter into my dreams, my instincts, my thoughts, which have taken a long time to mature and to come into daylight, and above all grasp from them what I have been about -- perhaps against my own will?"

4. Art is contemporary.

To want to create something outside of one's own age strikes me as suspect. (Paul Klee)

Every work of art is a child of its time, often it is the mother of our emotions. It follows that each period of culture produces an art of its own which cannot be repeated. (Wassily Kandinsky)

It's a nuisance when we speak of culture to speak of the pieces we have inherited -- however knowable the pieces. The noblest libraries and museums and the noblest memories do not make us cultured. Only our own making gives being to our culture. Not the man who quotes -- but the man who speaks out of himself for himself. Nothing archaic can help us or set us an example. Everything is new like ourselves. (Jack Tworkov)

5. Art and the individual:

A. Art is a personal experience. It completely eludes social theories. A cultural anthropological theory of art is a contradiction. Yet those who know art also "know" others in different places and times have had this personal experience.

B. Self-actualization, as the term and phenomenon have been developed by Maslow, have no relationship to art. It is possible for a person to be highly self-actualized who has not experienced art.

C. While art is experienced, identity is set aside. During art experience there is a loss of identity.

D. Art is not self-expression.

"I very much distrust expression as a driving force and as an aim in art." (Josef Albers)

E. The experience of art does not result from a positive act of will or through the exercise of choice in the rational or existential sense. Art is a gratuity. If the statement would not be misunderstood, I would call art a divine gift. This fact, when sufficiently developed, it seems to me, will throw considerable doubt on the depth of various contemporary existential positions. (Wylie Sypher uses the term post-existential in appraising Beckett, Genet, and Ionesco. These writers leave existentialism when they abandon the tragic pose. What man makes of himself, in their eyes, is negligible.) It does not seem possible to choose an aesthetic life if an aesthetic life means leading a life filled with "art experience."

6. Art, however, is human. When Ortega writes about the dehumanization of art he makes his point by defining the human in art as the presence of recognizable objects, especially human figures.

"If the likeness of man is often absent from modern art, Man himself is present, whole and naked -- more so than in any academic nudes." (Emile Langui)

"Without exception the artists of the last five or six generations have told us more about man and the world than humanity had a right to expect . . . . It would be pointless to consider seriously those literary commentators who deliberately confuse humanism with the human image." (Jimmy Ernst)

7. Art is never abstract.

8. It is not possible to be committed to art. John Dewey used the word "impulsion" to describe human involvement with art. This word is particularly apt. Motherwell speaks of art as a "passion."

9. Art is potentially available to everyone.

Concluding remarks:

It does not seem to me that art can be taught. Nor do I think that teaching is an art. It is a craft.

If aesthetics is to be saved from irrelevancy, philosophers, while learning the secrets of precise statement, must also have something to say. If they will have something to say about art, in addition to pursuing the trade of thinking, they must become artists.

CHAPTER 19.

RELEVANCE, CREATIVITY AND LIBERAL EDUCATION.

CATHARINE FELS.

One of the cliches contaminating the intellectual atmosphere today is the phrase "Oh, that's not relevant." This is put into many forms, all with the same amorphous amalgam of a number of meanings. Students, professors, editorial writers and politicians have taken up the cry. They have all found something at which they can point their fingers and say: "But it's irrelevant."

A student came up to one of us in the first week of a history of philosophy class and asked why I didn't drop everything else and teach the class Existentialism. "All this other junk is irrelevant," he said. He was asked what he really knew about all this "other junk," pointing out that if he does know it he shouldn't be in this course, but should take our offering on Existentialism. (1) He said that he didn't know what this other junk was about, but since it was done so long ago it had to be irrelevant.

Some professors have agreed with some students that most of the academic courses were "irrelevant" and turned their particular courses into encounter groups. (2) Forcing students into encounter groups, we have been informed by experts, is not very effective, since participation in these groups should be voluntary. These professors had given up trying to make their courses meaningful and turned their classrooms into prolonged bull sessions. These same professors maintained that grades meant nothing and gave all their students "A"s. If grades do mean nothing, of course they might as well have given all "F"s or all "C"s, something that mysteriously failed to occur to them. Some of these professors completed the emasculation of their courses by assigning no required reading, giving no examinations, these apparently being considered irrelevant also. And in one sense they are right. If the course is to have no planned intellectual content, then reading, examinations and lectures are irrelevant because there is nothing for them to be relevant to.

This brings us to our first major point. The student who wanted Existentialism taught knew nothing about Existentialism or the philosophy which was being taught. Therefore, he could hardly know to what they were relevant. He was exhibiting, however, an idea which is widely held today. This idea was pungently stated by the late Henry Ford: "History is Bunk." (3)

The professors who no longer taught formal course content had succumbed to the widespread antiintellectualism prevalent both on and off campuses today: (4) they want to make the students feel better and perhaps grow into people who have greater sensitivity towards the feelings of others than they had before. These are worthy goals, but the cost must be assessed and perhaps the place changed. These professors have assumed that the intellectual aspects of their discipline are irrelevant to their goals. The word "irrelevant" is used here to deny any relationship between course content and some unnamed area of immediate importance.

The fact that what is felt to be of great importance at a given moment may give way to something else -- and that this change can take place rapidly and often is given no thought. If institutions of higher learning attempted to adjust to these ephemeral forms of relevance, they would lose their usefulness. Rather, courses should be designed and taught in such a way that the students can see the relevance of the material and method to their -- the students -- own intellectual development, become intellectually involved, thereby making these courses relevant to present interests and future more developed interests.

The word relevant has come to have many meanings. Primarily it has been used in the logical sense to characterize part of an argument. A proposition is relevant to an argument if it makes a difference to it. That is, it is related to the other propositions in the argument in such a way that it makes the whole argument either valid or invalid. This relationship is objective; it is part of the nature of the situation and not due to the way the subject is viewing the argument. We can call this the objective factor of relevance to distinguish it from the subjective factor.

The subjective factor is the psychological one -- being able to "see" or "know" that the connection between the propositions in question is either present or potentially present.

In other words, the objective factor is the connection between propositions which any trained observer can see, especially if it is pointed out to him.

The subjective factor is the ability to see or know this objective factor. The subjective factor must be discussed in more detail as this is what is involved in most of the remarks about relevance so often made today.

The logical use of the term relevance has developed into a more common usage which can be analyzed back to the logical usage. The common use of "relevant" means related or connected. But in all instances of relatedness or connectedness, we are involved with the relationship of the thing -- event, proposition, etc. -- and the relationship is one of relevance when that thing -- event, proposition, etc. -- makes a difference to the total complex.

Making the connections and seeing the relationships which exist or potentially exist is a result of intellectual skill. Guilford speaks of it as an element in fluency. (5) Fluency for Guilford involves ease and freedom in relating things -- events, propositions, etc. It involves seeing new relationships between known things. It further involves the ability to relate new knowledge to old knowledge. Fluency involves familiarity and one cannot have familiarity without knowledge. The everyday use of the word fluency is applied to a level of skill in using a language and illustrates perfectly what is meant.

Guilford considers fluency an important aspect of creativity. Those people who have not acquired fluency in a discipline are unable to see the possible relevancies either within the field itself or between one field and another. One cannot see the relevant connections if one is ignorant, that is, if one is not fluent in the discipline or disciplines involved.

For a person to see the relevant relationships of one area to another one must have prior knowledge of both areas. There is no subjective relevance to be derived from ignorance. And making the connections -- seeing the relationships -- is one important element in a creative approach to any discipline -- and to any interdisciplinary activity. It can only come from such familiarity that one almost intuits the connections.

In the arts where one often makes and objectifies connections, fluency is indispensable. This same activity takes place in the sciences and in the development of technology. New connections, not previously present are created by human beings. Once they are created they are objective and then can be known as objective connections by other observers. It is important to note that this creativity cannot take place if the potential relevancies are not there. This is easily recognized if an example from the field of invention is imagined. For instance when Edison invented the electric light bulb, all the elements which went into its construction were well known. It was known that a wire carried a current and glowed (gave off light when the resistance to the current heated up the wire) and it was known that if this took place where oxygen was present the wire would burn. Edison sought a way to keep the resistance wire from burning up and still being able to glow -- and he used a vacuum bulb which was sealed from the air, thus permitting the wire to give off light without being in contact with oxygen and so burning up. He devised a way to bring the current to the filament without permitting air to enter and spoil the vacuum. Edison used disparate elements and put them together, making them relevant to one another in the context of a light bulb.

It should be pointed out here that because one couldn't see the connections -- the relevancy -- between two events (propositions, etc.), does not at all mean that the connections are not there. To assert that there are no connections on the basis of no recognition of evidence that there are connections would be to commit one of the most famous informal fallacies -- the argument from ignorance. Because we don't know whether something exists -- as a relevant connection -- does not give us the right to argue that it doesn't exist.

Because one didn't know of a historical and pictorial relationship between two art masterpieces doesn't mean this connection does not exist. It is well known by the art historians that Edouard Manet's Picnic in the Woods has Giorgione's Country Fete as an intellectual and pictorial ancestor. If one is not knowledgeable in this area and asserts there is no connection (relevance) between the two pictures, the assertion would be a commission of the fallacy in question. (6) Yet one finds that many who say this or that course or theory or book is "irrelevant" are really committing this same error. Most of the people committing this fallacy are, of course, ignorant of the fallacy of the "argument from ignorance" itself.

There are two further qualitative distinctions which might shed some light on problems of the meaning of "relevance." These are what we may call "short term" and "long term" relevance and the relationships and distinctions between theory and practice. We will take up the former pair first.

By "short term relevance" we mean the attempt to find things (events, propositions, etc.) which are related to immediate problems. By "long term relevance" we mean understanding that particular things (events, propositions, etc.) might be relevant to problems arising throughout a whole lifetime possibly, or at least in the future. We feel that the search for "short term relevance" to the exclusion of activities or learning having potential "long term relevance" is one of the characteristics of the present upsurge of antiintellectualism.

The search for "long term relevance" involves education in depth. It is one of the basic functions of a liberal arts education to aid in this search. It is often difficult to find "short term relevance" in the liberal arts.

The search for short term relevance is part of that emphasis on immediate success which is so prevalent in American society today. Instant knowledge is a part of instant success -- and the demand for education which is instantly relevant is one of its elements.

But "one swallow doesn't make a summer, neither does one fine day" to quote Aristotle. (7) Each day and each year in our lives brings up new problems and involves us in new levels of development. What was relevant in a short term sense at the age of eighteen or twenty may not -- probably won't be -- relevant at ages forty or sixty.

The actualization of the potential of a human being takes a whole lifetime and this is the only way to the achievement of happiness -- to paraphrase one of Aristotle's most famous ideas. One of the greatest satisfactions comes from things (ideas, events, etc.) which are relevant to a lifetime of development. This position, of course, does not leave out short term relevance -- but it does emphasize the importance of long term relevance. The curriculum in institutions of higher learning, it seems to us, should be evaluated in terms of a correct balance between these two. This would result in an emphasis on the liberal arts as liberating arts -- instead of today's tendency to de-emphasize general education.

The relationship between theory and practice is a facet of the relationship between long term and short term relevance. It is an old saw that theory without practice is empty and practice without theory is blind. There are plenty of apostles for the blind getting a wide press today. Practical courses, if they are handled correctly, seem to be immediately relevant. Training for particular types of jobs or professions is, on the whole -- especially if well worked out -- relevant to the near present situation of the trainees. Too often there has been omitted in this training the seemingly irrelevant education in history, philosophy, literature and sciences which supply long term relevancy.

During World War II when there was a manpower shortage and no prospects of jobs as Philosophy professors, the graduate students and new Ph.D.'s from the Berkeley Philosophy Department took jobs in the shipyards. Although philosophers are usually considered impractical, all of these men distinguished themselves in one way or another in practical shipyard work, and many became foremen or took other leadership responsibility though all began "at the bottom" as the phrase goes, having had no experience in shipyard crafts.

Although there has not to our knowledge been a statistical study of this phenomenon, the practical long term relevance of a trained mind was quite clear to us. It is our personal observation that general education with an emphasis on the sciences and mathematics made the exceptional performance of this group possible. The broader the educational base of men coming into the various crafts the better they were on technical jobs and the faster they rose to leadership positions.

It should be remembered that the early forties was a period of very rapid technological change. Old time craftsmen often dragged their heels at new methods. The liberal education seemed to give flexibility, an ability to grasp new relationships -- new relevancies of course.

Although there does not seem to be any connection between, for instance, philosophy and running a job with two to four hundred men installing electrical equipment, it is only a short term relevance which is missing.

There is, however, a long term relevance buried from sight which can be discovered in concrete situations which arose. Of course the understanding of electrical problems was necessary. The philosophers knew how to find out the things they didn't know, and had self-confidence in their ability to learn. In personnel work they had the ability to rank important and less important jobs and responsibilities. On very large jobs their general education enabled them to relate their areas of responsibility to the other crafts -- this last was very difficult for the old time craftsmen.

That this generalized ability is developed by general education has long been claimed as the justification for education in the liberal arts. It has never been proved ineffective. It is ironic that at the same time that the boards of directors of some of our largest corporations are looking for men with a broad general education, and trying to give some of this to their executives, many faculty members are failing to see the relevance of liberal arts education.

If anyone had told Gauss to "forget it" when he had developed his four-dimensional geometry because it wasn't relevant, they would have been doing a great disservice to mankind. Gauss, of course, couldn't know that Einstein would come along and see certain connections and be able to use the four-dimensional geometry in developing his theory of relativity. Einstein had the kind of mind and the training which enabled him to see the relevancies where others had not seen them. Moreover, developments in the field of physics had opened up the possibilities of those relevancies being seen by that time.

The relationship between knowledge and long term relevance is obvious. But the relationship between knowledge and short term relevance is often overlooked. Solutions to immediate problems involve knowledge. Often the broader the man's background the more connections and relationships can be seen among superficially unrelated areas.

Sometimes immediate problems are so pressing that one thinks only of immediately palliative solutions. But many of the major problems we face today -- though in need of immediate solutions, are very complex. Each proposed solution has so many side effects that it is necessary to remember that the search should be for long term relevancy in solutions. Rachel Carson's The Silent Spring is a beautiful attack on short term relevance which has disregarded long term relevance.

Long term solutions require years of the broadest kind of education. An ecologist is all kinds of biologist -- zoologist, bacteriologist, botanist, herpetologist and so on, plus geologist, agronomist and many more. It is only by a bringing together of man's knowledge that long term solutions can be creatively sought.

The twin factors of short term relevance and emphasis on practice without a theoretical base, are part of the antiintellectualism which is endemic in American culture. We have been able to overcome this antiintellectualism at certain periods, but have never been able to get rid of it. In the past few years, after a short suppression due to our jealousy over Sputnik -- that is for the Russians getting the first man into space -- antiintellectualism has blossomed forth into full bloom again, pointing its finger at much of value in the educative process, crying "that's irrelevant."

In conclusion, we would like to point out that the demand for short term relevance has the sad effect of taking the fun out of intellectual activity. (8) The creative mind wanders. It often follows some path simply out of intellectual curiosity or a spirit of fun or play. In raising a criteria of immediate relevancy to some everyday life problem as the standard of judgment for a teaching program, one of the most destructive elements in American tradition is again brought to the front. The Puritan attitudes that singing is dangerously evil, that doing something "for fun" is at worst "inspired by the devil," at best "irrelevant to life's necessities" is raising its head again.

These are, partly, the roots of our antiintellectualism. They can keep many from enjoying the thrill of seeing the connections from the vantage point of a broad educational base which may well appear on the surface to be irrelevant to everyday practical problems.

We must remember that the cry of irrelevancy is often a cry from ignorance. To prove irrelevancy is much more difficult than it seems at first glance.

Those who fail to acquire fluency in various fields have deprived themselves of the possibility of seeing the relevancies between those fields. They have condemned themselves to a narrow and uncreative way of looking at the events they confront. It is the role of teacher to help those who erroneously cry "irrelevant" to overcome this ignorance.

Documentations.

1. The demand by students that they choose a text has a similar answer. If they are sufficiently acquainted with the various texts available for a course, it should hardly be necessary for them to take the course.

2. This is not to be construed as a blanket criticism of encounter groups or sensitivity training. I took part in such a group last spring and found it rewarding. The point is that encounter groups and academic courses are not interchangeable.

3. The idea that "history is bunk" does not necessarily imply that all historical figures are bunk to the holder of that slogan. The meaning of the slogan and its observable use is that it is bunk to study and try to understand ideas, events, processes, etc. in their historical matrix. Thus, as one of our colleagues pointed out, the young may prefer Confucius to Wittgenstein. The fact that the thought of both Confucius and Wittgenstein had fathers and grandfathers, and were imbedded inextricably in a social matrix and were, further, influential in much later thought

seems too complicated and completely irrelevant to those who are either anti or a-historical. Santayana's famous statement that those who don't know history will be forced to relive it, is one of those historical gems beyond the ken of those who think history is bunk.

4. For further documentation of antiintellectual trends see Hofstadter, Richard, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962.

5. Guilford, J. Paul, The Nature of Human Intelligence, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. Personality, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.

6. Craven, Thomas, A Treasury of Art Masterpieces, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1939, p. 502.

7. Aristotle, Nichomacheon Ethics, Bk I, Ch. 7 between lines 15-20. In McKean, Richard, Editor, Introduction to Aristotle, New York: The Modern Library.

8. Seymour Halleck in Psychology Today, Nov., 1969 discusses long and short term relevance using quite different terminology. He refers to a student-patient type, describing him as....."Not a social activist or alienated or a hippy. He might best be thought of as an unrelenting stylist -- an individual whose life is dominated by the values of immediacy, relevance, social maneuverability, psychological mindedness and dissent......................Such patients raise an agonizing question: can man survive with comfort and grace if he ignores the value of the irrelevant?" Dr. Halleck uses the word relevant to indicate "short term relevance," only, as we have termed it. Content, depth, thoughts of the past and planning for the future he consents to label "irrelevant." This is something we find we cannot bear to do. However we find ourselves in considerable agreement with Dr. Halleck's ideas though complaining mildly about his willingness to let a good word go down the drain.

CHAPTER 20.

IS HUMANISTIC EDUCATION PHILOSOPHICAL?

GARY D. FENSTERMACHER.

The title of this paper poses a question which many persons might think odd. Since almost any phenomenon of which man is aware can be approached and discussed philosophically, then surely the phenomenon of humanistic education is amenable to philosophical consideration.

Yet currently it seems to be the case that the examination and advocacy of humanistic education is monopolized by psychologists, sociologists and avant garde teachers, while the philosophical community lags behind in scholarly devotion and missionary zeal. It almost seems as if there is nothing in humanistic education to merit the attention of philosophers.

Perhaps this state of affairs can be explained by looking at the way so-called humanistic educators talk about their field. Terms such as 'affective learning,' 'levels of consciousness,' 'sensitivity,' 'feeling,' 'confluence,' and 'awareness' make it appear that the topic fits the social and behavioral sciences far better than philosophy.

But part of the explanation also rests with Anglo-American philosophers who have traditionally shown disdain for the European-based parents of humanism, existentialism and phenomenology. In an effort to correct this neglect of the child, I shall try to identify a few of the key philosophical questions implicit in the notion of humanistic education. At the same time, I want to indicate how a few perennial philosophical problems might be recast so as to create a more substantial link between the study of philosophy and the practice of education.

Ordinarily, one would accomplish these objectives through an analytic essay typical of ordinary language philosophers. However, I have chosen a story and dialog format because it seems a better model of the message I wish to communicate, and because it leaves the reader free to interpret in his own way the points he finds most insightful -- an end to which most humanists subscribe.

Many years ago, a small group of men banded together to lament the deteriorating state of society. The peoples of the nation could not understand one another because they spoke different languages; children were either loose upon the streets or forced to labor beyond their capabilities; law and morality were defiled by those who carried guns, drank spirits and gambled their earnings; workers and employers refused to honor their humane obligations to one another; and parents were failing to prepare their children for the tortuous life ahead.

To put an end to these destructive conditions, the small group of men designed three great institutions. The first would teach all people to behave properly. The second would isolate from the rest of society all who, through no fault of their own, failed to conform to the standard of proper behavior. The third would isolate from the rest of society all who, with malice and forethought, broke the rules for proper behavior. These three great institutions were to be integrated into a single system known as SAP, after the first letter in the names of each of the institutions: Schools, Asylums and Prisons. The SAP System was so highly acclaimed and so thoroughly implemented by the peoples that all of society is now said to rest upon a saperstructure.

One day long after the saperstructure had become fully operational, a man named Namuh requested an audience before the SAP System High Council. The audience was granted, and Namuh gave this brief speech:

"I simply wish to call to your attention to what I believe to be some of the unintentional effects of the saperstructure. Because all persons must go to schools, schools which the entire public supports, we think it possible and proper to hold everyone to a very narrow standard of acceptable behavior. If someone steps outside this standard, he is sent to either an asylum or a prison. Thus we feel we have discharged our responsibility to mankind because we have provided everyone an opportunity to learn the standard, and we absolve our guilt for anyone's failure to do so by providing places to contain him when he is deviant. The System has run amuck because it allows us to believe the standard is right, when the System itself is the only rationale for the standard. If the schools could become places where all persons are educated to broader and more diverse standards, rather than places where the single existing standard is enforced, the budgets for inmates in asylums and prisons could be halved."

His speech completed, Namuh awaited a response from the High Council. It came quickly. "Are you contending that the standard taught in our schools is neither independently right nor justifiable, and that its viability is entirely dependent on the System -- such that, if the System ceased to exist, so would the standard?"

"That is it, precisely," answered Namuh.

"And are you also saying that asylums and prisons have become partners with the schools in enforcing this restricted standard upon all the people?"

"Yes," said Namuh, "that is the effect, even though it may not have been intended by the designers of the saperstructure."

Then another Council member spoke. "You call into question not only the schools provided by the System, but the very nature and purpose of education. Who are you to cast such doubts?"

"I have no credentials, other than that I am a fellow of your species."

"Of course, I can see that," scoffed a Councilman. "But surely you know that whenever the schools have tried to attain some end alien to the greater or more powerful portion of the population, they have failed . . .and often quite miserably. Surely you understand that the schools cannot do what society does not will them to do."

"Councilman, society does not instruct the schools to deal in a single standard, the System does."

"Oh, come, come! The same people compose society that compose the System."

"Agreed," said Namuh. "But because these two classes of things have the same members does not mean that they are identical classes, or that 'society' and 'System' are merely two different names for the same thing. It seems more the case that the people who compose society are trapped by the Systems they created to make the society function."

"You are telling us that the people have lost control of the institutions they created, that the people may or may not realize they have lost control, but that, whatever the case, they are doing nothing about it. If the people want things to be different from what they are, why are they not here to make the request?"

"I hope," said Namuh, "that you will consider me one of the people. As for all the people appearing before you, I do not think that will happen.

Perhaps it is because they would not know what to ask for, since they have not been exposed to any of the possible alternatives."

"Supposing you are correct, Namuh. What would you have us do?"

"I believe the standard now taught in schools should be broadened, and that additional standards should be incorporated. Some will be complementary to the existing standard, others will be alternatives."

"Nonsense!" yelled a Council member. "How can the schools both teach the people to take their proper place in society and alter the society into which they are supposed to be taking their proper place. It is as if instructions on how to desecrate the temple were included in a Bar Mitzvah."

"No, it is as if the Bar Mitzvah included instructions on how one might be confirmed to Christianity. Your analogy presupposes that all alternatives are destructive merely by virtue of the fact that they are alternatives. It is possible that the existence of alternatives would bring new vitality to traditional institutions, and conceivable that these same institutions may perish violently if alternatives are not provided."

"This talk about alternatives, about giving people choices, assumes that men are free and purposive. But you must know that this issue remains unresolved. Man may be determined, and quite incapable of doing other than what he is now doing."

Hearing that, Namuh replied: "The debate which rages between free will and determinism is grist without which the academic philosopher would have no mill. Free will and determinism is not a dualism to be resolved by philosophers, they are options to be chosen by human beings. Philosophers can help us by making clear to all what their choices entail, but they cannot decide for us by resolving that the universe is fundamentally more free than determined, or the other way 'round. Our world is what we, as individuals, choose it to be. But at present we are stopped in our tracks because many of the fundamental questions awaiting decision by each human being are locked up in the academies awaiting clarification and resolution. Before the academies took possession, these questions were held by the churches. The questions must be released, and the schools should become places where they are presented to all mankind for decision."

"Would it not be far more simple," asked the Chairman of the High Council with some sarcasm, "if these questions were decided by enlightened people who had a firm grasp of their complexity and full understanding of the consequences of deciding one way or the other?"

"Far more simple," replied Namuh. "But so long as the choices are made by another, my humanness is being defined by someone other than me. So long as I am prevented from making my own choices, my humanness is of no consequence to me or anyone else. Does it not strike this Council as paradoxical that the enlightened ceaselessly call upon the people to end war, prejudice, pollution and poverty, while at the same time they tighten their grip upon the very issues which the people must possess if they are to exercise their humanity upon these worldly problems?"

"What, precisely," asked another Councilman, "is the difference between educating a person to a single standard and providing him with a set of options? Is not the System still providing the substance upon which all choices are made? Is not the System still providing the same manner of instruction? What about the constraints of sheer survival in the workaday world -- would it not be cruel to provide alternatives in schools when life itself seems to offer none?"

"Those are worthy questions, Councilman. The difference is between allowing our systems and cultures to define my humanity and allowing me to define it for myself. As for the System providing the substance of my choices, I see nothing wrong with that -- it is the obligation of the System to help me define the boundaries of my alternatives. It is also the obligation of the System to provide an environment in which I may freely choose among those alternatives. As for their being so few alternatives in contemporary life, I am aware of it, and think it a poor state of affairs. I believe that we can begin to improve that condition by altering the nature and purpose of education in the way I have already suggested."

"If we allow the people to choose, how would we know that they made the right choice?"

"You probably would not know. That person may make his choice on grounds you cannot accept, or even perhaps on grounds you cannot understand."

"If that is the case, the schools are no place for this activity. How can the schools deal in things for which there are no right answers, or in things which other members of that community might not understand?"

"But, Councilman," pleaded Namuh, "the criterion for a right answer -- if there is any such thing -- is whether the person making the choice believes he chose well. There is much the schools can do in the way of providing the alternatives and helping people judge the character of their choices."

"Suppose another believed he chose rightly, but the choice affected me as well as him. What then?"

"It depends," said Namuh, "on the consequences of that choice for both you and him, and on the consistency of that choice with the Covenant."

"What Covenant?" asked the Councilman.

"The Covenant to which men assent for the general conduct of their lives together. It may be the Ten Commandments, the Golden Rule, or some other such agreement. Whatever it is, it sets the bounds beyond which no man may trespass and still retain the right to define his own humanness."

"But if this Covenant exists, it will tell us whether another has made the right choice. Furthermore, its existence makes alternatives unnecessary. All we need to do is what the Covenant tells us to do."

"No," said Namuh, "the Covenant only sets the conditions which allow men to coexist. It does not set the standards for goodness and badness or for right choices and wrong choices. If the Covenant did this, then it rather than we would define our humanness. Too often have we excused ourselves from choosing and judging our choices because we thought that so long as we did what the Covenant said, we were doing the right and proper thing. But the Covenant itself does not uplift, it merely states our agreements on how we shall keep the peace while we try to uplift one another."

At this point, a Councilman faced Namuh squarely and said, "Sir, you ask us to alter the curricula of our schools, to retrain or change our teachers, to redesign our facilities or build them anew, and to implement a new philosophy for the regulation of education, confinement and rehabilitation. In return, man will be denied access to the ultimate truths, he will be eternally subject to doubt and frustration, he will be spared only the decision to be born, he will never be able to honor or condemn another with certainty, and he will never know whether the world will be better tomorrow than it is today. For such 'benefits' you ask us to collapse a System that cares for most of the needs of most of the people, and does so with a minimum of anguish and maintenance. I say to you that Zeus, in his most consummate rage, could not have devised a more terrible punishment for his most recalcitrant subject. Your ideas are nothing more than a method of venting your masochism on an entire race. While you would bring man face to face with frailty and inadequacy, we at least keep alive the hope of a better age."

Here the Chairman of the SAP System High Council pounded a stamp down upon the dossier of the man, Namuh. It read: "Referred to Police." On the line marked "Recommendation," the Chairman wrote, "Asylum."

CHAPTER 21.

THE GROWING EDGE OF EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY: EDUCATION VERSUS THERAPY.

THOMAS A. REED.

When I hear the word controversy, I think of one or more persons opposing one or more other persons in a discussion about a common subject about which they disagree peacefully or violently or in some other way. The word "edge" gives me the feeling that the discussion is sharp and people disagree very precisely in their stands and tenets. Unfortunately, for me the quantity of subject matter over which we debate is so great and so varied that it is hard for me to understand this as a controversy. In fact for me there is not one controversy but many controversies, and my view of them is a most confusing one.

It seems to me that philosophers write their philosophies to describe a world as they want that world to be. The freedmen philosophers of ancient Athens who were so few described the world of Athens as they would have it be for their fellow freedmen, one twenty-fourth of the population. Plato, among them, admired Sparta, and he made an idealized Sparta the ideal state for his fellow freedmen of Athens, and for all men as he described his idealism in the context of the Republic and the Laws and in his description of the ideal just man. His star pupil, Aristotle, in true Twentieth Century fashion, rebelled against the idealist teaching of his master, and chose realism as his ideal philosophy for his fellows and for all men. Perhaps the fact that he was the tutor of Alexander the Great may have broadened his horizons and made him more worldly and less spiritually idealistic than his teacher Plato. Saint Augustine admired Plato and he described his ideal other-worldly Christianity in the City of God and the Confessions. Several hundred years later Saint Thomas Aquinas looked at Christianity through Aristotelian glasses and the world he wanted was realist. There were all sorts of variations of these philosophical themes expressed by the various schoolmen of the Middle Ages, as they described their ideal Christian world. Luther and Calvin did not want the Christian world they saw. It was too intellectual for them. So they built a Christian world with their hearts and founded it on faith. But their followers continued to describe their world as being almost every bit as other-worldly Christian and as authoritarian as the type of Christian world they had divorced themselves from. Since man's life span was short, and death and disease and sickness were prevalent among adults and children, fear and caution made religion strong, and religion colored most of the traditional philosophical viewpoints. Hegel was certainly the outstanding example of this with his religious authoritarian philosophy. For me his philosophy is a description of the ideal Germany seen through the eyes of a Nineteenth Century Plato. Hegel the idealist was so formidable that materialists and pragmatists copied him.

But Kierkegaard rebelled against Hegel and his overwhelming prestige. He rejected Hegel's objectivity and his reason, and he took the road of religious faith, subjectivity and free choice to describe his world. From the Renaissance on there were always those who rejected the traditional authoritarian and religious view of their contemporaries. Rousseau was one such. He rebelled and created Emile and sent him back to nature, and many afterwards followed.

After Nineteen Hundred John Dewey described the new ideal world of universal education in the United States, and he described it with the help of Hegel and Rousseau and William James. Dewey's world was a world of pragmatism, and Dewey had his influence, but there were also those who violently rejected him. Hutchins and Whitehead and Rickover pushed for realism. Horne and others pushed for idealism.

So the philosophers described the various worlds which they wanted.

Educators and others in our own day have continued to describe the world they want, and so the media have transmitted their views. Doctor Max Rafferty on a platform of traditionalism, idealism and populism, nationalism and anti-slobbism was elected California State Superintendent of Public Instruction, probably one of the most powerful educational offices in the world. But recently the knight errant, Sir William F. O'Neill with the sword Readin, Ritin and Rafferty slew the mighty dragon, Doctor Max Rafferty. Ever since we have been overwhelmed with Selected Educational Heresies.

With all that is presented by O'Neill, Rogers, Glasser, Skinner, Goodman and you name it, how can one not be overwhelmed and be perhaps not a little confused.

Before we begin to consider the matter of the difference between education and therapy there are other things to be considered. Somewhere in the early Sixties a Pope called John XXIII decided to call a council to bring the Catholic Church up to date. Most Catholics thought they were quite up to date without the council, but when the motions started by John XXIII began to stir, they were overwhelmed. Popes apologized to Protestants. Catholics, Protestants and Jews and the other religious peoples of the world began to talk to one another. Priests disagreed with bishops, and bishops and priests disagreed with Popes. Out of all this came traditionalists with their authoritarian viewpoint, liberals with their avant garde views, and the rest of the people somewhere in between.

Somewhere in the early Sixties an involvement in a war on the part of the United States in South East Asia eventually took from the United States the will and the ability to police the rest of the world, and the moral power to sway the nations of the world to her viewpoint. Once again the reaction of people were varied. Some wanted to answer all the problems with authoritarian views of law and order, force and vigor, the denial of funds. Others felt that there must be different answers. The world for them will not fall apart if the United States is not armed to the teeth and if the United States is not so very righteous about all that she does. These felt that somehow or other the world must be allowed to work out its own problems, and we must not impose our form of government on others.

On February 5, 1962, the planet Jupiter came into alignment with Mars, Mercury, Venus, Saturn, the sun and the moon. The alignment occurred in the sign of Aquarius. It was the dawning of the Age of Revolution. Astrologers breathed a sigh of relief. Had the alignment occurred in Capricorn, rather than in Aquarius, it would have presaged, not revolution, but annihilation.

Since the dawning of the Age of Aquarius, we have witnessed the emergence of a variety of religious and quasi-religious movements. We have watched the dawnings of a new Romanticism. Its symptoms are manifest. We have seen the growth of interest in Gothic tales, in fairy stories like the Lord of the Rings.

The new Romantics, like their Nineteenth Century forebears pursue exotic experiences through drugs and through a variety of Oriental cults. There is a new cult of primitivism, perhaps most strikingly embodied in hippie communes which attempt to return to the simpler living of a vanished frontier.

Aquarian Romantics are alienated from the established social and political structures. They excoriate Washington and the military-industrial complex. They are fascinated with the American Volkgeist. Their religious mood is subjective, individualistic, dissatisfied with traditional, organized forms of belief and worship.

Why the long introduction to the paper "The Growing Edge of Education Controversy: Education and Therapy -- Questions and Controversy?" The simple reason is this, that when the world was small and there were only a few bright, articulate men on this planet, before and during my youth, then the professor simply set forth his brilliant philosophical ideals in his lecture, and the student recounted the same in his notes and in his finals.

It was presumed that the student would put these ideas in practice in his life. The philosopher-professor went back to his study, and he thought and wrote until his next lecture. John Dewey may have had some influence to bring about a change in all this with his emphasis on relevance, but the universities remained pretty much bastions of traditionalism.

For the older person and those habituated in the ways of education, the structures represent security. The established institutions will change their ways in education reluctantly and only when forced to do so. The rest of the world, the developed nations, and the under-developed countries, and the third world are believers in tradition, and they will not readily accept our innovations in education. Traditional ways will be the only ways in the old established institutions. The new ways will have to prove themselves. Men will have to fight the systems to be allowed even to experiment with new techniques, because the world is afraid of change.

For the sake of argument let us accept all these magnificent changes which social and physical scientists have made possible for us, and let us briefly flush out some of the consequences of our accepting these changes. In all this we take our stand realizing that some religious leader may change the whole influence of religion on us, the third world may vanquish us all, some scientist may revoke the law of gravity, some soothesayer may discover in oatmeal and prunes some mind-expanding drug that will change our world view completely.

Let us begin with a definition. "Education will be," for us, "the means by which society prepares its young for a complete, happy, adult life.

Since we live in a democratic society, it may be well for us to explain what we mean by a democratic society. First of all, it should not be organizational democracy, the logical outgrowth of the present social and industrial order -- the society where economic and political organization is progressively concentrated and centralized, where efficiency and economy are emphasized above quality, and where a de facto scientific and technological caste system operates. The goal of such an organizational democracy is the smooth functioning of the prevailing socioeconomic order, and consequently the role of the individual is defined as "filling in" or "finding his proper place" -- nothing more nor less than the technological extension of our bureaucratic society. Organizational democracy is that form of tyranny in which the slaves and the masters are indistinguishable. Each person is so conditioned to social norms and values that he eagerly performs whatever the social machine demands. There is no dissent because everyone defines freedom in the same terms, for example, the freedom to do gleefully what is expected of him -- all in order to service the prevailing technological order.

No, the democratic society, which we envision, is quite different. It is a participatory democracy, in which the institutions serve the individual by cultivating, as well as responding to, his unique potentialities. Participatory democracy according to Erich Fromm is characterized by "active participation of the citizen in the decision-making process, and by finding ways and methods by which government planning is controlled by those for whom the planning is done." It does not deny leadership; it merely seeks to make leadership respond to the needs of the people it serves. Organizations exist for the sake of human beings; human beings do not exist for the sake of organizations. The goal of education development is revised from fitting the man to the machine to finding the opportunity in the economy that brings out the man, and if the opportunity does not exist, to make it. This involves encouraging individual enterprises and perhaps even subsidizing nonconformity. The impersonalization of the organization democracy is remedied by giving workers more voice in production and the kind of training to make that voice wise.

There seems to be a good deal of agreement in some intellectual circles that man in American society is being made to serve the state. Witness Reich's best-selling The Greening of America and Goodman's Compulsory Mis-education, and Growing Up Absurd. The compulsory school laws make the schools a baby sitting service during a period of collapse of the old-type family and during a time of extreme urbanization and urban mobility. The junior and the senior high schools serve as an arm of the police, providing cops and concentration camps paid for in the budget under the heading "Board of Education." The education role is, by and large, to provide -- at public and parents' expense -- apprentice-training for corporations, governments, and the teaching profession itself, and also to train the young, as New York's Commissioner of Education has said "to handle constructively their problems of adjustment to authority."

No one dares to challenge this vast monolithic bureaucracy, for a vast army even greater than the military-industrial complex is fed, clothed, housed and worked by this bureaucracy and the kindred industries connected with it. Not only are there teachers and administrators, but there are also staff and maintenance. Billions of dollars are spent each year, not including capital expenses. It is a gigantic market for textbook manufacturers, building contractors, and graduate-schools of education. If one were to attempt to modify this colossus, he would bring down on himself far more powerful opposition than the defenders of the SST. Yet it is hard to see how a colossal all-absorbing system, confining within its power almost every citizen, religious, irreligious, non-religious, can produce a free-thinking citizenry, instead of a person conditioned into accepting the authoritarian dictates of a technological society. How could Carl Rogers and the Rogerians or A. S. Neill ever accept such an authoritarian imposition on a so-called free people? It is hard to see how a free people have conditioned themselves and their courts and their legislatures to imposing this form of tyranny on every last individual citizen for several years of his life, especially when one considers the fact that the goals or objectives are for all too many of these citizens at best questionable, if not completely irrelevant.

For those people who are unemployed their education is quite irrelevant. In March 1961, 39% of the blacks were unemployed in Cleveland; 28% were unemployed in Philadelphia; 24% of the blacks were unemployed in Pittsburgh; 20% in Saint Louis. For these blacks no matter what they studied in school, it was quite irrelevant at the time of their unemployment.

Is it any wonder that we produce such an alienated group of people -- particularly when watching the evening news is deemed an act of courage. Today it seems that almost all Americans are alienated from someone or something: blacks from whites; youth from "the Establishment;" workers from jobs; husbands from wives; churchgoers from God; citizens from government; and even the individual from himself. This is the condition eloquently described by Edward Field in his poem Unwanted.

The poster with my picture on it
Is hanging on the bulletin board in the Post Office

I stand by it hoping to be recognized
Posing first full face and then profile

But everybody passes by and I have to admit
The photograph was taken some years ago.

I was unwanted then and I'm unwanted now
Ah guess ah'll go up echo mountain and crah.

I wish someone would find my fingerprints somewhere
Maybe on a corpse and say, "you're it."

Description: Male, or reasonably so
White, but not lily-white and usually deep-red

Thirty-fiveish, and looks it lately
Five-feet-nine and one-hundred-thirty pounds: no
physique

Black hair going gray, hairline receding fast
What used to be curly, now fuzzy

Brown eyes starey under beetling brow
Mole on chin, probably will become a wen

It is perfectly obvious that he was not popular
at school
No good at baseball, and wet his bed.

His aliases tell his history: Dumbell, Good-for-nothing, Jewboy,
Fieldinsky, Skinny, Fierceface, Greaseball, Sissy.

Warning: This man is not dangerous, answers to any name
Responds to love, don't call him or he will come.

Perhaps the methods of Carl Rogers and A. S. Neill and their nondirective approach to schools may be answers for all this alienation. Such methods would at least have the students doing some of the things they would like to do. The democratic way the goals are set up mutually by the student and the teacher seems to be the means of shaming the students into doing a good job in whatever they propose to undertake. At least, they seem to be able to work to their full capacity within the limits of their potentialities. But always there remains for me the bridging of the gap between the authoritarian world of the school and society and the

Rogerian nondirective method. It always has to be for me a compromise because students in our society are insecure when they are thrown totally on their own, and for my part I feel that I must meet the requirements of the school and society in which I operate.

If I were God, the first thing I would do would be to abrogate the compulsory education law at the end of the seventh grade, and I would not be so hard and fast about compulsory education in grades below the seventh. This might help us to take care of some of the alienation and ennui which is so prevalent in our society, and particularly in so much of our schools.

But then again it might be better to retain the compulsory school laws and modify them. The first principle which we must destroy in our society is the absolute that the school is a total and complete social good for every single citizen in the United States from the age of five to the age of eighteen. This would at least permit us some kind of alternative service for disturbed children and alienated children who question the necessity for attending school at all. Society might then realize that there must be more humane ways of dealing with not a few of the citizens who find the confinement within the school walls intolerable and pointless. How could many a child think otherwise in a society like California, where we killed off thirty per cent of our live births during the year by abortion, and where children for so many are an intolerable burden, and where a child can contribute practically nothing toward the maintenance of his home and the common good of his family and society. In our society school is the religion, whether it is public school or private school or religious school or irreligious school or nonreligious school, and the Supreme Court is the national school board and it rarely permits any exceptions to this absolute. The terrible thing about all this is that we become so conditioned in this absolute that most of us put our faith in this absolute. We do not believe in anything else, but we do believe that the school can answer all our prayers. This is true even though in our more reasonable and more humane moments we know that for many school has to be pointless, because at the end of it there are no jobs, or so many do not have any choice with regard to the job they have to choose, and even with regard to the job they do take their total education in school was almost completely irrelevant. In many instances the alienated make more sense than the unalienated because they heretically reject the view that the school is an absolute good for all men and women.

If we continue to be authoritarian there are really no answers for these problems, except possibly some form of suicide or revolution. If we continue to be authoritarian there is no controversy between education and therapy. Education is education and therapy is therapy and never the twain shall meet. For the authoritarian education is the formal acquisition of a certain amount of knowledge and understanding of reality, and what one does or does not do with this knowledge is his own business. For the authoritarian therapy is the practical use which is made of knowledge and understanding, and for the true authoritarian this sort of experience is at best very secondary to the theoretical aspects of the subject matter, hardly worthy of being considered as true education.

Let us return to our definition of education "as being the means by which society prepares its young for a complete, happy, adult life." Then education and therapy can work together. We are going to have to be somewhat existential about all this, because we are going to have to see things as they exist, and not abstractly as they may exist in the mind of a man or men. But if we are completely logical or existential here, we are going to have to throw out diplomas and degrees and credentials and licenses and age and sex and other hurdles and fences by which some people exclude other people from the good things of life. Without these diplomas and degrees and other hurdles then the schools will no longer be the agency which is to determine who can be a fireman, a policeman, a doctor, a dentist, a lawyer, a teacher, a professor, an accountant, a banker, a street cleaner. Then society will have to do its own screening of the humans in their effort to provide qualified people for the various tasks which are necessary for the continuance of society. Schools then will be less an object of hatred, but by the criteria of service they may become an object of love and need.

How may we accomplish this? It seems to me that our best answers should center around two principles, the principle of honesty and truth, and the principle of freedom.

The principle of honesty and truth must tell us that the school as an institution is not an absolute, infinitely perfect, a religion outside of which there is no salvation. Let us admit that the school of its very nature as an institution has its limitations. Let us look to other institutions to carry on where the school as an institution has limitations. Let us encourage some heresiarchs to come up with some other alternatives. The unions and adult society and graduate schools of education will burn these heresiarchs at the stake. But the alternative services of other institutions may save the school as an institution and permit it to play a more limited but a more satisfying role in urban society.

The principle of freedom would change entirely the role of the school. From being a branch of the police power of the state, it would become a service organization trying to help people to fulfill their self-chosen roles in life. If we accept McLuhan's view that we now live in a global village, there can no longer be a division between adult society and child society. We are going to have to make some overtures to television, now that we begin to recognize as educators that it has been invented. We are going to have to permit more non-graded schooling and flexible scheduling, and all sorts of other unstructured academic services for society. Rogerian nondirective teaching must have a place in the school. The inventiveness of competent teachers with imagination will develop many ways of using Rogerian methods. Margaret Mead's belief that beyond elementary education there must be more flexibility with regard to school attendance is in order. Just as students beyond elementary school should not all be compelled to attend school, so it must be possible for older more interested adults to return to school when they are more mature and more desirous of learning. There must be room somewhere for A. S. Neill, Maria Montessori and John Holt.

Just as school must be open to the liberal and freely accepted views of these people, so must school be a place for the authoritarian and the traditionalist.

B. F. Skinner and his "box" are a must. Although his deterministic views with regard to the nature of man are anathema in many quarters, his talents are needed in our society. As long as our dollar-oriented, violent society continues to produce Atticas and Rahways and San Quentins, some effort has to be made to condition away from violence so many of our people. Since this is a mixed bag and very controversial, it is well and important that his ideas should be experimented with.

Theodore Brameld and his Reconstructionists should be fitted into the system, but so must Hutchins, and Adler, Rickover and Bestor, Whitehead and Barzun, Logical Analysts and Linguistic Empiricists.

Bernard Shaw, like William F. Buckley, would rather be governed by the first two thousand names in the telephone directory than by the Harvard Faculty. "Those who can, do; those who can't, teach." There is need for the intellectual in our school and those for whom the intellectual appeals and on his own terms. Certain faculties agree that a university is a place to reflect and study and to be in no haste about either. For the intellectual universities and prep schools must entertain academics, places where people can think. This does not mean arenas of free debate. For him much that goes by that name is the weary and embittered exchange of slogans and cliches. But for him slogans, cliches and fears aside, debate free or not, has little to do with whether men find it possible to reflect. Debate is a poor relation to thought, however valuable it may be to legislators.

But this can never be, because men are afraid of truth and freedom. As a brutally intelligent university scientist has said for years: "God help us if the public ever finds out what we do here" in the university. As for freedom, men prefer the propaganda and the conditioning and the shibboleths of freedom to its reality. Their fears are so great that they would violently oppose freedom.

Documentations.

1. Andrews, Lewis M., and Marvin Karlans, Requiem for Democracy. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971.

2. Fromm, Erich, Escape from Freedom. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1941.

3. Fromm, Erich, The Sane Society. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1955.

4. Fromm, Erich, The Revolution of Hope. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

5. Goodman, Paul, Growing Up Absurd. New York: Vintage Books (Random House), 1956.

6. Goodman, Paul, Compulsory Mis-education. New York: The Horizon Press, 1964.

7. Kneller, George F., Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964.

8. Leonard, George B., Education and Ecstasy. New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1968.

9. O'Neill, William F., Readin, Ritin and Rafferty! Berkeley: The Glendessary Press, 1969.

10. O'Neill, William F., *Selected Educational Heresies*. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1969.

11. Reich, Charles, *The Greening of America*. New York: Bantam Books, 1970.

12. Rogers, Carl R., *Freedom to Learn*. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969.

13. Skinner, B., *Walden Two*. New York: Macmillan, 1948.

14. Skinner, B., *Verbal Behavior*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957.

15. Townsend, R., *Up the Organization*. New York: Knopf, 1970.

16. "Maria Montessori and A. S. Neill: A Dialogue," *Redbook*, December, 1964, pp. 42-43 and 88-92.

17. Margaret Mead, "Thinking Ahead," *Harvard Business Review*, XXXVI (November-December 1958), 23-37 and 164-170.

18. Bruce R. Park, "Give Me Back My Ivory Tower," *The National Observer*, Vol. 10, No. 42, p. 24.

7

CHAPTER 22.

A CATHOLIC CONCEPT OF MORALITY AND EDUCATION.

JOHN J. O'FARRELL.

Calling your attention to the first word in the title of this paper, namely, the indefinite article "A" as opposed to the definite article "THE," the reason for this announced limitation and more or less unofficial presentation is simply the practical impossibility of even adequately outlining in these straightened existential human conditions the broad spectrum of knowledge involved in the factual reality of Catholic morality and education.

The procedure in this paper, it is hoped, will be ironic and expository rather than dialectic and argumentative, informative rather than authoritative, an invitation further to explore rather than a take it or leave it attitude. The current Ecumenical Council should be an existential witness to the diversity in unity and to the variety of expression of the latency in meanings.

Obviously, in discussing or unfolding a practical problem, a number of presuppositions, based upon real or alleged evidence, have to be made. These presuppositions are theological, philosophical and axiological. A word about each:

Theological. The historical fact of the existence of Christ Who claimed to be divine and offered proofs for His Divinity, the facts of His revelation, the establishment of a teaching Church charged to integrate revealed truths, to apply these truths to human conduct and to societies developed in the course of human history, and to dispense the above-natural or spiritual means necessary for the achievement of man's spiritual objective;

Philosophical. The ontological, epistemological and axiological foundations of realist philosophy as such rather than the so-called "verbal constructs" of any distinguished exponent of the same; or more specifically:

Ontological. being is; being is intelligible; being is independent or dependent; being cannot both be and not be at the same time under the same respect; being is analogous; every being possesses the transcendental attributes of unity, truth and goodness; dependent being is caused; besides its constitutive causes, every finite being and whatever change occurs in such a being is wrought by an efficient cause for a purpose or end; being is dynamic in that it is constituted of essence and an act of existence -- in other words, the objective reason and notion of being is that being is both a noun and a verb. Detailing these ontological principles or applying them in a more specifically metaphysical way to the three great realities of God, the world and man, we would presuppose:

from natural or rational theology as distinguished from revealed, theology, (or better theology based upon divinely revealed facts and laws): Independent Being, the Uncaused Cause, infinitely intelligible and free, the source of all limited perfections, the Creator of all creatures, the Author of the divine law and the natural law;

from cosmology: back of any real or hypothesized cosmic evolution, the Creator is reductively the First Cause and Designer of the universe;

from rational psychology (as distinguished from the experimental): the Creator is the immediate cause of man's immortal soul with its powers of intellect and free will and thus, in endowing man with a conscience to distinguish fundamental right from wrong, has made him responsible for his human conduct and his immortal destiny. And now to other philosophical presuppositions that are:

Epistemological: the individual human knower exists with the power of reaching objective reality distinct from and independent of the knower; the formal object of the human mind is being and the universal in individual, sensible things obtained by mental abstraction; the mind can become aware of the before, during and after of some definite change; truth or the conformity between thought and thing in the existential order is colored by one's own subjectivity, antecedent habits, attitudes and values and patterns of experiences; the criterion of truth is objective evidence; universal ideas have a foundation in particular things but exist formally only in the mind; learning, or the acquisition of knowledge is a self-active process. Other philosophical presuppositions that are:

Axiological: every being as a being is ontologically good or valuable; every being is psychologically valuable to a human being if it perfects that human being's nature; every being is morally valuable to a human being if it is employed according to its own nature and if it helps a human nature or person to both his proximate and ultimate objectives; spiritual or above-natural help from God is the necessary value for a human creature successfully to achieve his ultimate objective of eternal happiness with God, his Creator. (This last observation is more strictly theological than philosophical.)

Of course, the constantly growing body of empirical facts from the natural and social sciences, and the recent history of our human conditions and predicaments, intrigue and stimulate the theologian, the philosopher, and particularly the ethician, to restate his principles in more modern language and to apply such principles in a more existential and personalized way.

Besides the foregoing presuppositions, another basic position has to be declared. The history of recorded human experience indicates that the finite, limited human thinker does not possess nor can he develop a simultaneous, universal and comprehensive view of reality. Rather he has to focus his perceptual and cognitive powers upon one aspect or level of reality at a time by induction, analysis, integration, reflection, deduction, evaluation, logical consistency and other methods. The results are discursively stated as opinions, hypotheses, truths, generalizations, universalizations, laws and principles. To synthesize the results of all these various and legitimate kinds of knowledge into a dynamic open system vibrant with existential tension and sensitive to change, discovery and free enquiry requires great wisdom -- a succession of eminently wise men -- a rare phenomenon.

Though not being one of the "intellectual Magi," it seems to me that the history of human thought plainly indicates at least five major approaches to reality that yield different kinds and degrees of knowledge. Somehow or other we have to avoid polarizing our human knowledge or the explanation of many sided reality around any one of these approaches; otherwise, we wind up in an exclusivism, in one or more of the dozen or so "isms" that inhibit genuine freedom, stifle progress and promote confusion.

The five major approaches to reality, five modes of knowing, are the theological, the philosophical, the empirical, the mathematical and the connatural or humanistic. They differ by reason of their formal object, purpose, their characteristic activity, the methods employed and the results to be achieved. In very briefly discussing these five modes of knowledge no conscious effort is being made to over-play or under-play any one at the expense of the other. Each in its own way is important and could be more fully and meaningfully presented by one of its devotees or experts. But to get one with the explanation.

The Theological approach: the formal object of theology is God and His Will known through Revelation. Its purpose is to establish the fact of and the meaning of revealed truth and to motivate acceptance and application of the same to human conduct. The characteristic activity of theology is the rational clarification of the data of revelation and the deepening of the supernatural gift of faith, that is, Faith in truths known upon unimpeachable and inerrent divine authority. The methods employed by theology consist of the verification of the facts of revelation by a complex, scientific historical method, the logical inter-relationship of these facts, the application of these truths to human conduct both in the objective and subjective order, and an evaluation of religious beliefs and moral conduct both individual and social. The results to be achieved by theology are integrity of belief, sanctity of action, formation of the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity, the development of the moral virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice, and to facilitate eternal salvation by sacramental and other means.

Theology is not faith because faith is a gift and can be both given and received without any formal theological knowledge. Faith is man's total response to that personal divine beckoning which is called the grace of God. Neither is theology more or less equivalent to natural religion. This type of religion, common to all men of all times, is the varied recognition of the creature's dependence upon the Creator and his fourfold reaction to this dependence by some form of worship, love, thanksgiving and justice -- or the rendering of a just due to all things according to their natures. Theology intellectually goes beyond both faith and religion in order to comprehend and intensify both of them.

The Philosophical approach: the formal object of philosophy is all being and their basic inter-relationships: God, Man and the world; what man is in origin, nature and destiny and why; what man does and ought to do as an individual and social being; what man makes in the practical arts -- philosophy of work, and what man makes in the fine arts -- philosophy of aesthetics. The purpose of philosophy is to reach a knowledge of the ultimate causes of all things, to analyze the thatness and whatness, the nature and inter-relationships of all things not only in their abstract nature but also in their existential subjectivity in the case of human beings, and to structure the hierarchy of being and operation. The characteristic activity in philosophy is reasoning based upon evidence --

the causality and sufficient reason for beings and the process of change in which they operate. The methods employed in philosophy are induction, abstraction, definition, division, analysis, conceptualization, deduction, reasoning, synthesis of causes and relations and evaluation of consistency of truths and opinions. Real truth in philosophy should never contradict a real truth discovered by other knowledge. The results to be achieved in philosophy are knowledge for its own sake, the formation of habits of knowledge, understanding, wisdom and prudence, the facilitation of moral habits, and the personalization of principles, truths and laws as constant guides to consistency in thought and responsible freedom in action.

To generalize in another way about philosophizing -- it is a kind of thinking which tries to abstract as much as possible from the co-activities of emotions, will and imagination and to examine only the intelligible nature of the object. Philosophizing is not just organizing in some extrinsic way, but is an attempt to reach out to the ultimately real, to understand things as far as possible just as they are.

The Empirical approach: the formal object of the natural and social sciences is the particulars of some restricted class of phenomena, external to the observer, that exist in some material amount and can be measured. It may be concerned with a particular thing or with a complicated process on the material level. The purpose of positive science is to discover the proximate causes of operation and suitability for human use, to categorize and interrelate observable and measurable data within a specific and limited field. Its characteristic-activity is controlled experimentation, the formation of hypotheses about material data and the testing of the same. The methods employed are induction, clarification, the formation of research designs, control of operations, reduction or control of variables and intangibles, measurement, statistical projection, mathematical logic, plotting of trends and evaluation of specific operational processes. The results to be achieved are to discover the proximate causes and construction of things, to determine how they operate, to establish hypotheses, to test the same, to state and explain physical laws.

The scientific or empirical approach, therefore, "is a refined discipline of pure intelligence." However, it does not deal with the intelligible nature of things; it is concerned with the inter-relation of facts, the organization of data only indirectly related to the nature of things; it draws out generalizations of facts, elaborates constructural concepts and constructural theories. Its methodology opens the way for a vast intellectual effort of nature and an enormous application of knowledge to practical matters, but it does not drive through to the ultimate meaning of things or the ultimate real explanation of the world.

The Mathematical approach: the *formal object* of mathematics is mathematical logical consistency. It is an idealized detachment from reality as such. There is no agreement as to what is allowed or excluded. Mathematics as such is not concerned with truth in any generally accepted sense of the term, but only with logical consistency within a postulational system. The *purpose* of mathematics is to discover new mathematical relationships by means of the mathematical method. As for its *characteristic activity*, after considering some model either in the real or in the ideal order attempts are made to represent such models in a strictly axiomatic, logical, deductive system which to the mathematician is the ideal expression of thought and the most satisfying experience. Very briefly, the *methods employed* are inductive observation and idealization in order to construct an axiomatic system. In mathematics the *results to be achieved* are a consistent axiomatic system. It is left to others to see the practical application of such a system to a real problem -- especially in atomic physics.

There are at least three different major schools of the philosophy of mathematics, their differences being due to different approaches: the systematic, the formalized and the creative. Mathematics, it is claimed, has characteristics of both a science and an art, namely, conception and communication.

The Connatural or humanistic approach (*involving common sense, human intuition, contemplation and personal subjectivity*). The *formal object* of this approach is the contemplation of the whole as a whole with a subjectivity of meaning. It is manifested particularly in aesthetic forms -- their creation or appreciation. The *purpose* of this way of knowing is to personalize all knowledge and to enhance its expression and communication in an artistic and pleasing manner. The *characteristic activity* of the connatural approach is undifferentiated subjectivity. It is man's total response to a total situation. It is not just theological, nor just philosophical, nor just empirical; it is not exclusively changeless or changing, structural or functional, theoretical or practical, absolute or relative, natural or supernatural; it is simply as completely and as profoundly human as one has so far developed. People as people act this way especially when they are profoundly their spontaneous selves not acting out a role or speaking from some restricted point of view. Perhaps millions acted or reacted this way from November 22nd to November 24th!! The connatural *method* (the word "method" almost degrades this mysterious and profound human activity) is an intuitive, informal reflection or patterning of the total human subjective reactions to and attitudes toward reality, truth, value and beauty -- infinitely varied but essentially the same. The results to be achieved by this connatural approach are to ennoble man's concept of himself and of nature round about him, to facilitate communication of and the enjoyment of the aesthetically and universally human. Its theme song is both human and divine: human in that we all have the same noble origin by creation, the same awe-inspiring nature despite individual differences, the same grand freely-to-be-chosen destiny; divine in His words: "love one another as I have loved you."

"As a kind of knowing we can describe this experience both subjectively and objectively. Subjectively it is characterized by an integral and unified operation of all man's conscious powers; understanding of this sort arises only in a context of imagination and emotion, of intellect and will operating in mutual interdependence. Whereas emotion impedes philosophical thinking, it is a necessary condition for humanistic understanding; whereas scientific definition aims at exact and purely intellectual terms, humanistic insight requires the rich flow of creative imagery....In humanistic experience, the object is created essentially within the sensible and sensitive activities of man. To isolate any aspect of the object from this level of presentation, to translate it into purely intelligible characters, is precisely to submit it to scientific or philosophical treatment and so to terminate the humanistic experience as such.....In this brief description, I am really pointing to a very rich sort of knowledge experience which we all have had to a greater or lesser extent. Reflection on this sort of knowledge reveals, I submit, that this description is a valid one and that in this experience we attain an understanding which cannot simply be translated into purely intellectual knowledge. Humanistic knowledge cannot be reduced to purely abstract conceptual knowledge, nor can any purely intellectual discipline substitute for it. The understanding of human life we derive from Homer or Augustine or Shakespeare can never be substituted for by psychology or philosophy of theology....."

So far this paper has dealt with presuppositions and a fundamental viewpoint regarding various modes of knowledge. Even if all of this material had been assumed, it would be impossible within a half-hour's lecture to present even in schematic form the content of Catholic morality and education. For the remaining space and time a few guide lines or characteristic hallmarks will be presented as an orientation toward further investigation, as a solvent of certain prejudice formed as a result of mis-information or an inadequate amount of knowledge. Whatever may be said about Catholic morality in terms of various approaches, modern insights, more effective pedagogical methods, the basic Catholic position will be: good positive law over contradicts the moral law and the moral laws interpretation ultimately yields to the divine law as preserved and interpreted by the official magisterium of the church.

It may be obvious at this point that a detailed framework of the theological truths, ethical principles and scientific insights regarding the responsible behavior of man in his individual and social life, both private and public, which might be subsumed under the title: "A Catholic Concept of Morality and Education," is not going to be presented here. The spectrum of various modes of knowledge is too broad, their implications too deep, their integrated meanings too complex to be presented in a single half-hour lecture. After all, a Catholic college curriculum devoted over 30 units or serious work to this task. To reflect it here would be at the rate of fifteen hours a minute! Rather, a few guidelines or characteristic hallmarks will be presented as an orientation toward further investigation, as a solvent of certain prejudices formed as a result of misinformation or an inadequate amount of knowledge.

Catholic morality, and its development in the educational process, is rooted (1) in divinely revealed truths systematized in theology and codified in Canon Law, (2) in the ethical system of realist philosophy, and (3) in the actual individual conscience, regarding the subjective degree of merit, guilt or omission, as it is affected by the pressures of both its internal and external environment -- thus depending in part upon well-grounded insights from the behavioral sciences.

Due to involved historical reasons, the human limitations of individual churchmen and educators, the intrinsic difficulty of a conservatism born of reverence for divine truths to express what is universally common to and in conformity with human nature regardless of time and place and at the same time to illuminate and personalize such principles in a spirit of accommodation to the existential human condition here and now, many Catholic moralists have exhibited themselves as concerned more with a code than a commitment, more with the spirit as such rather than with the human composite, more with eternity than with time, more with essentialistic logical frameworks than with existential personalized growth and fulfillment, more with its own defense and the integrity of its deposit of truths than with the extension, development and communication to all men of the implications of "love thy neighbor as thy self" and the basic unity of human society.

An awareness of a stasis resulting from one-sided emphasis, of a growing gap between principles and practices, of the great decline in fidelity to contractual relationships, of the rise in "adjustment" to and "conformity" with declining mores together with the corrosion of responsibility and personal integrity, the increase of hate and violence over love and cooperation, the switch from mutual self-help and resultant freedom to dependence upon government decree and subsidization -- all this and much more has been recognized and is being brought to a head in the current Ecumenical Council. A more humanistic approach and many-sided dialog will result. There will have to be more concentrated teamwork between theologians, philosophers and scientists, and this cross-fertilization regarding the morality of man and society -- what ought to be done existentially here and now, will not be "transmitted" to students but rather they will be stimulated and challenged to personalize problems and to continue to perfect solutions of them throughout their entire maturity.

Catholic morality and education, as I see it, is not based upon any Baconian dream of a universal science which could only produce an a-prioristic, imperialistic education or some omni-competent principle or tight set of exclusive assumptions from which all reality would be deductively coherent. Rather, Catholic morality and education is a critical sensitivity toward reality in which no one method or mode of knowledge is exclusively sufficient.

True, some legislation is necessary in the objective order, but both the limitations and freedom of conscience must be recognized in the subjective order. A knowledge of Catholic morality and education is a developing set of symbols mediating a mystery. No single mode of knowing explains the mystery. We hope we are aware of what is being done and what is not being done. After all, things are related by the limitations of many modes of knowing, not by the absolutism of each. We should lead not from "luminous principles" but from principles born of questioning and luminated by experience.

The purpose of Catholic morality and education should be to ask these two questions: (1) what does it mean to be completely human? and (2) what does it mean to be a human being and a Christian? Catholic questions are bigger than Catholic answers. Though heirs to great riches we do not possess an exhaustive set of antecedent conceptualizations. We do hope, however, to arouse in our students an ability to ask the questions, to answer them according to their ability and to keep questing for more and more moral maturity.

CHAPTER 23.

THE TEACHING OF VALUES.

ELIZABETH STEINER MACCIA.

Today, there is concern that our schools are teaching "WASP values" and, thus, excluding the values of other groups in the society. For example, the values of groups such as Chicanos and blacks are thought to be excluded through the teaching of our schools. This concern appears to be based on one or more of the following beliefs:

B1. the values of the dominant group in society are not necessarily the most worthwhile

B2. all values of a given society are worthy of perpetuation

B3. the values of one person or group cannot be judged by another person or group

B4. to teach values is to destroy personal freedom.

I shall agree that the concern is justified in terms of B1, but not in terms of B2, B3, and B4. I shall do so by showing how B1 is warranted and how B2, B3, and B4 are not. In the course of so showing, I shall offer some thoughts on the teaching of values.

Valuing is not appetitive but intellectual. It is not desiring but the judging of the desirability of the desiring. Desiring is appetitive, while appraising a desire is intellectual. Obviously, one can desire without valuing as in the case of sub-human organisms and infant human beings. Fido and the infant cannot judge their desiring. Obviously, too, one can value without desiring. One need not judge one's own desires nor desire what is desirable. The results of valuing are beliefs as to desirability. Beliefs as to desirability are called "values." Human beings, therefore, are value-makers par excellance.

The basis for desirability is either instrumentality or non-instrumentality. A state of affairs can be desirable because it conduces to some other state of affairs which is desirable, or it can be desirable in its own right. For instance, a teacher's act can be taken as desirable in terms of its effect upon a learner or as an act desirable in and of itself, e.g., for the personhood of the teacher. To state the matter differently, it can be judged as desirable as a means or as an end.

Non-instrumental values can be either true or false. Which is to say that beliefs about desirability in terms of inherent worth have truth value. These beliefs are true provided desirability was judged in the light of the ends of goodness and beauty. These are the ends that are valuable. Instrumental values too can be either true or false. Which is to say that beliefs about desirability in terms of use have truth value. These beliefs are true provided desirability was judged through practicality for goodness or beauty. What is desired must not only be effective but effective for what is good and for what is beautiful. These are the means that are valuable.

From what has been stated above, it is patent that what is judged desirable may not be necessarily valuable. A teacher's act that is anxiety-producing in a learner may be taken as desirable in terms of an effect it does not have, e.g., competitive behavior. Moreover, competitive behavior may be taken as a desirable educational outcome, although its goodness cannot be supported. The teacher's act valued for its practicality and goodness could be neither practical nor ethical. An instance that relates to the aesthetic dimension would be an ugly educationally ineffectual building desirable because of its low cost housing of teachers and learners. The building valued for its practicality is neither practical nor beautiful; it is not valuable.

Valuings, hence, must be subjected to evaluatings. Second-order valuings or valuings of values are required. Criteria for judgments of desirability also must be judged. The results of evaluating are beliefs as to valuableness. Beliefs as to valuableness are called "e-values." E-values are true values as to goodness, beauty, and practicality. These values constitute ethics, aesthetics, and praxiology.

Schema 1 is an attempt to summarize the analysis of desiring, valuing, and evaluating.

Given the above analysis, it becomes clear that the values to be taught are not necessarily the values of the dominant group in the society. The values of the dominant group are not necessarily the most worthwhile.

B1 is warranted, since the values to be taught are the e-values or the true values. Might does not make right as to goodness, beauty, or practicality. Those in power are not necessarily the philosopher-kings. That is to say, those in power are not necessarily those who are wise, i.e., who know what is good, beautiful, and practical. In fact, it probably would be safe to say that those in power have never been and are not now the wise. But whether those in power ever have been, are now, or in the future will be wise is not the essential point in warranting the belief that the values of the dominant group in society are not necessarily the most worthwhile. The essential point is that wisdom is required over and above dominance in order that values be also valuable or be e-values and that wisdom is not a necessary consequent of dominance.

In regard to B2, all values of a given society are worthy of perpetuation, the analysis makes patent its falsity. Only values that are true or are e-values are worthy of continuing. Not all culture should be transmitted. This is true irrespective of the group or person involved. For instance, the Chicano value of machismo is not valuable. It expresses itself in behavior such as male chauvinism. Machismo is destructive of personhood, and so is unethical and should not be taught.

However, some believe that judgments like the one above ought not be made except by Chicanos or by individuals. What Chicanos or an individual should value should be judged by the Chicanos or by the individual involved. This belief, a specification of B3 that the values of one person or group cannot be judged by another person or group, is a rejection of the objectivity of value judgments. This rejection can arise either from the supposed relativism of judgmental criteria or of judges.

Consider first the supposed relativism of judgmental criteria. It is thought that what is good or beautiful or practical is relative to the person or to the group. Goodness, beauty, and practicality are supposed not the same for all human beings. What is valuable for one is supposed not valuable for another. This position denies evaluation, since there would be no basis for judging the person's or group's values even by the person or group itself. The person or group would be able to engage in valuation, i.e., judge their desires as desirable in the light of what they take to be non-instrumental or instrumental, but they would not be able to judge the non-instrumentality or instrumentality in terms of something beyond their taking. No inter-subjectivity would be possible. To state the matter differently, no truth or falsity of values would be possible, i.e., no e-values or knowledge of good (ethics), knowledge of the beautiful (aesthetics), or knowledge of the practical (praxiology)


DESIRING
Judging
Desirability
VALUING
Judging
Valuableness
EVALUATING
Results in
VALUES
Results in
E-VALUES
NON-INSTRUMENTAL
INSTRUMENTAL
ETHICS
AESTHETICS
PRAXIOLOGY

SCHEMA 1: DESIRING, VALUING, AND EVALUATING would be possible. One consequence of this position is to rule out moral behavior, since there would be no ethical basis for human action. Morality, too, would give way to individual or cultural relativism.

Turning to the supposed relativism of judges. It is thought that only the person or group that holds the values can fully know them and not be biased in judging them. A non-Chicano woman, for example, is taken as incapable of knowing Chicano values and as biased against them. The situation would be taken as better with a Chicano woman, for at least she is Chicano even though she supposedly cannot know male values and is biased against them. It would follow from this position that only Chicanos can teach Chicano values and only men, male values. To generalize the position, we can only judge and teach the values that we hold.

Critiquing this position depends upon senses of "to know." (1) One can know in a theoretical, a qualitative, and a performative sense. To know in a theoretical sense is to know a state of affairs as a class or as an instance of a class; it is knowing-that. To know in a qualitative sense is to know a state of affairs as unique; it is knowing-that-one. To know in a performative sense is to know a state of affairs as an actor; it is a knowing-how-to-do. Given these three senses of "knowing," knowing is extended beyond thinking to feeling and acting.

In the light of this extension, is the generalization that we only can judge and teach the values which we hold warranted? I shall argue that it is not. Even if it could be argued that to know values qualitatively and performatively requires that one espouse them or be a member of a group that does, nevertheless knowing values in the sense of being able to feel them and act upon them is not necessary for judging them. What is necessary is a theoretical stance in which one determines membership in the class of goodness or beauty or practicality. Hence, espousing the values to be judged rather than not espousing them could be a biasing factor. To subject one's person and society to judgment is not always easy and demands a special discipline.

In considering the part of the generalization which is about teaching values, attention must be paid to the different senses of "teaching values." One can teach about values or teach values. To teach about values is to teach about the values people have and do hold, i.e., what the values are, why people have and do hold them, etc. The psychology of values, the sociology of values and the politics of values would be subjects about values. To teach values is to teach the desirable ends and means for these ends. Since one ought not teach values unless they are true, only e-values or desirable ends which are valuable and means for these valuable ends should be taught. A complete teaching would involve not only the teaching of theoretical knowledge of values, i.e., the teaching of ethics, aesthetics, and praxiology, but also the teaching of qualitative and performative knowledge of values, i.e., the teaching of value-sensitivity and value-doing. Often the teaching of ethics is confused with the teaching of morals and the teaching of morals is taken not to be a kind of value teaching, because theoretical teaching is taken as all of teaching. But

human behavior is moral
if and only if
ethically and praxiologically adequate,
sensitive, and
procedurally sound.

Therefore, the essential difference between the teaching of ethics and the teaching of morals is whether along with ethics one also teaches praxiology, knowledge of goodness as it uniquely displays itself in states of affairs, and knowledge of how to achieve goodness through unique displays.

Given the above explication of the teaching of values, the generalization that we only can teach the values which we hold is not true of the teaching of theoretical knowledge of values. All theoretical knowledge, including that of values, requires a universal stance. To be value theoretical, one must take a stance beyond one's own values or beyond the values of a particular group. At first glance, the generalization does appear true of qualitative and performative knowledge of values. In qualitative and performative knowledge of values, what is wanted is the kind of experience one would have if one held the values. But there is no reason why one cannot be directed to experience what a given group experiences or even what another individual has experienced. This is precisely what one does in teaching qualitative and performative knowledge. One, thus, can learn values so as to teach them. Also one can learn values without holding them. Just as one can know mathematics from theory to application (application includes awareness of the unique and a grasp of procedure) and not engage in it, so one can know morals from ethics and praxiology to application and not be moral. Therefore, the appearance is not a reality. The generalization that only those who hold the values can teach their application does not hold.

The final belief to discuss is B4, to teach values is to destroy human freedom. To teach values does not destroy freedom in either of its senses. In one sense, "freedom" means to be without restraints. To teach someone, as pointed out above, does not involve forcing them to live by that teaching. One can know mathematics and not do it. One can know morals and not be moral. Teaching qua teaching is not restrictive. In its other sense, "freedom" means the capacity to exercise choice. Teaching does not take away this capacity, but makes it possible to exercise it. Knowledge indeed makes one free. Unless one has a knowledge of e-values, a good, beautiful, and practical life cannot be chosen.

Documentation.

1. See George S. Maccia's "Pedagogical Epistemology," in *Proceedings of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society*. Edited by W. E. Brownson and J. E. Carter, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana, 1973, pp. 57-76.

CHAPTER 24.

A MODEL FOR MAKING AND TESTING VALUE JUDGMENTS.

LAWRENCE G. THOMAS.

In the past twenty-five years there has been a remarkable amount of communication between philosophers and social scientists concerning the empirical study of values. Some social scientists, of course, were edgy about this development, insisting that a genuine science of human behavior could have nothing to do with normative preferences and value judgments. Many philosophers, also, deplored this trend, arguing that only the philosophic methods of logical analysis and disciplined intuition were adequate to deal with value questions. But these two extremes have not prevented naturalistic-minded philosophers from cooperating with behavioral-minded scientists in exploring several dimensions of values.

In one sense value judgments have been objects of empirical study for as long as there have been social sciences. If value judgments are interpreted as expressions of preference or declarations of worth, then wedding rituals, laws of inheritance, and the progressive income tax qualify as value judgments. In fact, most of our social arrangements and traditional culture are formalized expressions of value. Sometimes the focus of attention is on the established content, as when an anthropologist is exploring the religious practices of the Kwakiutl or an economist is describing wage structures in the textile industry. In these instances, the established content consists of valued ways by which certain people channel their interests and reach at least a tolerable form of adjustment. At other times the focus is on the process of change, such as the change in economic values represented in the Industrial Revolution or the change in political policies in the United States after World War II. Values of one sort or another constitute the main subject matter of the social sciences.

But in another sense this approach to value judgments is not especially relevant to the concern of the politician, the labor leader, the business executive, the missionary, and the philosopher. The value content of the social sciences doesn't answer their urgent questions. The content of these disciplines is drawn from established, habitual value judgments, while these leaders are seeking new departures. It deals with innovations only in the descriptive sense, not in deliberative judgments of better or worse. It depicts the process of change and categorizes it, but it doesn't tell how completely the changes were made. In short, the social sciences provide useful background but do not deal directly with the concerns of the decision makers.

A philosopher, on the other hand, is profoundly concerned with the problems faced by politicians, labor leaders, business executives, school officials, and the like, in making their value judgments. He, too, is interested in how best to make judgments, not merely in what the results were from past decisions of specific groups. And he is interested in the process of making value judgments, not just to find out how it happens to be done by assorted groups, but to study whether it has been done poorly or well. This shared concern may account for the often reported observation that teachers, administrators, and similarly situated officials make more use of a philosophy (or ideology) than of scientific generalizations in reaching their decisions.

My intent, however, is not to oppose the treatment of value judgments in the social sciences to the treatment by philosophers and policy-makers. This would be a false opposition in any case, for a decision-maker who lacked knowledge of the social sciences relevant to his work would be largely limited to idiosyncratic experience and raw empiricism for the factual basis of his judgments. My intent, rather, is to urge the extension of scientific inquiry into these areas of special concern to the makers of value judgments. As matters now stand, scientific investigation falls short of any direct contribution toward answering the crucial questions, the "should" questions.

Consider the inquiries that could be made about the topic of controversial questions in the classroom:

1. Are controversial questions discussed in the classrooms of this school?

2. What are the effects of permitting the discussion of controversial questions in this school -- on the pupils, on the parents, or other teachers, on civic clubs, etc.?

3. Who opposes the practice? Who favors it?

4. Should controversial questions be discussed in the classrooms of this school?

The first three are straight empirical questions and, with proper qualifications and controls, could be investigated right now with the techniques of the social sciences. The fourth is a value question. It is also the most important of the four for school boards, administrators, and citizen groups as well as for teachers. But unfortunately, it is commonly considered unresearchable by scientific procedures. As we shall see later, this negative attitude occurs when the value question is treated quite separately from the preceding three questions instead of being analyzed into elements that could organize and interpret the investigations called for in the first three questions.

The same case could be made concerning the question of establishing a dress code for the school. Empirical inquiries can be made on a number of relevant points -- who favor and who oppose a dress code, how many other schools have one, what consequences elsewhere have been noted, the legal right of pupils and parents in this matter, the legal authority of the superintendent in this matter, etc. After these questions have been answered, however, the crucial question still remains: Should the school have a dress code?

And so it goes with similar questions of educational policy. The controversial question is not how many schools, for example, use ability grouping of their students but should the school use ability grouping. Not so much the present distribution of students by race in these schools as whether there should be proportional representation by race. Not so much a description of the legal powers of college administrators as how they should treat college students who use organized violence. In short, the most critical questions in education policy are characteristically value judgments, which are seldom considered to be researchable. If these value questions are not considered researchable, how are they answered?

The ways in which these major questions are answered at present are often opportunistic, capricious, or intuitive in the most unsystematic sense of that term. Sometimes the answers are sought in the majority vote of the public, as when school board candidates campaign for popular support of their particular preferences. More frequently special interest groups advance their simplistic answers, and school officials are expected to yield to the strongest pressures. Or, in direct contrast, the top administrator is regarded as the boss, and whatever he says goes. Even when expert consultants are called in to help, they are often expected to recommend the right answers instead of providing the facts and alternatives that the decision-makers need to deliberate on in reaching their own judgment. All of these are poor ways to attack such important questions of educational policy.

What is needed? Some would say we need stronger appeals to virtuous behavior, to respect for proper authority, to loyalty toward our moral traditions, to greater deference toward the judgments of scholars, to deeper commitments to universal standards. Helpful as these might be in raising the moral tone of policy controversies, they alone are not equal to the task. We don't need to standardize our values, but we do need to standardize our way of making and testing value judgments, especially if we take these questions seriously and want the judgments to be made competently. To get the maximum attention from empirical researchers, the procedure should be as open as possible to the attitudes and techniques characteristic of scientific inquiry. Nothing less than these requirements seems likely to insure the full cooperation of social scientists and educational philosophers and to enhance the quality of major value judgments in education.

The Proposed Model.

The process of making and testing value judgments is conceived here as a modified form of problem solving in the naturalistic, relativistic tradition of John Dewey and the latter day experimentalists. It consists of six distinguishable stages somewhat artificially abstracted from the flowing process of actual evaluations. They are presented here in the approximate order in which they usually occur in action, but any stage may be returned to or repeated in actual evaluations. Only one stage is ever likely to be omitted in the actual process, and that is the third one -- achieving a common frame of reference, a state of affairs which often exists already in communities or groups that have worked together successfully. After seeing first the distinctive character of each stage only briefly (to get the continuity or flow of the total process), we shall then look at each stage in considerable detail, seeking clarifying illustrations and opportunities for empirical research.

1. Undergoing conflict or lack. This is the stimulus or occasion for making a value judgment. There would be no motivation to make a judgment, let alone test it, if there were no disruption or interruption of our habitual ways of acting, no forced choices, no sense of lack and

hunger, no awakening of a desire for something new that cannot be obtained by the automatic operations of past habits.

2. *Diagnosing the situation for clues*. This phase constitutes the search for information, not merely to locate the possible causes of the disruption or the reasons for the appeal of the new object, but also (and more frequently) to acquire means for planning what might be done next. The data needed include facts and empirical evidence but also the experiences and interpretations, the opinions and interests, of others.

3. *Constructing a common frame of reference*. If two or more persons are involved in making and testing a value judgment (as is usually the case), they are not likely to have fruitful discussions, debates, and appeals to the evidence unless they share a common perspective on the issues. Clear communication and the achievement of common understanding depend upon sharing the same assumptions, the same facts and values taken for granted. These are the crucial features of a frame of reference, and agreement on these assumptions may have to be sought before the preceding phase, diagnosing the situation for clues, can be pursued very far.

4. *Deliberating on means-end relationships to reach a firm judgment*. A distinctive feature of this stage is the organization of the facts, opinions, interests, and other information collected into tentative judgments or hypotheses. When these are expressed in the form of means-end relationships, where a tentative end in view not only determines the desirability of possible means but also finds its own desirability heavily influenced by the character of the available means, the amount of deliberation demanded at this stage is often extensive and exacting. The intellectual product at this point is a value judgment based on prior diagnoses of the situation, seen from a specified frame of reference, and now considered worth testing in practice.

5. *Taking action on the judgment*. This testing stage is needed not only to validate the judgment at hand but also to provide evidence to use in making a better judgment next time.

6. *Reviewing the experienced consequences*. This, like the first stage in this process, is primarily an undergoing stage, but revealing at this point the worth of the previous investigating, consulting, deliberating, and choosing. As such, it deserves serious attention and reflection. The enjoyments, difficulties, interests, and factual connections which were once anticipated in the matured value judgment are now compared with the autonomous content of the experienced consequences of acting on that judgment. How well do the results fulfill the anticipations? All in all,

do these results resolve the conflict or fulfill the lack that grew out of the initial undergoing in this process? What has been learned that could be used to produce a more accurate and more satisfying judgment another time?

This in brief outline is the six-step model proposed to describe a competent performance in making and testing any value judgment. Each step needs a more detailed development of its possibilities, clarified by illustrations. The opportunity for systematic research to refine and improve the tests at each step would then be worth noting. To this expanded treatment of each step let us now turn.

Undergoing Conflict or Lack.

The initial undergoing provides the impetus for re-examining what we have been doing, but when it is lifted from the total process for closer inspection, we find it is suffused with uncertainties, ambiguities, and dilemmas. The undergoing does not, in itself, provide a purpose; rather, it creates the need to define a purpose.

The easiest way to describe this initial undergoing is to focus on the disruptions, interruptions, and conflicts which are immediately felt. For example, a principal of a high school, accustomed to the conventional middle-class range of attire and grooming, has had his expectations radically disrupted in the past few years. He might be able to tolerate the changes in dress, but when the athletic coach won't let long-haired boys play on the team, when teachers complain that their objections to mini-skirts on girls are answered by a shift to Levis, when the student employment agency can't place some youth solely because of appearance, and when some parents demand that their children have the right of self-expression in dress, his established habits and attitudes are threatened with disruptions, incongruities, and conflicting demands. He is catapulted into the process of making a new value judgment.

Dewey is usually credited with emphasizing the disruption, the conflict, the dissatisfaction that often launches problem solving, but he uses the term "lack" as often as he does "conflict." A lack could be considered a product of "disruption of continuity" or of disappointment with the results of established habits, but this conception tends to limit motivation to the restoration of equilibrium. Human beings, when they are healthy, rested, and unthreatened, want more than the serenity, tranquility, or contentment of equilibrium. When most of their basic deficiency needs have been taken care of (as Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers, William Livingston, Hadley Cantril and others have pointed out), human beings naturally seek new value experiences, new adventures, new risks they feel they can control, new refinements of old joys, new worlds to conquer. It seems to me that these can properly be called "experienced lacks" without doing too much violence to the conventional meaning of the term. The range of "lacks" we experience might be described on a continuum. At one end would fall the lacks arising from boredom, ennui, a vague restlessness, an unidentified unsatisfaction with the tedium of over-controlled experience. These qualities of a situation can be just as upsetting and problematical as an external invasion or an unexpected interruption or an unasked confrontation with an opposition. They constitute dissatisfactions with the present state of affairs. At the other end would be curiosity, the challenge of the unknown, a taste for variety, the thrill of adventure, the excitement of novelty. When a person is psychologically ready for these appeals, they occur as lacks in his present activities. They represent unsatisfaction more than dissatisfaction, but they upset the equilibrium of present activities just as surely. Moreover, they combine urgency and indeterminacy; they call for doing something different without providing adequate clues or pointing a direction.

Suppose we take as our continuing example a proposal to achieve proportional distribution of races in a district's schools by busing children beyond their neighborhoods. It is easy to see how this proposal can appear as a threat or possible disruption to established ways of doing things. If the proposal remains as only an external threat, however, no new judgment is required on present policy. The proposal is simply bad, evil, the enemy. Our present ways of allocating pupils to schools are good and must be defended. But if the proposal upsets our confidence in the established ways, if it raises a conflict or reveals a lack in what we always thought we wanted to do, then a new judgment must be sought. Our conflict cannot really be identified at this initial stage of undergoing and becoming upset, but it may turn out to be between a strong preference for neighborhood schooling and a profound belief in fair opportunities for all children. Or the felt lack might become identified later as this question: Will racially proportionate schools make education more real and relevant for my children? In any case, the motive or impulse to action is to remove the conflict or do something about the lack as now felt.

Since the problem is not yet objectively defined, the conflict or lack is not yet located and cognized. This outcome is desired but it comes later.

Right now the entire situation is indefinite and problematical to us. If we were being studied by scientific observers, they could not see the character of our conflict or the nature of our lack yet, any more than we can (although they might have more hypotheses), but they could surely see our perplexity and uncertainty. If this initial stage out of the entire six-step process were to become itself an object of empirical investigation, the following questions would be appropriate:

1. What are possible ways of locating (or creating) situations in which specified kinds of persons feel an important conflict (or lack) in their established ways of handling such situations? Which ways tend to evoke hostile defenses, which ways tend to evoke aversion and escape, and which ways usually lead into the second stage of making a new value judgment?

2. What signs or indices of undergoing a conflict (or lack) do various types of persons display in various kinds of situations? Can the dependable signs be categorized for economical use? Can they be predicted under specified conditions?

The answers to these questions would not only enhance our understanding of the beginning of competent value judgments but would also make the deliberate inducing of them more feasible and more reliable.

Diagnosing the Situation.

Having undergone an upset for unidentified reasons, we must now do something. Doing something is seldom, if ever, at random. It will be guided, no matter how tentatively, by some suspicion, some hypothesis, some hunch, some intimation. And the information found under this tentative direction will, in turn, affect the guiding hunch -- confirm it, refine it, alter it, refute it. The search is very likely to be more forward looking (i.e., focused on what needs to be done) than backward looking (i.e., finding out how this difficulty occurred), although the difference is a matter of emphasis instead of kind. This difference in emphasis has traditionally characterized the distinction between the concerns of evaluaters and the concerns of scientists, (1) even though a value judgment may be significantly improved by basing it on scientific knowledge of what causes the initial difficulties.

Since the purpose of this diagnostic stage is to gather information relevant to interests to be incorporated soon in a value judgment, the range of information sought will extend considerably beyond the usual kinds of hard evidence traditionally favored by educational researchers. The range will include not only official reports, vital statistics, test scores, and persistent attitudes, but also beliefs, hopes, current preferences, past fears, and present suspicions and doubts. A wide variety of people may have to be consulted to learn what interests are actually at stake in this unsettled situation.

The main achievements to be sought at this stage include (1) identifying most of the important interests that are thought to be desired (and functioning as goals, outcomes, criteria, or standards); (2) identifying most of their relationships to possible facts, trends, resources, and facilities that are thought relevant to the achievement or preservation of these important interests; (3) finding evidence of differences in judgment and interpretation that are probably worth investigating as arising from possible differences in frames of reference. The valuational question, for which a value judgment will soon be made and tested, can usually be stated loosely, vaguely, and in several versions at this point.

Returning to our example, let us say we are initially guided by a sense of conflict regarding school busing. To locate the conflict, we seek to identify the important interests involved, our own as well as those of others. If we find that some parents oppose busing because they chose their homesite to be near the highest quality school, and others favor busing in the belief that white parents will pay more attention to the educational opportunities of black pupils if these latter are attending the same school as their own children, we have tentatively located a conflict between groups of parents (even though drawing a genuine issue here must wait until the fourth stage). If we find a strong commitment to maintaining high educational standards and to providing equal educational opportunities for all children but profound doubts about the competence of the teaching staff to do well with pupils of heterogeneous backgrounds, the conflict is between professed ideals and presumed facts. If we find ourselves committed both to providing equal access to the best schools in the district and to avoiding any transfer of pupils from their own neighborhood schools, the conflict may be a disjunction between what Charles Morris calls a "conceived" value and an "operational" value (2) (i.e., between what we profess to be generally desirable and what we actually practice). This kind of conflict calls for self-diagnosis more than for environmental diagnosis.

Depending on which conflict of interests now guides us, we shall then look for such relevant facts as the distribution of races in the different residential zones, the comparative school facilities at predominantly white and predominantly black schools, the amount of parental participation in the program planning of each school, the standards of teacher selection maintained by the school board, the content of the in-service training provided for teachers at different schools, the costs and risks of busing, and so on. We should recognize, however, that at this stage the relationships between a tentatively identified conflict (or lack) and the relevant information sought and acquired is both reciprocal and unstable, each side of the relationship being capable of altering or redefining the other. But as this diagnostic stage approaches fulfillment, certain valuational questions will emerge as tentative definitions of the problem. For example, how can we secure equal educational opportunity without busing the children? Or how can we liquidate the white middle-class opposition to busing?

If we were to become objects of empirical research at this stage of the judgment-making process, significant contributions to our understanding of the process and to our competence in using it could be realized from answers to such questions as these:

1. How can an observer identify the kinds of interests and contingent facts that different groups of participants actually perceive or acknowledge in their diagnosis? Could he use the counselor's technique of having the participants talk about their perceptions and dilemmas? Would a role-playing technique, where one participant is asked to instruct another, be effective? Would asking them to write down the pros and cons of alternative choices be useful? (Presenting a check-off list of possibilities is probably too "instructive," and the excessively intellectual game of asking them to face imaginary choices with pre-formed sets of consequences should also be avoided.)

2. What evidence will discriminate a genuine involvement of the participants in making diagnoses from a mere willingness to role-play or engage in a game with the observer?

Constructing a Common Frame of Reference.

Specific attention to the frame of reference is needed when more than one person is involved in reaching a value judgment and when the persons involved have different backgrounds. Similar frames of reference are usually held by those of similar economic status, educational status, and social and vocational opportunities. The similarity will probably be implicit and unnoticed, but as long as it is shared, it need not be made explicit for study. Hence, when the construction of value judgment is of concern to only a single individual or to a group of similar backgrounds, this third stage can probably be skipped. For all others this stage deserves careful exploration, because so much of what a person sees, believes, or ignores is determined, usually unconsciously, by his frame of reference.

Since the most important features of a frame of reference are the facts and values taken for granted, they are thereby the most difficult to identify. The things that we take for granted are the last things we look at or question. Often we have to be irritated, annoyed, or outraged by the suggestions or acts of others to discover the hidden values and beliefs that we have been taking for granted. Instead of indulging our irritation or anger at this stage, we should be wise to take them as clues to recognizing our own frame of reference. Another useful clue is the qualities we praise and the traits we condemn in others. These are often our ideals for ourselves -- and sometimes the suppressed tendencies we hate in ourselves.

After some humbling degree of self-awareness has been obtained on these hidden biases, attention can be given to constructing deliberately a common frame of reference. One of the most useful skills in accomplishing this is facility in detecting possible assumptions underlying the diagnoses of, and proposed solutions to, the difficulties under discussion. For example, in the argument over the busing of pupils away from neighborhood schools, the claim might be made that this additional busing would increase school costs 10%. Regardless of the factual accuracy of the case, the claim could rest on the assumption of no educational benefit coming from the extra cost (and the implied waste of school funds) or on the assumption of proportionate (or even greater) educational value being derived from this expenditure -- and it surely makes a difference which assumption is held. Or consider the claim that the mixing of white and black pupils from different backgrounds will lead to more frustration for blacks and lower quality schooling for whites. Before plunging into debate on the claim, let us look first for its possible assumptions. Does it assume that educating consists of presenting the same academic materials to all children for mastery? Does it assume that the differing backgrounds of pupils are irrelevant to the proper content of the curriculum? Does it assume that motivation for learning is best set by the amount of competition stimulated among pupils? If not all these plausible assumptions are acceptable, what alternatives exist and how would they affect the meaning and validity of the claim?

There is no guarantee, of course, that this process of exposing assumptions will always result in consensus on a frame of reference, but it certainly increases the prospects of achieving agreement on some assumptions and identifying the genuine disagreements. The prospects of consensus can be enhanced even further if common agreement on some principles of method can be obtained fairly early. For instance, disagreements on _facts_ assumed could be resolved by empirical investigation if one of the _values_ assumed by all involved is the superiority of publicly tested evidence over one's personal beliefs, no matter how cherished. Another facilitating principle is agreeing to treat all value judgments as hypotheses, no matter how confident we may be in their authoritative source. Especially desirable is some skill in trying out different frames of reference, occupying first one and then another, to get their distinctive views of the world. In this connection the group members might adopt the principle that the degree to which one understands a different set of assumptions is measured by how plausibly they can be stated by one who does not agree with them.

These strategies and techniques are not needed for the deep moral commitments that are shared by virtually everyone growing up in our western culture. And, on the other hand, they would not work to resolve a clash of beliefs or attitudes at the visceral level (e.g., favoring and opposing the close association of blacks and whites as equals). The latter conflicts yield only to time and further experience. But they are suitable for the value assumptions of moderate intensity or depth and of easily acknowledged diversity. To illustrate this level and type, the participants in our example might reach agreement on the following value hierarchy as an explicit frame of reference: Educational quality should be promoted first at every school, regardless of racial composition; if busing aids it, fine; if not, don't waste money on busing. Participants at another school might reach consensus on this value hierarchy: First priority goes to insuring a second-to-none education for blacks; then to promoting closer association of white and black pupils. The wording is different in each case and reflects different orientations to the problem, but the prospects of merging these two into a common frame of reference appear to be excellent.

Empirical researchers could contribute much to understanding the dimensions of this stage and promoting its effective operation by exploring these questions:

1. What techniques are most effective in helping people identify their own assumptions? Are those suggested above equally successful with various kinds of people in various kinds of situations? Does previous

research in other contexts suggest additional techniques to try with this problem?

2. What kinds of values and beliefs are assumed in common by various groupings of people who live and work together? Do they share more of some assumptions than do those who are socially distant?

3. When people appear to differ irreconcilably on certain assumptions of fact or value, what are the most effective ways of dissolving the rigidities? How successful are the following techniques under specified conditions?

a. Dialoging in open forum.

b. Appealing to majority vote.

c. Arranging for empirical tests of all disagreements over facts.

d. Living and working together to build a body of shared experiences.

Deliberating on Means-End Relationships.

Now that the problematical situation has been carefully diagnosed and an explicit frame of reference established, the next step is to derive a firm value judgment from the evidence, the varied interests, and the guiding principles agreed upon. The form of the judgment will be, either implicitly or better explicitly, a means-end relationship, and it should be the product of systematic deliberation. Neither the end nor the means is set in advance, but each is created and refined, through imaginative thought, in reciprocal relation with the other. This is dialectical thinking and parallels the transactional view of experience. Let us look at it in greater detail and with illustrations.

The process at this stage has two foci, the selection of ends and the selection of means, but each is studied in close relationship to the other. When the focus is on the choice of ends-in-view, the available means and their costs modify and shape the interests that become the projected goals. For example, an interest in improving the education of black pupils lacks character or form until it is seen as the possible product of busing them away from their neighborhood school, or of changing the traditional curriculum, or of using unprepared teachers in the white schools, or of tripling the number of black teachers, etc. The goal of a better education for black pupils through busing, racially proportionate schools, and encouraging close association of black and white pupils is significantly different from the goal of a better education for black pupils through hiring all black teachers and administrators for predominantly black schools, providing intensive in-service training, and formulating a curriculum to develop pride in being black.

On the other hand, when the focus is on the choice of appropriate means, each possible means needs to be examined for its probable outcomes beyond the initial end-in-view. These further outcomes should be viewed as candidates for additional intended goals or as liabilities against the selection of this particular means. For example, if busing children to racially proportionate schools seems likely to improve the quality of education of black pupils but is also seen as taking money away from other school equipment, getting parents concerned about the quality of education throughout the district instead of just in a neighborhood school, forecasting a need for the three specialized high schools in the district to become comprehensive schools, and promoting social dating between white and black students, the appropriateness of busing as a means now depends on whether these other likely outcomes are accepted as additional ends-in-view or viewed as detractions from the worth of the means. In either event, these are the conditions for a responsible choice of means.

This reciprocal or transactional deliberation on possible goals and possible means continues until the participants agree that their selection represents a condition of stable and inclusive interdependence between certain ends and means. The agreement may fall short of consensus, perhaps consisting of a majority vote or accepting a special committee's recommendation. The selection may also fall short of a complete solution to the problem as originally diagnosed. For example, to continue our illustration, the conclusion agreed upon at this point might be (1) to try out busing at only a few schools, if the majority of parents involved are willing, or (2) to bus children only to those schools with superior records for effective teaching, or (3) to promote busing experiences for all children through greater use of community resources and inter-school projects. In fact, the original problem identified at the diagnosis stage may now be significantly altered as a result of this deliberation on ends and means.

This is the stage where the making of a value judgment reaches maturity. It is fulfilled when coherently organized means appear comprehensively united with a coherent set of goals to support a proposal for action.

Its testing comes next, but the value judgment amounts to a competent declaration of the worth of trying out this proposal in practice.

The dimensions of the deliberation described in this stage rest at a number of points on empirical questions and hypotheses. Scientific investigations by educational researchers at these points could not only test the empirical assumptions in the theory but also improve the techniques for conducting this transactional kind of deliberation. Some possibilities are suggested in the following questions.

1. To what extent, under what conditions, and for what types of people does the perception of a new but possible means-end relation affect or alter an earlier judgment?

2. Granted that the perception of more of the means involved in reaching a desired goal clarifies the meaning of that goal, does it also heighten the anticipated enjoyment of achieving that goal?

3. What could be some unobtrusive measures of "anticipated enjoyment?"

4. Are people less sure of their affections for a possible goal (i.e., a future state of affairs desired) when they know little about the means required than when the goal is conceived in terms of estimated means to reach it?

5. Are there definite skills involved in estimating the other probable consequences of means besides the achievement of the ends-in-view? If so, can they be specifically taught? In context only? Separate from context?

6. Can the habit of changing one's goals in the light of inadequate old means but of promising new means be taught specifically and separately? Or learned only as a by-product of actual participation in evaluations with a high contingency factor?

Taking Action on the Judgment.

The purpose of this stage is to test the validity of the value judgment, but there are two distinct senses in which the validity is tested. One is the matter of factual accuracy: Do the perceived relations of the means-end chosen actually work as anticipated when action is taken on its central proposal? The other sense tests the integrity of the participants: Do they believe enough in the validity of this value judgment to put it to the test of public experience?

When the testing action is of comparatively short duration (as in establishing a new dress code for the school), it can be completed before the consequences are reviewed and appraised. In actions covering a considerable period of time (as in promoting social integration of the minority-majority in school), occasional check points may be needed for reviewing and redirecting the program of action. In any case the try-out should be pursued long enough to allow new evidence and possibly new interests to appear. It should also be remembered that this action stage is needed not only to test the validity of the matured value judgment but also to provide data (including changed interests and new factual evidence) for use in making a better judgment next time.

Empirical studies of the degree to which people act on their beliefs and attitudes are already familiar to educational researchers. The techniques which measured this relationship may be appropriate to testing the commitment of participants to the worth of their consensus. Perhaps the greatest need is for the development of natural ways of taking group action on value judgments that insure that all the participants will experience as directly as possible the actual consequences.

Reviewing the Experienced Consequences.

There may be a temptation for the participants at this final stage to make a gross and global pronouncement: "This was a good decision." or "On the whole that was a pretty fair judgment." Without denying the relevance and virtue of a summary interpretation, my position is that it should come after a reflective examination of the consequences of the try-out. Some people, of course, claim that they don't need this period of reflective examination, that they have an intuitive knowledge of the total outcome that is different from any summation of the detailed parts. This contention may be a matter of personality style, but I would fear that those who rely on a direct intuition of the whole value of the act may be missing some actual occurrences in the process that would significantly alter their final interpretation. At any rate the richer prospects for scientific investigation into this concluding stage seem to lie in the behavior of those who conduct a reflective examination of the consequences before they reach a global interpretation.

Certain aspects of the experienced consequences deserve special attention because of their evaluative significance. First, of course, is identifying the particular likings and dislikings, the enjoyments and the hurts, which occurred as products and by-products of taking action on the judgment. Let us suppose, for example, that the following outcomes were noted in particular:

1. After nine months of busing, there was no exceptional gain (nor loss) in standardized test scores on basic skills, but there was a small decline in the incidence of juvenile delinquency.

2. Most children enjoyed the bus rides, the bus drivers complained they found it difficult to control the exuberance.

3. Many parents found they enjoyed the longer period of time that their children were away from home.

Which of these were expected (thus confirming those parts of the judgment)? Which were unexpected (some serving to refute the judgment and others to expand the intended goals next time)?

Second, and of equal importance, is noting how well the predicted factual relationships worked out. Suppose, for example, that some parents feared social intimacy among black and white pupils, and other parents welcomed it, but all agreed that busing the children would promote it. Then suppose the results were that, while proportionate racial representation was achieved statistically, segregation-by-choice in friendships, playground games, and social activities obviously persisted in all schools but one, which had initiated a systematic program of integrated social activities. What empirical connections were confirmed? Disconfirmed? Left obscure? Suppose further that some unexpected relationships appeared: (a) Teachers found the pupils more interested in class work that was related to experiences on the bus trips; (b) There was a surprising increase in the number of teachers who expressed a preference for teaching special classes for underprivileged children, whether black or white. Can the unexpected results be readily attributed to certain means used, or does locating the cause require further investigation?

In sum, a global interpretation is now called for. It could be sought in a summary of the answers found to the questions listed above, but such an interpretation is too likely to be static. It could also be sought in the affective terms now being used by the participants -- words of praise, of disappointment, of enthusiasm, or of resentment. But these terms are vague, unstandardized, and poor communicators to others who did not themselves undergo this six-stage process. To get a behavioral clue and to highlight the continuing, progressive nature of all value judgments, possibly the best way to learn the group's global interpretation is to ask: After the participants have undergone the consequences of their value judgment in action and have discussed or reflected on the results, how much do they desire to continue the try-out of this proposed course of action (i.e., continue testing the value judgment)? Or how much do they seek re-examinations and revisions of earlier stages in the process? Or to what extent do they prefer to formulate a new and different judgment for the next try-out?

The most needed empirical research in this concluding stage consists chiefly of methods and techniques. What are dependable techniques for identifying objectively the enjoyments and the hurts, the satisfactions and the dissatisfactions? How can the emergence of new interests during the valuation process be detected by unobtrusive measures? A great part of this reviewing stage, however, consists of straight empirical questions -- the connections between means tried and results obtained. These will hopefully attract the interest and participation of educational researchers, who will recognize the contextual significance of these questions being the closing phase of the process of making and testing value judgments.

Documentations.

1. See Peter Caws, Science and the Theory of Value, (New York, Random House), 1967, Chapter 4.

2. Charles Morris, Varieties of Human Value, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press), 1956, Chapter 1.

CHAPTER 25.

THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF AXIOLOGY.

ROBERT BRUCE MCLAREN.

Perhaps because I am writing this in the shadow of the Berlin Wall, with its tank traps and active machine gun emplacements, and have so recently been jolted by visits to war memorials and death camps, I find it tempting to raise questions about the educational philosophy that schooled a generation which could elect a Hitler, and build human incinerators. Granted that a vast array of complex social and economic pressures antedated those events, before one writes it off as a freak of history or a peculiarly German quirk, it is well to recall that warning signals were everywhere, and education was almost always seen as a major key. During that era which Winston Churchill called "this hideous epoc," there were warnings in every major nation that such atrocities could happen anywhere.

During the early 1930's Ortega y Gassett expressed alarm that schools were teaching youth merely techniques for living in mechanized age, while failing to imbue "a feeling for their great historic or cultural heritage . . . (and leaving them) without a moral code and without standards." (1) A decade later, Walter Lippmann published a caveat just before the start of World War II, that if the prevailing trend continued, of omitting from the schools' curricula the ideals and values which had been central to the Judaeo-Christian West, our whole civilization would be in jeopardy. (2) After another decade, in 1951, Lewis Mumford declared that a sizeable percentage of our student population "may for all practical purposes, be considered moral imbeciles . . . their values remain infantile if not brutally criminal." (3)

If one is prompted by such negative assessments to become defensive and claim that our youth aren't all that bad, and that even if they are it isn't the fault of the schools, he may be reminded of the juvenile crime rate which rises each year at several times the growth rate of that age group in society. And it is instructive to note that the most caustic critics of schools since the 1960's, have been educators themselves, whose articles and books have sounded an alarm unprecedented in the history of the profession. From the writings of Goodman, Illich, Silberman, Toffler and others, one gains the impression that we have gone beyond the point of no return so there is little left to do but abolish formal compulsory education as we have known it. Indeed, Ivan Illich insists that "schools have alienated man from his learning." (4) They are in fact countering the very purpose for their existence.

Illich does, however, issue a constructive reprimand for those who have gotten on the Everett Reimer bandwagon in calling for the radical deschooling of society, and affirms with Dwight Allen that "many of the future societal problems coming in the next thirty years can be solved _only_ through education." (5) Schools are an integral part of our total culture, and are today the only institutions in which virtually every citizen is required to participate for a significant span of years.

The question before us then is not whether the schools are so bad they should be abolished, but, in full view of their many ills, what is the most appropriate remedy to which we as philosophers can address ourselves? We are not administrators, for the most part, and even if we were, we would have to recognize that the problems will not be resolved or the ills cured by administrative tinkering. The issues are essentially axiological in nature. What I am proposing here is that there is a level of concern which is even prior to axiology which requires our attention and most cogent thought. Value systems are not born in a vacuum, but always arise in a specific context. That framework will inevitably be either the State, one's view of nature, social custom, one's own ego, or some conception of deity. Each of these presupposes an ontology either covertly or explicitly, and all axiological concerns are derived therefrom. I do not propose that we take time here to rehearse the whole weary history of the ontological debate which, since Anselm, has been a battlefield of endless argument. But I am proposing that axiology is not only related to ontology but indeed derived from it, and hope at least to provide some substantiation for the contention. Any effort to affect cut-flower phenomenon; severed from their ontological roots, value systems, like flowers in a vase, are destined to wither and die however deceptive their lingering appearance of life. The implication of this for educational practice will become evident.

I.

Plato's observation that "what is honored in a country will be cultivated there," provides a good opening gambit. In Athens, the nation-state provided the value system because for the citizen, his very being was defined by the state. While in the Republic, he seems to allow room for individualism, in his book Laws, he makes clear the necessary subordination of citizens to the state: "Every creation," he wrote, "is for the sake of the whole . . . you are created for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of you." To be, in any significant sense, was to be a citizen. In both Plato and Aristotle, we find this concept reinforced in their proposals for education, the whole purpose of which was to train Athenians to be good citizens. Citizenship was clearly delineated by the state, which was the fountain of all personal and social values.

However fully Plato might expound his metaphysical theory of a transcendent ideational realm, it becomes clear that for him no less than for Hegel 2,300 years later, it was the concrete political state in which the citizen found that realm of ideas becoming actualized, and within which all his values were derived. Plato appeals to Socrates for his notion of a priori knowledge, but in fact he makes the educational system responsible for so training the student that the latter conforms to what the law demands as if it were his nature to do so. Because knowledge is power, it is imperative that the transmission of the right knowledge be controlled by the state. For all practical purposes then, the state becomes the ontos, the essential being, from which the individual derives his being and which therefore dictates the value system which is to govern the individual's life.

But states do not govern; leaders must assume authority. In Plato's Republic, leadership was to be trained. The governing powers of Athens, however, paid little attention to Plato's plan, nor has any society since. Kings, dictators or other officials have assumed power and in many situations declared (as with Louis the XIV of France) that they embodied the state in their own persons. Assuming such identity of leader and state, Machiavelli outlined, in The Prince, and The Discourses, a specific rationale for enforcing the principle, and inferred that because ruler and state are the creators of the law, they are above the law and thus above morality. The line from Machiavelli to the educational policies of Mussolini's Italy, structured and enforced by Giovanni Gentile, is sufficiently evident.

II.

Since Rousseau, there have been many who have rejected the state as the rightful context for man's developing value systems, and have looked to nature. But Rousseau was not the first; the ancient Pythagorus had drawn a distinction between the values established by Cosmic Mind and those derived by men in their societies, and held that moral goodness, derived from Cosmic Mind, was most clearly revealed in natural law. Cicero taught that "true law" or the laws of morality, are those derived from reason consonant with nature. In the 17th century, Hugo Grotius, often called "the father of the Natural Law theory," held that human reason participates in the Divine Mind to the extent that it is consonant with nature.

The problem with making Nature the ultimate reality, the ontos of man's habitation, becomes clear when one examines the conflict between "survival of the fittest" as a law of nature, and the concept of justice which would accord the weakest member of the group equal rights with the strongest. Tennyson observed that "nature is red in fang and claw," and provides little helpful guidance in concerns that matter most for the preservation of a civilization. Furthermore, the way in which the natural law concept accommodates itself to the desires of those invoking it, makes it particularly suspect. The "divine right of Kings," claimed its authority in one century, while the leaders of the French Revolution claimed it in the next to justify abolishing the monarchy. Depending on one's definition of "nature" one can justify ignoring the sufferings of the weak, as did the ancient Romans, or on the other hand affirm the right of the weak to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Bertrand Russell said it well when he cautioned against a "superstitious reverence for nature," for nature is not a thing-in-itself, but simply a term for the way things are . . . and that includes the fact that one day all nature will run down, and the universe will collapse in ruin.

III.

If one chooses to have nature or the state to be his ultimate reality, the ontos from which his values derive, he may do so, and the educational system he creates will tend to communicate and enforce those values. But if one has misgivings about the results, as did Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, he must reconsider his ontology. In his book, The Common Law, Holmes denied that the law is a system of reason or a deduction from natural law, asserting that law is "what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious." Nevertheless, his most common posture with regard to the decisions of colleagues on the bench was heard in his familiar: "Justice Holmes dissents." He knew of the ambiguities of natural law, and the potential tyrannies of the state, and saw the danger in assuming that law and justice are synonymous. Beyond the law, writes John Hallowell, in his book, Main Currents in Modern Political Thought, mankind will find redemption from tyranny only through faith in God. (6)

Hallowell is not a theologian, nor does he provide any guidelines by which a school system might effect a buttoning-on place between faith and action. But his suggestion is not without historic precedent. In ancient Israel, the very name for God, Yahweh, contains the root for the verb, "to be." In faith, the people of Israel recognized that their own being, as a people, was rooted in the being of God. Furthermore, their laws and indeed their whole moral, literary, and artistic life was governed by this concept that everything they did, all the values they lived by, everything they aspired to become, was under the Being, from whom all other beings derive. Ontology was for them no abstract philosophical matter, but a living encounter with One whose righteous judgment conditioned their axiology.

One can make a case for the argument that the Judaeo-Christian tradition itself is the fountainhead of Western Civilization's value system, and trace the religious influence from the educational practice of the Hebrew people before the Christian era, through the rise of universities in the Middle Ages, the public school concepts of Luther and Calvin to the establishment of schools in Colonial America including both grammar schools and the first major universities, and down to the present. As Alfred Nord Whitehead pointed out in his book The Aims of Education, ". . . the essence of education is that it be religious . . ." not in the narrow institutional sense but in aspect that it binds mankind back to the roots of our humanity in culture, history and faith.

Even in a pluralistic society where the Supreme Court has wisely acted to prevent sectarian favoritism, it is well to recall that the court has not forbidden a proper academic study of religion. The question for modern public education becomes, as President Howard Jefferson, of Clark University expressed it: ". . . not whether religion and liberal education are compatible, but whether an education which excludes religion can be truly liberal. (7) Liberal education has never been possible in any real sense where the value orientation of religious faith has been denied. If in the name of objectivity, we refuse to let it be known what values we uphold then, and Swarthmore's President Courtney Smith has written: "Students will graduate from school with the feeling that values don't count for much . . . They'll balk at religious, or moral, or ethical, or political commitment, or stake everything on getting ahead which will always be viewed in a materialistic way." (8)

IV.

It seems quite clear that organized religion in our pluralistic society is not palatable to everyone, and we can be grateful that those who framed the Constitution and Bill of Rights, even though they were for the most part religious men themselves, safeguarded the right to seek other paths. It remains therefore for each person to choose what will be for him the ultimate loyalty; the reality from which his other values derive. I believe it was Albert Schweitzer who said that if a man will not have Jehovah as his God he will have either the state or the blind forces of nature as his master. It is not really possible either psychologically or socially for the self-styled individualist to maintain his autonomy for long. He holds his privileges of choice only because others in his society have granted them, as any political scientist, aware of conditions in many other nations, can verify. One does not have to be a Skinnerian to acknowledge that much of what we are and choose to become have their roots in conditions of our familial and social environment. Even as taxpaying and law-constrained citizens, our range of personal deliberations remain severely narrowed.

Yet there are possibilities within the interstices, so to speak, where value determinations are required of us. For many of these, as the Nuremberg trials so painfully underscored, we must take personal responsibility; no appeal to nature or to prior state requirements suffice to diminish culpability. In crisis situations, if our responses are to be judged, we must be able to rely on an axiological system deeply rooted in an order that transcends both nature and the state. It is that Order, that Reality about which we must be clear; it is that ontos which we will have chosen. In a world gasping for leadership that can be trusted, it becomes the special challenge of teachers and philosophers to make that choice wisely and without equivocation. "If the trumpet sounds an uncertain tone, who will follow?"

Your choice, and mine, not only for ourselves but for those who call us teacher, may yet have enduring significance.

Documentations.

1. Ortega y Gassett, Jose, *The Revolt of the Masses*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1932.

2. Lippmann, Walter, "The State of Education Today" in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, VII, January 15, 1941.

3. Mumford, Lewis, *The Conduct of Life*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1951, p. 154.

4. Illich, Ivan, "After Deschooling, What?" *Social Policy* Vol. 2, No. 3 (Sept-Oct.), New York: Social Policy Corporation, 1971.

5. Allen, Dwight, "What the Future of Education Might Be" in *The Future of Education 1975-2000*, Theodore Hipple, Editor, Pacific Palisades, Goodyear Publishing Company, 1974.

6. Hallowell, John H., *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought*, New York: Henry Holt, 1950, p. 651.

7. Quoted in "Education, Christian and Liberal," by Phillip Moulton, *The Christian Century* (April 21, 1954), p. 489.

8. Smith, Courtney C., "Contributions of Quakerism to Education" in *The Westonian*, Vol. 62, No. 3, p. 6.

CHAPTER 26.

THE DIRECTION OF THE ARROW: AXIOLOGY IN CRISIS.

DAROLD R. BECKMAN.

Speeches, articles, and commentaries on philosophy of education often remind one of the chorus background in a play by the Greek comic Aristophanes, or perhaps a parallel with Aeschylus is more appropriate because the fate of education takes on such tragic proportions. The chorus always has a poetic lilt, a cacophony of sound, and a message and interaction with the real players on the stage, as though it were in communication with the gods. So it is with the self-appointed philosophers of education who presume an aura of divinity while they prognosticate, analyze, or evaluate. This semi-isolation of the professional philosophers of education (despite any earlier apprenticeship, if luck had it so, as public school administrators or classroom teachers) serves as both their strength and weakness. On the one hand, dedication to the discipline without the cross-currents of teacher politics, pupil welfare and control, public criticism, and administrative pressure reinforces the belief, real or imagined, in personal objectivity. On the other hand, the development of the philosopher, like the process of deification, can lead to delusions about one's self and the role of the discipline.

Of course, it may be argued that the professional philosopher is still rooted in the American experience: his goals merge with the varied social and economic goals of the culture and his mood reflects the joys, sorrows, and aspirations of the general educational world. Perhaps it is only the precious phraseology and exotic vocabulary that sets aside this professional being. Common men have historically been intrigued by exalted styles and our professional philosopher comports himself with catholic grandeur, bordering frequently on the mystic. Suddenly it comes as a shock to the philosopher that the reverence has been lost and few are seeking atonement or rejuvenation at the fountainhead of philosophy of education.

Certain recent trends in teacher certification and graduate degree requirements verify that the study of philosophy of education does not command great attention. Likewise, the contempt for theory among teachers and teacher candidates rages like wildfire, scorching all intellectual activity except the "practical." Now, if the philosophizing of the past era has been nothing but academic claptrap, one can shrug off the trends as the working of sweet justice. However, if the growing mood is primarily one of obscurantism, of hatred for all theory, then we need clearer perspectives on the utility of theory, more significant goals in education, and more meaningful value study.

One of the most exasperating philosophical experiences of the young educator is to encounter the professional who tells him that philosophy does not make value judgments, that it can only deal with value statements analytically and impassionately. This is confusing and disorienting advice to the young black or Chicano person just beginning to develop pride in his culture. It is tepid inspiration to the concerned ecologist who sees earth's clear air and rich soil being poisoned daily by the value-blind polluters. It is received with contempt by the lover of mankind committed to fighting the economic problems of poverty and the international problems of political injustice.

The condition of education in the public schools is one in which facts and skills reign supreme, while value judgments and thoughtful decision-making cower in the shadows of the curriculum. Technical training, whether in the primary aspects of reading and mathematics or the advanced areas of chemistry or business machines, can deal happily with limited controversies over teaching because it does not have to square off with the tender issues of ethical involvement.

The historical reasons for this condition are complex but not ambiguous. First, in the late 1940s and 1950s the status of academic freedom was under frightful attack from congressional investigators with perverted interpretations of "loyalty" and "Americanism." Major professional organizations, such as the AAUP and NEA were even slow to mount a counter-attack. Teacher fears of public criticism or dismissal over sensitive topics sterilized the curriculum, especially on issues of racism, evolution, socialism, world peace and atomic diplomacy, the nature of capitalism, and religious values.

A second reason for the low value-profile of public education has been the relatively stable economic growth of the nation from 1940 to 1973 with only temporary and slight cyclical declines in business activity. The one major world war and the two Asian military involvements in this period, while adversely affecting the lives of many Americans, did not restrain industrial development and were not fought on native soil. Consequently, the middle classes who dominated the boards of education saw to it that the schools concentrated on subject matter seemingly beneficial to the continuing sovereignty of a profit-based technological society. Administrative controls focused attention on making the classrooms more efficient purveyors of knowledge and superintendents campaigned for office under slogans that mocked the child-centered curriculum and satirized the social-problems approach to learning.

The third reason for apathetic behavior in the realm of value study has been the lure of the technological mystique itself and all its attractive psychological rationalizations. New forms of behaviorism emerged in the past two decades. Programmed learning, computer-based instruction, multi-media centers, and individualized audio-visual lessons swept into the schools combining technical elegance with sophistry to establish frequently a specious concept of educational progress. Not surprisingly teachers found in this push-button instruction an alternative to the disciplinary problems of group learning. Thus, some teachers dispersed their reading circles in favor of isolated carrels with head-phones and screens to block inter-action. In essence, technology could have adapted to varied forms of instruction, including value studies, but software producers found the largest and most profitable markets in non-controversial factual type materials.

A fourth reason for paucity of ethical concern probably is found in schools of teacher education. Theodore Brameld blamed it on the weak background frequently obtained by the teacher candidates in the behavioral sciences, and especially in anthropology. Sociologists, political scientists, and economists would argue the neglect of their respective disciplines contributes to weaknesses in adequate axiological competence in the social sciences. Obviously formal course study bears some weight in the development of young people, but the paths to social consciousness and ethical concern are unpredictable for individuals. For one person the professor of medieval literature may open the heart and mind to the universal problems of mankind. Another student may find an intelligent lecturer on modern political forces failed to stimulate him or unlock any of the social enigmas. In a large sense the emergence of value positions is personal and emotional. The college teacher whose ideas evoke the passions either of love or anger may be producing a value-oriented individual. The university instructor who causes students to face issues, to probe their own value assumptions, and to seek just action also is stirring up the waters where the currents of virtue flow. Any school of education that stakes all on logical analysis, intellectual understanding, and technical know-how has missed the human path to teacher preparation in the realm of values.

A fifth factor in our listing of reasons is professional leadership. Curriculum change at any period can move in a multitude of directions. In the late fifties and sixties when the civil rights movement was gathering momentum professional organizations had the power to effect some of the changes. It was to the credit of the American Federation of Teachers that it sponsored "freedom schools" when certain boards of education shut the doors to their public schools to prevent desegregation. Bicultural, bilingual education has met some of the needs of Chicano young people because the California Teachers Association was moved to listen to urgent demands and initiate practical steps. The national leadership of the National Teachers Association was seeking cultural detent with the Soviet Union before the Nixon-Kissinger travels to Moscow. Professional educational associations have not always been in the forefront of movements to sponsor significant social value changes. The point is that unless they show leadership in reflecting the pressures in society the profession itself can hardly be expected to follow suit.

The above only enumerates some of the reasons for the low status of value education in the schools. The concerned individual sometimes attempts to survey the panoply of problems that besets our world and becomes overwhelmed by the gargantuan tasks. How do you spark a sense of beauty in the inner city child who breathes daily the garbage smells from the empty broken-bottle lot beside his seamy tenement and is hypnotized by the colorless concrete and dingy brink of his surroundings? How do you soothe the revenge feelings stirred by ethnic conflicts in the community? How do you compete with the lack of human feeling that has grown out of a televised fantasy world of violence, callous action, and insensitive human behavior? How do you promote concepts of justice when Attica looms in the background to presidential pardons? How do you teach family relations when a third of the classroom has not had the experience of a father figure? How do you raise the dignity of women when machismo is vehemently promoted at home? It is not one problem alone that frustrates teachers. It is the whole set of problems which acts like a hydra-headed monster defying victory.

There is a rising tide of humanist concern among educators. That has become increasingly noticeable for almost a decade. It was apparent in the switch from team teaching to open classrooms wherein the focus of new teaching structures moved from efficiency in teaching to love and respect of pupils. The humanist mood also blossomed in the curricula response to minorities, the emotionally handicapped and mentally gifted. Strangely, however, this personalism has found favor in an era of reduced school budgets and billions of federally impounded funds. Perhaps the sudden decline in the mobility of teachers in the past three years has contributed to more firmly rooted faculties.

At any rate the intensified economic crises facing the profession of education generally has now set the axiological crisis in a more prominent position. The Watergate years of 1973 and 1974 opened up the hornets' nest of unethical behavior. We now ponder over the "dirty tricks" that have been done to the education of segments of the population. We wonder whether the failure to use legally appropriated funds was actually a "rip-off" by the vested interests and the so-called "inflationary" justification for the impoundment was just another cover-up operation. Our skepticism rides the whirlwind of discontent.

It is not a time for schools to create a tablet of Commandments for teachers and pupils to follow. But the direction of the arrow for the profession of education needs to be reset. For too long the study and discussion of values that affect the fabric of our lives have been neglected or been given token attention. The terms "personal respect," "democratic humanism," "human justice," and "virtuous behavior" need to be combined with real problems of rural youth, city kids, blacks, unemployed young people, and law-defying delinquents. Studies should focus on the value problems of uses of science as well as the comprehension of scientific data. Art, music, dance, and drama (too often the victims of budget cuts) need to flourish again in the curriculum spotlight.

The ideal of the "liberated" student has been posed in recent times. This concept is riddled with ambiguities. Since "liberated" means "to be set free from," one questions what the student has been freed from. Is it from teacher prescriptions, or from having to attend classes, or from established programs of study? The best assumption is that the "liberated" student is one who takes a hand in deciding his course of investigations and helps plan his own work. That requires a high degree of self-conscious activity and understanding of personal values. The "liberated" student is not formed overnight. It is thus with the goal of creating the "liberated" student (and later the self-directed citizen) that we recognize the profound basis for a renewed direction toward value studies in the schools.

CHAPTER 27.

EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM IS TO OUGHT -- THE DIFFICULT RISE.

HUGH C. BLACK.

Can you believe this reality? "The most basic difficulty I've faced as a teacher is how to relate subject matter and method." So declared a Baltimore community college teacher as recently as May 1974! Amazingly, in the same issue of the prestigious educational journal (PHI DELTA KAPPAN, LV, No. 9) Arthur E. Salz of Queens College and Mortimer Smith of the Council for Basic Education continued a controversy over the "Truly Open Classroom" begun in the February 1974 issue (LV, No. 6, pp. 388-392). Salz declared himself in favor of educative experiences which are "exciting, joyful, challenging, and meaningful now" and which "enrich our lives for the future by leading us to new vistas." But Smith smashed out at this "lively corpse" of the "progressive education movement" which he labeled the "real revolution in American education." Smith declared:

"True education is based on the assumption that there is much learning that is essential for everyone to acquire. Civilization is built on common knowledge, common background, common interests. It cannot be built on the ignorance that would be the result of accepting Salz's contention that there is no body of knowledge that everyone needs . . . . what a starvation diet he is willing to accept!"

Surprisingly, the community college teacher rejected long since the extremist view in psychology of Skinner, on the one hand, and more recently that of Rogers, on the other. Both he and Salz seem to be grasping for educational philosophy as they refer to John Dewey.

Yes, I recognize such realities; for I weep of frustration at such examples of the disparity between the real and the ideal, the "is" and the "ought." I suffer when the editors of that same journal refuse to publish a review of a book making available for "leaders in Education" knowledge long possessed which should have got us beyond such debilitating controversy long ago. We ought to do better!

All of us suffer from the reality of educational philosophy declining, of our public schools faring less well than they should, and of too many lives being negated by aimlessness, fragmentariness, and vagueness when they should have been touched by the kind of education providing unity, completeness, and decisiveness. Available knowledge has not been brought to bear, and ideal education is in short supply as too many of us as educational philosophers have fallen far short of being those exemplary models of human excellence in living and educating we ought to be.

"Play up the new; reinterpret the old so it appears new and appealing; attack and tear down; misinterpret, pass over, or ignore what is known about education and the nature of the good, true, and beautiful." These realities lie behind the songs of self-aggrandizement of the Pied Pipers of Education who have taken us at an alarming rate from the 1950s through the 1960s and now to nearly mid-point of the 1970s. That way of reality and of what "is," I maintain as my thesis, will not do. This play on the new and the attention-getting has diverted us from seeing what our main problem is and knowing that rich resources from the Idealists are available in meeting our present need: the difficult rise from what "is" to what "ought" to be.

This presidential address seeks a partial explanation of our condition, a call to attack the problem from which we have been diverted, and a citation of "old" resources of knowledge. We ought, I maintain, rise from evil -- by which I mean the same as St. Augustine: the turning from the higher to the lower -- and advance on solid stepping-stones to even greater possibilities in our field. In this "old" message lies the truly "new."

I begin in the language of the "new." Twenty-four years now have passed since the event, but the "lived reality" the existentialists speak of still abides in "essence." At my father's funeral in the Methodist church he helped build in my hometown of Childress, Texas, I, the son, so badly wanted to take the place of the minister-friend and say what I thought "ought" to be said about the principles by which my father lived, which characterize him to me to this day, and which we would all profit from emulating and practicing. Whether he knew Immanual Kant from his studies at small Clarendon College or Southwestern University or even at all, I do not know. But I do know -- and wanted to tell -- that his life was for me a model and exemplification of what Kant meant by an ethics of duty and responsibility beyond oneself. For Hugh Shannon Black, a businessman in American culture, lived a moral life of service to others and acted on the basis of principle and out of respect for principle, a life of dutiful loyalty to what he knew as highest and best. I am thankful for that model of relating oneself morally and ethically to family, church, political party, public schools, and government. I am all the more grateful for that model in the light of the Nixon White House gang amorality of recent years and my own suffering experiences. I want to do what I can to transmit that ideal, an ideal of what ought to be, especially in educational philosophy and its contributions to the making of better men and women and a better society through better schooling. We ought to rise to a better making of "educated" men and women -- the "persons" always considered of first priority by Idealists.

I follow in the footsteps of oughtness of my father and of those I first trod some twenty years ago now when I began my presidential address to the Southwestern Philosophy of Education Society (in an appeal for more philosophy in education) with these words from the then popular Broadway play, "Teahouse of the August Moon" by John Patrick: "Not easy to learn.//Sometimes painful.//But pain makes man think.//Thought makes man wise.//Wisdom makes life endurable." That insight from the school of experience (another priority of Idealists) Aeschylus in fifth century B. C. Athens expressed immortally in Agamemnon (176-178): "Zeus, who guided men to think; who had laid it down that wisdom//comes alone through suffering." I share with you here some of my experiences of "pain" that we may gain wisdom to rise from what is to what ought to be.

I suffer pain from Donald Arnstine's "The Use of Coercion in Changing the Schools," the PES presidential address of 1973 (reproduced in EDUCATIONAL THEORY, 23, No. 4, Fall 1973, pp. 277-288). As I interpret his view (with its several oversimplifications and contradictions), he presents a model which stands as just the opposite of what my father lived and the entire tenor of Idealism in education points us toward. Characterizing our typical schools as formal organizations which he terms "bureaucracies," Arnstine "tells" us that their policies implement a "single, clear-cut goal:" "to keep children in school as long as possible." From neither them nor their representatives acting in their official capacities can we expect, says Arnstine, the kind of moral integrity represented by honesty, courage, considerateness, and sympathy. Toward them, he tells us, it is nonsense to speak of our having a moral obligation. To institute educational changes making "the rights and interests of individuals relevant to organizational decision-making," we must translate them "into pressures of one kind or another" and use coercion. ". . . There is nothing unethical," he writes, "and much that is practical, in the use of coercion as a means of educational change. Indeed, the only question to raise is how to organize it effectively in particular situations." He is sure (as a professed empiricist?) of the ABSOLUTE TRUTH AND RIGHTNESS of HIS answer to the how: anything goes and is justifiable! For I have heard him declare in effect: "If that bureaucratic 'formal organization' the California Legislature passes the Ryan Act, and it is a 'bad' act, then any action of ours to combat it -- no matter what or how evil -- is justified. In our response, we have no moral obligation."

The advocacy of coercion of the Arnstine kind in our relationships one to another leaves me fearful and frightened of what might come, for he has opened the window and out fly ethical considerations and morality. Have we advanced no further than White House "Plumbers" or Machiavelli, who so long ago in THE PRINCE attempted to divorce politics from ethics? Have we reached the point in our educational relationships that the wisdom from our heritage in the guiding ideal of "Deal strongly with oneself but gently with others!" no longer applies? I hope not.

From the pain of Arnstine's "re-interpretation" of old empiricism let us turn now to its opposite among the "new" trends. For I suffer equally from my own "lived reality" of "existentialism" in educational philosophy, which has come to me in two forms.

One has been a general compilation of everything under the sun and in life which everyone might consider to be good and worthy. That form has been called "existentialism." But for me it has little meaningful application in specific knowledge of what particular teachers must do with today's children to accomplish the results of good teaching. I am puzzled because I find in it no basis for differentiating out what is purely "existential." What I find good in it, I am already familiar with in the literature of Idealism. What I abhor about this form is the behavior of its proponents: their so often indifference to what ought to be, their non-involvement with bringing to bear knowledge of educational philosophy to the realities of the people's arguments over what education is and to teacher-education legislation.

The other form of existentialism I also judge in terms of the Fourth Gospel standard: "By their fruits ye shall know them." Perhaps my judgments about these espousers of "existentialism" are faulty and limited because I respond in terms of selfish reality rather than what ought to be when they tell me: "This Idealism and your writings have to do with the past; we have to find something new for today; this of yours will not do!" I respond out of puzzlement when in the next breath I am told by a long-ago disliker of John Dewey: "Perhaps John Dewey is the only real educational philosopher we have!" I can testify to the difficulty of the rise from the "is" to the "ought" at this point! From my Idealist teachers I know that concepts and ideas -- if truly known --

can be communicated in ordinary language. Yet I must live with those who would disregard that wisdom of old in their hurry to develop the "new" language of existential thought which we must learn if we would understand it and apply it to education. It is so difficult to listen when their actions and conduct mean to me little more than: "that is good which allows me to do what I want to satisfy my own needs, interests, and feelings." That from the advocate of "newness" is to me an "old" approach: a reaction to a rational approach to life. I suffer when they resist any application of Aristotle's law of non-contradiction and are (to me) inconsistent and unaccountable when they say, for example: "Don't hold _me_ responsible for what happened at that conference; _I_ don't _know_ what we agreed upon; _I_ am _not_ responsible." That is as old as Dewey's account of the irresponsible man in the 1897 THE STUDY OF ETHICS:

"Every bad man is (in the substantial sense) irresponsible; he cannot be counted upon in action, he is not certain, reliable, trustworthy. He does not respond to his duties, to his functions. . . . Irresponsibility is but another name for his lack of unity, of integrity; being divided within himself, he is unstable, we can never be sure of him, he is not sure of himself. . . . He is _capable_ of foreseeing consequences, and of having these foreseen consequences influence or modify his conduct. The person who fails in one respect or other of these factors is. . . . morally immature, and is not responsible."

While then emerging into his "new" instrumentalism in 1897, Dewey was still the Idealist when he said: "We are responsible for our deeds because they are ourselves. . . . I am myself, I am conscious of myself in my deeds, I am responsible, name not three facts, but one fact." Our present-day existentialists, I maintain, could profit from worthy Idealism -- even from Dewey and his emphasis on reflective thinking! I cannot see how they can approach responsibly our future tasks without recognizing reasoning and rationality. For they are involved in the problems we all are challenged to meet: anarchy vs. tyranny; change vs. stability; and reason, knowledge, and ideas vs. feelings, emotions, and doing. They ought, I believe, offer a needed counterpoint to the faddish analytic approach in an attempt to put together, to synthesize, to see education whole. But that has always been the emphasis and spirit of Idealism, and that is "old!"

Further pain and suffering are mine when I reflect on the "new" happenings stirred up by those who, unlike our existentialists, would avoid feelings and emotion and attempts at unity on any grand scale. These are the linguistic and/or conceptual analysis educational philosophers some of whom continue to pain me as thoroughly today as did

D. J. O'Connor a decade ago. Back in the spring 1963 issue of HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW he readily categorized and dismissed Robert Ulich's latest book as "urbane and cultured sermonizing in which factual generalizations, disguised recommendations, and metaphysical theories are mixed up together without any attempt to distinguish them or any attempt to warn the reader that they should be distinguished." And so these "Pied Pipers" have piped our new talents away from the old, the past into the limited "bare bones" of the analytical, linguistic, or conceptual analysis approach to educational philosophy. To me, their emphasis has been only on the first part of Goethe's classic injunction: "First, to divide; but, then, to unite!" Here in the Far Western regional society we may profit from a John Connely's use of the analytic approach for insights into the teaching of reading, or perhaps Robert Rossi shall make his contribution in applying this form of educational philosophy to measurement theories and testing-instruments. Or at the international level we may profit from the insights of R. S. Peters' "Education as Initiation." But I am pained because educators have too often been piped away from the significant insights of Idealism in education in "uniting" as well as "dividing." We suffer because too few of us know the 1958 statement of my teacher Frederick Eby:

"Education is a gradual initiation into life, the revealing of the nature and significance of life to the young. It is the observing and imitating of how men lived and are living. It gives concrete pictures of personalities who have experienced the highest values of human existence. It is an examination of the kind of life that is most worth living. Education assists the young to observe widely, analyze, and compare the various kinds and qualities of life so as to select those of greatest promise."

Educational philosophy and our schools suffer by the divorce between "history and philosophy of education" resulting in lack of that knowledge of culture and civilization which affords specific meanings to Eby's definition. This divorce gives us the evils in education stemming from the misinterpretations and narrow visions of the revisionist historians of education, especially when used by an Arnstine to support his position under the over-generalized disclaimer "if the history of education can be believed."

We ought to experience a rise from the bare bones of linguistic analysis, include the best of existentialism, and put it all together in the spirit of Meiklejohn's 1942 EDUCATION BETWEEN TWO WORLDS which I summarized in the concluding reading in THE GREAT EDUCATORS as "A Missing Chord in Educational Theory."

What is opens the door on an old reality: the self-aggrandizement songs of the Pied Pipers have shut out what might help us most -- the literature of Idealistic educational philosophy.

I. L. Kandel felt this keenly long ago in a sharing of his experience which Christopher J. Lucas affords us as recently as his 1969 Macmillan WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION? Kandel's "lived reality" was a 40 years in which American education suffered from domination of one philosophical approach -- pragmatism or empiricism. He felt that one approach had been pursued "almost as a theological cult" surrounded by a kind of sanctity so that "all other theories and their professors came to be regarded almost as profane." "Criticism of it," Kandel wrote, "was classed almost as blasphemy and critics were damned as traditionalists, perennialists, or essentialists, or even as out of touch with the American ethos." When I experience John Paul Strain's "Idealism: A Clarification of an Educational Philosophy" on pp. 135-146 of our 1973-74 PROCEEDINGS, I feel as frustrated today as Kandel must have felt. We should be above condemning through labeling!

Strain dismisses with evangelical fervor such Idealists in education as Herman Harrel Horne, J. Donald Butler, Theodore M. Greene, and Alexander Meiklejohn as "synthesizers." Amazingly, he identifies Idealism with Traditionalism, Essentialism, the Council for Basic Education, Religionists, and Absolutists! The "thought pattern," says Strain, goes back to Rosenkranz's THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (1848, 1886) which Horne in 1904 called "the classic text in philosophy of education" and the "'masterpiece' of Idealistic philosophy." But examination of Horne's statements in their full context reveals Strain's misinterpretations. For Horne, at the same time, also cited Herbert Spencer's ON EDUCATION of 1861 as "one of the most widely read and influential of the books on education of the last half-century." And those were progressive rather than traditional influences. Moreover, Horne criticized both for doing what "almost all of the theoretical treatises on the nature of education" do: "omit entirely the consideration of the nature of aesthetic education." In fact, Horne's statement (on pp. 12-13 of his 1904 THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION) does not reveal to me the Absolutist with all the answers which Strain would have us believe Idealists are:

"The education of the emotions, ending in the appreciative sense of the beautiful, is an unwritten chapter in educational theory. The explanation of this omission is doubtless the late recognition, beginning with Rousseau, accorded the feelings as real elements of psychic life. But there is no excuse for this omission from the point of view, either of the importance of the emotions in life, or of their fundamental place in the structure of body and mind of the individual. A new philosophy of education must supply this lack."

Today that chapter in educational theory remains unwritten. We are challenged to give up our diversions and face up to the problem set for us long ago by Horne and Dewey but even earlier by the writings of Kant: the problem of the rational and the emotional sides of our human nature.

In educational philosophy we must synthesize better two opposing approaches (over which the people have battled in every decade of this century) so that teachers will no longer find their chief difficulty in relating subject matter and method. Dewey brought it to a head in the year of my birth (1920) in his statement on pp. 84-87 of RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY (reprinted in Ch. 52 in THE GREAT EDUCATORS). Dewey felt that his new scientific formulation of the nature of experience based upon biology completely exploded the old psychology which had dominated philosophy. Instead of the intellectual, cognitive, knowledge factors of mind coming first and emotions, feelings, willing, and action following, Dewey reversed the picture. He emphasized life as behavior, activity, doing, and feeling -- from which may be derived knowledge and education. The Herbartian approach, on the other hand, emphasized the teacher's role in presenting ideas, knowledge, and experiences to formulate a "many-sidedness of interests" through apperception and a correlated curriculum drawing on the racial experiences recorded in history and literature. Its intention was morality: the forming of the right kind of person, one who could make good judgments and commit himself to right conduct and behavior. Recognizing Dewey's correctness, some of us, nevertheless, have not favored throwing out the Herbartian pedagogy. For it may still be best and most appropriate for older students of higher intellectual abilities for learning academic subject-matter under guidance from those with a wider perspective. We must somehow rise above mere "organisms" with "tendencies, impulses" acting to the "becoming" through teaching-learning situations of persons and selves who bring to bear knowledge of the true, good, and beautiful to the making of judgments, of judging aright. This is a call not only for analyses. It is a demand for analyses which lead to syntheses, as the Idealists have attempted from Plato to the present day of living in a world of the PLAYBOY philosophy! We must again and again, I say as my message, attempt to "put it together" to afford us a better society through better persons -- even as Sylvia Ashton-Warner attempted in her [illegible]972 SPEARPOINT: "TEACHER" IN AMERICA. Puzzled by the values of young children the product of permissiveness in society in an affluent open school in Colorado, she worked out organic teaching as a combination of the inner and the outer, activities at times drawing out the inner but also at times putting in from outside -- a "handing down of the culture." A more recent example of a suggestive synthesis comes from an Idealist in FWPES, Donald S. Seckinger, whose "The Significance of Didactic Learning," appeared in the January 1974 issue of INTELLECT on pp. 240-241.

Challenging you with our problem after trying to explain our diversions from it, I conclude on the positive note of suggesting knowledge-resources. I repeat that our problem in educational philosophy is still how to balance the informal and formal elements of schooling, the doing and knowing, the feeling and reasoning, the inner and the outer. The "is" is that our American people have affected our schools by arguing over such matters in simplistic, black-or-white, extreme terms. The result is that our communities, if you care enough to sound them out, are split over the old controversy: "Traditionalism" or "Progressivism." Our professional obligation is to face up to the realities of "the facts." Too many youth today are turned off by extremes. Authoritarian education they experience as meaningless in their lives, where it really "ought" to count. The opposite experiences of "laissez-faire," "progressive" education, they recognize, is not the answer. For that approach gives us irresponsible youth left free to follow in action their impulses and feelings of the moment. Today, I maintain, we need "beautiful" persons who have experienced an education raising them from selfishness -- "Mine! Mine!" shouts the selfish youngster -- to altruism -- the kind of person invisioned by Herbart and the learning-product theorists of education who bring knowledge, principles, and ideals to bear in "judging aright."

For what "ought" to be in a new philosophy of aesthetic education, I recommend the writings of several Idealists. Frederick Eby, very late in a long life, finally made available to us in the revised edition of THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EDUCATION (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952) his unwritten chapter in education: "The Restoration of Idealism." There he "puts together" the relationship between philosophers and educational reformers which he discovered in Schiller's "On the Sublime" and "Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man." This is the idea or ideal that man may become reasonable and rational and able to judge aright through the aesthetic -- the clue to making the inner the outer and the outer the inner which so concerned Pestalozzi and Froebel and, today, Sylvia Ashton-Warner. A new conception of mind by such Idealists at the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University as James Edwin Creighton is worth studying in his AN INTRODUCTORY LOGIC by Macmillan and in the writings of R. A. Tsanoff (my teacher at Rice University) and Susanne K. Langer. We need to touch base again with the rich resources in Langer's "Symbolic Transformation" chapter in PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY (reproduced in part in THE GREAT EDUCATORS). And we can ill afford to be ignorant of

289.

Langer's later work: MIND: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN FEELING (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).

We ought to profit still from such Idealistic masters in comparative education and history of education as I. L. Kandel and Robert Ulich, despite O'Connor's dismissal of the latter for his "urbane and cultured sermonizing." Our schools would be better today had we put into practice more of Ulich's great synthesis of the European and American approaches to secondary education available to us in his 1951 Beacon press CRISIS AND HOPE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION. Also unknown to today's educational philosophers is Henry C. Morrison's amazing synthesis in THE CURRICULUM OF THE COMMON SCHOOL of 1944 and his THE PRACTICE OF TEACHING IN THE SECONDARY SCHOOLS of 1926 and 1931. We ought to build on such compilations of practical school knowledge so that "learning-units" might be taught systematically and yet take into account individual differences to produce persons with intelligence, conscience, and taste who can "judge aright."

Our schools would have been prevented from disastrous swings from scientific, technological emphases to humanistic education had we brought to bear available knowledge from Idealists in providing truly liberal or general education. We can still profit from GENERAL EDUCATION IN A FREE SOCIETY — THE HARVARD REPORT. We must not be diverted from the knowledge in T. M. Greene (ed.), THE MEANING OF THE HUMANITIES (Princeton, 1938), LIBERAL EDUCATION RE-EXAMINED -- ITS ROLE IN A DEMOCRACY (Harper, 1943), or Greene's plan for liberal education summarized in Chapter IV of the Fifty-Fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education. Old? Yes, but I still think we can build on Greene's analysis which disclosed four basic skills of the liberally educated person which might be taught through four disciplines so that students might "catch" essential values. Today we need more attempts such as his to "put it together" in integral positions mediating between the two extremes he described: "religious and philosophical authoritarianism, on the one hand, and nihilistic skepticism, both secular and religious, on the other."

And then there is literature as a further resource for knowledge of what ought to be. Had we built on Idealism, rather than the attractive "new" diversions away from it, we would not today have to be reminded that our "proper study of mankind" is "the study of man" and his dealings with his world and himself and his human neighbors. We would have people living under the ideal, as Dostoevski put it in BROTHERS KARAMAZOV, "Everyone is really responsible to all men for all and everything," since, as John Donne put it earlier, no man can be an island unto himself, or as an older tradition put it: "I am a human being, so I cannot be indifferent to anything that has to do with human life and human nature."

We ought to have humility and sit on the shoulders of the giants of the past, whether a Walter Lippmann and ESSAYS IN THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY or Walter Jaeger and his PAIDEIA or Edith Hamilton and THE GREEK WAY. For we are capable of something more than the present "isness:" A diversity of individual opinion about the vital problems of education. We must learn the ideal of self-knowledge and self-restraint. We must learn to be sophos and "become" in our "being" those who so know ourselves as to understand our limits. We must become persons governed by medan agan -- "nothing to excess" -- willing to turn, as Socrates sought to direct his fellow Athenians, from the path of desire and appetite for wealth, fame, and prestige toward that fine balance: the "better" path of mind and spirit. As the founder of Idealism put it:

"Now, when all these studies reach the point of intercommunion and connection with one another, and come to be considered in their mutual affinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them have a value for our objects, otherwise there is no profit in them (Plato, REPUBLIC, VII, 531d)."

In the light of the model of the Idealist in educational philosophy let us continue to "put things together" so as to open doors on the human possibilities of what might yet be because of you and me and the difference we might make. That is the difficult rise from "is" to what "ought" to be. Let us get on with our tasks!

CHAPTER 28.

FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY IN EDUCATION.

STEPHEN L. ALLEY.

Recently there has been a spate of provocative articles in the professional journals about freedom or democracy in relation to education. (1) These articles generally have suffered from one or more of the following deficiencies:

1. There has been no really earnest attempt to link the concepts of freedom and democracy in relation to education.

2. There has been a prevalent misconception of democracy which has resulted in at least one spurious definition. (2)

3. There has been no adequate treatment of the problem of responsibility in relation to freedom and democracy.

This paper is intended to remedy these deficiencies.

I. Ethical Freedom.

A genuine advance in man's understanding of freedom has been made in our time. Contributions to this advance have come from several quarters. Existentialists have echoed Sartre's despairing realization that "nothing, absolutely nothing, justifies me in my choice of values." Sartre investigated the formula man is condemned to be free in several works: the essay on Mauriac's *La Fiu de la Nuit*, the great tragedy *Morts sans Sepultures* (published in America as *The Victors*), *Les Mouches*, *L'Age de Raison*, and even the large philosophical work, *Being and Nothingness*.

In The Age of Reason, there is this passage, "He was free, free for everything, free to act like an animal or like a machine, free for accepting, free for refusing, free for shuffling....He could do what he wanted to do, nobody had the right to advise him. There would be neither right nor wrong unless he invented them.... He was alone in a monstrous silence, free and alone, without help, without an excuse, condemned to decide without any possible recourse, condemned forever to be free." (3)

In the philosophical work, freedom is defined more carefully:

"Thus freedom is a lesser being which supposes being in order to elude it. It is not free not to exist or not to be free....naturally freedom is not this being in the sense of being-in-itself. But by freedom's illuminating insufficiencies in the light of the end chosen, *there is* this being which is its own....we said that freedom is not free not to be free and that it is not free not to exist. This is because the fact of not being able not to exist. This is because the fact of not being able not to be free is the *facticity* of freedom, and the fact of not being able not to exist is its *contingency*. Contingency and facticity are really one.... To exist as *the fact* of freedom or to have to be a being in the midst of the world are one and the same thing...." (4)

For Sartre this theory of freedom, so sketchily presented in these two excerpts, is the necessary condition of his theory of values, but it might be argued just as validly that it is derived from his atheism. If God does not exist, he supposes, then there are no commandments, no precepts, no hierarchy of values to guide him. But if there are no values underwritten by the cosmos then man has nothing to justify his preferences or repulsions or even the meanings he ascribes to things. There is nothing to legitimize his conduct. He stands in mortal aloneness in his choices, and assumes total responsibility for them. In the acts of choosing he creates his values, and these choices are made in freedom. The one choice wherein he has no choice is in the fact of decision itself. He has no choice except to choose. Not to choose is itself a choice. Man is condemned to be free.

Without a universal code of ethics by which he may be guided, without a scale of values guaranteed by a supra-natural being, without a hierarchy of values of universal validity, man stands in this dreadful freedom; *each man* chooses his ethics for himself. "For I am a man and each man has to invent his own way," says Orestes in *Les Mouches*. "I am condemned, condemned to have no law other than my own." (5)

One may violently disagree with Sartre's atheism -- as this writer does --

and still agree that he has most dramatically shown the truly awful character of freedom of choice.

The experimentalist Van Cleve Morris agrees with Sartre when he says that man is his freedom to become, and hence man cannot be defined. The moment you define man, you destroy his freedom to become something else, and thus you destroy man himself. The definition of man can have no other effect than to destroy the thing you wish to understand. (6) The paradox of philosophies is that every one of them "has endeavored to assert the freedom of man, but has ended up by either overlooking it or destroying it." (7)

Quandt is asserting the same axiological autonomy when she declares that "no longer can we depend on sacred custom or natural law to tell us who we are." (8)

Even Dewey in his attack on eternal verities and the quest for certainty was insisting on the fact of man's freedom to determine his own values. And Brameld and the reconstructionists, albeit confusedly, by implication and explicit assertion do likewise.

Of all these, only Sartre has discerned the true state of the world, the consequences of man's dreadful freedom.

When a man chooses for himself, he chooses for all men, says Sartre, thus accurately rephrasing Kant's categorical imperative in its just and pertinent form. Man thus accepts responsibility for his choices or he "flees his freedom." "My freedom needs the freedom of others;" and I must so act to preserve their freedom, or I destroy my own. And since I am my project, my freedom, I thus destroy myself.

Only on this immutable and dreadful facticity of freedom -- and the fact that I am not free not to choose -- can be firmly based a responsible axiology. Only by a kind of "bad faith" can a man avoid asking himself the Kantian (and Sartrean) question, "We should always ask ourselves: What would happen if everybody would do the same?"

II. Democracy.

Quandt has endeavored to describe democracy as just "one of several valid answers," and insists upon the rejection of "Those educational philosophies which would falsify our historical existency by denying the limited nature of the democratic way of life." In a lamentable bit of name-calling, she denies that "democracy is essentially a moral commitment," as the American Association of School Administrators defined it. (9) She labels "incomprehending self-righteousness" the Association's statement that democracy "is the story of man's long quest for justice, equity, righteousness, good conscience, and fair dealing..."

Deprived of its metaphysical validation, she says, the democratic pattern of values and institutions represent the projection of our destiny only by common consent.

No matter what one may think of the Association's utterances, one must note that in criticizing them, Mrs. Quandt ignores the fundamental characteristic of democracy, that it is "that form of social organization which must depend on personal character and moral autonomy." (10) In a brilliant analysis of democracy, Ralph Barton Perry noted that "the members of a democratic society cannot be wards of their betters; for there is no class of betters, but only a better part gathered from all the members," finding collective expression in the ultimate authority which is not strictly opinion, but an interested attitude, a being for or against. This attitude is judged by moral standards as good will or ill will, and by cognitive standards as mediated by truth or error. (11)

Perry makes these additional points:

1. Democracy is especially concerned with standards. The besetting weakness of democracy is the debasing of standards to the level of the mass; to prevent this its first educational duty is a clear, uncompromising definition of standards.

2. Democratic education is a peculiar ambitious education. The system itself, which determines what places there are to fill, shall be created by the men who fill them.

3. Thus education for democracy implies the development of a capacity for self-determination.

If we accept Perry's analysis, and if we accept the facticity of man's freedom as set forth by Sartre, -- and I think we can deny either of these only through the most frivolous caprice -- then democracy and its distinguishing characteristic of self-determination must be seen to be anchored in the elemental, basic fact of freedom. To insist that rival systems are equally valid is either to deny an elemental fact or to imply that the rival systems develop the capacity for self-determination as well as does democracy. Such an implication is by no means proven, and events of the past fifty years seem to prove exactly the opposite.

In the development of a capacity for self-determination, then, democracy and freedom join, and are seen to be one.

Now this would seem to imply complete axiological relativism. Freedom as the first condition for the development of self, and a capacity for self-determination as the first moral goal of education for democracy have both been insisted upon. As a matter of fact, it is exactly the opposite. The development of values is nurtured through the exercise of moral responsibility. Freedom and responsibility are two sides of the same coin. One can not talk of one without the other. Whoever ventures to try runs the danger of showing his ignorance of both.

Democracy might be defined then, as "that set of political and social circumstance which best serves the development of a capacity for self-determination, at the same time best protecting the interests of all concerned." It is readily seen that democracy has very little to do with equality, excepting that all men are equal in a moral sense. It is readily seen that democracy has everything to do with institutional interests, insofar as institutions are expressions of the collective interested attitude. Here is advocated in short, a return to the concept of democracy held by Jefferson, who distrusted government by the people and who certainly would have been horrified at the naive and mistaken equation of equality with democracy with freedom. I suppose that we must say finally with Walt Whitman that democracy "is a word the real gist of which still sleeps, quite unawakened.... It is a treat word whose history I suppose remains unwritten because that history has yet to be enacted."

III. Responsibility.

In the acceptance of self-determinations, or freedom, there is the implied acceptance of responsibility. Sartre says, "My freedom needs the freedom of others," and thus my freedom is circumscribed by the freedom of others. This is a real limitation upon my freedom, but it only points up my responsibility to others. Only through my enhancing their freedom can I enhance my own and remove the limitation which their freedom sets upon mine.

This is very close to the social psychologist's explication of morality. It means, so he tells us, "The incorporation of a person into his social environment, achieved by the active understanding of reciprocal relationships and obligations to other persons."

This explication is only a muted, impersonalized reiteration of the existentialist's sharp insistence on the awful consequences of freedom, the responsibility of one's choices when one chooses for all men as he does in his acts of choice.

There are two facts concerning this assumption of responsibility: One is that the development of a capacity of self-determination is dependent upon it. A personality does not develop in isolation. Its development occurs only through trans-personal contacts, and the ethical personality develops only through those trans-personal contacts in which the individual assumes responsibility for his acts of choice. In many discussions of axiology, there is a tendency to make "ethical" almost synonymous with "responsible."

The other fact is that basic moral principles themselves as they appear to the community are modified by the creative, moral judgment. The moral process is interactive, dynamic. It is, in short, educative.

Summary.

The capacity of self-determination is forged of the chain of freedom and responsibility. They are the very stuff of self-determination, which in turn is interdependent with a democratic milieu.

Documentations.

1. A partial list: "Freedom in Student Activities," and Van Cleve Morris, "Freedom and Choice in Educative Process," both in Educational Theory, Oct., 1958; Jean B. Quandt, "The Role of Democratic Values in Educational Philosophy," Harvard Educational Review, Spring, 1958.

2. Quandt, op. cit.

297.

3. L'Age de Raison, p. 249.

4. Being and Nothingness, Translated by Hazel Barnes. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1956.

5. Les Mouches, pp. 100-101.

6. Morris, op. cit., p. 235.

7. Ibid.

8. Quandt, op. cit.

9. American Association of School Administrators, Educating for American Citizenship. Thirty-Second yearbook. Washington, D. C.: the Association, 1954, p. 42.

10. Ralph Barton Perry, "Education and the Science of Education," Philosophy and Education. Ed. Israel Scheffler. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1958, pp. 26-27.

11. Ibid.

CHAPTER 29.

PHILOSOPHY AND TEACHER EDUCATION.

LEROY F. TROUTNER.

Ages-old and simple though my thesis may be, its restatement and re-examination here should be helpful. Briefly stated, the claim is made that a study of philosophy, the result of which involves the student in a critical analysis of his own beliefs, may contribute more to good, effective teaching than any other single study. This is so because the clarification of beliefs which should result from such a study will help to develop a more balanced, autonomous personality as well as a more profound, perspective-wise thinker. It may be helpful to keep in mind that these claimed benefits operate on two different but related levels, in the becoming of a person and in the ideational realm of thinking about education. An auxiliary notion running through the entire paper is the contention that since you cannot separate the teaching act from the person doing the teaching, anything that contributes to the becoming of a better person contributes to the becoming of a better teacher. That the study of philosophy will make such a contribution is predicated upon the conviction that there exists a positive connection between critical thinking and the good life. Please note that I am not making this claim for a study of the philosophy of education nor any of the more technical philosophies that are so much in vogue today but for a study of philosophy as originally viewed by the Greeks.

Some may feel that simple and old ideas are not proper topics for philosophical thought. Others feel that the age-old problems in philosophy, which have proved so resistant to final answers, should be set aside in favor of the so-called "new" and more technical problems that are more amenable to precise answers. Certainly the latter seems to be the trend in philosophical circles today. We are anxious for answers that are exact, explicit, and, if possible, measurable. So why should we plague ourselves with such ancient questions as "What is the good life?" -- questions that, although resilient in terms of providing fresh insights for each new generation, seem to defy any clear-cut resolution?

If one feels compelled to answer this question, I would answer by saying: "We should so plague ourselves because the simplest ideas in life are the most pervasive and fundamental." "What is the good?" "What is man?" "What does it mean to know?" -- these "simplest" questions rather than the highly technical inquiries of the day are the most difficult to understand. Being the most substantive, they are the oldest; being the most profound, they are the most difficult. But being the most substantive and the most profound, they are also the most important. Furthermore, they infuse all areas of life including the educational. I will argue that because of the ideational entailment future educators would do well to ground their thinking in these more substantive concerns. A study of philosophy as traditionally conceived should help to provide such a ground.

In order to understand the full significance of this thesis, it should be emphasized that in this un-modern context we will be speaking of education in its more generic meaning. As a result of the specialization of knowledge, we tend to think of education as that something which we "see" happening in the classrooms throughout the nation, particularly as that part of schooling that has been formalized in the teaching act, the methods of teaching, the content of teaching, etc.; but obviously, this is only a small part of education. When we view education from this narrow perspective with our major concern focused on the obvious part that can be seen with the naked eye, it resembles an iceberg. But, as everyone knows, it is the larger, more foundational part of the iceberg that is its most vital center -- the foundational part that one disregards at one's peril.

Although as educators we might like to think otherwise, education is like an iceberg because so much of it is covert. Despite the spectacular advances in science, just exactly what happens in the development and formation of a personality is still largely a mystery. Much of the information about character and personality development which we claim to be real knowledge of the "becoming" of a person merely reflects the Great Pretension that is our age. We pretend to know in so many areas where in fact we do not know. We are so blinded by the light rays of "progress" that we fail to perceive the shadows of half-truths and ignorance.

We often talk as though we really know how the school influences the growth and development of Johnny's personality, mainly, I presume, because we claim to know what Mrs. Jones is teaching Johnny. Besides the teaching of certain subject areas she is also instructing in such values as cooperation, hard work, and punctuality. But the question that is really relevant is not what Mrs. Jones is teaching but what Johnny is learning. And although we would hope that there is a substantial correlation between these two aspects of the teaching act, the point of the matter is that we do not know what this correlation is until we know Mrs. Jones as a person. More to the point, no one will really know until Mrs. Jones knows herself and what her influence as a person is upon her students.

Still, let me hasten to add, the lack of knowledge and especially the lack of awareness in this area in no way detracts from its importance. In fact such blindness only adds to the significance of this hidden education. The child is developing his character and personality every waking moment of his life, inside of class and out, whether we know it or not; and we as teachers -- more importantly we as concrete existing individuals -- who stand up in front of the class are by "being-there" influencing that development for good or ill. What we are as individuals may have far more lasting educational significance than what we teach -- if in fact the two can be separated in any other way than logically. In the case of the teacher no less than the parent, education by "being-there" is a very powerful force; and like the iceberg, we ignore this part of our instruction at our peril.

The fact that we cannot separate the activity of teaching from the living presence of the person who is doing the teaching (except of course when the knowledge is transmitted by a machine) leads us to one final caveat before our consideration of that special kind of teacher education called philosophy. We often talk as though a teacher should be impartial in his attitude toward his students as well as to the ideas, particularly the controversial ones, that he presents. This implies the possibility of separating the activity of teaching from the person who does the teaching, possibly through the medium of role playing. It also implies a profound ignorance of the nature of being human. A teacher is a person; and as a person, he or she is biased because to be human is to be biased. To be human is to possess certain attitudinal predispositions to thought and action. We cannot be free from biases, nor should we want to be free from prejudices unless we want to be free from our humanity. Existing man is a living bias, and to reject his bias is to reject his life. Only machines are free from bias. But to say this is not to tie our hands and say we cannot make judgments as to the probity of a certain mode of living our biases over another mode. Much as water is purified when exposed to the light of the sun so too will personal biases and predispositions to thought and action be purified when exposed to the light of critical thought. It is not that teachers can or should be freed from their biases or beliefs, but rather we are recommending that the prejudiced value configurations of teachers as human beings be exposed to the light of consciousness and then purified (in the sense of "reconstructed") through the process of a continuing exposure to critical thought. This is philosophy as originally conceived by the Greeks. Socrates was probably the first to see clearly this intimate connection between philosophy, learning, and living. (1)

This is the heart of the argument. Now it may well be true that there exists an intermediary step between beliefs and behavior. It may be that our beliefs influence what might be called our attitudinal predisposition to act or think in a certain way which in turn affects our behavior; but this does not affect the main point. There must be a connection between beliefs and behavior; otherwise the whole history of western thought stands for nothing; otherwise the whole history of education stands for nothing. The assumption underlying all intellection and education is the notion that it is better to believe in the sense of knowing than to be unable to believe due to ignorance. Knowledge is better than ignorance. Why? Because knowledge somehow illuminates the path to a better life. To take thought is to perform on the highest level of which man is capable. To know also leads to greater control over ourselves and our environment. For whatever reasons, ever since Socrates and Plato first revealed the connection between knowledge and the good, western man has assumed that the process of knowing will result in leading into that which is better, whereas ignorance is a leading away from that which is good. Whether our beliefs are _apriori_ certain or only probable, whether our ideas are viewed as tools to be discarded when no longer useful, makes little difference. Our beliefs about beliefs are still beliefs and, furthermore, they influence our behavior.

Examples of beliefs and their consequences on behavior are legion. Suppose a husband believes his wife to be unfaithful, or a child believes his parents hate each other. Suppose you believe that the Aryan race is the master race, or the white to be superior to the Negro. Suppose you believe, as Soren Kierkegaard did, that the sins of the father shall be visited upon the son. Or suppose you believe that everyone hates you. There seems to be little doubt of the influence of these beliefs upon behavior. Now let us take a belief that appears to be inextricably connected with our cultural conditioning, i.e., our perspective of time. Obviously the temporality configuration of people varies; it varies from culture to culture, for example compare the Aristotelian with the Heideggerian; it varies with the age of the person, for example compare a teen-ager's view of death with that of a man of eighty. Now we seem to be conditioned to a certain type of temporal response by our culture, our epoch, and our age. But the point is that we can become aware of the conditioning factors, and in becoming aware we can go one step further and decide whether or not this is in fact the temporal response we really want. So although we may have been originally conditioned to a particular temporal perspective, by taking thought we can even modify a behavioral response that is almost as close to us as is the skin itself.

Where do we get our beliefs? Any classification list is necessarily arbitrary; but of one thing we can be quite certain: most of our beliefs are acquired through authority. At one time or another our parents, an older brother or sister, certain ministers and teachers, represent an authority from whom we accept beliefs. And then there is the printed page. It has always amazed me how the most ordinary ideas and commands take on such dignity and worth when found on the printed page. Unfortunately, the purpose of most formal education consists of getting students to accept beliefs on authority. A course in philosophy, I claim, should result in a different kind of education which would act as a corrective to much of the instruction by authority that we find today. A philosophy course should lead students to a critical analysis of their own beliefs. We also get some of our beliefs from immediate experience, although the number of beliefs so derived is probably quite limited. Finally, some beliefs are obtained through impulse, i.e., through desires, bodily states, emotions -- the whole conative side of our life. But we are not nearly so concerned with where we get our beliefs as with what we do with our beliefs. The philosopher knows that the process of accepting these beliefs on authority, immediate experience, or impulse may involve thought, but what he is primarily interested in is critical thought. Ordinarily we think critically about our beliefs only when they get us into trouble. But this is not philosophy. Philosophy is the deliberate attempt to criticize beliefs without waiting for the belief to get one into trouble. It represents a systematic attempt to reconstruct one's beliefs through critical thinking. Here you ask for the credentials of your beliefs: "What is the justification for holding to such a belief?" "Why, in the light of my more recent experience, should I continue to hold such a belief?"

Philosophy may begin with any questioning; but after beginning with the question why, it proceeds either of two ways, i.e., through a critical analysis or a critical synthesis. The former involves a clarification of beliefs through an investigation of their assumptions and their relationships to other beliefs while the latter involves an attempt to synthesize and harmonize a given cluster of beliefs. These two functions of philosophy, which incidentally can only be separated logically, are possible because all beliefs presuppose something and all are found in relation to other beliefs. In the context of the living individual, beliefs or ideas do not stand alone, discrete and single. At least criticized beliefs are only meaningful when viewed in relation to other beliefs. As a result we are not clear in our beliefs if we are not clear in the presuppositions and interconnectedness of our beliefs. What philosophy asks is that we take our beliefs and push them back and down as far as possible by noting their assumptions and their consequences.

Let us note two examples.

Suppose we subscribe to the policy that all second graders should come up to a certain minimum grade in reading before being promoted to the third grade. What is being assumed in this policy? For one thing we are saying that the minimum standard below which the child will fail is a good standard. Otherwise why did we choose it? This leads to the question of what is a good standard? Who is the authority? Who has the right to say that Johnny will fail if he does not achieve the minimum standard? What are the criteria used to determine the standard? Here we are also assuming that one standard is appropriate for all children. Also we are consciously or unconsciously subscribing to the proposition that reading achievement is more important than social adjustment. At least this is a consequence of holding to a minimum standard for reading. Then, too, how does one resolve the problem as to blame if the child is not up to standard? Is it the child's fault or the teacher's fault? This seems to involve a moral problem. (2)

Or take, for example, Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz's inference that maybe we should pull the children of economically underprivileged parents out of the home and place them in school at the age of three rather than six. (3) What are the consequences and presuppositions of such a belief? It seems to me that anyone who analyzes this educational question fully will be forced inevitably to consider three major philosophical questions: what is the nature of man, what is the nature of change, and what is the nature of morality, as well as a host of considerations in political and social philosophy.

Now much of this may sound very elemental, but the point is that on two levels philosophy and education flow together naturally becoming a part of the same process: in living, philosophizing becomes the education of a life; in ideation, educational concerns become philosophical concerns. Furthermore, it is here being contended that on both levels the study of philosophy can help one become a better teacher. More specifically, on the first level to philosophize will help a person become a more autonomous individual and a more harmonious personality.

A philosophical analysis will help to clarify our beliefs, and in this process the belief will either be discarded or become our own. It is only to the extent that we have subjected our beliefs to a critical analysis that we can claim them to be our very own. Otherwise our behavior is largely an automatic response to ideas we have accepted on authority. It is no doubt true that much of behavior is the result of conditioning; but it is only to the extent that we live our criticized beliefs that we can claim the moral autonomy of an authentic individual.

A philosophical synthesis also has important consequences of a practical nature for those who are willing to practice it. As you consider the patterning and the relationships of your beliefs one to another, you will at the same time find yourself concerned with building a consistent set of beliefs. Why? Because there is something about the nature of being human that seems to compel us to try to order our world, and our beliefs are a part of our "being-in-the-world." In this process we will tend to harmonize our personalities. Of course there is nothing inevitable about this. But it does seem to follow that when we think things through and harmonize our beliefs we tend, at the same time, to harmonize our attitudes.

A more harmonious and autonomous personality that has been gained through a critical evaluation of one's beliefs is not the result of one action at one time in one's life. Rather it is a continuing process that never ends. In fact, it is a way of life, a way of life that leads to better living and better teaching. With autonomy of beliefs should come added control over one's behavior and influence as a person.

The additional benefits, which incidentally are more closely related to the known function of teaching, to be gained from this type of study derives from two facts: in this enterprise we call philosophy we are concerned with the more foundational ideas of life, and ultimately all educational questions entail these more substantive considerations.

The study of philosophy should provide the teacher with a much needed ballast with which more surely to steer a meaningful course in the treacherous ideational ocean of today. In analyzing the assumptions and the consequences of ideas the teacher who studies philosophy will gradually become acquainted with the more generic concepts of intellection. He will gradually realize that such fundamental questions as what is reality, what is knowledge, what is man, what is the good, what is change, etc., are all related and together they form a meaningful mosaic of substantive thought, a pattern of thought which provides the basic ground for all other ideas, including those of education. This is not to say that the student of philosophy will have the answers to these questions, but they will be aware of some answers. Then, armed with these substantive meanings and at home with the more inclusive concepts, when the educator is confronted with a so-called 'new' idea like team teaching, programmed learning, or the Brunerian approach to learning and curriculum building he will not automatically be swept into the stream of assent just because everyone else is doing it. He then will be able to stand his own ground and analyze these so-called new ideas in the light of the more substantive concepts with which he is now familiar. This can and should be done because of the natural confluence of the larger philosophical concerns with educational considerations. Ultimately, educational problems can only be resolved when considered within the larger more fundamental context of life itself. Anything less is only an expedient make-shift unworthy of anyone who claims to be educated. Whether or not children should be sent to school at three rather than six is much more than just a problem in behavioral engineering!

Finally, philosophizing can help the teacher see life and education steadily and as a whole. This is not something that comes easily. To see the trees as well as the forest without losing either takes a great deal of knowledge and experience, but a study of philosophy can help us realize this kind of wisdom. It can help us achieve a synthesis of perspectives -- seeing education steadily, day by day, insufferable detail after insufferable detail, endless excruciating meeting after endless excruciating meeting, and at the same time seeing education whole -- seeing real live individual youngsters with feelings and emotions and fears and hopes needing and sometimes even asking for guidance and instruction for the living of a life.

Needless to say this double vision is more difficult than ever to develop. In this day of specialization brought on by the application of the scientific method to almost every phase of living, it is becoming increasingly impossible to gain a sense of the whole. We seem to be learning more and more about less and less; and, moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that this trend will not continue at an accelerated rate. Granted the benefits of such a fantastic production of knowledge are obvious and immense; the danger inherent in such a trend are equally significant but much less obvious. To mention only one, as Whitehead says, this professionalization of knowledge produces minds in a groove, minds bound to one set of abstractions and concepts because they are so specialized. "But, there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate for the comprehension of human life." (4)

Although philosophy has not escaped from this modern trend toward the specialization of knowledge, it still manages, traditionally at least, to maintain this double vision. The philosopher analyzes concepts, i.e., he tries to get down to the root meaning of ideas, but at the same time he is concerned with the synthesis of views, with the whole picture. At any given time the philosopher like any other specialist will concentrate on a given set of abstractions, but there is something about the philosophical enterprise that, in the most part, should prevent the production of minds in a groove. The typical philosophical mind wants to cut across the field, he wants to ramble, he wants to make sense out of the totality, i.e., life itself.

Philosophy and education not only come together naturally in the realm of ideation but also in each of us as we subject our beliefs to critical thought. Living philosophy in this way will help us gain that double focus; it will help us break the fetters that bind us to one set of abstraction and concepts. But there is an added dividend to be realized from this practice of philosophizing -- an additional benefit that results from our being members of the teaching profession plus the fact that we cannot separate our teaching from our particularity as individuals. We educate our students not only by transmitting the culture but also by transmitting ourselves; hence, knowing oneself is just as important as knowing one's subject. By practicing philosophy we will gradually gain more control over that most dangerous part of the educative iceberg. As a result of knowing ourselves more completely, we will be in a much better position to judge what our influence is as a person. We will gradually reveal to the light of consciousness and subsequent control more and more of that covert education as we make the implicit explicit through a systematic reflection of ourselves and our world. For these reasons I believe that the study of philosophy as traditionally conceived will make a greater contribution to good, effective teaching in the classroom than any other single subject.

Documentations.

1. Much of the credit for the structure of the analysis that follows should go to Professor Mothershead of Stanford University who offers this description of what is philosophy in his introductory course. Although it is mine in that I have appropriated it into my thinking, it belongs originally to Socrates and then Professor Mothershead -- if in fact it can be said that ideas "belong" to anyone.

307.

2. I am indebted to Professor L. G. Thomas of Stanford University for this illustrative idea.

3. In an editorial *The Daily Democrat* has Secretary Wirtz saying: "We've got to investigate. . .whether this business of starting (school) at the age of six . . . is right or not. My present impression is that especially in the areas of the underprivileged in this country, there are more people committed to unemployment between the ages of three and six than at any other period." The reason, he said, "is that they grow up in a family where they've forgotten what works (sic) means . . . and it may well be that we ought to pull them out . . . at an earlier age." August 25, 1964, Woodland, California.

4. A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, Mentor Book, 1925, p. 196.

CHAPTER 30.

EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY: SOME CAUTIONARY NOTES AND QUALIFICATIONS.

WILLIAM F. O'NEILL.

There are various approaches to educational philosophy but, regardless of what method is used, there are certain basic qualifications that need to be attached to virtually any generalizations about the philosophical bases of educational practices. There are, of course, many of these but, for present purposes and because of obvious time and space limitations, five will be singled out for special consideration.

1. There is an important difference between belief and behavior.

An individual's conscious beliefs and his observable behavior correspond to the extent that his behavior is directed by belief and to the extent that his professions of belief are corroborated by appropriate types of behavior. In the final analysis, however, behavior verifies belief: a person is what he does and not what he says he does. This is true for three basic reasons: (a) Belief is ultimately an aspect of behavior. Behavior is a far broader category than conscious belief. Only a small part of behavior is directed by conscious awareness, let alone by explicit ideas and theories. (b) All belief is a product of behavior. Belief evolves out of behavior. At basis, our beliefs describe the meaning inherent within the experience generated by our past behavior. (c) The purpose of belief is to direct behavior. (1)

2. Not all education -- whether one is talking about specific educational practices or more generalized educational policies -- is based upon a coherent philosophy of education.

Contrary to the intellectual's traditional retort that "all practice is the practice of some theory," most practice is not based upon "theory" in the usual sense at all. Instead, most practice -- educational or otherwise -- is merely an extension of prior practice. For better or worse, most people generally practice practice and not theory, and most people behave according to habit, custom or impulse, rather than on the basis of serious intellectual convictions. This is not to deny that "man is a rational animal." On the other hand, this statement refers primarily to man's *potentiality* for rational action and not to his daily mode of operations. Quantitatively, very little human behavior appears to be actually motivated by ideological preconsiderations.

A central element of confusion here stems from a tendency to equate two significantly different ideas. The idea "All practice is the practice of some theory" is not true. On the other hand, the idea "All practice can be interpreted on the *basis* of some theory" -- that is, "All behavior can be theorized, or philosophized, *about*" -- *is* true, but it conveys an entirely different sort of meaning. The latter statement differs from the former in one basic respect: It does not assume that "rational" behavior is necessarily "reasoned" behavior; that is, it does not hold that all behavior which can be *explained in terms of* abstract ideas is necessarily *motivated by* a conscious commitment to the realization of such ideas. It does not deny the possibility of ideological, or theory-motivated, behavior. It does, however, deny that *all* behavior is *necessarily* ideological.

Translated over to the province of educational practices, what this means can be summarized as follows: All educational practices can be subjected to intellectual analysis and construed in terms of theoretical precepts. On the other hand, not all educational practice is "theoretical" in the sense of being based upon explicit ideological presuppositions or of being motivated by conscious ideological intent.

In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that there is a significant difference between an educator who is consciously and intentionally committed to some particular "educational philosophy" and one whose educational practices are construed *by others* to reflect such a commitment. Interpretations on the basis of observed behavior can be notoriously misleading. The Marxist who teaches in a Catholic parochial school so that he can afford to spend his weekends writing tracts against Christianity is not a "Thomist" regardless of his superficial conformity to Catholic doctrine in the classroom. A student radical who actively promotes repressive procedures on the part of the high school principal as a tactic for fomenting a campus revolt on behalf of student rights is not an "educational conservative" despite superficial appearances to the contrary.

One point of view which causes a great deal of confusion in this general area is that which holds that, since all education is purposive, and, since all purposes are based upon philosophical assumptions about the ultimate nature of value, all education is necessarily philosophical. This position, which is actually a variation of the position already discussed, makes two fundamental errors: (a) As previously indicated, it confuses theory (the assumptions which can be analyzed out of behavior) with the internal dynamic, or psychological motive, which gives rise to such behavior in the first place. (b) It mistakenly assumes that all purposes are based upon assumptions about the abstract nature of value -- that is, it confuses the normative (behavior based upon consciously-recognized abstract ideas about value), the volitional (consciously willful behavior) and the conative (implicitly willful behavior).

This latter point is a particularly difficult one to deal with, because the three terms, conative, volitional and normative, are frequently confused, although they have reference to substantially different types of action. Conative behavior is behavior which is either implicitly or explicitly purposive. The newborn infant's behavior is implicitly intentional, because he seeks the satisfaction of needs (and therefore the realization of goals) which he is not yet capable of comprehending. If and when he comes to understand the meaning implicit within his own behavior, his conative behavior becomes conscious (explicit) and therefore volitional. Volitional behavior is explicit (conscious) conative behavior in which the individual actually "has a purpose in mind." Normative behavior is behavior which is either implicitly or explicitly directed by some idea (some abstract concept or point of view) with respect to what is good or desirable. In a sense, all behavior is conative (motivated). Some conative behavior is conscious (intentional) and therefore volitional. Some volitional behavior is based on higher cognition involving abstract notions of what is good and bad and is therefore normative. From the empirical point of view, in the course of an individual's psychological development he is conative before he is volitional, and he is volitional before he is normative. Ultimately his behavior comes to reflect a combination of all three, but, in the final analysis (and as represented in Figure I), conative behavior is the broader and more encompassing category: All normative behavior is volitional, and all volitional behavior is conative. The volitional is, in this sense, a subset of the conative, and the normative is, in turn, a subset of the volitional.

3. There is a significant difference between educational practices which are logically implied by a particular philosophical position on the one hand and the educational practices which are merely psychologically-related to (or correlated with) a particular philosophical position on the other.

The philosophical followers of Saint Thomas Aquinas, for example, subscribe to the notion that the foremost goal of formal education is to train the student to comprehend the great religious truths which are required in order to secure the salvation of his immortal soul. This policy is a logical extension of the basic Thomistic worldview. On the other hand, most Thomists also subscribe to relatively formalized and didactic procedures in the classroom. As compared to the educational followers of existentialism and experimentalism, they are far less likely to use free inquiry techniques, activity methods, and so on. Here, however, we are dealing not so much with a practice which is a logical outgrowth of basic philosophical convictions as with one which is merely correlated (or associated) with the sort of personality-structure which is predisposed toward the Thomistic approach in the first place. This distinction is perhaps best clarified by referring to the basic worldview of empirical naturalism, which might be summarized as follows:

personal behavior
↓ (gives rise to)
personal experience
↓ (which gives rise to)
personal belief
↓ (which ultimately eventuates in)
the establishment of personality (including basic values)
↓ (which is central in formulating a)
personal philosophy

What this suggests can be summarized in three basic points. First, philosophical similarities are generally based upon psychological similarities which, in turn, grow out of corresponding experiences caused by undergoing (and therefore learning from) the same and similar sorts of behavior during the earliest years of life. Similar personalities seek the same and similar sorts of experience, which ultimately gives rise to the same and similar types of belief. In short, common belief is rooted in common behavior. Common belief also generates common behavior, but only on an after-the-fact basis, because belief itself is rooted in the primary pre-rational personality-structure which is established during infancy and early childhood.

Figure I

CONATIVE BEHAVIOR, VOLITIONAL BEHAVIOR AND
NORMATIVE BEHAVIOR


CONATIVE BEHAVIOR
VOLITIONAL BEHAVIOR
NORMATIVE BEHAVIOR

Second, behavior (as previously indicated) is a broader concept than belief, and far broader than philosophical belief. Belief is merely a conscious distillation of the meaning inherent within overall behavior. Since common beliefs are grounded in common behavior, it is understandable that correspondences in behavior between individuals sharing the same or similar belief-systems will be even broader and more encompassing than their agreements in the area of mere theory. In other words, since the philosophical evolves out of the psychological, the consensus between representatives of a particular educational philosophy with respect to virtually any significant educational question will tend to be much broader than would be suggested by merely examining the behavior logically necessitated by their common agreement in the area of theory. The consensus is fundamentally at the level of character-structure and not in the realm of a posteriori rationalization.

It is, in this regard, difficult to establish a clear-cut relationship between the so-called "educational philosophies," such as "essentialism" and "perennialism," which tend to be almost exclusively concerned with education as schooling and which are most directly related to moral and political philosophies at the middle-range of abstraction, and the various "philosophies of education," such as "educational realism," "educational pragmatism," and "educational existentialism," which have emerged deductively on the basis of inference from more fundamental (ontological) differences in the area of knowing and the known. In general, however, two considerations are worth noting: (a) Certain of the basic philosophical systems are logically incompatible with certain of the so-called "educational philosophies." A traditional theistic realist such as Saint Thomas Aquinas could not, for example, logically subscribe to an educational position like "educational libertarianism" which holds that the primary objective of education is to encourage humanistic social reforms by maximizing personal freedom within education and by advocating the extension of more humanitarian conditions within society-at-large. In a similar sense, a philosophical experimentalist like John Dewey would be guilty of gross self-contradiction if he were to endorse the highly traditional "educational rationalism" advanced by a person like Robert Maynard Hutchins or Mortimer Adler. (b) While it is very difficult to draw any convincing inferences about the ultimate philosophical assumptions underlying specifically "educational philosophies," there are, as already noted, many indirect, or psychological, relationships between those espousing certain philosophical positions and those advocating particular educational approaches. These relationships in themselves make it appear likely that persons advocating certain philosophical positions are significantly more predisposed toward certain educational practices than others. Realists in the tradition of

Plato and (perhaps) Aristotle, for example, tend to be educational traditionalists because they characteristically emphasize the formal mastery of subject-matter content over the value of open-ended experimental inquiry. This is not to say that an Aristotelian is philosophically constrained to do so, however. Theoretically, he could focus almost entirely on problem-solving procedures or even veer in a highly libertarian direction. Factually, however, this is not the case. There appears to be a rather convincing psychological relationship between subscribing to philosophical realism and being predisposed toward a rather high degree of educational formalism. In a similar sense, in educational terms, most experimentalists tend to be either "liberals" or "libertarians" who are profoundly committed to the fullest expression of political freedom, usually centering around some form of representational democracy. This commitment, however, appears to be, at best, indirectly related to experimentalism as a philosophy. It is quite possible to be an experimentalist -- as the existence of B. F. Skinner testifies -- and still have profound doubts about the wisdom of political democracy. Again, the correlation seems to be primarily rooted in a sort of meta-philosophical agreement at the level of basic character-structure which predates, and probably predisposes toward, any particular type of philosophical commitment.

Third, two factors virtually preclude any total philosophical agreement between individuals. These are, first, the fact that no person's behavior or experience can ever really be the same as any other's, and, second, that, once formulated, any system of beliefs generates behavior only in the light of particular and largely uncontrollable circumstances which, again, are never really identical for any two people. On the other hand, and despite these qualifications, personal experience does tend to be generally similar for almost everyone, and even basic differences in belief tend to fall into relatively predictable patterns because of the constancies and continuities which recur within overall human behavior as an unavoidable requirement for biological survival and for success within such survival.

4. There is no one-to-one relationship between philosophical beliefs and educational practices.

Contrary to some opinion, a number of things affect practice quite apart from theoretical assumptions, and, in general, three qualifications are necessary:

a. In most cases, an "educational philosophy" refers to the way in which some particular philosophy applies to the problems of education. The way in which any philosophy applies to schooling necessarily depends upon a variety of conditions quite apart from philosophical theory as such: the nature of the situation confronted, the physical and psychological nature of the individual responding to it (his sensory acuity, his intelligence, his temperament, his knowledgeability, et cetera), the individual's psychological response to the situation, and so on. Philosophy, as philosophy, is merely an integrated system of general ideas by means of which a person intellectually organizes his experience. Practical behavior -- in the classroom or elsewhere -- is always a compromise between the perfect and the possible, and this compromise is affected by a large number of variables quite apart from personal philosophy as such. Philosophy may affect the way a person construes his circumstances, but it very seldom plays even the dominant role in creating the circumstances which he construes.

b. The more developed, definitive and comprehensive a philosophy is the more likely it will be to imply clearcut educational policies and practices. On the other hand, it is almost impossible to describe, explain or predict specific educational practices on the basis of a general system of philosophy like "realism" or "existentialism," because what makes such theories "general systems" in the first place is precisely the fact that they fail to make definitive statements about particular problems (as by defining particular moral policies) and that they therefore fail to develop many of the areas of intermediate theory (such as moral and political philosophy) which are central for the development of an effective philosophy of education. For this reason, the educational implications of general philosophical "systems" are probably better exemplified through the ideas of particular representatives of such systems (such as Aristotle in the area of traditional realism or John Dewey in the area of experimentalism) than by extrapolating on the basis of fundamental ontological differences at the highest level of meta-philosophical abstraction.

c. Since any generalization about the educational implications of a more basic philosophical position is necessarily tempered by the implicit qualification "other things being equal," the traditional philosophies, which assume the fundamental stability of all things (that is, that other things are generally equal, that variability and change tend to be the exception rather than the rule), tend to provide a more explicit and definitive basis for educational system-making than do the open-ended, process-oriented philosophies with their characteristic stress on relativity, subjectivity and individual differences. This is not to say that the empirical, or process, philosophies such as existentialism and experimentalism are less capable of generating effective approaches to education, but merely that the prescriptive moral and political principles associated with these positions tend to incorporate variability and change as absolutes and are therefore far less likely to absolutize the particular than are the more traditional metaphysical positions.

5. In forecasting educational behavior, knowing a person's philosophy (including his basic values) may be important, but knowing the specific priority-ranking of his values tends to be even more important. In general, four questions are of central significance:

a. What are the person's basic values? (What is his overall value-commitment?)

b. How intensely is he committed to these values? (How profound is this commitment?)

c. What, in general, is the priority-ranking of these values? (What does he care for most, and in what order?)

d. How does the individual perceive these values as relating to the situation at hand? (What is the situational relevance of his personal commitment?)

Documentation.

1. Needless to say, this is in itself a philosophical position that is based upon certain presuppositions about the empirical (and, specifically, behavioral) bases of all belief. This is an involved topic which goes far beyond the requirements of the present discussion, but, in a summary form, the empirical behaviorist's point of view about the relationship between behavior and belief can be summarized in the following sequence of points:

Implicit (behavioral) meaning; organized behavior in the earliest phases of life, gives rise to

↓

Explicit (symbolic) meaning; beliefs represented as knowledge in terms of symbols and images.

↓

This results in behavior mediated by belief; practice directed by explicit knowledge.

↓

This eventuates in belief mediated by belief; the internal criticism of knowledge on the basis of other knowledge: the verification of knowledge on the basis of accepted knowledge criteria (the reconstruction and correction of knowledge by means of accepted principles for knowing).

↓

This makes possible the reconstruction and correction of behavior by means of verified knowledge, including

↓

The correction of explicit belief-systems and

↓

The improvement of behavior by means of verified belief

↓

Which leads to the continued verification of beliefs, and so on.

In even more cursory summarization it might be represented in the following manner:

Behaving gives rise to

↓

believing, which gives rise to

↓

thinking (the application of belief to behavior), which eventuates in

↓

theorizing (the application of belief to belief)

↓

which alters behavior, therefore modifying beliefs, altering thought-processes and giving rise to new reality-concepts (theories).

CHAPTER 31.

CONFLICTING THEORIES OF EDUCATION: A CLASSIFICATION.

HUGH C. BLACK.

The conflicting theories of education since 1900 and the confusions in and about education in the 'sixties indicate crucial needs of both practitioners and theorists. Practitioners especially need analyses, concepts, generalizations, and classifications of theories of education which facilitate their orientation and lead to right judgments about matters of practice in schools. If current confusion in both theories and practices is to give way to enlightenment and progress, this educational task so long ago recognized and practiced by Plato must be done. Moreover, this task should be fruitful in meeting the needs of theorists grappling with the complex problem of achieving new theories in another decade of crisis in American education. For several years now, more and more recognition has been given to inadequacies of and deficiencies in the older, conflicting accounts of education. Imperative seems to be the need to get beyond the present level of conflict and argument and arrive at new theories carrying the arguments to a new level.

This paper is an attempt to elaborate an earlier classificatory scheme, apply it, and suggest its fruitfulness in meeting the needs cited above.

The proposed classification arose from my needs in accomplishing the doctoral dissertation, "The Learning-Product and the Learning-Process Theories of Education: An Attempted Synthesis" (University of Texas, 1949). Significantly, those needs of more than a decade ago were the same as those of today. There was the need, then as now, of arriving at a synthesis suggesting a new and "better" account of education and "better" judgments about educational practices. But before this could be accomplished, then as now, other needs had to be met. The confusion in education arising from conflicting theories of education had to be analyzed, concepts arrived at through classification and definition, and generalizations made which might bring the order out of chaos so necessary for advancement. The earlier classificatory scheme was suggested in the article "Confusion and Conflict in Educational Theory: An Analysis" (Peabody Journal of Education, XXX, 1952, pp. 153-160). The attempted synthesis and "better" account of education suggesting one possible way out of educational confusion appeared in the article "A Way Out of Educational Confusion" (Educational Theory, IV, April, 1954, pp. 113-119). Recognition of the strong relationship between theory and practice was expressed in the article "Practical Implications of a Theory of Education" (Educational Theory, IV, October, 1954, pp. 263-268). This approach to the heated educational controversies of the late 'forties (which might also have been helpful in the previous strong outbreaks of the same controversy in the late 'thirties and late 'twenties) would appear to be fruitful in the educational controversies of the 'sixties.

I am suggesting that practitioners and theorists in education today may find helpful a four-fold classification of educational theories. This might be considered a scale of educational theories consisting of a continuous line (a continuum) upon which one marks four points of orientation. Two points should be located near the outer limits of the line to indicate the two extreme contrasting views of education. The other two points should be located near the center (one on each side) to indicate the two contrasting less extreme, "more tenable" theories of education. At each point of orientation a name is given to each basic view: at the extreme right, "Traditionalism;" at the less extreme right point, "The Learning-Product Theory;" at the extreme left, "Progressivism;" and at the less extreme left point, "The Learning-Process Theory."

By defining each of the orientation points, we arrive at a four-fold classification of educational theories and formulate a scale useful in meeting the needs already set forth. Let us begin with the two extreme viewpoints.

In defining the two extreme viewpoints and characterizing the outer limits of our scale (recognizing that some views may be more extreme and should be placed beyond our outer limits), we draw upon several good sources. I. L. Kandel's Conflicting Theories of Education (New York, Macmillan, 1938, pp. 20-26) and John Dewey's Experience and Education (New York, Macmillan, 1938, p. 1-6) best delineated the conflict between these viewpoints. Moreover, classifying theories of education into "Traditionalism" and "Progressivism" is justifiable because these are familiar terms frequently used in the literature of philosophy of education. In 1939 Brubacher used these same categories because they are, as he put it, "already the familiar stock in trade of school people, and even the lay-public." (1) In fact, at that time Brubacher (in Chapter XIV, "Systematic Philosophies of Education") summarized the viewpoints in modern philosophies of education under the two categories: "progressive education" and "traditionalists" or "essentialists." Similarly, but using more categories, Brameld (in his 1950 Patterns of Educational Philosophy) included in his classificatory scheme "Essentialism" and "Progressivism." I prefer to restrict the term "Essentialism" to the specific movement by Bagley and others around 1938. (2) On my scale, I would place "Essentialism" in this restricted sense as not so extreme a position as "Traditionalism" and hence closer to or within "The Learning-Product Theory" classification. I interpret Brameld to mean by "Essentialism" what Dewey, Kandel, Morrison, and others would consider by "Traditionalism." Also to be noted before proceeding is the fact that more than a dichotomous classification seems to be demanded today. In 1950 Brameld suggested more than two, and in the 1962 edition of Modern Philosophies of Education Brubacher discarded the earlier two-fold classification in favor of twelve "pegs" on which he could "hang" modern philosophies of education. Yet, I believe, the older categories are still useful. Let us define each.

What is "Traditionalism" in our classificatory scheme? On the right side of our chart (as we must also do on the left side for "Progressivism") we must define the view in both theory and practice. In theory, the Traditionalist is defined as the person who emphasizes exclusively the concept of education as the transmission of the social heritage from the older to the younger generation. He conceives of education as being primarily a formation from without, or, as Dewey expressed it, "a process of overcoming natural inclination and substituting in its place habits acquired under external pressure." (3) This view, account, or theory of education has implications for practices in schools. Likewise, witnessing the practices in schools, one may readily identify the underlying view or account of education.

What are the practices in schools implied by the Traditionalist's account of education? Since these have been so well delineated in the sources mentioned and have become customary in school-lore, we need merely summarize those points that contrast with practices in Progressive schools. The objective of education is summarized in the traditional statement that "Education is a preparation for life." Reliance is placed upon textbooks as the depositories of the social heritage and upon teachers as the instruments for the transmission of the social heritage. Emphasis is given to the acquisition of isolated skills and techniques by drill. The commendable child is in-going, receptive, passive, docile, and obedient. In the traditional school discipline is customarily strict. The school may be characterized as "teacher and subject-matter centered."

Turning now to the extreme left side of our chart and the contrasting theory of education, we seek a definition of "Progressivism" in our classificatory scheme.

How does the "Progressivist" conceive education? We shall define "Progressivism" as that theory of education which emphasizes exclusively the concept of education as individual development. Progressivists maintain that education is a development from within based on natural endowment. This theoretical view contrasts with that of Traditionalism as we have defined it. The educational practices that follow as implications also contrast.

Taking their cue from Rousseau and subsequent educational theorists, the Progressivists maintain that the young do not become educated by passively receiving the social heritage from the elders. Rather, education is a matter of the development of the individual. The young become educated by acting upon and reacting with the environment and in the process gain their own experience, knowledge, and skills. Hence in practice the objective of education and schooling is not preparation for life. Rather, say the Progressivists, "education is life." In their schools reliance upon textbooks and teachers is minimized. Emphasis is upon activity, self-activity, conjoint activities, the physical manipulation of objects, and upon pupil-planning. The commendable child in this school is out-going, vigorous, enthusiastic, even boisterous. Mild or non-existent (according to its critics) is the discipline of this school. The Progressive school is "child-centered."

Such a two-fold classification of educational theories defining opposite, extreme views of education seems necessary for anyone concerned with the fundamental dualism in educational theory running from ancient times to the present. From the time of the Sophists in 5th-century B.C. Greece, as Bagley so well pointed out in 1938, (4) educational theories have often emphasized either "interest, freedom, immediate needs, personal experience, psychological organization, and pupil-initiative," or "effort, discipline, remote goals, race-experience, logical sequence, and teacher-initiative." Emphasizing one set of concepts and condemning the opposite, many contestants today carry on the aged battle.

Next we turn to the center areas of our four-fold classificatory scheme. Our concern is with less extreme conceptions of education to which we may apply the terms: "Learning-Product Theory" and "Learning-Process Theory." (5) To my way of thinking, these two types of educational theory are more tenable than either of the two extreme theories. If their basic concepts are put into school practice, we would more likely

A CLASSIFICATION OF THEORIES OF EDUCATION

Hugh C. Black

Theory

Extreme Progressivism

1. Education as individual development (the young become educated by interacting with the environment and in the process gaining their own experience, knowledge, and skills).
2. Education as a development from within based on natural endowment (unfolding of natural powers and abilities).


Individual Child interacts with environment
Meets Problems
Solves Them
Gains Knowledge becomes Educated
Environment

Practice

3. Education is life.
   Objective: Make the most of present life.
4. Minimize importance of books and of teachers. Emphasize activity, doing, pupil-planning, self-expression.
5. The child: outgoing, vigorous, enthusiastic, even boisterous.
6. Discipline: mild.
7. Child-centered school.

Learning-Process Theory (Dewey)

Emphasizes:
Education as individual development

Education as process, method

Takes into account:
Fducation as transmission of social heritage

Personality as product of education

Learning-Product Theory (Morrison)

Emphasizes:
Education as transmission of social heritage

Personality as product of education

Takes into account:
Education as individual development

Education as process, method

Extreme Traditionalism

Theory

1. Education as transmission of the social heritage from the older generation to the younger generation (the direct handing on to the young of the ideas, beliefs, standards, rules of conduct, and culture of the older generation).
2. Education as a formation from without ("a process of overcoming natural inclination and substituting in its place habits acquired under external pressure").


insights, ideas as to how to live, values, culture, social heritage-organized bodies of knowledge in possession of the elders and in books
Produces
Man living in Society env.
Transmitted by Teacher
To members of the younger generation

Practice

3. Education is preparation for life.
   Objective: Preparation for future life by acquiring organized bodies of knowledge.
4. Reliance upon textbooks and depositories of the social heritage and upon teachers as instruments for transmission of social heritage. Acquisition of isolated skills and techniques by drill.
5. The child: in-going, receptive, passive, docile, obedient.
6. Discipline: strict.
7. Teacher and subject-matter centered school.

HCB:at:2-64:500

achieve better products than those from Traditionalist or Progressive schools. But more than this, they are more tenable theories because they give a more adequate account of what education really is. However that may be, they are two further approaches to education in both theory and practice.

Since the proposed classificatory scheme is intended to be expressed in chart form for easy grasp by students, we shall modify our procedure in this area of the chart or scale. We shall limit ourselves to placing on the chart a general statement about each class of educational theory, the name of one representative of the whole class, and a statement of the contrasting points of emphasis of each. Hence we are unable to list contrasting practices implied by each theory as we did with Traditionalism and Progressivism. But the student should know that each of our "more tenable" theories has implications for practices in schools. Moreover, he should be encouraged to study those sources which indicate the detailed, contrasting practices. For example, to understand fully the "learning-Product Theory" he should study Henry C. Morrison's The Curriculum of the Common School and The Practice of Teaching in the Secondary School as well as Basic Principles in Education. Similarly, he should study all of Dewey's Democracy and Education rather than those parts stating Dewey's theory of education.

The "Learning-Product Theory," at the less extreme position on the right of our scale of educational theories, is that view of the nature of education which has its source in the educational theory of Herbart and its development in the writings of the German Herbartians and of such American writers as Charles DeGarmo, Charles and Frank McMurry, S. C. Parker, Charles H. Judd, and Henry C. Morrison. This theory of education opposes Traditionalism; yet, when carried to its extreme limit, the learning-product theory becomes that of Traditionalism. It also opposes Progressivism and contrasts directly with the learning-process theory. The writings of the late Henry C. Morrison best exemplify the "Learning-Product Theory of Education."

Morrison does not commit the error of Traditionalism and Progressivism in giving an exclusive emphasis to one aspect of education only. He emphasizes the concept of education as the transmission of the social heritage, but he does not do so to the same extent as extreme Traditionalists. He takes into account but does not emphasize the concept of education as individual development, the concept emphasized exclusively by extreme Progressivists. Especially to be noted is the fact that Morrison's account of education includes -- and emphasizes -- an additional aspect of education: the product of education. According to Morrison, personality is the product of education; and, contrary to Dewey, he spells out its structure. Each learning mastered by the pupil (from "learning-units" taught under systematic procedures) results in a product, a new attitude of understanding or appreciation, a new ability, or a skill which is expressed as an accretion to personality. This product of education and the concept of education as transmission of the social heritage are the two aspects of education Morrison emphasizes. But he does take into account individual development and the process or method of education.

The "Learning-Process Theory," at the less extreme position on the left in our scale, is that view of education which has its source in Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and Froebel and its development in such writers as William James, G. Stanley Hall, John Dewey, and Boyd H. Bode. When carried to its extreme limit, the learning-process theory becomes that of Progressivism. It opposes Traditionalism and contrasts directly with the learning-product theory. The most complete and representative statement of the learning-process theory is that of John Dewey.

Dewey, as Morrison, does not commit the error of Traditionalism and Progressivism in giving an exclusive emphasis to one aspect of education alone. Dewey emphasizes the conception of education as individual development, but he does not do so to the same extent as extreme Progressivists. He takes into account, but does not emphasize, as Morrison does, education as the transmission of the social heritage, the concept which Traditionalists emphasize exclusively. Furthermore, Dewey, as Morrison, brings from the penumbra of educational theory into bright light an additional aspect of education. But it is a different one: the concept of education as a process. Dewey contrasts with Morrison in this emphasis upon the process of education, the method of educating. Dewey's main concern is with the way in which the young come into likemindedness with the older generation, with communicating, directing, and growing. But he does take into account the concept of education as transmission of the social heritage, and his theory implies (although he does not spell out its structure, as does Morrison) personality as the product of education.

Our four-fold classificatory scheme thus recognizes four aspects of education and distinguishes the four classes of educational theories according to differences in emphasis. Four concepts -- education as transmission of the social heritage, education as individual development, education as a product, and education as a process -- are the differentiating factors.

In proposing this scheme I have applied the ideals of Plato with respect to conceptual knowledge. My task began with analyses of many particular writers on education from earliest times to the present. Definition by classification of concepts and the attainment of generalizations which might lead to syntheses is the outcome.

The suggested scheme of classification should help students and practitioners in that orientation to theories of education so necessary before making judgments about educational practices. Several specific examples may make clearer the use of the scheme in gaining orientation. These examples should lead the reader to the point of making his own interpretation of current writers on education and placing them appropriately on our scale for orientation. Thus will be made easier the task of getting one's bearings on the Bestors, Rickovers, and Conants of our day.

Soon after the launching of the first Sputnik on October 4, 1957, I. L. Kandel published in The Educational Forum (6) his optimistic article, "Controversy Ended." Kandel believed that this momentous event would occasion an end to the old battle between the Traditionalists and Progressivists and allow educators a chance to re-think our serious educational problems. Applying our four-fold classificatory chart, the reader would be in a better position to assess Kandel's statements because he would recognize that Kandel is writing from the "Learning-Product Theory" point of view. He would probably judge that a Progressivist would not agree. Actually this is the case, for a few pages later (7) appears Samuel Tenenbaum's article "The Case for Progressive Education" which expresses a willingness to resume the old, old battle. Even without the title, a few pages of reading should lead the reader to identify Tenenbaum on our scale as a Progressivist.

If we turn to books rather than articles in professional journals, several other examples of the use of our classificatory scale come to mind. If we go back to the end of World War II, we find the important Education for ALL American Youth by the influential Educational Policies Commission and may readily identify it on our scale as "Learning-Process" tending toward "Progressivism" in its view of education. Similarly, we may identify the Report of the Harvard Committee on General Education in a Free Society, General Education in a Free Society, as expressing the "Learning-Product" theory of education. Also to be placed in the "Learning-Product" category are the books on education by Sir Richard Livingstone, a British writer from whom Americans would profit from reading. One of the most influential textbooks in philosophy of education has been Harry S. Broudy's Building a Philosophy of Education, which I would also place in the "Learning-Product Theory" category. For contrasting views of education, we may turn to several books which may be identified as on the left side of our scale in their orientation. John P. Wynne's writings are "Learning-Process" and a direct-line continuation of John Dewey. Ernest Bayles' Democratic Educational Theory may be identified as one variant of the Dewey "Learning-Process Theory." The writings of William Heard Kilpatrick and John L. Childs are other variants from Dewey and may be placed on our chart somewhere between "The Learning-Process Theory" and "Progressivism." There also belong such "social consensus" and "group dynamics" writers as Raup, Stanley, Smith, Thomas, and Benne. Harold Rugg's views would be classified as a departure from Dewey's views and would be placed close to or within our category of "Progressivism." Emphasizing method and approach rather than content and substance, the "Linguistic Analysis" writers would appear somewhere on the left side of our scale depending upon the interpretation of the work of the specific individual. Such a recent book as Hullfish and Smith's Reflective Thinking: The Method of Education would be placed in a similar area on our chart.

The scale may be considered in a restrictive sense as no more than an attempt to classify "theories of education" as distinguished from "philosophies of education." "Theories of education" may be given the restricted meaning of "accounts of what education is essentially" or "definitions of education." "Philosophies of education" may be a broader term which includes definitions and accounts of education within a system of thought embracing views on those fundamental philosophical issues whose solution determines the answers to educational problems. Granted that this is so, the suggested scale is still useful for orientation purposes in education for both practitioners and theorists seeking a new synthesis. For example, J. Donald Butler may be an Idealist in his philosophy of education and hold importantly different views on some philosophical issues from Harry S. Broudy, a Classical Realist. Our scale may not do justice to their full philosophies of education. Yet basically both hold the same view of education, and classifying them under "The Learning-Product Theory" helps us in our orientation.

The scale may be extended upward to embrace more recent theories of education which attempt to synthesize the older conflicting theories of education and continue the controversy at a higher level.

Limiting our scale strictly to "theories of education," we might extend it upward to include the suggested "better" definition and account of education I attempted in "A Way Out of Educational Confusion." This view should advance us to a higher level of thinking about education, but it has not yet been expanded and developed into a complete "philosophy of education."

Applying our scale upward to the next level and enlarging the scope to include "philosophies of education," we should mention two recent attempts at synthesis. Theodore Brameld's Toward a Reconstructed Philosophy of Education (1956) is one such attempt which was declared at that time not to be yet a fully developed philosophy of education. Frank C. Wegener's The Organic Philosophy of Education (1957) has received little attention from the reviewers, but it was offered as a full philosophy of education which I believe merits far more consideration than it has been given thus far. Again, at the new level, as at the old, our four fold classificatory scheme serves us well in getting our bearings. For Brameld's "Reconstructionism," as I interpret it, may be placed on our scale somewhere on the left side between the "Learning-Process Theory" and "Progressivism." And Wegener's view of education, while Idealistic and Whiteheadean Realistic in philosophy, must be classified on the right side of our scale with the "Learning-Product Theory." Again the argument is joined, but at another level. But our four-fold classificatory scheme of educational theories helps us see the argument "steadily and as a whole."

Documentations.

1. John S. Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939, p. 324.

2. See William C. Bagley, "As Essentialist's Platform for the Advancement of American Education," Educational Administration and Supervision, XXIV (April, 1938), pp. 241-256.

3. Experience and Education, p. 1.

4. Op. cit., pp. 244-245.

5. For these terms I am indebted to Dr. J. Alvis Lynch, who used them in his education courses at The Rice Institute, Houston, Texas, in the 'thirties and early 'forties.

6. XXII (January, 1958), pp. 175-181.

7. 183-192.

CHAPTER 32.

COMPETENCY-BASED EDUCATION.

JAMES JOHN JELINEK.

Both my grandmothers were very wise women, but they had most unusual ways of expressing their wisdom. "Vaclav," they would say to me, "syr v pasti na mysi je zadarmo." Translation: "James, the cheese in a mousetrap is free."

Today the free cheese in the academic mousetrap is the consensus cognoscenti -- the process by which the elite in our profession and society determine what behaviors shall be conditioned, built into the structures of learners.

At the present time, for example, the Associated Organizations for Teacher Education is requesting a few experts "to identify the competencies and behaviors of teachers desired at each level." (I hasten to point out that I am one of these experts. I do this, of course, not to be immodest, but rather to let you know that a president of The Far Western Philosophy of Education Society gets to be a part of some very exclusive company.) "The Delphi technique," states the chairman of A. O. T. E. in his letter to me, "will be used, which will provide a rank ordering of behavior and competencies. . . .Keep in mind," he says, "such questions as, what behaviors and competencies are necessary to the person entering teacher training, what competencies should he or she have at the end of training, and what competencies should be stressed in inservice training?" (1) What the Associated Organizations for Teacher Education calls the Delphi technique is, of course, nothing more nor less than consensus cognoscenti, or, as the television people say, objectives by Nielson Rating.

Likewise the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education through its Distinguished Achievement Awards Program and through its Executive Secretary emphasizes the desirability of and the need for "behavior-based," "competency-based," "performance-based systems approaches." In recent years virtually all the awards have been given to institutions, including Arizona State University, for "performance-based, field centered programs," "on-site school teacher-education programs," "highly individualized, performance based programs," and the like. (2)

In the words of Edward C. Pomeroy, Executive Director of the Association, "Performance-based teacher education . . . . has the potential for restructuring the education of teachers. It bespeaks the emerging future and points the way for teacher education. A significant number of A. A. C. T. E. member colleges and universities have already committed their teacher education programs to performance-based goals and are now going all-out to forge a new approach to preparing teachers." (3)

In Arizona, too, the State Board of Education has issued its manifesto on performance-based criteria to be used by administrators in the evaluation of teachers for their recertification. The State Superintendent of Public Instruction in Arizona states, "There is no one policy which will strengthen the common and high schools more than recertification of teachers based upon performance. To achieve a recertification procedure based on teacher performance, courses in graduate colleges in education will need to be drastically revised." (4)

The ways in which this revision occurs are many and varied, but when prior structures are evident, as of course they are with performance-based criteria and behavioristic objectives, the mode is one of conditioning. The mode prevails on all levels -- elementary, secondary, and higher education levels.

Supervisors in Chandler, Arizona, themselves under the supervision of three university professors, offer one example of this conditioning process. They monitor their student teachers with an electronic feedback system. Using "The Instrument for the Observation of Teaching Effectiveness" (an instrument for performance rating), the supervisor, while the student-teacher conditions the pupils in the class, stands in the back of the room conditioning the student-teacher with various types of reenforcement, verbal feedback, in a low voice through a transistor microphone. The pupils in the class cannot hear any of the comments of the supervisor but the student teacher hears them through an earphone as he conducts the class! He behaves in accordance with the directions of the supervisor! (5)

As scholars in the philosophy of education it behooves us to examine critically the relationship of ends and means, theory and practice, inherent in this emphasis in the preparation of teachers. "To place the emphasis upon the securing of proficiency in teaching and discipline," Dewey warned two-thirds of a century ago, "*puts the attention of the student teacher in the wrong place, and tends to fix it in the wrong direction*. . . . For immediate skill may be got at the cost of the power to keep on growing. The teacher who leaves the professional school with power of managing a class of children may appear to superior advantage the first day, the first week, the first month, or even the first year. But later 'progress' may with such consist only in perfecting and refining skills already possessed. Such persons seem to know how to teach, but they are not students of teaching." Unless a teacher is also a student of teaching, "he cannot grow as a teacher, an inspirer and director of soul-life." (The emphasis is in the original.) (6)

In these terms whether the growth of the student is continuous or sporadic, whether it begets more growth or disappears in arrestment, is utterly dependent upon whether that student is educated or trained, whether he is intrinsically motivated or extrinsically motivated, whether he is a learner or an achiever, whether he is inner directed or outer directed, whether he experiences positive disintegrationism or negative disintegrationism. (7) These alternatives merit our close scrutiny, especially in terms of philosophical principle.

There are in substance two main aspects to the case against performance-based criteria for training. One is that in a world of transience no trainer can know with any degree of certainty those behaviors to build into the structure of his trainees to equip them effectively to cope with the world of tomorrow. The second is that the trained individual, conditioned as he is to invoke responses which he cannot change, is quite incapable of reconstructing his experiences in the world of transience in which he finds himself.

The concept of future shock strongly suggests that there must be balance, not merely between rates of change in various sectors of the society and its culture but between the pace of environmental change and the limited pace of human response. Future shock grows out of the increasing lag between the two. (8)

The behavioristic competencies of a bygone day are inadequate to the needs of today and the behavioristic competencies of today will be inadequate to the tasks at hand in the future. Of the 450,000 usable words now in the English language more than one-half of them would be incomprehensible to William Shakespeare. The pace of turnover in art is vision-blurring -- the viewer scarcely has time to "see" a school develop, to learn its language, so to speak, before it vanishes. Ideas come and go at a frenetic rate that in science at least is one hundred times faster than a mere century ago. The family of old is shattering only to come together again in strange and novel ways -- with purchased embryos, professional parents taking on the childbearing function of others, communal arrangements, geriatric group marriages, homosexual family units, polygamy, and serial trajectory marriages. As technology becomes more sophisticated and the cost of introducing variation declines, uniformity in business is giving way to diversity, the origins of overchoice for consumers and producers. In schools and universities complex standardizing systems based upon degrees, majors, minors, cognate minors, and the like, are changing to the point at which no two students move along the same track. In the broader sense even the old ways of integrating a society, methods based on uniformity, simplicity, and permanence are no longer effective and are giving way to a new, more finely fragmented social order based on more diverse and short-lived components we have not yet learned to link together and integrate into the whole. And so it goes.

As the society speeds up change in the outer world the individual is compelled to relearn his environment at every moment. This, in itself, places a unique demand upon the education he pursues and has a profound impact upon it. The people of the past, adapting to comparatively stable environments, maintained longer-lasting ties with their own conceptions of "the-way-things-are." We, moving into a high-transience society, are forced to truncate these relationships. Just as we make and break our relationships with things, places, people, and organizations at an ever more rapid pace, so, too, do we turn over our conceptions of reality, our mental images of the world at shorter and shorter intervals.

Transience, then, the forcible abbreviation of man's relationships, is not merely a condition of the external world. It is within us as well. New discoveries, new technologies, new social arrangements in the external world erupt into our lives in the form of increased turnover rates -- shorter and shorter relational periods. They force a faster and faster pace of daily life. They demand a new level of effective intelligence -- behavior guided by an anticipation of consequences, behavior based upon the reconstruction of experience; not behavior based upon conditioned responses built into structure by trainers engaging in acts of cognition relevant only to an obsolete or at best obsolescent environment, not behavior that sets the stage for the devastating social illness Alvin Toffler calls "future shock." (8)

Any response built into the structure of the learner, if it cannot be changed by him, is a dangerous response to acquire. The educated person, the free person, rethinks his experiences and faces subsequent situations a different person. The trained person is forever the slave of his trainer, no matter how benevolent the trainer, no matter how sophisticated the trainer in his knowledge of prior structures. The behaviorists of today who have arrogated to themselves various titles inherent in social engineering recognize, of course, no ground between behaviors they would build into the structures of students and dark, blank, hopeless uncertainty and insecurity. (9) Not until they have been reborn into the life of effective intelligence will they recognize the security inherent in methods of inquiring, observing, experimenting, and hypothesizing. Thinkers do not see as disastrous the ineffectiveness or inappropriateness of a given behavior because they retain security of procedure, the process by which they reconstruct, rethink, their experiences.

The method of synthesis in philosophy in general and the philosophy of education in particular involves the organization of knowledge into functional as well as congruent relationships -- the formulation of philosophical principles that identify actions, events, things and their consequences. (10) On this basis may I please share with you some basic philosophical principles I have formulated in my attempts to resolve the issue before us -- the issue of consensus cognoscenti versus reconstructio experientiae? The principles include the principle of doublemindedness, the principle of didacticism, and the principle of heurism.

The Principle of Doublemindedness. The first of these is the principle of doublemindedness. If in a pedagogical encounter there is extrinsic motivation, divided attention, doublemindedness, that is, if the goals of the trainer are different from the goals of the trainee, if the demands of the trainer forbid the direct expression of the purposes of the learner, if the entire surrender and wholehearted adoption of the course of action demanded of the trainee by the trainer is impossible, if there is so-called "stern discipling" -- external coercive pressure, if there is motivation through rewards extraneous to the thing to be done, if there is schooling that is merely preparatory, schooling with ends beyond the student's present grasp, if there is exaggerated emphasis upon conditioning designed to produce skill in action independently of thought -- exercises having no purpose but the production of automatic skill, if what is spontaneous and vital in mental action and reaction goes unused untested, then (a) the trainee deliberately revolts or deliberately attempts to deceive others, (b) the outcome is a confused and divided state of interest in which the trainee is fooled as to his own real intent, (c) the trainee tries to serve two masters at once -- on the one hand, he wants to do what he is expected to do, to please others, to get their approval, to be apprehensive of penalty, to "pay attention to the lesson" or whatever the requirement is; but on the other hand, he wants to pursue his own purposes since the evident suppression of their exhibition does not abolish them, (d) he finds irksome the strain of attention to what is hostile to desire, (e) in spite of his outward behavior, his underlying desires determine the main course of his thought and his deeper emotional responses, and his mind wanders from the nominal subject and devotes itself to what is intrinsically more desirable, (f) there is an obvious loss of energy of thought immediately available when he is consciously trying to seem to try to attend to one matter while his imagination is spontaneously going out to more congenial affairs, (g) there is a subtle and permanent crippling of intellectual activity based upon the fostering of habitual self-deception inherent in the doublemindedness that hampers integrity and completeness of mental action, (h) a split is developed between conscious thought and attention and impulsive emotion and desire, (i) reflective dealings with the content of instruction are constrained and half-hearted attention wanders, (j) dealings with the interests of the student by the student become illicit; transactions with them are furtive; the discipline that comes from regulating response by deliberate inquiry having a purpose fails; the deepest concern and most congenial enterprises of the imagination (since they center about the things dearest to desire) are casual and concealed; they enter into action in ways which are unacknowledged; and they are demoralizing because they are not subject to rectification by consideration of consequences.

The Principle of Didacticism. The second of my principles is the principle of didacticism. If the teacher and student relationship at any level, inside or outside the school, is behavioristic in character, if it involves trainers and trainees -- the oppressors and the oppressed, if it involves narrating subjects (the teachers) and patient listening objects (the students), then (a) education becomes an act of depositing in which students are the depositories and the teachers are the depositors, (b) the content of instruction, whether it be descriptive or valuational, is lifeless, petrified, motionless, static, compartmentalized -- alien to the existential experience of the students, detached from the meaning and the totality that engendered it and could give it significance, (c) the training leads the students to memorize mechanically the narrated content, turns them into containers to be filled by the teacher -- thus the more completely he fills the container, the better teacher he is; the more meekly the containers permit themselves to be filled, the better students they are, (d) the approach is irrelevant to the reconstruction of experience of the student, (e) knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable to those whom they consider to know nothing, (f) the approach minimizes and annuls the creative power of the students and encourages their credulity in such a way as to serve the interests of the trainers who care neither to have the world or the experience of the students reconstructed, (g) the interests of the trainers lie in changing the consciousness of the trainees, not the situations which oppress them, for the more they can be led to adapt to the situation the more easily they can be dominated, (h) the approach masks the effort to turn men into automatons and thereby negates their efforts at humanization, (i) the trainers react forcefully against any action in the educational situation which stimulates the critical faculties of the students who seek to solve the problems of their lives, (j) the students who perceive themselves to be oppressed are regarded as pathological cases of a healthy society, marginal individuals who deviate from the general configuration of a good society, and who must be trained to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented view of reality deposited in them, and (k) the educated man is the adapted man because he is better fit for the world as it is.

The Principle of Heurism. If, on the other hand, the teacher and student relationship at any level, inside or outside the school, is heuristic in nature, if it involves modes of inquiring, hypothesizing, problem-solving, if teachers and students are both subjects (a subject being one who knows and acts) rather than subjects and objects (an object being one who is known and is acted upon), then (a) education becomes responding to the intentionalities of the participants, (b) languaging replaces narrating, (c) acts of cognition replace transferrals of information, (d) cognizable objects (referents) intermediate cognitive individuals (the subjects -- the teachers and the students), (e) dialogical relations are used to the fullest capacity of the cognitive actors (teachers and students) to cooperate in perceiving the same cognizable objects (referents) (f) the term subject or teacher-student replaces teacher-of-the-students and subjects or students-teachers replaces students-of-the-teacher, (g) the teacher is no longer merely the one-who-teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue with students, who, in turn, while being taught also teach, all becoming jointly responsible for the process in which they all grow, (h) no one teaches another, nor is anyone "self-taught;" individuals teach each other, mediated by the referents of their world, (i) the teacher-student is not cognitive in his preparation and narrative in his presentation, (j) the teacher-student does not regard cognizable objects (referents) as his private property but as the object of reflection by himself and his students, (k) the teacher-student reconstructs his reflections in the reflection of students, (l) the students are critical coinvestigators in dialogue with the teacher, (m) the teacher studies reality with students and reconstructs his earlier reflections and considerations as the students express their own, (n) education involves a constant unveiling of reality, (o) education strives for the emergence of consciousness and critical intervention in reality, (p) students pursue problems relating to themselves *in* the world and *with* the world and feel increasingly more challenged and obliged to respond to that challenge, (q) authentic reflection considers men in their reactions with the world, (r) students, simultaneously reflecting on themselves and on the world, increase the scope of their perception and begin to direct their observations toward previously inconspicuous phenomena, (s) students develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find themselves and they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality in process, in reconstruction.

In summary, then, if education is carried on by "A" *for* "B" or by "A" *about* "B," if oppressors act upon men to indoctrinate them, condition them, and adjust them to a reality which must remain unreconstructed, then the ensuing behaviors are conditioned behaviors that are, in themselves, acts of violence; if, on the other hand, education is carried on by "A" *with* "B," if the teacher asks himself what he will dialogue with the students about, then the preoccupation with the content of the dialogue is a preoccupation with curriculum in authentic education, mediated by the world, a world which impresses and challenges both teacher and student, giving rise to descriptions and valuations about it impregnated with hopes, anxieties, doubts, and the like.

May I please close in a very, very personal way with a loose paraphrase of a very famous educator? The more I reflect upon the resolution of the issue of consensus cognoscienti versus reconstructio experientiae, the more I am convinced that my hopes for those I love the most in my lifespace are similar in many ways to the hopes I have for my students -- that each be a free, authentic, and independent spirit; that each be an inquiring, hypothesizing, reconstructing person; that each be a humane, compassionate, empathetic individual, and in so doing grant others the freedom to be likewise.

Documentations.

1. Letter to the Author from Arthur G. Martin, Chairman, Associated Organizations for Teacher Education, One Dupont Circle, Washington, D. C., October 2, 1972.

2. *Excellence in Teacher Education: Distinguished Achievement Awards of the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education*, 1972, 1971, 1970.

3. Edward C. Pomeroy, *Beyond the Upheaval*, Thirteenth Charles W. Hunt Lecture, American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, Washington, D. C., 1972, 21 pp.

4. "Performance-Based Recertification Procedure is Sought for Teachers," *Phoenix Gazette*, June 26, 1972, p. 14.

5. "System Monitors Student Teachers," *Phoenix Gazette*, June 27, 1972, p. 14.

6. John Dewey, "The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education," National Society for the Scientific Study of Education, *The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education*, Third Yearbook, Part I, Public School Publishing Company, Bloomington, Illinois, 1904.

7. James John Jelinek, "A Reconstructed Epistemology for Philosophy of Education," *Philosophy of Education: 1969*, Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, Tempe, Arizona, 1969, pp. 17 to 24.

8. Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock*, Random House, New York, 1971, 562 pp.

9. B. F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, Knopf, New York, 1971, 225 pp.

10. B. Othanel Smith, "Philosophy of Education," *Encyclopedia of Educational Research*, Third Edition, Macmillan, New York, 1960, pp. 957 to 964.

CHAPTER 33.

THE CONCEPT OF "MEDIUM" IN EDUCATION.

MICHAEL J. PARSONS.

I.

In this paper I am interested in our notion of a medium in education. No doubt we have all used the phrase "educational media," and no doubt we are all familiar with some of the things that the phrase denotes: films, blackboards, TV, programmed texts, and so on. We might also agree, for it is a widely accepted view, that the role of such "media" in the educational process is more than is suggested by the older term "educational aids." That is, they are not merely ancillary to, or illustrative of, teaching in the classroom, nor does the teacher have a choice whether or not to use them in his teaching. Instead, as we now tend to think, they are omnipresent in teaching, and inescapably so; and if we are to teach we must choose among these devices, if only by default. Education, it seems, must take place through, or by, or with some medium: for no medium, no education.

It is worth noticing that while the study of what used to be called "educational aids" is now, and properly, assuming a large place in Colleges of Education, there is no universally agreed term for the subject of that study. The most frequently suggested are couched in terms either of "technology" or of "media," though there are others (e.g., "communications"); and, since these can be coupled with characteristic teaching-learning options, they give rise to many alternatives in the literature: e.g., instructional media, teaching technology, teaching media, educational technology and most frequently, perhaps, educational media. I have also seen "media technology."

It is apparent that behind these terminological difficulties lie conceptual ones. If education is the kind of activity that is dependent upon a medium, then what kind of activity is that? More concretely one might ask, what is and is not to be counted as a case of a medium in education? Consider the difficulty of setting limits to the list of items that count as cases of educational media. Shall we add the architecture of the school, the social interaction of the students, the character of the teacher? Each of these have been suggested. But clearly the list must have some limits, or the notion of media in education becomes non-discriminative and therefore useless. What distinctions will serve to mark off media from non-media, or, for that matter, one medium from another? The following distinctions, each suggested to me by the journal literature in the field, are all of different kinds: the distinction between a lecture given in person and via TV; between a verbal description of an incident and a film of it; again, between seeing the film and watching the incident itself; between reading a book silently, and hearing it read aloud, whether in person or on record. It may be worth remarking that the word "media" is in educational circles almost always found in the plural. I suspect that one reason for this is that it is more vague, for to name some particular as a medium goes part way to committing oneself to a view of what an educational medium is.

My question, then, is what is our notion of a medium, and what is its place in talk about education? Or, perhaps better, what are the implications of the view that education (or teaching, or learning) is the kind of thing that must be mediated? I approach this question by asking where the word has its natural home, in connection with which activities it is normally used. These seem to me to be, basically, two. In spite of the opinion of Beardsley, who thinks the word is "almost useless," (1) I think that the central uses of "medium" are in connection with two broad, but distinct, kinds of activity, art and communication, and that its use in other cases is peripheral or derivative. Of course, the notion of "communication" may itself be considerably extended by metaphor; here I intend it in a narrow, non-metaphorical sense. Some examples of what are usually accounted "communications media" are: telephone, semaphore, messages in bottles. I think the use of "media" in the phrase "mass media" is to be interpreted largely as it is in connection with communication, though there may be ambiguous cases.

I shall therefore compare the use of "medium" in art with its use in communication, and speculate as to which is appropriate in education. For it happens that education (as also some of the "mass media") has some points of similarity with both art and communication, and it may be that the plausibility of "educational media" rests on these similarities. I shall conclude that the question of the appropriateness, or of the implications of, this phrase is therefore largely a question of how far and how importantly education is to be thought of as like art or like communication.

It might be objected against this procedure that the use of "medium" in art is only a special case of its use in communications, but this of course depends on conceiving art itself as a form of communication. I regard this as one of the metaphorical extensions of the notion of "communication" which I have already disclaimed. The metaphor may have its value, but many things might be said against it. Some of them will be said in the course of my argument.

II.

How has "medium" been used in talking about art? It is true, as Beardsley once again remarks, that even here its uses have been many, and not clearly distinguished. But there is a sense for which it is an appropriate, and perhaps even a traditional, term and it can be carefully stated, as it has been recently by Aldritch. (2) In this sense the "medium" is what the artist works with to achieve his total aesthetic effect; it is what he changes and arranges, and is guided by, in making the work of art. For a painter, it is the appearance of his paint; not, strictly speaking, the paint itself -- the pigment and its ground -- but its appearance; it is this that the painter as such is sensitive to and what, when arranged by him, constitutes his painting. Similarly, in music the medium is sound; in literature, the appearance of words and of meanings, and so on.

It is not to my purpose to attempt a full account of this notion; for that, read Aldritch. Instead I shall ask the subsidiary question: what are the important differences between it and the notion of a medium of communication, since, as I think the use of the term in education seems to borrow something from both?

One might start by observing that one can distinguish fairly clearly between the subject-matter and the content of a work of art, but not, with any ease, between the content and the medium. Thus, when a painter sets out to paint a landscape, he starts with some subject-matter: the objects in the landscape. However, this subject-matter is transformed as it finds a place in the work of art; it is not simply transmitted or arranged, but is changed into something quite different, which for clarity (following Aldritch) may be called the "content" of the work. In such cases the difference between subject-matter and content is radical; they exist, as Plato insisted, on different planes of reality. The subject matter exists as natural objects exist; the content of the work of art is only appearance. The landscape is reduced to two dimensions; what was capable of being touched and smelt is now accessible only to sight (the paint may be touched and smelt, of course, but not the appearance of the paint). The point here is that the landscape as "content" is wholly dependent on the medium. The landscape-as-content is not something which conceivably could have been represented by some other painting, or in some other medium, though the landscape-as-subject matter is. Art, in short, is not a simple and direct reflection of reality, for "subject matter" and "content" are not the same. Of course they are related in some way, for unless there are similarities between them, there is no sense in speaking of subject-matter at all. And in the case of "non-representational" art the difference from communication is even clearer, since communication cannot be without subject-matter. It is the medium of art, then, that determines the character of the content and obliges us to distinguish this from the subject matter. A common phrase for this is to say that the medium here is opaque rather than transparent.

This may be thought of as another way of saying that a medium in art is not a means to an end. For means-end reasoning is appropriate only where the character of the end is empirically but not necessarily connected with the character of the means. A means is something which, when it has brought about the desired end, can be discarded and its precise character is irrelevant to the achieved character of the end. Therefore, in principle (though not always in practice) it would be possible for a different means to have brought about the same end. Means, one may say, are in principle substitutable one for another. (3) This is not the case with a medium in art. The appearance of the paint is not irrelevant when the painting is finished. Rather the medium is the work of art, and if it is removed there is nothing left. If it is substituted for, a different work of art (at best) is obtained.

On the other hand, a medium of communication is, ideally, transparent. I mean by this simply that its function is to reproduce its original material as faithfully as possible. And this original material, the subject-matter, is not to be distinguished from its content, the message, except perhaps where mistakes have been made. A record, for example, of a musical performance is judged to be good just in so far as it reproduces the original performance without distortion, that is, in so far as its subject-matter and content are identical. Minor changes in the recording process are thought of as technical rather than artistic, that is, as better or worse means to the same end, rather than as alternative ends. And if one were to change the medium of communication, e.g., put the music on tape or broadcast it over the radio, we are inclined to think that the content remains the same, though we may debate the technical success of the new presentation. This, it should be clear, makes a medium of communication a case of a means to an end; a medium in this sense is a means of transport.

A common image for a medium in communications is that of a channel. Now a channel is clearly a means to an end; it is a conduit which is calculated to conduct subject-matter from one place to another without changing its character. Making, maintaining and using a channel are technical matters which may be guided, in principle, by calculation and experiment. Moreover, it is easy to see how experiments, in the form of comparisons of efficiency, are to be instituted, for we can easily measure how much information is transmitted and with how little distortion. It may be noted that this justifies thinking of the senses as media of communication. For one may compare the ear and the eye for efficiency in this respect; for example, by having one class read a piece from a book to themselves, reading the same piece aloud to another, similar class, and having a third follow it visually on the page while hearing it read aloud; and comparing the results. In such a case one is comparing communication channels; the medium in the aesthetic sense remains the same throughout: for it is all in words. When the senses are thought of in this way, it is the nature of the case that they can be used as channels only in conjunction with at least one other medium, in either the communications or the aesthetic sense. When one watches TV, for example, the TV is one medium, the eyes and ears another. It is a part of the notion of a medium in communication that one may be subordinated to another, in just the way that one means may be subordinated to another. One might with ingenuity construct a long chain of such dependencies: the eyes may be the medium for watching the TV screen which is the medium for a documentary film in which there appears a photograph... Nevertheless such a chain depends on there being something to be transmitted. There is never, *pace* McLuhan, a medium without something mediated, anymore than there can be a means without an end, for the two notions are conceptually related.

On the other hand, there can be no such hierarchy of dependencies among aesthetic media. If we put together mime and the spoken word, we have not two distinct media but one new one; if we use elaborately painted backdrops on the stage, there is still only one aesthetic medium. It follows that the phrase "mixed-media," which is heard in talk about both art and education, properly refers only to media of communication. Yet all cases are cases of mixed media in the sense that one must always use a sense channel plus something else.

Another way of stating this difference is to say that for communication a message is necessary, for art not. In uncertain cases we may use this as a test, by trying to isolate the message. Suppose it is claimed that the smile on teacher's face is a medium of communication. We may ask, what is the message communicated? It is as if the teacher said, it's another lovely Monday morning and I'm happy to be with you. If that is what the teacher means by it and also what the child understands it to mean, we will agree that the smile was a means of communication. We will not, if the child was puzzled by it, or thought it meant: I've discovered your guilty secret and you won't get away with it. Either way, what the smile cannot be said to communicate is itself: the message that we look for must be something other than the smile itself. Therefore, it must be distinguishable from the medium. And, it is evident, for it to be distinguishable in this way, it must be formulable also in some other medium, as, in the example above, in words. A message is something which in principle can be formulated in alternative media, though not always with equal success. One may therefore conceive it independently of any particular medium, and consider which would be the most suitable medium for its transport. We may ask: does this message lend itself to visual treatment? Then we will use photographs or simplified diagrams. Is it more economic to use mathematical symbols? and so on. This kind of question, which is typical of the communications engineer, assumes that the message is in some sense already determined, that it is of a certain character to begin with, and that the task of the communications engineer is to choose a medium that accords with that character, will distort the message least and be most economic to use. Such choices no doubt leave large areas for disagreement and individual judgment. Nevertheless they are technical choices, in which only a lack of the relevant information leaves room for disagreement. For where the end is determined (i.e., where the message is fixed), disagreement over means can be settled by an increase in knowledge.

In art, on the other hand (to make the contrast explicit), the end is not known in advance, except in the most general sense. If it were known in advance then the specifically artistic work would be already done: the rest, we would say, is mere copying or transcribing. For it is commonplace to say that art consists in the activity of discovering the character or significance of something, of formulating content for the first time; that it is the perception of form, the crystallization of significance out of chaos; and so forth. This I take to be part of our common notion of what art is. It follows from this that in art the "content" is not separable from the medium as a message is separable from the medium of communication, for to separate the content from its medium would necessitate formulating it in another. Such a formulation would have to be either the creation of another work of art, or a reduction of the content of the work of art to a message. Either way no equivalence could be claimed. Art and communication are therefore distinct, and if one insists on saying that a work of art has a message, then one has at least to recognize that it is a peculiar kind of message, one which is unique to that work of art. One cannot ask of it the question that I have said distinguishes the communications engineer: which formulation is most efficient? Similarly to say that art is communication is simply to use the notion of communication loosely.

III.

What light, then, does this contrast of a medium in art with a medium in communication throw on the interpretation of "educational media?" It clarifies, I think, two models that we use to conceptualize the situation in which the phrase is used. It remains, not to choose between these models, but to suggest how they affect our thinking about education and "educational media."

In education today we often ask questions about messages. For example, in a work discussing curriculum revision, we find four features of the process of revision isolated for discussion, of which two are:

"(a) the process of identifying the subject-matter which is to be dealt with within (an) educational unit; (b) the embodiment of that subject-matter in material form, as test, laboratory or classroom materials, and other learning aids;" (4)

It is clear that these are analogous to the kind of questions that I have said is peculiar to the communications engineer. They are analogous, not identical, since the situation of the communications engineer and of the teacher are actually different. The engineer must ask: what representation of this message can be transmitted more economically, and with least distortion? the teacher: what representation of this message offers the best chance of being understood and learned? The criteria of success will differ in so far as these purposes differ. For example some principles of math are commonly presented in schools for the first time in graphic form because they are more easily understood that way, whereas merely as communication algebraic systems of notation may be more efficient.

Such differences, however, are likely to be swamped by the similarities, which lie in what the questions pre-suppose about the medium; i.e., that a message exists independently of any particular embodiment of it, and that the choice of medium is governed largely by the character of this message. Evidently, then, the communications model of "educational media" is appropriate in so far as it is appropriate to conceive education as the learning of a set of messages known in advance to the teacher through whatever means seems most efficient. Education has always had to do with the learning of messages, and is hardly conceivable without them. Moreover, this is a useful way of conceiving the teacher's business. It simplifies his task, emphasizes his power, and focuses attention on his choices, rather than on those of the learner. By making these choices technical ones, that is, by turning them into questions of means to ends, it encourages research, the accumulation of knowledge and technological invention. The teacher becomes a specialist, and can hope for systematic improvement of technique. A clearer name for this conception of "education media" would be "teaching technology."

Similarly the weaknesses of this analogy are related to these assumptions. It is not always obvious that in education a message can be formulated in advance. Sometimes it is more a matter of skills and appreciations than of information. The nature of learning outcomes of these kinds is much debated, but few assimilate them with messages. If anything, it is the other way round. (5) Another way of saying this is to observe that education is also importantly a matter of acquiring dispositions and changing habits, and that some of these seem to lie outside the range of the communications analogy.

In the same way, the choice of medium may properly be affected by consideration of more than the character of the message. It may be that using particular media constantly will affect one's imagination in particular ways, that TV or books may shape one's mode of thinking. In this sense we may say that Gutenberg man differs from Hollywood man, and the medium, while it is not the message, may be as important as the message. (6) Since some of these effects will be held valuable and some not, the teaching technologist must modify his question to allow for this. The difficulty is in relating such questions of value with the questions of communicative efficiency. Shall we agree, for instance, with Arnheim, who thinks that "visual thinking" has been underplayed in education in favor of "linear thinking?" (7) How can such a question be answered? Not, clearly, simply in terms of the greater communicative efficiency of linear thinking. Herbert Read has suggested that certain important ideas are particularly suited to statement in particular media, and that to be unacquainted with the medium is to be at a disadvantage in understanding the relevant idea. (8) It seems not impossible that some ideas can be articulated in words but not in music, in algebraic symbols but not in words, in paint but not in prose. It may also be that the reverse relation holds: that if one is too much in the habit of linear thinking, some other modes of thinking are inaccessible to one. If any of this is plausible then the question becomes, how valuable these ideas or modes of thinking are? At this point we have circled, it seems, from the analogy with communication back to the analogy with art. Such a question is certainly not a technical one, and the necessity of bearing it in mind cannot but embarrass the teaching technologist.

What of the analogy of media in education with media in art? Here one turns up straightaway ancient metaphors that cannot be properly disinterred in the available space. My discussion of them must be even briefer. Both the teacher and the learner have often been thought of as artists; that is, as being concerned with media in education in the way that artists are concerned with media. Of these, however, the metaphor of the teacher as artist, though it may be the more common in rhetoric, seems the less plausible in practice. Its frequency may be due more to a conviction of the importance of teachers than to a sense of its appropriateness; it seems usually to mean no more than that the practice of teaching requires judgments about particulars. It is perhaps arbitrary to say that the companion metaphor of the learner as artist seems more plausible. It may only be that it has been discussed in the literature more in detail. Black, for example, pictures the learner as struggling with different kinds of material (such as mathematical relationships) to arrange it into some comprehensive and significant form. Such a conception throws emphasis on the content as being indistinguishable from the medium. The outcome of the learner's struggle, guided by his intuition, is determined in large part by the particular character of the material struggled with, as the artist's is. (9) The outcome of this activity is whatever the learner manages to formulate and it is not to be construed as a message, for it cannot be known to others in advance. The medium is evidently important in its own character, since the outcome depends in large part on that character. These features, it will be seen, are the obverse of the assumptions just discussed in connection with the communication analogy.

The strengths of the analogy with art, then, will be the obverse of those already discussed. They lie in the fact that the child does have to work at making sense of the lesson, and that what finally counts is the significant pattern that he apprehends. Another way of saying this is that the learner must come to have a feeling for the subject if he is to be said to have learned it: unless a man has at some time appreciated the elegance of a proof or the wit of a poem he cannot be said to know geometry or poetry. This kind of knowledge is not reducible to messages. (10) The complementary weakness of this lies in the plain fact that a child may get a problem wrong even though it seems to him that he has it right, and that this is also important. The aesthetic medium in geometry, to follow the analogy strictly, might be said to be, not geometrical relationships, but the appearance of geometrical relationships: what Susanne Langer might have called Virtual Reasoning, reasoning that has the appearance of validity. But, evidently, Virtual Reasoning may be invalid reasoning, as validity is defined by the consensus of the relevant experts. Indeed, as the history of mathematics demonstrates, it is often a hard thing to learn that what seems obviously right is not so in fact. Many a child starts by finding that, for example, deficit financing is obviously wrong, or that racial segregation is obviously right, and education today must include coming to understand that one's intuitions of certainty may be mistaken. The analogy, in brief, fails to take account of the fact that the artist's imagination, unlike the learner's, has been shaped by a long discipline in his art.

Finally, if the learner is to be thought of as an artist, then he will decide which medium he will work with, for the medium is simply what he finds to be relevant. There is an obvious point in insisting on this. For if the learner is more interested in the shapes and smells of the laboratory than in the color of the litmus, he is not doing chemistry, no matter what the lesson is called. This raises the same question already raised in connection with education as communication: how to decide the relative values of particular media? If a learner works better with music rather than math, with literature rather than philosophy, why should we foist unsympathetic media on him? Do we ask poets to paint, or musicians to make statues? Evidently these questions do not call for technical answers. Yet we can justify, presumably, obliging children to learn at least some of the things that we oblige them to learn; there are some messages that everyone needs if he is to be educated. But even these can be articulated better in some media than in others by different people. It seems that we are not, on the whole, sensitive enough to such variations among people, and that their investigation might well be one of the central topics in the systematic study of "educational media."

IV.

One might summarize the results of this discussion as follows. There are at least two different ways of construing "educational media," both of them important, neither adequate by itself. One of these focuses largely on the teacher's problems, making them technical in character, and construing "media" as a particular kind of means. It implies a predetermined curriculum, and offers to settle the choice of media by measurement and comparison. Such a model suits many elements of our technological society. The second model throws emphasis on the activity of the learner, and on what he can discover and create. His results cannot easily be compared with one another, or with those of other children. The choice of medium is necessarily the learner's. The teacher may offer opportunity and criticism. This model is somewhat out of fashion. A suitable name for this conception of "media" might be "learning media." The phrase "educational media" is systematically ambiguous between these two models, covering both teaching and learning, and the channels of communication and the media of art. This may be a practical advantage, since neither conception seems sufficient.

I have adumbrated the inadequacies of these models of "educational media," which turn out to be complementary; but I have not discussed the possibility of using both models at the same time. Whether these two frame-works are incompatible, or whether they can be made to be compatible with minor adjustments, is a question not to be attempted at the end of a paper.

Documentations.

1. Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958) p. 82.

2. Virgil C. Aldritch, Philosophy of Art, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 35, foll.

3. See R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 15-17, for a discussion of what it is to be a means to an end.

4. J. R. Zacharias and S. White, "The Requirements for Major Curriculum Revision," *School and Society*, 92:2239, (Feb. 22, 1964), p. 66.

5. For a brief summary of the current literature on this topic see Jonas F. Soltis, *An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts*, (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1968), p. 36, foll.

6. The reference is to Marshall McLuhan's *The Medium is the Message*, (New York: Bantam Books, 1967).

7. Rudolph Arnheim, "Visual Thinking," in G. Kepes (ed.) *The Education of Vision*, (Braziller, 1965), pp. 1-14.

8. Most notably in *Icon and Idea*, (New York: Schocken Books, 1965).

9. Max Black, "Education as Art and Discipline," in I. Scheffler (ed.), *Philosophy and Education*, (Allyn and Bacon, 1966), pp. 32-38.

10. cf. Richard Peters, *Ethics and Education*, (Scott, Foresman and Co., 1967), p. 73.

CHAPTER 34.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHIZING.

EVELINA ORTEZA y MIRANDA.

There is no doubt that ordinary language philosophizing has contributed much to the clarification of concepts which are philosophically interesting, among which, for example, are 'freedom,' 'responsibility,' 'knowledge,' 'beliefs,' 'action,' 'intention,' 'caring,' etc. It has also contributed some insights into certain philosophic problems. J. L. Austin's works, for example, the most well known of which is, perhaps, *How To Do Things With Words*, have done much to ease the rigid distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences by suggesting other ways of looking at utterances, given their different functions. In education, such concepts as 'know,' 'learn,' 'teach,' 'indoctrinate,' etc. have been successfully clarified, that is, successful in unpacking their different senses and showing their relatedness, if any, to each other. Talk about them is becoming clear. The verbs 'know' and 'learn,' for example, have been analyzed into such expressions as 'know that,' 'know how to do,' 'know the,' and 'learn that,' 'learn how to do,' 'learn to,' 'learn the' and 'learn to be.' It has also been shown that the relationship between 'teaching' and 'learning' is like that of 'looking' and 'finding' but not 'playing a game' and 'winning' or 'losing' it. One may look for something but not find it and find it even if he is not looking for it. In the same manner, one may teach something to someone but the intended learning is not achieved. The intended learning, however, may be learned by someone without somebody else teaching it to him. The causal relationship does not obtain. On 'playing a game' and 'winning' or 'losing' it, one may play a game and either win or lose. However, if one wins or loses the game, then, it must be the case that he played in the game. In teaching and learning, one cannot say that because learning did or did not take place, then, it must be the case that teaching did or did not take place. On indoctrination, only the untutored philosopher of education would say "Teaching is indoctrination" taking 'is' to be definitionally equivalent as in 'Physical death is the cessation of biological life.' Admittedly, the employment of ordinary language techniques on educational concepts by analytic philosophers of education has resulted in the clarification of their meanings and thus correct use.

But, perhaps, there are certain characteristics of some of the commonly employed techniques or ordinary language which also tend to encourage a proliferation and an acceptance of the different kinds of utterances and different uses of a concept. When these techniques are applied to educational concepts, the suggestion could be that all uses of a given concept and all forms of utterances with regard to it are all equally important and necessary to the practice of education, which is teaching, to the study of practice of education, to the study of formal/institutionalized education or schooling, and to the study of education as a discipline. The reluctance of ordinary language to reject some of these uses, even if they are clearly distant and peripheral to the central interest of education which is, strictly speaking, knowledge, that which is true, analytically/scientifically, is due to its idea that 'each expression has a logic of its own.' And if so, then, each expression must be studied, accepted or rejected on the basis of its logic. This requires its clarification, encouraging analytic philosophers of education to concentrate on elucidating/clarifying educational concepts, giving the impression that analytic philosophy is _all_ clarificatory. Such a generous attitude of ordinary language toward all forms and kinds of utterances encourages the unmanageability of uses of educational concepts, instead of recommending only their _correct_ uses in talking about professional and academic matters of education (using it in all senses above).

Of course, it is false that ordinary language philosophizing is _all_ clarificatory. It is also given to an activity which is normative in intent, namely, _the rational reconstruction of educational concepts and theories_ (if there are any). (1) But that there seems to be certain hindrances/hesitations in engaging in this specific activity is clear from the literature of philosophy of education. To inquire why this is so, this paper looks at two of the commonly employed techniques of ordinary language philosophizing in order to find out if there are certain characteristics in them which encourage such inhibitions. In the process, some difficulties of ordinary language may be also noted.

Brief Description of Ordinary Language Techniques.

Testing a Claim by Examples and Counterexamples. (2) The well-known formulation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for accepting the claim 'S knows that p' is:

'S knows that p' IFF (a) S believes that p, (b) S has adequate evidence that p, and (c) p.

To test the acceptability of these conditions, I present the case of one who claims to know that the capital of England is London and he believes it. But, when asked what his evidence is for saying so, he may not be able to give it. He claims to have learned it before but has now forgotten it. This case shows that the mere fact that 'p is true' and 'x believes that p' are not sufficient conditions for saying that 'x knows that p.' The evidence condition is missing. However, I can argue that he had the evidence at one time. If this is rejected, then, is evidence necessarily limited to the present? If so, only a few knowledge claims can be made. The epistemic conditions may be 'too strong' in its requirements and not discerning of 'good' candidates for the label 'know,' as in the case above.

Or, consider a child who may have been taught to reply '8' to any arithmetical problem, thus '4 plus 4,' '2 plus 2 plus 4,' etc. Everytime he responds his answer is, of course, correct. And the child, because of praises from listeners, believes truly that he knows '4 plus 4 equals 8.' When hearing the child for the first time answer only one of the items, say, '4 plus 6 minus 2,' the listener may, indeed, say that the child knows. The child happens to know the correct answer and he believes something that is true. Yet, these are not sufficient to make the claim that if 'x knows that p' then it follows that 'x believes that p.'

The illustrations show that in testing the acceptability of the epistemic conditions, imaginable possibilities are developed in order to find out if they would fit the schema and if not, whether or not they can be acceptable on other grounds. Here, they fail to fulfill all the conditions posited but it is not altogether possible to deny that 'in a certain sense' they are cases of 'knowing.' The counterexamples suggest that the epistemological conditions are 'too narrow' and find only limited application. The epistemological conditions are then relaxed in order to accommodate 'questionable' cases, especially if the explication of the 'sense' in which such cases are cases of 'knowing' is, more or less, successful.

The Different Senses/Uses of a Given Term. On distinguishing different uses of a given term, consider the following expressions: (1) 'I know that Edmonton is the capital of Alberta.' (2) 'I know that 2 plus 2 is 4.' (3) 'I know that green vegetables are rich in Vitamin A.' (4) 'I know that Russia has a socialistic form of government.' (5) 'I know that bachelors are unmarried men.' (6) 'I know that Mary is a good person.' (7) 'I know that God exists.' From these examples one observes that there are various ways of knowing. And a given way of knowing depends upon that which is claimed to be known, thus knowing _a fact_, knowing _an analytic truth_, knowing _states of affairs_, knowing _a religious claim_, etc. The acceptance or rejection of 'I know' or 'knowing' depends upon what it is that is claimed to be known, that is, whether or not it can be upheld that the object can, indeed, be said to be known in one way or another. This practice is noted in the expression 'knowing in the sense that.'

But notice that the kinds of objects claimed to be known are different from one another, answering to different kinds of evidence (if one can talk of evidences other than empirical/scientific). How is it possible to claim that they are all objects of the locution "I know"? The answer, of course, is that there are different senses of knowing, as there are different senses of truth, and meaningfulness. Each sense of knowing, likewise, of truth, of meaningfulness, has a logic of its own and it cannot be reduced to or judged by the standard of another 'sense of knowing.' "Every mode of reasoning, every type of sentence, and every single sentence will have its own logical criteria to be discovered by examining its individual peculiar uses." (3) There is no attempt to find the 'essence' of knowledge for there is none, but

"We can point to a series of clear paradigm cases of what it is to know something, and clustered around them a range of progressively differing cases in which we do actually apply the word 'knowledge' but, in a quite different context, or for a quite different purpose, with a quite different effect." (4)

The different uses of 'know' for different reasons and occasions are _all equally acceptable_.

Observations on Ordinary Language Techniques. On the practices of ordinary language philosophizing, two observations may be made, namely, (1) its tendency to broaden the meaning of a concept/expression, and (2) its tendency to minimize the logical meaning of a concept/expression by constantly attending to its different and peripheral uses and to items external to it which may be labelled 'extra-linguistic,' such as contextual situation problems.

(1) The broadening of the meaning of a concept. In the paradigm case technique, one sees the broadening of the meaning of a concept through the broadening of the set of criteria on which claims to an expression, for example, 'I know,' should be judged. Allowing legitimacy to the different kinds of 'in the sense that,' depending upon what is claimed to be known (and there can be endless claims!), suggests acceptance of different criteria for the claim 'I know.' Instead of positing a set of criteria for what is to count as an acceptable or not acceptable 'in the sense that,' the expression itself seems to be used to justify the saying 'I know.' Ordinary language is unable to develop such a set of criteria because it is tied to its 'dogma' of 'every expression has a logic of its own' which renders every proposition acceptable, given its own logic.

For this reason, the development of paradigmatic cases seems to be a simple exercise of sorting out different uses of a given concept. Saying that "we can point to a series of clear paradigm cases" is not saying much for the "series of clear paradigm cases" are paradigms only of a certain kind of use of a given term. They are not paradigms of the cases clustered around them that seem to differ (in terms of context, purpose, effect, etc.) from them but to which clustered cases the same term, applied to the paradigm cases, is also actually applied. The cases clustering around the paradigmatic cases have a logic of their own and they can only be judged on that basis. They are also paradigms of the kind of use that they exhibit. They are correct because "....there exist such language habits, conventions or rules that (these sentences) logically could be used to talk about something...." (5)

Antony Flew, for example, in saying that to answer the question "What is philosophy" is to point to various specimens, such as those in Logic and Language, is also saying that these are paradigmatic works of ordinary language philosophizing only. Other kinds of philosophizing have also their own paradigms. Similarly, while some may consider 'I know that 2 plus 2 is 4' or 'I know that Edmonton is the capital of Alberta' as a 'clear case' or 'strict sense' of 'know,' still it is not a paradigm for 'I know Mary very well.' The latter, with its own logical features, is a paradigm of cases of 'knowing in the sense of personal, intimate acquaintance' while the former is a paradigm of 'knowing analytic/empirical truth.' Just because 'I know that 2 plus 2 is 4' is often considered a 'clear case' of knowing, it does not follow that 'I know Mary very well' is not. It is questionable to speak of 'strict sense' or 'central case' without specifying what the case is 'central to' or 'strict sense of.'

Consider, too, the exercise of providing examples and counterexamples. The attempt is to develop cases which are distant to and clearly not identical with the paradigms and to find out if they would be impossible to deny as 'good' epistemic claims even if they do not seem to meet any of the epistemic requirements. But this is a futile exercise because with every counterexample presented, new logical features are also added, some of which may be extra-linguistic, which are not necessarily present in the clear cases. The newly developed cases exhibit a logic of their own and consequently cannot be accounted for nor rejected completely by the epistemic conditions. It is therefore easy to show that the epistemic formulation is inadequate and limited because these cases argue that in one sense or another they are certain kinds of 'S knows that p.' They conform to common linguistic behaviour, that is, to the standard uses of the ordinary expression 'S knows that p.' One can point to standard situations to which they are applied. And, of course, may there not be a situation that would arise that would justify the use of any expression that is at the pleasure of anyone? (6)

There seems to be no point, therefore, in attempting to develop the epistemological conditions (or any other set of conditions for any concept) intended to cover or account for knowledge claims for all are acceptable by virtue of the expressions 'in the sense that,' 'in a way,' 'in a manner of speaking,' etc. Putative contrary cases are accommodated in some ways or another; the different senses of a term are brought into play, thus weakening the discriminatory force, either individually or collectively, of the set of criteria which is used to judge the acceptability of a given expression.

Of course, it may be argued that ordinary language does not accept any expression to be meaningful simply because 'it has a logic of its own.' Admitting that the set of criteria for what is meaningful is disputed, still ordinary language would say that some discriminations are possible. For example, claims such as 'The ordinary house is beautiful,' 'Pain is pleasant,' 'Self-destruction is good,' 'Two equals three,' or 'Stonehenge is the capital of England,' all seem problematic, in one degree or another. Surely, to say that 'a claim is logical' is, at least, to grant it a measure of respectability and to say that 'a claim has its own logic' is by extension to carry over the suggestion of respectability granted to the logical. If 'the logic of the claim' turns out, upon examination, to be 'illogical,' as in the above cases, then, we reject that claim. (7)

But, perhaps, this is what ordinary language philosophizing cannot do. For it warns against forcing "actual language to accord with some preconceived model," say the model of 'logical' which is derived from an 'ideal language.' It is not clear, Austin would say, whether or not the above examples are clearly true or false, analytic or synthetic. It is not clear whether or not: 'good' is a part of the meaning of 'self-destruction;' 'pain' is a part of the meaning of 'pleasant.' And is an 'ordinary house' either 'beautiful or not?' Discussing the problem of 'being extended' and 'being shaped,' Austin says: "Suppose now someone says 'x is extended but has no shape.' Somehow we cannot see what this 'could mean' -- there are no semantic conventions, explicit or implicit, to cover this case: yet it is not prohibited in any way -- there are no limiting rules about what we might or might not say in extraordinary cases." (8) Likewise, in matters above, there are no semantic conventions which would prohibit someone from saying them. "An actual language," says Austin, "has few, if any, explicit conventions, no sharp limits to the spheres of operation of rules, no rigid separation of what is syntactical and what is semantical." (9) In problematic utterances, the thing to do "is to set out the description of the facts at length" (10) to find out whether or not the utterances are acceptable. If, for example, we find out that 'an ordinary house' is a 'beautiful house' to a certain degree or in some respects, then, surely, the sentence 'An ordinary house is beautiful' should be true to that certain degree or in some respects. But it is not clearly either true or false that it is a 'beautiful house.' Surely, there could be a 'sense' in which 'ordinary' could be 'beautiful.' On 'Stonehenge is the capital of England:' this is acceptable because it is meaningful. There are no logical contradictions. To say that it has to be rejected because it is false is a matter of fact and not of meaning. Moreover, to say 'that which is false deceives and must not be uttered' is to introduce a moral point of view into an analysis of language and the activities we perform in using language saying "We ought not to tell lies." But this is a different matter now.

"Two equals three" is a different problem and has to be argued for in a different way. In the arbitrary arithmetical system, the intrinsic meaning of 'two' and 'three' is never such that we can say 'two equals three.' One simply does not talk this way arithmetically. A technical language such as that of arithmetic rejects an utterance, in the context of arithmetic, that deviates from the strict/technical use of arithmetical terms. This is, of course, the attraction of an 'ideal' or 'technical' language. It never breaks down, says Austin.

Now, in ordinary language, could there be a 'sense' of 'equals' which renders 'two equals three' sensible? It is not uncommon, for example, to hear that 'One person's ability equals that of two' suggesting that 'equals' means 'amounts to' or 'comparable to.' And what of 'He *is* the whole world to me?' Note that the use of 'equals' is qualified in order for 'two equals three' to be sensible, thus two *persons' ability*. In 'The size of two of these apples equals the size of three of those' the qualification is *the size of the apples*. It may be said that 'equals' is stretched too much, accommodating different phenomena. This, of course, is the problem of ordinary language which was noted earlier in the use of 'I know.' 'Equals' or 'equals to' in ordinary discourse is not used in its strict arithmetical meaning which is numerical identity but used in its peripheral and extended senses thus making 'two equals three' sensible. Using it this way, 'equals to' is vague and there can be no imposition on its limits or else its use in ordinary language becomes artificial. This is to say that the boundaries of concepts in natural language are fuzzy. In arithmetical discourse, however, it is never the case that 'two equals three' but in ordinary language it can be the case that 'two equals three' because the use of 'equals' is qualified in *the context of some particularities*. And, of course, any one can teach someone that 'two equals three' even if it is false, considering that 'teach' does not have any built-in norms/standards or criteria. Austin puts the problem of ordinary language in this way:

> "Ordinary language breaks down in extraordinary cases. (In such cases, the cause of the break-down is semantical.) Now no doubt an *ideal* language would *not* break down, whatever happened. In doing physics, for example, where our language is tightened up in order precisely to describe complicated and unusual cases concisely, we *prepare linguistically for the worst*. In ordinary language we do not: *words fail us*. If we talk as though an ordinary must be like an ideal language, we shall misrepresent the facts." (11)

A linguist, of note, puts the problem similarly:

> "Sensitive students of language...have long been attuned to the fact that natural language concepts have vague boundaries and fuzzy edges and that, consequently, natural language sentences will very often be neither true, nor false, nor nonsensical, but rather true to a certain extent and false to a certain extent, true in certain respects and false in other respects." (12)

The constant use of such modifiers as 'sort of,' 'typical,' 'in essence,' 'in a manner of speaking,' 'in the sense that,' 'mostly,' 'largely,' 'pretty much,' and other similar expressions, which the linguist calls "hedges," is evidence of this claim. Their use and effect on truth conditions can only be sensible if the corresponding sentences admit of degrees of truth. In a study on category membership of an individual or object, which he cites, it was found out that people think of members of a given species not simply as being birds or non-birds, but as birds to a certain degree. Any attempts, he says, "to limit truth conditions for natural language sentences to true, false, 'nonsense' will distort the natural language concepts by portraying them as having sharply defined rather than fuzzily defined boundaries." This led him to conclude that "in natural language, truth is a matter of degree, not an absolute." This, of course, does not mean that one despairs because of vagueness and fuzziness of degree words. There can be a serious study within formal semantics of the logic of fuzzy concepts. For example, to say 'x is a bird' is also to say 'x flies.' But not all birds fly. How, then, is the problem of entailment argued? We may say that 'once a bird has a certain degree of birdiness, say 0.7, then it flies to degree 0.7.' There is a degree of entailment which is also the degree of necessary truth.

Unless, of course, an utterance is totally nonsensical, such as 'Nor here neither was,' and there is nothing that can be done about it, ordinary language philosophizing suggests, implicitly that ordinary language is correct, just as it is. If 'category mistakes' are, sometimes, committed, they are resolved, not by appealing to a criterion of correctness outside of language, and certainly not to an 'ideal' or 'artificial language,' but by a close attention to and examination of the logical characteristics of such expressions in which these mistakes obtain. It is, indirectly, suggested that ordinary language is meaningful and impossible to misuse. Matters of philosophic problems, for example, the problem of whether or not one knows what the other person is feeling/thinking, such that it is problematic whether or not one can speak of 'knowing that the person is sad' is resolved by evoking evidence in the actual fact that we do speak of 'knowing what Mary is thinking about,' 'knowing how Mary feels.' (13) And we are understood by those around us when we do speak in this way. The actual linguistic use determines acceptability while the importance of 'proper uses of words' and the function of philosophy to say what these 'proper uses of words' are is minimized, if not obscured.

Ordinary language practices tend to discourage the meaning of a concept from dictating the kinds of cases that can be and cannot be drawn/deduced from it. Rather, the meaning of a concept is 'reformed' or 'revised' by fitting it into the phenomenon on which it is being tried on or employed. In our example, the objects that are claimed to be known, now dictate the meaning of 'know' instead of the meaning of 'know' dictating whether or not such objects are cases/instances of 'know.' The result of this practice is to say: "I know that which is true and true in any of the following senses: analytic, synthetic, scientific, personal acquaintances, states of affairs, religious, moral, etc." But "to philosophize is not to accommodate itself to the phenomenon in question but rather to assimilate and adjust the phenomenon to its own scheme," (14) that is, to its own rules of meaning and talking, in order that talk/discourse about the phenomenon may be 'reformed' and made meaningful. The appeal is to the rules of the use of 'know,' which rules are arbitrary to a given theory of meaning but not to matters of factuality/evidence, which are empirical, not philosophic, problems. To examine the meaning of a word is not to examine the 'state of affairs' to which it refers. For the question is with the use/meaning of a word, not with the so-called 'facts,' whether they be so or not. "Words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things...." However, it is admitted that "when we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again not merely at words (or meanings, whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk about." (15) But, before we can have a sharp perception of any given reality, we must have a sharpened awareness of the words which we apply to it. ".... We need to prise (words) off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness and can relook at the world without blinkers." (16) The meaning of a term is clarified by inquiring into and attending to the rules governing its use. Thus, to philosophize in education is to be clear and precise with what is meant when one speaks of 'knowledge,' of 'teaching,' of 'learning,' etc., which is also to say that one is clear with regard to the rules governing the uses of such terms. It is wrong to say "I know that there are ghosts in Okotoks" or to say "Now that the learners have learned the spelling of certain words, we have to find out if they, in fact, spell them correctly." And we have to stop talking of 'knowing as a process,' but say 'coming to know.' There is no need to say 'strong sense' or 'weak sense' of knowing for the practice could lead to a broadening of its meaning if not to its contradiction, as in Scheffler's case.

Scheffler's 'Weak Sense' and 'Strong Sense' of Knowing. (17) Scheffler, in speaking of a 'weak sense' and a 'strong sense' of knowing, is able to account for cases that seem to be a certain kind of knowledge but which cannot fulfill all the requirements of the epistemic conditions. This raises some questions with regard to the expressions 'strong and weak senses of knowing' and 'knowing.'

The expressions 'weak sense' and 'strong sense' are vague, suggesting degrees of intensity. Both are 'degree words.' One's sense of knowing can progress from a 'weak' to a 'strong' sense, as though in a continuum. But it is odd to say: "I know weakly, or know strongly, that the capital of Alberta is Edmonton." It is admitted that 'I know' claims serve a double function. That is, they say something about the speaker and something else as well. To say "I know that Edmonton is the capital of Alberta" says something about 'I' as well as something about 'a state of affairs.' Hence, it is not always clear whether 'knows strongly or weakly' refers to the knower or to that which is claimed to be known. If it refers to the latter and that which is claimed to be known is absolutely true, what is the reason for calling it knowing in its 'strong sense?' If that which is claimed to be true is true, then, it is true. To qualify it as either 'strong' or 'weak' is unnecessary and odd.

If 'knows strongly or weakly' refers to the speaker, we also have some problems. When one says "I strongly believe in God," this means that the believer holds his belief in a certain manner, that is, strongly or with conviction. Other believers share the same belief but they do not hold it to the same degree of conviction as others, thus judged 'weak believers.' The belief itself is neither strong nor weak; it is simply a belief. Grammatical acceptance of the expression 'strong beliefs' or 'weak beliefs' (adjective + noun) and our use of it in ordinary discourse have misled us to say that some beliefs are 'strong' and some 'weak.' But 'weak' or 'strong' is not applicable to beliefs but to the reaction of the believer who holds such beliefs. Similarly, if 'I know in a strong sense' is permitted, 'strong sense' applies to the knower who claims to know. 'Strong' in 'strong sense' functions as an intensifier of one's knowing something; similarly, 'very' in 'very sure' functions as a reinforcer of one's feelings of being sure. They function psychologically but do not add a bit of truth to that which is already true. It is a description of one's reaction to that which he claims to know. As a reaction/feeling toward an epistemological object, it does not have a public place in the assessment of that which is claimed to be true or false. One speaks of a 'strong believer' but not of a 'strong knower.' One says: "I believe but I doubt" but not "I know but I am not sure." 'I believe,' like 'being sure,' meaning 'feeling sure,' but unlike 'I know,' partakes of degrees of intensity, conviction, feeling, which are psychological, not epistemological, matters. And when one allows degrees of knowing and refers this to that which is claimed to be known, then, one also suggests degrees of truth, which is questionable. Scheffler, in accommodating different sorts of knowing, broadens the expressions 'know' and 'knowledge' which in the practice and study of education are already unmanageable terms.

It has been evident with regard to the epistemic conditions that it is difficult to imagine how different senses/uses of a certain term can be accounted for or covered by one set of conditions. For judging a given expression, in the manner of ordinary language, means taking into account the speaker, the context, the purpose, the effect, etc. "It is commonly impossible to distinguish between different senses of a word without considering how it is used in context." (18) And by 'context,' is meant "at least, the time, the place, the situation, the identity of the speaker, the subjects which form the immediate focus of interest, and the personal histories of both the speaker and those he is addressing." (19) The use of a concept in ordinary language philosophizing is easily broadened by attending to such extra-linguistic elements, instead of strictly limiting its attention to the syntactic and strict semantic features of linguistic expression.

(2) Minimization of the logical meaning of a concept. In allowing the diverse uses of a given concept, on the ground that they are ordinarily so used, the tendency to broaden and consequently empty the meaning of a concept is encouraged. But any given concept has 'in' it what may be called its 'logical meaning' which is 'inherent' in it. The 'logical meaning' of 'male' is 'man.' To the often used example, 'bachelor,' its logical meaning is 'unmarried, male, adult person.' 'Logical' means that any given concept necessarily entails a given meaning which may be called its 'original,' 'primitive,' or 'undefinable' meaning. If such a meaning is violated, then, there is a contradiction or nonsensicality in the expression. The utterance 'A male is a female' is a semantic nonsensicality, although acceptable syntactically.

The proper use of a concept clearly depends upon whether or not its logical meaning has been violated. Every other proposed meaning must be judged on its degree of closeness to it. For the logical meaning of a concept is its public meaning which is independent of any speaker but is inherent in the concept itself. It may be extended, or other meanings may be derived from, hence, peripheral to or parasitic on, it, but at all times, the logical meaning must be true for all speakers who employ the concept. It is the standard for accepting or rejecting these other uses. There is total agreement on its use regardless of contextual situations because it is independent of them. The other meanings derived from it may be relative to and partake of the subjective interests and inclinations of the speaker. There need be no agreement on them for they do not belong to the logical meaning of the term but to the speaker's idiosyncracies, hence, private to him.

Ordinary language recognizes the logical meaning of a concept, evident in the expressions 'paradigms' and 'clear cases.' But, along with the logical meaning other meanings derived from it are also accepted, given the context of their uses. Given varied contexts there are varied meanings, thus minimizing if not obscuring the significance of the 'paradigms' and 'clear cases.' To say 'the speaker is using this particular term in this sense' and to say 'the other speaker, using the same term, is using it in its other sense,' may be clarifying. But, it also suggests that meanings are private and individual; they are all stipulations. There is no need for terms and their meanings to control us. To stipulate is, of course, a handy device, essential to some philosophic discourses; but unable to settle substantial questions. Its arbitrary characteristic, arbitrary to the speaker, always seems to lack intellectual rigor unless the speaker is Einstein who is giving the term 'relativity' an entirely new meaning.

The argument here is that those in the practice and study of education must begin to employ public language, which consists only of logical meanings of key educational concepts, in discoursing about educational problems. Encouraging the different senses/uses of a concept, which may be acceptable when talking about ordinary matters but, perhaps not, when talking about educational problems, may lead philosophy of education back to its practice of encouraging private languages (stipulations), understandable only to those who held allegiance to the same philosophic thought. In the past, one's answer to "What is knowledge?" (and answers to other questions as well) made sense to another only if he knew the speaker to be a pragmatist, or a realist, or whatever. The private languages, with their 'hidden assumptions,' 'beliefs,' 'creeds,' etc. prevented philosophers from doing a cooperative examination of philosophy of education. But where is the need to talk of 'hidden assumptions,' 'contextual situations,' etc. to find out if 'Education is experience,' 'To teach is to cause one to learn' or 'To teach is to care' are instances of knowledge claims? or definitions? The need to say "It depends upon one's philosophy of education?" Would ordinary language say: "It depends upon how one is using his terms?" Perhaps not. But it would also hesitate to say: "In the context of professional/academic matters of education, these terms should only be used in this particular way."

In sum, the question of ordinary language philosophizing is that in mastering the paradigm case technique which, says Flew, is "the clue to the whole business (of linguistic philosophy)," one distinguishes and sorts out different uses of a given concept and finds them all acceptable in one way or another.! (20) The distinctions, capable of distinguishing one use/meaning of a concept from other uses/meanings, are nonetheless equally valued and accepted, given their respective contexts. Not one is distinguished, that is, given value/valued over the others. "What is the meaning of 'x'?" is interpreted to be a request for mere description of meaning, rarely a request for legislation of appropriate rules to be laid down and adopted with regard to the strict use of 'x.' So, what is the use of distinctions when no direction can be drawn from them on how one ought to use a given concept in education?

In part, the problem of analysis is its concentration on its function of " ... (reporting) how language functions in some realm of discourse; it doesn't impose arbitrary standards of precision on the performance." (21) One may find, for example, that a given educational concept has overlapping ranges of uses or that there is vagueness and ambiguity in educational language which is functional to the performance of the proper social role of education. There is no attempt to remove such imprecision because to do so is to render the language of education incapable of performing its social role. (22) The concept is judged, effective or not, on the basis of its role. But whether or not the concept should play such a role in a particular discourse is not questioned. On slogans, for example, the point is not to get rid of them in educational discourse but to make them more effective in their role by " ... (reducing) the initial systematic ambiguity of a slogan by deliberately restricting or delimiting its application to some limited set of proposals within the larger amorphous class." (23)

But to take ordinary language to be primarily reportorial or descriptive of language is to miss the point of ordinary language as a theory of meaning. Any given theory of meaning rests upon a set of distinctions which are the 'bed rock' of a theory. The framers of a theory of meaning choose, either arbitrarily or deliberately among them for specific purposes. If the choice is deliberate, then the theory of meaning is, to a degree, disguised proposals and/or prescriptions. (24) For example, when one analyzes a concept and he claims that now there is a 'clear' understanding of it, this is to say that the 'correct' rules governing the concept's behaviour is now discerned. And its corresponding correct use may now be recommended. Analyzing the concept resulted in its revised meaning which is usually claimed to be the 'correct' one. There has been a "systematic restatement" of the concept and it is better able to exhibit "the real form of the fact" which is being inquired into, whereas previously it could not do so. (25) Evidence of recommended correct uses of educational terms is now found in philosophy of education literature. 'Education' is now divorced from 'schooling;' 'teaching' is talked independent of 'learning.' This suggests that these terms are now used correctly which, in turn, suggests the prescriptive/normative aspect of ordinary language philosophizing, which is not denied. But, perhaps, it is not taken seriously enough such that it directs its attention to the rational reconstruction of concepts and theories of education (if there are any) that have been clarified. The elucidation of concepts remains to be the occupation of a number of analytic philosophers of education. And as the techniques of ordinary language become specialized, they give rise to problems of their own which, in turn, require attention and study, relegating problems of systematization of concepts for another time. And the seriousness of Professor George F. Kneller's correct observation is missed. Analysis, he says,

> "... has illuminated individual educational concepts and concept pairs (for example, teaching and learning) but no analytic philosopher has yet sought to coordinate or systematize major educational concepts. In time analysts may undertake such systematizing; to date they have shown no taste for it." (26)

Of course, the reply could be that problems of systematization of concepts cannot be undertaken now for there is still much to be done in analyzing individual concepts and their relatedness and non-relatedness to each other. To systematize prematurely would be just as questionable as not to systematize at all. Systematization of all educational concepts requires the cooperative endeavour of philosophers of education.

The above reply is, of course, correct. However, it is not completely convincing. There remains the suspicion that ordinary language philosophizing is tied to its 'dictum' that 'every proposition has a logic of its own.' To systematize propositions means to relate or connect them with one another. But how can this be done, given their different logics? To move from the analytic to the empirical then to the judgmental, for example, is to cross over from one logic to another and this is simply questionable. To reduce certain kinds of propositions to other kinds is to go against the keyword of ordinary language philosophizing, which is "autonomy, the repudiation of logical assimilation by favoured types of statement and of distortion of use by reduction of one sort of statement to another." (27) Philosophers of education, fearful of falling into the is-ought controversy vacillate between being solely a description of language or being both a description of language and a prescription of linguistic behaviour. To deny the latter completely is to misunderstand ordinary language as a theory of meaning, as stated earlier. On the other hand, engaging in it is not always without philosophic difficulties. Consequently, after its clarificatory activities, ordinary language falls back on its practice of accepting all forms of utterances and discourses as they are. Or, in its more heroic moments, ordinary language

".... (tries) to preserve a balance between (the) 'formalizer's dream' that non-formalized language really is, or ought to be replaced by, a calculus; and the Humpty Dumpty nightmare that there is, at least in those parts of it which most concern philosophers, no logic or order at all." (28)

Putting aside the conceptual problem of 'preserve a balance,' to attend to the logical meaning of a concept and at the same time take account of contextual situations in an attempt to 'preserve a balance' between them may be a near impossibility. It is to 'combine' formal and informal logic, deduction and induction, logic and discovery. But the former term in these expressions is necessarily restrictive and talks of necessity while the latter term is open-textured and admits of endless possibilities. Necessity is in the talk, in the language, employed in talking about objects, problems, situations, experiences, etc. but it is not in the objects, problems, situations, experiences, etc. which are in the world. Objects, problems, etc. which are in the world cannot be prescribed but talk about them can and ought to be prescribed.

As suggested earlier, the activity of prescribing the correct use of terms/concepts, that is, how certain terms ought only to be used, is not necessarily against the 'spirit' of ordinary language philosophizing. Ordinary language can be "improved upon" primarily because ordinary language serving the practical business of life is fed mainly by experiences "available to ordinary men throughout most of civilized history" and is not quite subject to the "... resources of the microscope and its successors." (29) Conceivably, superstition, error, and fantasy may have become incorporated in ordinary language. Moreover, if our interests are "more extensive or intellectual than the ordinary," (30) then, perhaps, they would not be served best and completely by ordinary language. Having discovered certain facts about ordinary usage, for example, its inadequacy to meet the demands of a more complex interest, for example, the improvement of the language of practice of education and the development of a professional language, "it will not do to rest content with that, as though there were nothing more to be discussed and discovered. There may be plenty that might happen and does happen which would need new and better language to describe it in.... There may be extraordinary facts, even about our everyday experience, which plain men and plain language overlook." (31) "Essential though it is as a preliminary to track down the detail of our ordinary uses of words, it seems that we shall in the end always be compelled to straighten (to improve) them out to some extent." (32) To clarify ordinary language is the "begin-all" although not necessarily the "end all" of philosophic activities. This is also to say that projects of linguistic reforms and thence the creation of a special/technical vocabulary/language cannot be countenanced if there has been no prior clarification and understanding of what ordinary language (which may figure in a technical study) is like if it is that which is being reformed. Clearly, "ordinary language...in principle...can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded." (33) But this cannot be achieved if philosophers of education continue to occupy themselves exclusively with the task of clarifying/elucidating educational concepts, limiting themselves to the employment of the two commonly used techniques of ordinary language philosophizing, which, as shown in this paper, have certain tendencies which are not necessarily desirable, given the need of the study and practice of education: the development of a public language. Ordinary language philosophizing must now engage seriously and explicitly in its normative activity and reform our language of education. Or else, it remains to be viewed as mere therapy, a curing of 'mental cramps,' and not necessarily constructive to problems of education.

To conclude: It is common knowledge that the language employed by those in the study and practice of education is embarrassingly rich. There is no need to increase its riches by allowing in it all sorts of 'in the sense thats' of a given term nor by giving room to all sorts of utterances on the ground that they cannot be judged acceptable or not by a set of criteria which is independent of them because it is of a different, hence, imposed logic. The task now is to restrict talk or language of education to the logical meaning of its key concepts and to attend to their formal consequences, which is also to say that we ought to reform our language of education. Focussing on logical meaning, which is public language, of key educational concepts, hopefully leads to the development of a professional language of education common to all those in its study and practice. And the task of a professional language of education is to discriminate between and among certain kinds of utterances and linguistic assertions about education, to sort them out and to judge whether or not their characteristics warrant their right to belong to a body of knowledge of practice of education/teaching, of formal education/schooling, and of education as a discipline. A professional language of education ought to be, must be, a language internal and indigenous to education, that is, necessarily derived from the concept 'education,' hence appropriate to its central activities; which common language is employed by professionals/academicians of education when communicating and discussing with each other professional/academic matters of education and when making judgments about them. (34)

Documentations.

1. For the purpose of this paper, a quotation of the definition of the above will suffice: "Explication, as here understood, is not a mere description of the accepted usages of the terms under consideration: it has to go beyond the limitations, ambiguities, and inconsistencies of common usage and has to show how we had better construe the meanings of those terms if we wish to arrive at a consistent and comprehensive theory... (It is adequate) in the sense that the explication provides a reasonably close *analysis* of the commonly accepted meaning of the explicandum...and secondly in the sense that the explication achieves a "*rational reconstruction*" of the explicandum, i.e., that it provides, together perhaps with other explications, a general conceptual framework which permits a consistent and precise restatement and theoretical systematization of the contexts in which the explicandum is used..." Carl G. Hempel, "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning," in Leonard Linsky, ed., *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language*. University of Illinois Press, 1952, p. 183.

2. In this paper the epistemic conditions are used as the object of the employment of these techniques.

3. Stephen Toulmin, *An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics*. Cambridge University Press, 1950, p. 83.

4. A. Phillips Griffiths, "Introduction," in A. Phillips Griffiths, ed., *Knowledge and Belief*. Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 6.

5. P. F. Strawson, "On Referring," in Antony Flew, ed., *Essays in Conceptual Analysis*. London: Macmillan, 1956, p. 33.

6. *Cf*. Professor Waismann's discussion on the 'open texture' nature of empirical problems in "Verifiability," in Antony Flew, ed., *Logic and Language*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968, pp. 117-144. First Series.

7. This point was raised by Professor David D. Jenkins, University of Calgary, for which I am grateful.

8. J. L. Austin, "The Meaning of a Word," in J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock, eds., *J. L. Austin: Philosophical Papers*. Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 68.

367.

9. Ibid., p. 67.

10. Ibid., p. 68.

11. Ibid.

12. George Lakoff, "Hedges: A Study in Meaning Criteria and the Logic of Fuzzy Concepts." Paper read at the Workshop in Linguistics and Semantics. April, 1972. University of Western Ontario.

13. For other related points on this problem, see: J. L. Austin, "Other Minds," op. cit., pp. 76-116.

14. George L. Newsome, Jr., "Philosophical Analysis as Conceptual Revision: An Analysis of Two Theories of Meaning," in Harold B. Dunkel, ed., Philosophy of Education. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society, 1970, p. 30.

15. J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," op. cit., p. 182.

16. Ibid.

17. See Israel Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman, 1965.

18. F. Waismann, "Language Strata," in Antony Flew, ed., Logic and Language. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966, p. 12. Second Series.

19. P. F. Strawson, "On Referring," op. cit., p. 42.

20. See: Abraham Edel, "Analytic Philosophy of Education at the Crossroads," Educational Theory, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring, 1972), p. 135; Harry S. Broudy, "The Role of Analysis in Educational Philosophy," Educational Theory, Vol. 14, No. 4 (October, 1964), 265.

21. James E. McClellan and B. Paul Komisar, "Preface," to C. D. Hardie, Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory. New York: Teachers College Press, 1968, p. ix.

22. Ibid., p. viii.

23. B. Paul Komisar and James E. McClellan, "The Logic of Slogans," in B. Othanel Smith and Robert H. Ennis, eds., Language and Concepts in Education. Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1962, p. 196.

24. The point on theories of meaning being prescriptive is from George L. Newsome, Jr., "Philosophical Analysis as Conceptual Revision: An Analysis of Two Theories of Meaning," _op_. _cit_., pp. 20-33.

25. Gilbert Ryle puts it this way: ".... there is, after all, a sense in which we can properly inquire and even say 'what it really means to say so and so.' For we can ask what is the real form of the fact recorded when this is concealed or disguised and not duly exhibited by the expression in question. And we can often succeed in stating this fact in a new form of words which does exhibit what the other failed to exhibit." "Systematically Misleading Expressions," in A. G. N. Flew, ed., _Logic and Language_. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968, p. 36. First Series.

26. George F. Kneller, "Logic and Analysis," in George F. Kneller, ed., _Foundations of Education_. New York: Wiley, 1971, p. 287. Third edition.

27. Morris Weitz, "Oxford Philosophy," _The Philosophical Review_, Vol. LXII, No. 2 (April, 1953), 206.

28. Antony Flew, "Philosophy and Language," in his edited collection, _Essays in Conceptual Analysis_. London: Macmillan, 1956, p. 18.

29. J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," in J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock, eds., _J. L. Austin_: _Philosophical Papers_. Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 185.

30. _Ibid_.

31. J. L. Austin, "The Meaning of a Word," _ibid_., p. 69.

32. J. L. Austin, "How to Talk," _ibid_., p. 134.

33. J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," _ibid_., p. 185.

34. The problems relative to the development of a professional language of education, which is to say that such a language is, perhaps, not quite developed, are not within the scope of this paper.

CHAPTER 35.

WARNING: DO NOT INNOVATE EXCEPT WITHIN EXISTING GUIDELINES.

CALVIN C. NELSON.

The explanations of natural phenomena accepted at one time are not necessarily those that are accepted at another time. As new observations are made and as existing concepts are re-examined, different understandings of man and his universe emerge. Thus, our understandings of man and nature have gradually changed over the centuries.

The process of change is not always a smooth one. If specific explanations are widely held and if new interpretations represent extreme deviations from what is currently held to be true, strong resistance to the new explanation can be expected. History is replete with examples of this, and virtually no area of human inquiry has been spared. It was present when Galileo proposed new theories about astronomical phenomena which differed from prevailing viewpoints. Hegel surely encountered it when he took exception to the Kantian philosophy of the late seventeenth century. Freud's interpretation of human behavior also met significant resistance. It, along with the Darwinian theory of evolution is still being opposed. No doubt, the advocates of probability, non-spatial geometry and infinity were scorned by mathematicians when they first suggested these concepts.

Education is no exception even though (or perhaps because) much of the existing body of knowledge about instruction lacks clear definition. Thus, Dewey's explanations probably represented too great a cognitive leap for an advocate of Christian Wolf or Johann Herbart.

Collingwood considered this resistance phenomena when he noted that Sir Arthur Eddington in his 1928 *Gifford Lectures* reminded his audience that Hegel's anti-Newton stance regarding the movement of the planets was essentially post Einstein in its nature. Collingwood observes that it is significant for a distinguished scientist such as Eddington to note approximately one hundred years after the fact that there were grains of truth in Hegel's *Naturphilosophie*; and further that he felt it necessary to apologize to his listeners for making the discovery. Collingwood wonders "how far was the habitual and monotonous execration of Hegel by nineteenth-century natural scientists due to the fact that he violently disliked the physics of his own day, and demanded the substitution for it of a physics which, it turns out, was to be in effect the physics that we now have?" (1)

The problem of obtaining some degree of acceptance of new explanations becomes greater as these explanations are institutionalized and backed up with the force of law and social pressures. Certainly Galileo must have experienced this with respect to the church. It is interesting to imagine the problems to be encountered if some future educator developed an explanation of instruction which, when implemented, might require only two days a week instructional time, be as efficient as exciting, dynamic and imaginative explanations?

Why, then, the paradox? Why, on the one hand, is there a certain amount of pressure for NEW and imaginative goals, for the development of NEW programs, and the application of NEW processes, while on the other hand there is an opposite pressure to maintain the status-quo? To be sure NEW programs, goals, and processes are introduced; but this happens in a guarded manner. There is a tendency to accept new ways of doing things, provided they do not significantly deviate from the Common Sense and the existing processes of the educational community.

There are many possible explanations for the paradox. These might include the educator's concern for practical results and disdain for the theoretical, lack of viable explanations of the relationships between variables, social pressures, economic pressures, political considerations, institutionalized Common Sense about what constitutes instruction and an unwillingness or inability to systematically test the implications of new concepts. Whatever the reasons, the paradox exists at all levels of education. We see it in responses to requests for proposals from the U. S. Office of Education. We see it in a myriad of other ways -- responses to new ways to manage the classroom, proposals for teaching reading, ways to evaluate instructional outcomes, and so on. All suggestions for change, if they are to be implemented, must be evaluated by some person or group of persons. Evaluation implies the existence of a set of standards for making a decision. It is these standards that are of interest. While there is a strong possibility that the standards are frequently political, economic, or social in nature (rather than instructional), there is also a possibility that some consist of an allegiance to unsubstantiated statements concerning what education and instruction are about or should be about. The more widely accepted these statements, the less the likelihood that explanations and proposals which take exception to the statements will be accepted.

In a sense we operate in matters of education decision-making somewhat like the people in the following fictional sketch. Suppose that a graduate of the University of Bologne Medical School in the Thirteenth century had an idea that the plague was associated with the appearance of rats. Now the Common Sense of the day was that the plague was associated with the damp poisonous air arising from water front dock areas. Furthermore, Common Sense (prudent judgment and unreflective thinking of ordinary men) dictated tried and true ways to combat the plague. The most accepted way of combating the plague was to build huge fires in the streets to drive off the bad damp air. If the fires were kept burning long enough, the virulence of the plague was seen to diminish and eventually it went away. What do you suppose would happen if our fictional physician approached the town fathers with a proposition to round up and kill all of the rats in the town and keep their population at zero as a means of controlling the plague? No doubt, the town fathers would not only refuse financially to support the project; but they might even run every physician out of town as some kind of a "nut." The Common Sense of the time simply could not conceive of the possibility that the plague was associated with fleas carried by rats.

Common Sense must of necessity depend upon that which is known or thought to be known; it is a useful basis for decision-making. In our culture, and especially in education, it is highly prosed. The Common Sense of the classroom teacher, the school principal, or the school board member is considered far more valuable as a basis for decision-making than theoretical constructs and unsubstantiated explanations. There is no quarrel with this, as such. A problem, however, arises when the criteria of Common Sense are used to judge innovative proposals. As Alfred North Whitehead once observed, in matters of creative thought, Common Sense is a bad master. "Its sole criterion for judgment is that new ideas shall look like old ones." (2)

If one would innovate, he must exchange his guidelines from Common Sense and generally accepted opinion for the guidelines for evaluating questions regarding the novel, the "break-through," the here-to-fore not considered. Only through such an exchange, will "innovation" become more than an "in-vogue" word for educators. The criteria for evaluating the products or potential products of divergent thinking cannot possibly be the same as these for evaluating the results of convergent thinking.

Much of the "knowledge" which underlies the decision-making behavior of educators, with regard to innovation reflects conventional wisdom. This wisdom consists, in the main, of beliefs, unverified statements, concepts which generate untestable statements, and the outcomes of inadequate research. Much of this "wisdom" has been reduced to platitudinous statements. These statements say everything and nothing at the same time. A platitude is a peculiar mixture of truth, half truth, and untruth. For the most part, the platitude seems to be accepted as a matter of fact. As such it tends to be automatically invoked by educational decision makers.

For many educators, the platitude has achieved the status of an article of faith. The following items reflect a portion of the conventional wisdom of educators:

1. We don't teach subject matter, we teach children.
2. We learn by doing.
3. Education is life itself, not preparation.
4. Students really learn only when they are interested.
5. The aim of education is growth; the aim of growth is just more growth.
6. The school curriculum is as broad as life itself.
7. The school should be child centered.
8. Competition is the lifeblood of achievement.
9. Let's cut out the frills of education.
10. There's too much progressive education in the schools.
11. Let's go back to the Three R's.
12. "Psychologists tell us."
13. We teach them how to think, not what to think.
14. College teachers cannot teach teachers unless they have public school teaching experience.

15. Regular class teaching experience is a necessary prerequisite for effective teaching of exceptional children.

16. Teacher training activities must always be relevant to the teacher's problem now.

17. Concepts about education are true only if their truth is immediately perceived in the classroom.

18. Possession of the doctorate is a necessary prerequisite to college teaching.

19. We must teach the whole child.

20. Handicapped children learn better if they are segregated into special classes.

21. Handicapped children learn better if they are integrated into the regular classroom.

22. Schools should be operated six hours a day, five days a week, 180 days a year.

23. Teaching is an art, an undefinable process which operates privately in the teacher resulting in changes in students.

24. A practical "real-life" curriculum is the only viable basis for teacher training.

25. Having prior experiences with children is prima facia evidence that a teacher training candidate will make a good teacher.

26. Teacher training programs have a significant impact on teacher behavior in the classroom.

27. If you want a good administrator, hire a coach or PE teacher. They have experience and training in handling people.

28. Teaching future teachers about theory and philosophy is a waste of time since it has no practical value.

29. Integration of racial and ethnic subgroups improves learning.

30. The I.Q. Test indicates the child's potential for school learning.

31. Knowledge of learning theory is essential for better teaching.

32. The smaller the class, the better the learning.

33. Competency-based instruction is superior to traditional instruction.

34. In order to get a child to learn, all you have to do is motivate him.

35. The Business Accountability Model will improve instruction.

36. Instruction based on results-management increases teaching efficiency and student learning.

37. Behavior modification dehumanizes learners.

38. Children learn better if they are loved. (3)

While all educators do not accept all of the platitudes as self-evident truths, many accept one or more of them as such. The statements are, for the most part, useless as standards for making decisions about education. Some are unverifiable, others are potentially verifiable, but have not been tested. Still others have been tested with doubtful results. Whatever their status, they reflect for many, the conventional wisdom of the field. As such, they serve as implicit guidelines for some educators when evaluating innovative proposals.

The criticism implicit in the title of this paper is not meant to disparage the value of established fact as a basis for making judgments about innovative proposals. On the contrary, it is the systematic development of a body of information which makes intelligent innovation possible. It is failure to discriminate between what constitutes information and what constitutes opinion, the results of individual experiences, and emotional commitment to an idea that gets in the way of innovation -- the unreflective thinking of ordinary men! Of those statements listed above which are verifiable, exceptions can be found in every instance. In spite of this, entire educational programs and significant laws governing education have been based on one or more of the statements. In addition, no doubt, many innovative proposals have been rejected or significantly modified because the educational decision-makers involved subscribe uncritically to one or more of the above platitudes.

The educational philosopher can provide a much needed service to the educator in dealing with innovation. This service involves assisting the educator to examine objectively his presuppositions about education, instruction, curriculum planning and development, and learning. The following areas appear to demand the special attention of the philosopher:

1. Developing skills in identifying one's presuppositions and tracing them back to absolute presuppositions.

2. Becoming aware of and skilled in the use of the rules of scientific evidence and their application to educational propositions.

3. Distinguishing between empirically verifiable and unverifiable statements.

4. Developing skill in the application of logic to making educational decisions.

5. Increasing familiarity with the different criteria of truth and their application to evaluating educational propositions.

6. Developing problem statements about education which are potentially solvable by educators.

7. Distinguishing between educational problem statements and their implications from political, economic and social problem statements and their implications.

8. Assisting the educator to rearrange his priorities with regard to theoretical and practical thinking when considering the values of innovative proposals.

9. Helping the educator develop heuristic and parsimonious theories about instruction.

10. Developing problem definition and solving skills which focus primarily on educational and instructional considerations.

These are some of the ways in which philosophers can serve the profession. One of the major deficiencies in the preparation of teachers and administrators, it would appear, is that they seldom are given sufficient opportunity to develop the skills and knowledges listed. Some educators never have the opportunity, others are given minimal opportunity in a master's or doctoral program long after they have been in positions requiring that they make decisions dependent on these skills and knowledges. If more educational decision-makers possessed the above mentioned skills and knowledges, the established guidelines for innovation would no longer be conventional wisdom, individual experience of specific educators, or uncritical adherence to a specific educational dogma.

Documentations.

1. Collingwood, R. G., Metaphysics, London: Oxford University Press, 1940, p. 271.

2. Whitehead, A., An Introduction to Mathematics, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1911, p. 157.

3. I am indebted to Kenneth Hansen for the first thirteen of these. Hansen, Kenneth H., Public Education in American Society, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963, pp. 345-373.

CHAPTER 36.

TRYING TO MAKE SENSE OUT OF "EXISTENTIAL THOUGHT AND EDUCATION."

LEROY F. TROUTNER.

When I first became interested in the general topic of "Existential Thought and Education" a number of years ago I am sure that the idea never crossed my mind that twenty years later I would find myself investigating the question of how to make sense out of this area of inquiry. But now this kind of investigation not only seems appropriate but necessary; for after twenty years of research on the part of scores of philosophers of education, research which has produced well over one-hundred articles, over one-hundred dissertations, as well as a number of books, I find the whole area of Existential Thought and Education to be just as confusing and amorphous, if not more so, as it was many years ago when I first started to think about the topic. A cursory investigation into the 109 dissertations (by the last count) written on this topic, beginning with the first one in 1945 titled "The Significance of the Philosophy of Soren Kierkegaard for Religious Education," (1) clearly illustrates this point. It is the range and variety of the topics that is so striking.

We find dissertations focusing on over a dozen different existential philosophers, running all the way from Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky, to Merleau-Ponty and Abbagnano. We also find a number of comparative studies, some contrasting different existential philosophers as they relate to education while others compare one or more existential philosophers with another thinker, such as Dewey or Rogers, and then try to draw educational implications from the comparison. Some dissertations consider the possible relevance of Existential Thought for certain selected dimensions of the schooling process such as curriculum, teaching, counseling, and teacher-pupil relationships. Others analyze certain selected existential themes, like freedom or authenticity, for possible educational implications. Then there are dissertations applying Existential Thought to certain disciplines like mathematics, literature, the arts, physical education, and humanism. Also in the literature there exists a number of attempts to apply the phenomenological method of description to certain aspects of schooling; and, finally, we find a number of dissertations dealing with Existential Thought and certain specific levels or kinds of education like higher education, Christian education, education for the mentally retarded, and vocational education. (2) But nowhere in the literature, with one notable exception, (3) do we find a systematic philosophical analysis that attempts to provide some foundation and structure to the area of inquiry itself. Nowhere do we find the basic philosophical questions being asked: "What is the possibility of connecting existential philosophy and education?", "What are the parameters of this area of inquiry?", and "How and where is the interface, if any, to be found?" Until this basic foundational ground work is laid, until the connection is made and the interface located, I do not feel that we can claim to have made sense out of Existential Thought and Education.

Why is this task so difficult? Why have these questions not been answered? Why, after all these years of research and reflection on the part of scores of philosophers of education is Existential Thought and Education as a field of inquiry so formless and chaotic? Why have we not been able to make the connection in a logical, coherent, and persuasive manner? In the process of trying to find answers to these questions we will be led, hopefully, to some concrete suggestions as to how we can make more sense out of this field of inquiry in the future. The actual task of formulating the connection will, perforce, have to be left to another paper; however I shall conclude this piece with a bare outline of that formulation as I now see it.

A. One of the main reasons why we are still faced with the problem of thinking through the basic assumptions and parameters of our field of inquiry is because so many of us who have worked in this field, it appears, have been more interested in salesmanship than scholarship. (Please note I am not excluding myself from this criticism.) Too much of our published research, I fear, has been produced by philosophers of education whose emotional interest in the topic has outweighed their scholarly interest. In other words we have not allowed ourselves sufficient time to "get on top of" the topic at hand before publishing our findings. In making this criticism, however, I am not suggesting that the only reliable research is that which results from the near-ideal "objective" conditions of the laboratory scientist.

We all know now that "pure objectivity" is a fabrication of the mind: for the very instant you make such a claim, at that very moment you have illustrated the impossibility of such a posture. All experience, including the work of the scientist, is intentional. In the act of perception, the perceiver always contributes something to the object perceived. There is a difference, however, between trying to be as "objective" and "impartial" as possible when dealing with the data at hand and merely allowing one's feelings and emotions full rein. This latter posture, however, is particularly tempting (in fact one might say almost appropriate) when working with Existential Thought; for the subject matter of existential phenomenology is the subject matter of our lives as we live them. Existential Thought attempts to analyze and describe how we live our life, i.e., how we live our freedom, our anxiety, our joy, sorrow, and alienation, our attitude toward the Other, our death, our language, and our transcendence. So when we study Existential Thought we are in a very real sense studying ourselves. We soon begin to see where our study can help to clarify some of the gut issues of life and death, where it can provide us with some guidelines and suggestions as to what it means to become oneself through choice. And before we know it, we find ourselves "philosophizing out of need for our redemption." Moreover, this is the way it should be, because Existential Thought does represent an attempt to connect thinking about life with life as lived. So it is altogether understandable when we see students, both young and old, "getting hooked" on Existential Thought: it "grabs them" where they live. This kind of emotional involvement, however, often militates against the critical, scholarly approach that is so badly needed. We must get beyond this stage of close personal involvement. We must "get on top of" the topic at hand. And this takes time, often more time than we are willing to give in the press of publish or perish.

B. This same temporal pressure may also help to explain our second reason. Too many of us have been inadequately prepared in the fundamentals of existential philosophy to do the substantive job of connecting Existential Thought with Education. Existential phenomenology represents a radically different style of philosophizing and a radically different perspective of man and the world. Moreover it takes considerable time to master this new mode of seeing. In our typically American impatience to get on with the job, in this instance the job of delineating out educational recommendations and pronouncements, too many of us have failed first of all to give ourselves sufficient time to adequately understand the philosophy which must provide the contextual ground out of which the educational analysis should grow. This rush to get on with the educational analysis before adequately understanding the philosophy has been, from the point of view of responsible scholarship, a very serious mistake; because the educational analysis in this instance will be only as valid as one's understanding of the philosophy. Since the existential thinkers themselves do not write on educational matters the entire responsibility of finding educational implications falls upon the educational philosopher; and his educational findings can only be justified and validated within the context of his understanding of the philosophy. In far too many cases our understanding of Existential Thought has proved to be inadequate for the task. (4) The fault, however, lies not only with ourselves.

Much of our difficulty in this area stems from the complexity and elusiveness of the two concepts which we are attempting to join. Both concepts, not being very close to the ground, are very difficult to tie down. They both are very much alive and it often seems difficult to get them to stand still long enough for adequate definition and comprehension.

Whether or not there exists a meaningful connection between Existential Thought and Education will depend, at least in part, upon what kind of education we are talking about. If we are talking about traditional-conservative education where the accent is upon the transmission of the funded capitol of civilization, i.e., the knowledge and values of a society enshrined in public language, to the upcoming generation, then there seems to be little or no common ground between Existential Thought and education. The major concern and emphasis that is to be found in most traditional-conservative education is upon teaching a body of knowledge, laid out in various subject matter fields, in an organized, systematic fashion. The focus is primarily, if not exclusively, on the cognitive. The purpose of this kind of education is to stimulate, train, and develop the student's intellectual endowment so that upon becoming an adult he can take his proper place in society. Most traditional education is seen from the perspective of society -- whose agent is the teacher. The primary emphasis of the existential thinker, on the other hand, is directed towards analyzing and describing the basic structure of human existence _as lived_. This emphasis necessarily results in a singular, individual (not societal) focus. Moreover, the existentialist finds moods and feelings to be more significant in human existence than the theoretical-intellectual dimension of life, the latter visualized as a mode of being which is derived from and secondary to the more primordial life-world. One of the first questions we need to investigate, and investigate very thoroughly, is whether or not the primary thrust of these two phenomenon, i.e., Existential Thought and Education as schooling, which means teaching, is so divergent as to make any viable connection impossible.

If, on the other hand, we look at some of the major ideas underlying the "open classroom," where teaching in the traditional sense is noticeably absent and instead the focus shifts to learning and the conscious, purposeful development of a confident, and trusting person, we will find a considerable area of common ground between Existential Thought and Education. For example, notice how many of the principle learning assumptions that Barth finds in his analysis of the open classroom jibe very nicely with basic existential principles and concerns. The key learning principle in the open classroom is trust in the innate abilities of children, to motivate themselves to exploration and learning. Consequently, adult intervention is held at a minimum. A strong self concept on the part of the child is "the *sine qua non* of open education; if, and only if, the child respects himself will he be able to be responsible for his own learning." (5) Another learning assumption of the open classroom, according to Barth, is that concept formation "proceeds very slowly" in children, and they learn and develop intellectually "not only at their own rate, but in their own style." Though children pass through similar stages of intellectual development each does so "in his own way, and at his own rate and in his own time." Intellectual growth and development takes place "through a sequence of concrete experiences followed by abstractions," and verbal abstractions "should follow direct experience with objects and ideas, not precede them or substitute for them." (6)

All of these assumptions can be seen to be not only compatible but in many cases identical with many of the ideas we find in the various existential analyses. The existential thinker makes much of the primordiality of lived time over clock time, and how the practical world of everydayness is more fundamental than the intellectual world of abstractions, the latter being a derivative of the more basic life-world. So we find the compatibility between many of the ideas underlying the radical-alternative approach to education and Existential Thought to be just as striking as the dissonance found between traditional-conservative education and Existential Thought. Education is a many-faceted concept that in any given analysis must first be tied down and defined if we are to make sense out of our inquiry.

C. As we move on to our second concept, however, the situation becomes stickier. Both concepts need to be tied down; but in the case of Existential Thought our problem has been further aggravated by a number of complicating factors. Part of our difficulty stems from the fact that too often the language of Existential Thought is vulgarized to the level of a fad so that the term "existential" or "existentialism" gets applied to all sorts of people and activities that are only remotely connected, if at all, with the philosophy. (7) When speaking and writing about Existential Thought and Education we must be very precise and discriminating in our use of language. (8) A second reason for our difficulty is that we find a sense of elusiveness built right into the philosophy itself. This is because the original datum of our investigation, i.e., lived reality, is itself elusive, multifaceted and seemingly contradictory. Immediate lived experience cannot be "neatly packaged in concepts or presented as an interlocking system." Life itself has many "loose ends." It is fraught with caprice, ambiguity, and scores of experiences that defy explanation and logic. It is incomplete, fragmentary, often botched and meaningless. Human existence cannot be circumscribed within a system of thought because so much of life escapes objectification and systematization. This does not mean, however, that it is impossible to conceptualize existence. It is difficult, yes, but the existential analyses that we have today describing the basic structure of existence with all of its moods and feelings represents ample proof that it is possible.

Probably the most important single reason why so many of us have fallen short in our understanding of Existential Thought is because we have failed to recognize the extent to which this new Continental development represents a radically new style and method of philosophizing. The _sine qua non_ of existential understanding, in a philosophical sense, is to recognize, appreciate and understand it as _a new way of thinking_. Existential Thought offers us a new perspective, a new way of seeing man and the world. Although its thinking is securely rooted in the western philosophical tradition its primary thrust does represent a radically new turning in western thought. This new perspective is made necessary by the nature of the datum upon which the existentialist focuses, i.e., the immediate experience of lived reality. Here the traditional rationalistic, empirical, or linguistic styles of philosophizing are completely inappropriate. To see the human life world (Lebenswelt) for purpose of analysis and description demands a new mode of seeing as well as a new language. And this takes us to our final point.

D. One of the primary reasons why confusion reigns in the field of Existential Thought and Education is because of our inadequate training and preparation in the use and understanding of the language of existential philosophy, an inadequacy, unfortunately, that has forced so many to write and talk about the topic at hand in educational rather than in philosophical categories, thus completely missing the distinctive insights and flavor of existential philosophy. This lack of preparation in existential language is, of course, a part and parcel of the need for more adequate understanding of Existential Thought. Understanding existential thought means understanding existential language. We cannot clearly see and comprehend the meaning of Existential Thought if we use the vocabulary of the educator, the romantic, the humanist, or the humanistic psychologist. Nor can we grasp the authentic meaning of existential philosophy when using the conceptual schema of John Dewey, the Idealists, or the Realists. Existential philosophy has its own vocabulary and language; and understanding and language are equiprimordial.

What do all these reasons add up to? If we are going to make the connection between Existential Thought and Education in a careful, deliberate, and persuasive manner thereby making more sense out of our area of inquiry, we must become more scholarly in our effort; we must gain a greater understanding of the language and content of existential philosophy; and we must become more philosophical, in the sense of foundational, in our thinking and questioning. We must no longer assume a viable connection but rather ask: What is the possibility of a connection between Existential Thought and Education? After answering the first question and presuming that it still seems reasonable that there is a possibility of a viable connection between certain facets of Existential Thought and certain kinds of Education then the next question is: "What method is to be used in order to demonstrate the connection?" I, for one, believe that the vast majority of the evidence suggests that Existential Thought and Education as schooling, like oil and water, do not mix. But, to my mind, this does not mean necessarily that Existential Thought and Education cannot be synthesized into some meaningful relation. After all, maybe this is part of our problem, i.e., that in defining education as schooling we have been unnecessarily restrictive. I would suggest that in order to demonstrate the connection we bracket out any specific meaning in the second term, particularly the conflation between education and schooling, and then investigate what existential philosophy has to say about 'education' in the broader sense. Here the accent would fall on the philosophy rather than schooling. After all, Existential Thought purports to describe the various modes of being human. Surely "being educated" can be seen to be one of those modes. This technique will force us to think in terms of existential language rather than educational language, thus affording us the opportunity to take advantage of the unique insights and style of the philosophy itself.

Having decided on the general method the third question is "Where is the interface to be located?" I am suggesting that the interface can be found in the philosophy itself; because existential philosophy investigates the structure of being human and being educated is an integral part of being human.

In the first paper that I ever presented to the Philosophy of Education Society, a paper titled "Existentialism, Phenomenology, and the Philosophy of Education" I concluded my piece with the following remark:

> Although the existential thinker does not concern himself with the subject of formal education, existentialism and education do meet on the primordial, preconceptual level of the immediate experience of Existence, in the Lebenswelt of each individual. (9)

Today, ten years later, I have no reason to change that summary statement.

Documentations.

1. Thomte, Reidar, The significance of the philosophy of Soren Kierkegaard for religious education. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, New York University, 1945.

2. I can provide copies of this bibliography of dissertations if anyone is interested.

3. The exception to which I refer is: Baker, Bruce French, On the possibility of the relation between existentialism and education. (Doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University) Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1964. No. 64-12248.

4. This lack of adequate preparation coupled with the natural tendency toward excessive emotional involvement in the topic may help to explain, at least in part, why there has been so much criticism of the research that has been published in this area. I am not prepared to say that the amount has been inordinate. After all, criticism is at the very heart of academic life: you cannot get movement on the leading edge without it. However, I do know that the researcher in this area who has escaped criticism of his scholarship is rare indeed! And much of this criticism, in my judgment, has been warranted. One of the ways to make more sense out of this field in the future is to get back to the fundamentals of sound scholarship. We should always be able to justify our educational implications and inferences by being able to refer directly to original sources of certain existential thinkers. (For references regarding this criticism see footnotes in, Troutner, Leroy F., "Toward a Phenomenology of Education: An Exercise in the Foundations," Philosophy of Education, 1974, Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, Boston, Massachusetts, April 1974.)

385.

5. Ronald S. Barth, "Open Education---Assumptions About Learning," *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, Vol. 1, 1969, p. 31.

6. *Ibid*., p. 35.

7. A good case in point, in my judgment, is the label "existential educator" or "existential teacher," terms that so many philosophers of education seem to be able to use with such ease and frequency. But what does it mean to refer to an instructor as "existential?" Is it someone who is knowledgeable about and persuaded by existential philosophy? If so it may well be that the only existential teacher is an ex-teacher. If you take existentialism seriously you become a witness not a teacher. Does it make any more sense to talk about an "existential housewife," "existential plumber," or an "existential lawyer?" There isn't another philosophy, apparently, that can be popularized so easily; everybody seems to know what existentialism is all about; everybody knows that it has to do with freedom and the individual and being able to choose and do your own thing. As Jean-Paul Sartre stated: "the word is now so loosely applied to so many things that it no longer means anything at all." (As quoted in John Macquarrie, *Existentialism*, London, England: Hutchinson Co., 1972, p. 1.)

8. For example, we can no longer afford the imprecision of such classifications as "existentialism" and "phenomenology." Even the category "existential-phenomenology" is fraught with all kinds of ambiguity for the uninitiated. Instead of using such umbrella terms we must become more sensitive to precision in our discussions and ask "What existential thinker are you speaking of and what kind of phenomenology are you referring to?" We can start with the very simple but basic distinction between the pre-Husserlian and post-Husserlian existential thinker. The existential thinkers of the 19th Century, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, can and should be distinguished from the phenomenological thinkers of the Twentieth; else nothing but confusion results. It is not only unnecessary but straining the concept unduly to refer to the "phenomenology" of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. It is of course true that these two 19th Century giants greatly influenced a great many 20th Century thinkers. It is equally true that there is a sense in which some of the writings of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche can be called "phenomenological." When deliberating on the connection between Existential Thought and Education, however, the time has come when we must either refer to a particular philosopher, or, if we are going to use some sort of classification schema, we must at least distinguish between the pre-Husserlian existential thinker and the post-Husserlian existential thinkers with their many different varieties of "phenomenology."

When dealing with the phenomenological thinker we can do much to clear up the confusion if we will designate what kind of phenomenology we are talking about: (a) the "pure phenomenology" of Husserl's early period, (b) the "transcendental phenomenology" of his more mature works, a philosophical turning that only Gurwitsch and Natanson have been able to accept and follow, (c) the "existential phenomenology" of Sartre, Heidegger, and Merleau Ponty, (d) and the "dialogal phenomenology" of Strasser and possibly Buber and Marcel. Granted, we are not always able to make these distinctions between the various kinds of phenomenology as clear and distinct as we might like; still if we are not going to refer to a particular phenomenological thinker when discussing Existential Thought and Education the least we can do is to refer to a particular kind of phenomenology. It makes little or no sense to talk about "phenomenology" or "existentialism" anymore unless we are very careful and precise as to the exact meaning that we are investing in these terms.

9. L. F. Troutner, "Existentialism, Phenomenology, and the Philosophy of Education," Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, 1964, p. 124.

CHAPTER 37.

MAKING SENSE OUT OF "EXISTENTIAL THOUGHT AND EDUCATION."

DONALD VANDENBURG.

Existential thought and education have great affinity for each other. (1) Both are primarily concerned with the simple matter of becoming human. Because existential philosophers focus attention upon adult existence, however, an equation of philosophy of existence and philosophy of education would omit the differences between childlike and adult existence, including education. If existential thought is to have significance for education, someone has to utilize the resources of existential thought to build a theory of education. This theory should (a) delineate the conditions of childlike existence that make education possible, (b) characterize processes of education and curriculum within the limitations and possibilities of human existence, and (c) guide these formulations by the aim of education as adult existence. This paper will attempt to offer meta-theoretical guidelines for this task of sense-making.

Time limits permit addressing the methodological problems regarding (1) the choice of existential philosophers for the theoretical basis, (2) the language to be employed in theory formulation, and (3) a *modus operandi* for the actual theoretical research.

I. Existential Thought.

The problem of choosing existential philosophers can be solved by beginning with the prototype to establish a referent for the term, "existential thought." Abstracting Kierkegaard's central claim will yield the essential characteristic of existential thought regardless of whose it is. It is embodied in his statement, "Subjectivity is the truth," when understood ontologically. (2) His main point was not epistemological, for he freely admitted that objective knowledge and objective cognitive processes are legitimate in the appropriate domains.

(3) He meant that the truth of the whole matter is that each person is a subject, as indicated in an alternative statement, "Inwardness is the truth." (4) There is consciousness and self-consciousness. Kierkegaard's corresponding ethical claim was that the most important task any person could undertake is the development of his subjectness. (5) The neologism subjectness permits the abstraction of the ontological point without confusing it with the epistemological issue. Individual subjectness is not reducible to purely cognitive processes, however, for there is consciousness in the affective and voluntary domains, too. (6) The development of one's subjectness is, according to Kierkegaard, a structural rather than merely cognitive matter. It requires a deepening of inwardness, a progressively deeper self-transparency and self-constancy.

The criterion for the use of the phrase, "existential thought," is the primary concern for the development of individual subjectness. The various existential philosophers seem to disagree on the nature of subjectness and its development, but the findings are cumulative. Buber and Marcel, for example, noticed the significance of interhuman dialogue for the development of subjectness. Others have noticed the importance of the dialogue with the world. Each of the central ontological claims of the major existential philosophers outlines a dimension of human possibility that requires educative development if child-like subjectness is to become adult subjectness. They are mutually complementary, and should be synthesized, I submit, when formulating educational theory.

II. Language.

This project of extracting the essential characteristics of subjectness raises the question of the language in which to formulate educational theory. If it is to be coordinated by its vocabulary and syntax to its ontological basis in the pupil's subjectness, the non-objectifying language of the existential literature -- the language of being -- has to be employed, but each philosopher uses it differently.

The language of the ontic existentialists -- Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Marcel, Jaspers, Buber, Berdyaev, Camus, etc. -- will not suffice because their writings are literary, polemical, and cluttered with objectifying metaphysical language from the philosophical tradition. (7) Their language lacks the purity necessary for the kind of articulation of educational problems wherein the language itself helps to resolve the problem through the inner elaboration of its own logos. (8)

The language of Husserlian pure phenomenology might seem appropriate, but its "pure subjectivity" is a disembodied, cognitive consciousness. Its language is unsuitable to coordinate educational theory to its ontological basis, for the subjectness to be educated is concrete, embodied, individual, social, and historical. It is an existing consciousness. (9)

This leaves the language of existential phenomenology, of Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Gusdorf, Kwant, Ricoeur, Luijpen, Plessner, Minkowski, Nabert, Schutz, etc. (10) This language is existential like the ontic existentialists but descriptive like Husserlian phenomenology. Here the existential thought is combined with descriptive methods to obtain ontologically founded existential structures. (11) Educational theory requires a similar effort to derive the existential a priori of education.

The use of the language from existential phenomenology can follow three self-evident rules. The negative rule is to avoid terms that prevent an adequate formulation of the educational problem at hand. Two examples: Sartre's distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself is of limited value in articulating the conditions of the pupil's dialogue with the world. The dualistic terms yield dualistic conclusions, dictated by the terms themselves, that contradict the phenomenologically given data regarding this dialogue. (12) Similarly, Sartre's claim that all acts of consciousness are nihilations is valid for certain modes of consciousness, but the term "nihilation" is of limited use in formulating the conditions necessary to enable the pupil's dialogue with other people. (13)

The positive rule is to use whatever terms from existential phenomenology that help disclose educational phenomena as they appear and that can specify the conditions for the educative development of subjectness through interhuman dialogue, dialogue with the world, dialogue with the intellectual, historical world, dialogue with the social world, and, especially, through dialogue with older people. The language should be compatible with the regulative goal of research of obtaining a genetic phenomenology that is focussed upon the educative development of consciousness.

The third rule is that the language of educational theory cannot be predicated a priori. It has to be chosen for its fittingness within theoretical research as the logos of education manifests itself. (14) A coherent language developed creatively within theoretical research itself upon the aforementioned basis can make sense by articulating the connections between educational phenomena. These are to be found in the being of man and have to be uncovered by listening to the logos of education.

III. Making Sense.

The following modus operandi for listening to the words of education will be over-structured for intelligibility. It will be set forth with an illustrative problem. The actual procedure of sense-making, I submit, should begin with an educational problem to make sense of it by using a three-phase hermeneutic, or interpretive, process that renders the implicit understanding explicit. (15)

Phase One: Linguistic Hermeneutic.

1. Preliminary ontological questioning of a new expression in education. A particular study can begin by questioning a new linguistic usage in current educational controversy to ascertain if it embodies a new disclosure of a previously hidden educational phenomenon. One such usage that can serve for an extended illustration is "open education." These kinds of questions are pertinent. Does the pupil as a subjectness require openness? For what? To expand his subjectness to the world? To other people? To the teacher? To curricular content? To what else? To society? What is the precise relation between the pupil's subjectness and openness? Are they, perhaps, identical? Could it be that openness as such is a necessary condition of education? Is it a sufficient condition?

2. Interpretation of associated ordinary terms. If the preliminary questioning makes sense, closely related linguistic expressions that occur in the controversy's context have to be examined to see what they disclose, ordinary language terms first. In this example, "informal education." The preliminary idea of openness as such and a bit of reflection suggest that the distinction between open education and closed (?) education is not identical to the distinction between informal and formal education. If openness is the opening of the pupil's subjectness to the world, etc., then both informal and formal education can be open, and both closed. One can listen to a lecture, or a paper,

with openness to what is said, just as one can engage in discussion while closed to what other people are saying. If closed formal education is deplorable, as alleged, then so too must be closed informal education. The problem obviously merits theoretical research.

3. Interpretation of associated special terms. One can then examine the contextually related special terms for their disclosure of the phenomenon. Grasping why the special term was used retains its partial grasp of the phenomenon even when the pre-philosophical understanding expressed in its use requires interpretation. The expression "learning climate," for example, seems inadequate to deal with the phenomenon of open education because the psychological model in which it is embedded (Rogers') conflates closed formal instruction with all formal instruction. This model conceals the phenomenon of open formal instruction. The best intent of the term, "learning climate," however, is to call attention to the importance of the affective tone of the classroom.

This same literature also contains accidental uses of the ordinary word "atmosphere" to refer to the classroom's affectivity. A comparison indicates that we would speak of a working climate but not a working atmosphere, and of the atmosphere of a restaurant but not its climate. The word "atmosphere" is superior to "climate" for elucidating "open education" because the pedagogic atmosphere can be present in both informal and formal educational processes. The concept of the pedagogic atmosphere manifests the affective tone of the classroom when it is open.

These three steps are a linguistic hermeneutic that attempts to grasp and explicate the pre-philosophical understanding, or tacit knowledge, of an educational phenomenon through the clarification of the language actually used in educational controversy. It differs from "normal analysis" in two ways. First, there is no attempt to make a merely linguistic point, or to score debaters' points. Second, the interpretive process is consciously guided by an explicit understanding that the process and goal of education is the development of the pupil's subjectness. It focuses attention upon the phenomenon that the words disclose to capitalize upon the fresh insights of new usage. Thus logos remains in contact with mythos, concept with percept, as one listens to the words to see what they make manifest. These three steps should yield a statement naming the educational phenomenon sought by the new expression when the contexts of its use are purged of the straw men, etc., that surround it in polemical writings. For example, the classroom is open when it is suffused with the pedagogic atmosphere.

4. Preliminary phenomenological hermeneutic. The phenomenon can now be

outlined as a phenomenon in the lived-world with a further bit of hermeneutic that is now more phenomenological than linguistic. This will grasp its ontological basis and complete the first phase of an inquiry. If one says that he likes the atmosphere of a particular restaurant, this usage can be accompanied by an awareness that the perceived atmosphere depends upon, in addition to the objective conditions, one's own mood, upon whom one is with, and upon the mood created by being there together. The atmosphere depends upon a state-of-being and a state-of-co-being. This suggests that the pedagogic atmosphere is constituted by the teacher's and pupil's states-of-being and how these structure their being there together when they turn toward each other within the distinctly pedagogic relation. This general statement of the ontological foundation of the educational phenomenon completes the first phase of sense making, for the problem is now defined.

Phase Two: Phenomenological Hermeneutic.

5. Primal ontological questioning. The educational phenomenon can now be questioned from the vantage point of the ontological claims of the various existential philosophers. Before this is illustrated in the example, it is necessary to shift terms from "state-of-being" to "life-feeling" to insure focussing upon affectivity at the dispositional level rather than upon transient emotions. The following questions are addressed from the major ontological claims to the phenomenon at hand.

What life-feelings constitute openness to the world, enabling dialogue with the world? What life-feelings constitute openness to the social-historical world, enabling dialogue with this world? Which constitute openness to other people enabling genuine dialogue with them? Are these life-feelings identical for pupil and teacher, differentiated only by chronological age? Are there life-feelings constitutive of the pupil's openness to the future, enabling dialogue, so to speak, with his future? What about a life-feeling that can open the pupil to himself?

6. Secondary ontological questioning. The questioning from the primal claims manifests but dimly the structural components of the phenomenon. Each of these merits separate questioning for its foundation. An understanding of the secondary existential structures uncovered by the existential phenomenologists is necessary here, but the problem entails reformulating selected structures in terms of the educational phenomenon at hand. The latter, differentiated by the primary ontological

questioning, must be questioned in terms of its existential structures.

In the illustration, one has to discover the life-feeling correspondent to each existential structure on each side of the pedagogic relation when the latter itself is ontologically grounded to establish the conditions necessarily constitutive of the pedagogic atmosphere. What life-feeling is constitutive of authentic spatializing on the side of the pupil and upon the side of the teacher? What life-feelings, for each, embody authentic temporalizing, authentic understanding, and authentic being-toward-one-another? How are these related to the openness that enables dialogue with the world, with others, etc.? Which life-feelings embody the structural aspects of the distinctly pedagogic dialogue? How is the aggregate of these life-feelings unified by more fundamental attunements such as the affective embodiment of transcendence and openness itself?

7. *Phenomenological description*. The remainder of the second phase is the bulk of a particular inquiry. It attempts to answer these questions by phenomenologically describing the educational phenomenon. A detailed description of the dimensions specified by the right preliminary questions ascertains the essential characteristics of the phenomenon. Those that are essential to the description are essential to the phenomenon.

In the example, the description would have to be sufficiently detailed to show that the constitutive features of the pedagogic atmosphere were the interhuman life-feelings of pedagogic love, gratitude for life, and trust in the pupil on the side of the teacher, and respect for the teacher, gratitude for help, and obedience on the side of the pupil. It would show their basis in the world-oriented life-feelings of serenity, good-naturedness, and patience on the teacher's side, and cheerfulness, morningness, and expectancy on the pupil's side, for these correspond to authentic spatiality, temporality, and "letting be," or *Gelassenheit*, respectively. It would show how these in turn are based upon the more primordial attunements of love of the world and trust in the world, corresponding to authentic transcendence, which in turn is founded upon hope as the affective constituent of openness itself. It would have to let these life-feelings show themselves as the affective a priori of genuine cognitive learning, i.e., as the affective schemata that makes it possible to cognize the world, or, if you will, as the affective presuppositions of rationality. (16)

Phase Three: Categorial Interpretation.

8. Setting into context. The final step locates the specific phenomenon in the whole domain of education and in the whole of an integrated life. The illustration can serve one last time. All of schooling need not be educating within the pedagogic atmosphere. It probably could not be. A comparison with various forms of rapport, and, indeed, with learning climate, can yield criteria to indicate the contingent circumstances that make each desirable. The inquiry would be incomplete, too, without some indication concerning what a teacher might do to establish a pedagogic atmosphere, and concerning relations to existing and possible quantitative research and to theory in the special sciences. In this phase, finally, the actual significance of the particular phenomenon for the development of subjectness must be assessed.

The present paper has discussed a three-phase methodology for doing one kind of philosophy of education. The method herein explained was herein utilized. The first phase delineated the referent for "existential thought" and argued that educational theorizing should employ a non-objectifying, transcendental language to explicate the existential a priori of education. The second phase presented an eight-step research design for doing theoretical research in education. The third phase can begin by indicating that the "steps" and "phases" were an accommodation to linear, oral presentation. Each of the "steps" attempted to grasp an essential characteristic of sense-making in educational theorizing, which I would now like to claim to be as fluid and variable as Dewey's features of reflective experience. Yes, I have attempted to schematize a "complete act of thought" for making sense out of "existential thought and education."

I am fully cognizant of the difficulties entailed and merely wish now to submit two hypotheses for your consideration. The more that each research paper in educational theory explicitly embodies, according to the light of its author, what have herein been called its essential characteristics, the more sense it will make. The second hypothesis is that the more numerous are the studies that establish the ontological foundation of the basic concepts of education through utilization of these characteristics, the closer will be the achievement, collectively and through the years, to establishing the science or discipline of education.

In other words, this paper has been guided by the regulative goal of inquiry of the philosopher of education serving a function similar to that of basic theorists in any of the special sciences, that of conceptualizing the theory that outlines the phenomena specific to a particular domain. This regulative goal seems necessary for anyone who wishes to make maximal sense of existential thought and education. (17)

Documentations.

1. I wish to thank Professor George F. Kneller for his critique of earlier drafts of this paper.

2. Soren Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), tr. by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, pp. 183-187.

3. *Ibid*., pp. 27; 70, n. 2; 178-181. For Kierkegaard, "objective thinking" is out of place only when the truth is already known, and only in the ethical and religious domains. *Ibid*., pp. 72-74.

4. *Ibid*., p. 216.

5. *Ibid*., pp. 119, 141-147.

6. "The real subject is not the cognitive subject...the real subject is the ethically existing subject." *Ibid*., p. 281. Kierkegaard's polemic against Hegel may have made it seem as though he rejected rationality as such, but this interpretation makes it extremely difficult to understand his insistence that genuinely human existence involved a continuous dialectic with the universal. See Jean-Paul Sartre's contribution to the UNESCO colloquium on Kierkegaard, "Kierkegaard: The Singular Universal," in Sartre, *Between Existentialism and Marxism* (London: NLB, 1974), tr. by John Matthews, pp. 141-169.

7. The distinction between ontic and ontological existentialists first came to my attention in a compelling way in James M. Edie, "Transcendental Phenomenology," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 25 (1964): 52-63. Examples of the misleading use of metaphysical language: Kierkegaard, "It is only systemists and objective philosophers who have ceased to be human beings, and have become speculative philosophy in the abstract, an entity which belongs in the realm of pure being....However

much the subject has the infinite within himself, through being an existing individual, he is in the process of becoming." Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 85. Nietzsche, "To impose upon becoming the character of being -- that is the supreme will to power," The Will to Power (New York: Random House, 1968), tr. by Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingsdale, p. 330.

Both of these statements remain within the metaphysical distinction between being and becoming, betraying their intentions by making becoming something other than being.

8. Then, too, the claim that there can be no existential system made by the ontic existentialists would be intelligible only if it were not itself a generic claim about human existence that implicates additional generic claims in its explication. Kierkegaard was the first to claim that there could be no existential system (Postscript, pp. 99-113), but he made many generic claims about human existence. The sentence, "Existence itself, the act of existing, is a striving, and is pathetic and comic in the same degree," (Postscript, p. 84), makes seven such generic claims. It says that human existence is (a) an act, (b) a striving, (c) more real when striving, (d) pathetic, or tragic, (e) comic, (f) simultaneously pathetic and comic, and (g) pathetic and comic in direct proportion to each other. That is to say that Kierkegaard himself thought very systematically.

He foresaw this interpretation and contended ahead of time that it would necessarily involve a misinterpretation (Postscript, p. 546), but this is only after he had to erect his existential system to refute the Hegelian system and its rationalized theology. The strongest that his claim can be made is that there can be no existential system on the Hegelian model. His point was mostly theological, however, for he held that faith in God required a qualitative leap (Postscript, p. 15), rather than rational persuasion. It is the individual's God-relation that is for Kierkegaard the essential secret, that which cannot be conceptualized. In his day individual existence was overlooked because of the excessively rational; today it is overlooked because of the excessively irrational. Systematizing can now promote the growth of subjectness as provocation could then. In either case the point is to find a means to witness to the truth of subjectness.

9. This is precisely Kierkegaard's point against Hegel.

10. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time; Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception; Gusdorf, Speaking; Kwant, Phenomenology of Language; Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature;

Luijpen, Existential Phenomenology; Plessner, Laughing and Crying; Minkowski, Lived Time; Nabert, Elements for an Ethic; Schutz and Luckman, The Structures of the Life-World.

11. Rather than being merely experiential occurrences as in the ontic existentialists.

12. Sartre began by claiming that the concrete was man in the world and that everything else was an abstraction (Being and Nothingness, p. 3), but then forgot that being-for-itself and being-in-itself were abstractions from this reality. His conclusion that man is a useless passion results from the artificial abstraction, for it is the terms that he cannot get back together when he claims that the for-itself cannot become the in-itself.

13. Again, the very use of the term results in the impossibility of dialogic relations between people in Sartre's view.

14. Ontic existentialism supplies the mythos, the intuitions, of education. Existential phenomenology, however, yields the language necessary for the logos, the conceptions, of educational theory. Logos is the totality of intersubjectively established meanings of a language. The logos of education is the totality of meanings that can be available through the language of education. Only authentic speech, however, is constitutive of logos, and logos of it. The use of words that disclose the world, the contact with mythos, enables speech to be authentic. See Martin Buber, "What is Common to All," in The Knowledge of Man (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 89-109; and Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), ch. 1. Both of these attempt to retrieve the concept of logos from Heraclitus, i.e., from pre-Socratic and pre-Christian sources.

15. The following methodology is an adaptation from Otto Bollnow, "Der Wissenschaftscharakter der Pädagogik," in Erziehung in anthropologischer Sicht (Zurich: Morgarten Verlag, 1969), pp. 15-50. See also my own "Phenomenology and Educational Research," in David Denton, editor, Existentialism and Phenomenology in Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 1974), pp. 183-220.

16. I have tried to work this out elsewhere in "Openness: The Pedagogic Atmosphere," in The Philosophy of Open Education (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), edited by David Nyberg, in the series The International Library of Philosophy of Education, edited by R. S. Peters, in press.

17. In Ryle's sense, it would be a category mistake to take direction from existential thought or philosophy rather than from the goals of educational theory. In Kierkegaard's sense, it is a category mistake to omit the simply human from one's own life, which includes the necessity for choices and the courage to "will one thing," here, to will educational theory, rather than philosophy, as befits a professor of education.

CHAPTER 38.

DEWEY'S RELATIVISTIC PHILOSOPHY, LEWIN'S FIELD PSYCHOLOGY, AND LEARNING.

MORRIS L. BIGGE.

With the advent of the "sputnik age," people found themselves deeply frustrated and they have reacted true to psychological form; they have regressed to earlier patterns of behavior. Thus we find society in general behaving, under frustration, the way we would expect individuals to perform in a like situation.

American education, too, has felt the sting of post-sputnikian regression. We made schools a scapegoat, took a quick look at them, and decided to make some sweeping changes. Having, in calmer times, established no basic philosophy undergirding what we were trying to do in school, we now are heading public education on a regressive trail.

As the storm has gathered, representatives of our professional organizations talked like visionary idealists yet acted like tough-minded realists; and John Q. Public didn't like what he was getting. When he visited schools he found teachers dealing with his children in much the same manner as he did at home and by gad! he didn't like it. He then behaved in the only way he knew how -- his thinking turned back to the "good old schools."

There is a strong likelihood that, through mass public reaction and professional default, the current situation will culminate in educational regression to pre-scientific mental discipline as the prevailing psychology reflected in schools. However there, still, is a way out. In a frustration situation, aggression may come to replace regression; we may, psychologically speaking, fight instead of resorting to flight.

We now can see that a perverted Deweyism, which found its way into our schools and is the prevailing "whipping boy" of most critics, may, because of the reaction it has engendered, turn out to be just about the worst thing that could have happened to public education. However, we have the paradoxical condition that a serious re-reading and application of Dewey might open the way for establishment of greater growth and stability in our schools than they ever have manifested in the past.

One branch of pragmatism has been represented by a group of transitional thinkers who not only made a valuable contribution to development of a new way of thinking but also perpetuated some ideas and practices which have not been all to the good. These people defined pragmatism as a compromise position within which one accepts the assumptions of a realist and then works toward the goals of an idealist.

Because of the great enthusiasm for scientific realism in the 1920's and 30's, it was reasonable for one group of "pragmatic" individuals to develop this transitional position. They saw the same scientific world that Newton had described and they faced up to the fact, as they saw it, that man, too, was a part of that scientific world; he was a creature of cause and effect just as was anything else. They considered the concept of transcendental purpose a myth that modern scientific man should explode. Thus they established what basically was a non-purposive psychology. They failed to see that there are three, not merely two, possible positions in regard to purpose. Namely, one may be committed to transcendental purpose, no purpose, or immanent purpose.

Having set a mechanistic, materialistic frame of reference and being basically humanitarian in nature, these people proceeded to pursue idealistic purposes within a naturalistic, realistic commitment. This self-contradictory and inadequate position continues to be manifested in our schools and among some educational philosophers who call themselves pragmatists. Again, I want to emphasize that these thinkers have made a definite contribution to the development of American educational thought, but their thinking has been transitional, and the time is far past when it should have been replaced by something more adequate and less self-contradictory.

Extreme emphasis upon life adjustment as the aims of education probably has developed upon this realism-idealism compromise point of view. Consequently, when advocates of this position were attacked by self-styled educational experts of the 1950's and 60's, they were unable to muster a very convincing defense.

In 1927 Dewey stated, "The assimilation of human science to physical science represents, in other words, only another form of absolutistic logic, a kind of physical absolutism" (3, p. 199). Had realistic-idealistic pragmatists thought through the implications of statements such as this, they would have seen that the assumptions of a naturalistic, neo-realist were not an adequate base upon which to build a new way of thinking.

A shortcoming of Dewey's philosophy is that as it matured it did not provide a psychological structure and vehicle for its implementation in our schools. Consequently, many followers of Dewey have developed a psychology of amazing simplicity and one that their students can do very little with. Pragmatically oriented teachers often have great ideas of where they are going and why they are going there, but little conception of the proper vehicle to use.

This, however, is not true of all of Dewey's followers. Some followed the implications of their realistic assumptions and embraced a Watsonian behaviorism or a Thorndikian connectionism. Such a psychology was a vehicle all right, but as an instrumentality of Dewey's outlook it generally traveled backwards.

A few brave souls ventured into field psychology and discovered an affinity between the pragmatic outlook and this psychological orientation. There is evidence that the time is ripe for further expansion of the relationships between Dewey's philosophy and Lewin's psychology. This paper consists of a brief presentation of the two lines of thought in general, followed by more extensive comparison of them in regard to certain topics closely associated with learning theory.

Both Dewey's philosophy and Lewin's psychology have many overtones that have implications for learning theory, but neither writer has explicitly developed a well-rounded theory of learning. As one peruses the writings of the two men, he is impressed by the fact that, when they treat learning theory, they do so in a strikingly similar manner.

In 1939 Dewey wrote, ". . . although I have said that I regard psychology as indispensable for sound philosophizing at the present juncture, I have failed to develop in a systematic way my underlying psychological principles" (12, p. 554). In light of this statement it is reasonable to infer that Dewey thought that implicit within his philosophy was a systematic psychology even though it had not been carefully delineated.

In 1939 Dewey also mentioned that his thinking had changed through the years but basically in the right direction. Thus it is probable that his psychological commitment may best be ascertained by looking at his later works. Sometime between 1917 and 1922 Dewey gave human instincts an honorable burial. This necessitated a rather marked shift in his thinking. For this reason, only his major works which were completed after 1922 are considered in this paper.

Dewey's Relativistic Philosophy.

Dewey's relativistic or pragmatic philosophy, summarized briefly, is as follows: Thought functions as a guide to action. Truth is to be tested by its consequences. Emphasis is to be given to critical intellectual activity as opposed to metaphysical formulations.

The principle of relativity is taken seriously. The thesis of relativity applied to human behavior is that a person cannot deal with things in isolation, but only with them as related to other objects. Propositions or concepts are products of human minds; they are intellectual functions. Independent existence of objects or even of other person's ideas is not denied. A relativist simply notes that a person sizes up his world as he finds it, in a way that makes things fall into a pattern. He contends that the assumptions underlying any form of absolutism are essentially undemocratic. Furthermore, the principle of democracy, because of its very nature, is not an absolute.

Dewey saw reality in its historical sense to be an absolutistic term that connoted a pre-existent, transcendental reality. He inveighed against historical absolutistic outlooks and felt it was futile to attempt to define a transcendental reality which, if it does exist, cannot be known. He saw the historical outlook in which men have pictured a fixed, absolute reality independent of any perception of it to have been a great stumbling block to progress in the modern world. A relativist's system of thinking is not dependent upon existence of supernatural being.

Dewey labored to produce an empirical theory of ideas that would be free from the burdens imposed by either sensationism or a priori rationalism. He wanted to emancipate intellectual activity from the supposed need of always harking back to that which had already been given for the test of the value of ideas. Through emancipation of thinking from necessity of testing conclusions solely by reference to antecedent existence, he developed the originative possibilities of thinking (5, p. 114). Dewey wanted to develop a system of establishing cognitive knowledge that rests upon the most dependable methods of inquiry available. To him, the basic problem of philosophy concerned the interaction of our judgments about ends to be sought with the knowledge of the means for achieving them. In 1929 he stated, "But the essence of pragmatic instrumentalism is to conceive of both knowledge and practice as means of making goods -- excellencies of all kinds -- secure in experienced existence" (5, p. 37).

In his Logic published in 1938, Dewey discussed the weaknesses of popular positivism and logical positivism. It is evident that he conceived these positions an inadequate foundation for a scientific approach. He acknowledged the contribution of positivism and traditional empiricism in their uprooting superstition, mysticism, etc. However, he questioned their adequacy for modern scientific thinking. The basic weakness of this position, as he saw it, was that "It is quite willing to admit that generalizations are valid provided they have the sanction of science. But it inherited from traditional empiricism its contempt for general ideas and for theories that pretend to be anything else than summary records of ascertained facts. Its logic has no recognized place for hypotheses which at a given time outrun the scope of already determined 'facts,' and which, indeed, may not be capable of verification at the time or of direct factual verification at any time" (11, p. 519). Dewey observed that the history of science shows that many hypotheses, that at the time of their origin were purely speculative and at that time may even have been considered metaphysical, have played a great role in advancement of science. He further noted that no important scientific hypothesis had ever been verified in the form in which it was originally presented nor without considerable revisions and modifications. Even though the positivistic theory claims to be strictly scientific, it falls short in its being committed to the old metaphysical view that attributed inherent truth and falsity to ideas and properties.

Along with criticizing the positivistic spectator theory of knowledge, Dewey also took to task introspective doctrine. He stated, "It is not too much to say that the introspective doctrine -- much wider in logical scope than so-called introspective psychology -- is the last desperate stand and fortress of the classic doctrine that knowledge is immediate grasp, intuition, envisagment, possession" (2, p. 340).

Dewey saw his philosophy as an emergent synthesis arising out of the conflicts and inadequacies of absolutistic realisms and idealisms. He also considered introspection in psychology a manifestation of vestiges of idealism. In his early writings, he was not so clear in seeing behaviorism as a manifestation of naturalistic realism but this observation becomes clearer as his thought proceeded through the years. In his Experience and Nature published in 1925, he seemed not to recognize existence of Watsonian behaviorism but in his "Rejoinder" of 1939 he stated, ". . . while I believe Nature has a mechanism -- for otherwise knowledge could not be an instrument for its control -- I do not accept its reduction to a mechanism" (12, p. 580).

In 1933 he seemed to develop the thesis that a mechanistic behavioristic psychology is adequate for the lower animals but not for man. He stated, "Animals learn (when they learn at all) by a 'cut-and-try' method, by doing at random first one thing and then another thing and continuing the things that happen to succeed. This procedure is followed by human beings when they do not operate on the basis of ideas, when they 'monkey,' to use a term derived from the random activity of one of the most intelligent of the lower animals. Action directed consciously by ideas -- by suggested meanings accepted for the sake of experimenting with them -- is the sole alternative both to bull-headed stupidity and to learning bought from that dear teacher -- chance experience" (8, pp. 134-135). A stronger non-mechanistic statement is found in the Sources of a Science of Education. Here Dewey stated, "The parent and educator deal with situations that never repeat one another. Exact quantitative determinations are far from meeting the demands of such situations, for they presuppose repetitions and exact uniformities" (4, p. 65).

Lewin's Field Psychology.

Lewin's early philosophical orientation was in an idealism that supported Gestalt psychology. The progressive development of his thinking after he arrived in the United States shows gradual movement toward a pragmatic outlook. However, he continued to have a place for absolutes in the form of relationships that were to be accepted as objective, experienced, and discovered. He never achieved a clean break with the realistic doctrine of independent existence. He acknowledged that products of research, at any stage, need not be ultimate truth in order to be true. Nevertheless, he assumed that ultimate truth is there, to be found.

Lewin considered psychology a science closely related to everyday life. He wanted most of all to study the various problems of the social sciences involving minority groups, political organizations, and international and intercultural relations. He was extremely interested in democratic principles and practices. In the course of applying his psychological theory to problems in these areas, he became interested in teaching and learning.

The center of Lewin's psychological interest was in the motivating conditions of person-environment situations. His field theory is particularly useful in social, personality, and educational psychology. He developed his field psychology in such way as to make it fundamentally different from the various S-R associationisms. Whereas S-R associationisms study psychology as a series of events, the very term field of field psychology implies that, psychologically interpreted, everything happens at once.

Lewin's goal was to make the concepts of field psychology of sufficient scope to be applicable to all kinds of behavior and yet specific enough to permit representation of a definite person in a concrete situation. He thought that objectivity in psychology demands representation of the field adequately and accurately, as it exists for an individual at a particular time.

Lewin used the concepts topology, borrowed from geometry, and vector, borrowed from physics, to picture psychological reality in terms of field relationships of a person and his environment. He made much use of constructs, hypotheses, and theories. To him scientific method, as well as embracing the process of observation and classification of data, also included constructive formulation and testing of hypotheses.

Lewin's key construct was life space. It represents the total pattern of factors or influences that, at a certain moment or longer period of time, affects the behavior of a person. A person's life space represents the total world in which he lives. This may include his precepts, his knowledge and his beliefs; his forward and backward time perspective; and his abstract ideas as well as concrete objects. In a life space a person and his environment are in simultaneous mutual interaction (SMI) and are mutually interdependent. Central to a life space is the person -- a consciously behaving self. The person is not identical with a biological organism, neither is it a ghostlike mentalistic thing. Rather it is the center of abilities and needs; it is that which a child means when he says "I" or "me."

The two basic aspects of a life space are a person and his psychological environment. Environment is constituted of everything in which, toward which, or away from which a person can change his psychological position. It sometimes means the momentary situation of the child. At other times it means the milieu; that is, the chief characteristics of a more permanent situation.

The third crucial concept of field psychology is the foreign hull of a life space. A foreign hull is constituted of those aspects of an organism's physical and social environment that are observable by the one studying the particular person but that, at that moment, have no significance for the person being studied. Thus, it is a complex of all non-psychological factors that surround a life space. It is that part of one's physical and social environment that, at the time under consideration, is not included in the psychological environment.

Some essential features of field psychology are as follows: (1) Perception and reality are defined relativistically, (2) behavior is interpreted to be purposive, (3) there is emphasis upon psychological functions as contrasted with objects or movements, (4) such emphasis is situational not historical; a psychological study always centers upon a description of a situation as a whole -- a field. The study then proceeds to specific and detailed analysis of various aspects of the situation, but at no time are the aspects viewed as isolated elements. (5) The principle of contemporaneity is made paramount. A psychological field or life space is a construct of such nature that it contains everything psychological that is transpiring in relation to a specific person at a given expanse of time.

The Dewey-Lewin Concord.

Let us now examine the positions of Deweyan relativism and Lewinian field psychology in regard to (1) psychological contemporaneity, (2) purposiveness of human behavior, (3) nature of the perceptive process, and (4) definition of learning, and let us examine these positions in such a way as to center upon Dewey's specific, documented statements as related to a more generalized, undocumented Lewinian position in regard to these matters (every quotation in this paper is a statement of John Dewey).

Psychological Contemporaneity. Contemporaneity is the principle that one can study and predict behavior best when he views it in a frame of reference within which everything is going on at once. The critical issue of field psychology, when compared with stimulus-response associationisms, is not molarity versus atomism, but contemporaneity versus mere serial cause and effect. Today, many S-R associationists have adopted a molar approach to behavior; they often refer to the organism as a whole and to the total environment. But psychological contemporaneity still remains outside their life spaces.

S-R associationists generally would agree with Dewey when he stated, "Those who talk most of the organism, physiologists and psychologists, are often just those who display least sense of the intimate, delicate and subtle interdependence of all organic structures and processes with one another. The world seems mad in preoccupation with what is specific, particular, disconnected in medicine, politics, science, industry, education" (2, p. 295). However, these same psychologists would not be enthusiastic over his next statement, "In terms of a conscious control of inclusive wholes, search for those links which occupy key positions and which effect critical connections is indispensable" (2, p. 295).

Contemporaneity is the essential feature of field psychology that is most often misunderstood. The unit of time of a life space, microscopically viewed, is a moment; however, macroscopically considered, it may cover hours or even years. Whatever the length of time, everything is going on at once -- that is the meaning of field.

A person's psychological field that exists at a given time contains, as well as the environment of the present, the views of that individual about his future and his past. Any psychological past or psychological future is a simultaneous part of a field existing at a given time. Psychologically, there is no past or future except as it enters into the present.

An individual's views about the past, as about the rest of the physical and social world, are often incorrect; nevertheless they constitute a significant psychological past in his own life space. Furthermore, the goals of an individual as a psychological fact lie in the present and they too constitute an essential part of his life space. The content of the goals may lie in the future and they may never occur. The nature of an expectation is not dependent upon the event's coming to pass. If an Indian warrior were brave so that in the future he would go to the happy hunting ground, whether or not there actually existed a future happy hunting ground would have no bearing on his being brave. His happy hunting ground is a part -- a goal region -- of his contemporaneous life space.

The principle of contemporaneity means that psychological events are determined by conditions at the time behavior occurs. One cannot derive behavior from either the future or the past as such. Both S-R associationists and field psychologists give little place for future cause of events. However, field psychologists differ sharply from S-R associationists in their insistence that derivation of behavior from the past is equally metaphysical -- beyond the realm of science. Since past events do not now exist, they, as such, can have no effect on the present.

Thus, influence of a future can be only anticipatory, and effects of a past can be only indirect. However, through continuity of life spaces, past psychological fields do have their "trace" -- residue -- in a present field, which influences a person's behavior. Psychological *trace* corresponds to *mind* as used by Dewey. *Trace* is a region or condition of a present life space that has *similarity* to a characteristic of earlier life spaces. In other words, *trace* means that there is some similarity of regions of succeeding life spaces. When a person uses an earlier acquired insight in solving a current problem, the insight is an example of trace.

The psychology implicit in Dewey's philosophy unquestionality is molar, not atomistic, however this does not settle the issue. Is it contemporaneous, not merely serial? One of Dewey's many statements that reflect molarity is, "The whole organism is concerned in every act to some extent and in some fashion, internal organs as well as muscular, those of circulation, secretion, etc." (1, p. 150).

Dewey in his development of the meaning of consciousness paralleled Lewin's concept, contemporaneous life space. He opposed both realistic and idealistic definitions of consciousness. He did not accept an epiphenomenal theory of consciousness. Neither did he subscribe to a doctrine of original creativity of consciousness -- that it makes objects what they are (2, p. 315). For Dewey, "consciousness, an idea, is that phase of a system of meanings which at a given time is undergoing re-direction, transitive transformation. . . . Consciousness *is* the meaning of events in course of remaking; its 'cause' is only the fact that this is one of the ways in which nature goes on" (2, p. 308). "Mind denotes the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life; . . ." (2, p. 303).

In *Knowing and the Known*, Dewey used the expression "life activity" in a way quite similar to Lewin's use of *life space*. He wrote, "consideration of the simpler physiological activities which significantly enough already bore the name 'functions' serve to indicate that a life-activity [life space] is not anything going on *between* one thing, the organism, and another thing, the environment, but that, *as* life-activity, it is a simple event over and across that distinction (not to say separation). Anything that can be entitled to either of these names has first to be located and identified as it is incorporated, engrossed, in life-activity" (13, p. 323). Also, in his *Experience and Education*, Dewey used the concept *life-space* in virtually the same sense as Lewin (10, p. 88).

Dewey, too, viewed person and environment as the two interactive factors in a contemporaneous situation. "Whatever else organic life is or is not, it is a process of activity that involves an environment. It is a transaction extending beyond the spatial limits of the organism. An organism does not live in an environment; it lives by means of an environment" (11, p. 25).

When Dewey was thinking psychologically, he made self, organism, and person synonymous terms; self or person is organism psychologically defined. An example of his usage of these terms as synonyms may be found in his Logic, "A person, or, more generically, an organism, becomes a knowing subject in virtue of engaging in operations of controlled inquiry" (11, p. 526).

Dewey evidently shunned the idea of a substantive self just as much as he did that of a mechanistic, biological organism. His way of escaping both of these was to define self or organism as a factor within experience. He stated, "moreover the organism -- the self, the 'subject' of action, -- is a factor within experience and not something outside of it to which experiences are attached as the self's private property" (12, p. 532). "The self is both formed and brought into consciousness through interaction with environment" (9, p. 282). In 1949 Dewey observed that, "Were the word organism widely understood as an organization in which a living body and environing conditions cooperate as fiddle and player work together, it would not have been necessary to repeat so often the expression 'organic-environmental'" (13, p. 286).

In Dewey's thinking, self, person, or organism always was given a predominate position. In Experience and Nature, he stated, "Yet till we understand operations of the self as the tool of tools, the means in all use of means, specifying its differential activities in their distinctive consequences in varying qualities of what is experienced, science is incomplete and the use made of it is at the mercy of an unknown factor, so that the ultimate and important consequence is in so far a matter of accident" (2, p. 247). Thus, to Dewey, a scientific description of self and its contemporaneous functions was highly desirable, and this is the pivotal idea of field psychology. In contrast, S-R associationisms either make very little of the concept psychological self or they treat it as identical with a mechanistic biological organism.

In his dealing with organism -- environment relationships, Dewey stated, ". . . the genuine correspondence of life and mind with nature is like the correspondence of two persons who 'correspond' in order to learn each one of the acts, ideas and intents of the other one, in such ways as to modify one's own intents, ideas and acts, and to substitute partaking in a common and inclusive situation for separate and independent performances" (2, p. 283). For Dewey, "'Situation' stands for something inclusive of a large number of diverse elements existing across wide areas of space and long periods of time, but which, nevertheless, have their own unity" (13, p. 315). The unity Dewey speaks of here is synonymous with Lewin's psychological field or life space "What is designated by the word 'situation' is not a single object or event or set of objects and events. For we never experience nor form judgments about objects and events in isolation, but only in connection with a contextual whole. This latter is what is called a 'situation'" (11, p. 66).

Dewey's situation -- Lewin's life space -- is sensed or felt; it is a total qualitative situation. ". . . a situation is a whole in virtue of its immediately pervasive quality. When we describe it from the psychological side, we have to say that the situation as a qualitative whole is sensed or felt. Such an expression is, however, valuable only as it is taken negatively to indicate that it is not, as such, an object in discourse. Stating that it is felt is wholly misleading if it gives the impression that the situation is a feeling or an emotion or anything mentalistic. On the contrary, feeling, sensation and emotion have themselves to be identified and described in terms of immediate presence of a total qualitative situation" (11, p. 68).

Dewey, like Lewin, emphasized a psychological past that consists of that which one carries with him into his present life space -- this residue from the past is mind. "We find also in all these higher organisms that what is done is conditioned by consequences of prior activities; . . . In consequence, an organism acts with reference to a time-spread, a serial order of events, as a unit, just as it does in reference to a unified spatial variety. Thus an environment both extensive and enduring is immediately implicated in present behavior. Operatively speaking, the remote and the past are 'in' behavior making it what it is. The action called 'organic' is not just that of internal structure; it is an integration of organic-environmental connections" (2, p. 279).

Now what did Dewey say about a psychological future? "To the being fully alive, the future is not ominous but a promise; it surrounds the present as a halo. It consists of possibilities that are felt as a possession of what is now and here. In life that is truly life, everything overlaps and merges" (9, p. 18).

Dewey emphasized that the idea of using the present simply to get ready for the future is a self-contradiction. Such an ideal omits and even shuts out the very conditions by which a person can prepare for his future. "To live in the present is compatible with condensation of far-reaching meanings in the present. Such enrichment of the present for its own sake is the just heritage of childhood and the best insurer of future growth" (8, p. 287). "We always live at the time we live and not at some other time, and only by extracting at each present time the full meaning of each present experience are we prepared for doing the same thing in the future. This is the only preparation which in the long run amounts to anything" (10, p. 51).

Dewey considered adjustment not a matter of responses to stimuli but of re-established rapport within a psychological environment or situation. This is illustrated when he said, "Every need, say hunger for fresh air or food, is a lack that denotes at least a temporary absence of adequate adjustment with surroundings. But it is also a demand, a reaching out into the environment to make good the lack and to restore adjustment by building at least a temporary equilibrium. . . . Equilibrium comes about not mechanically and inertly but out of, and because of, tension" (9, pp. 13-14). "Inner harmony is attained only when, by some means, terms are made with the environment. . . . In the process of living, attainment of a period of equilibrium is at the same time the initiation of a new relation to the environment, one that brings with it potency of new adjustments to be made through struggle" (9, p. 17).

Purposiveness of Human Behavior. Within field psychology purposive is nearly a synonym for intelligent. A unique characteristic of human beings is their capacity to pursue long-sighted, as well as short-sighted, self-interests. Field psychologists recognize the significance of this fact. When a child is behaving purposively, he is pursuing his goals in light of the insights he has available; he is behaving intelligently. The goal or goals toward which a child strives psychologically exist in his present life space. The phenomenon of goal is such that expectation -- not actual realization -- is its essence. Although the content of a goal may be in the future or may not occur at all, this goal as a psychological fact necessarily lies in the present life space.

The purposiveness in field psychology is immanent, not transcendental, to the world of experience; it prevails in workaday life situations. Careful study of people, as well as of other animate beings, in life situations indicates that if they are active at all they are trying to do something, and that, through our anticipating what they are trying to do, we can predict most accurately what they are going to do. Whether there is transcendental -- supernatural -- purpose in the universe is another problem which is related only indirectly to the concept immanently purposive as developed in field psychology.

Dewey not only made much of purpose behavior, but he also identified purpose action with intelligent action. In 1929 he said, "Now intelligent action is purposive action; if it is a natural occurrence, coming into being under complex but specifiable conditions of organic and social interaction, then purpose like intelligence is within nature; it is a 'category' having objective standing and validity. It has this status in a direct way through the place and operation of human art within the natural scene; for distinctively human conduct can be interpreted and understood only in terms of purpose. . . action which is distinctively human is marked by intent" (5, p. 246). In 1934 he wrote, "All interest is an identification of a self with some material aspect of the objective world, of the nature that includes man. Purpose is this identification in action" (9, p. 277). He further stated in 1938, "Every intelligent act involves selection of certain things as means to other things as their consequences" (11, p. 460).

That human action not only is purpose but also consciously so is attested by the following: "The immediately precarious, the point of greatest immediate need, defines the apex of consciousness, its intense or focal mode. And this is the point of re-direction, of re-adaptation, re-organization" (2, p. 312). "Through consciousness, he [a person] converts the relations of cause and effect that are found in nature into relations of means and consequences" (9, p. 25). "Even anger and hate are partly caused by us rather than in us" (9, p. 251). "Our needs are drafts drawn upon the environment, at first blindly, then with conscious interest and attention" (9, p. 255).

A good summary statement of Dewey's position on purposiveness is contained in his Philosophy and Civilization, which he wrote in 1931. "Instrumentalism maintains in opposition to many contrary tendencies in the American environment, that action should be intelligent and reflective, and that thought should occupy a central position in life. That is the reason for our insistence on the teleological phase of thought and knowledge. If it must be teleological in particular and not merely true in the abstract, that is probably due to the practical element which is found in all the phases of American life. However, that may be, what we insist upon above all else is that intelligence be regarded as the only source and sole guarantee of a desirable and happy future" (7, p. 33).

Nature of the Perceptive Process. In man's perceptive process is he psychologically active, passive, or interactive? If he is psychologically active he basically is a mind, which is a ". . . spectator beholding the world from without and finding its highest satisfaction in the joy of self-sufficing contemplation" (5, p. 291). If he is passive he is a mental or physical ". . . piece of blotting paper that absorbs and retains automatically" (8, p. 261). If man is interactive he is a psychological organism or person and environment which together form a situation (10, pp. 38-39).

Dewey and Lewin were in very close agreement in their treatment of perception. Both saw it as a process within which man is psychologically interactive, he is neither passive nor active, nor a combination of both.

Lewin interpreted perception in the broadest possible sense to cover all the different ways a person has of getting to know his environment. He thought that the conception of the perceptual world as a sum of sensory elements should be abandoned, and that stimuli should be assessed not according to their physical intensity but their psychological reality. Within his psychological system the field, i.e., life space, that influences an individual is described, not in "objective," physical terms, but in the way it exists for that person at that time. Lewin made no attempt to relate behavior to a biological organism and its physical or geographical environment as such. The psychological concept person is much broader than is the biological concept organism. A life space or field consists of the content of an individual's perception. Neither the organism nor the environment alone is the one main factor. Rather, a person and his environment are simultaneously interacting and participating in perception; they constitute a SMI (simultaneous mutual interaction).

In apparently the same situation, a person at different times may perceive quite different aspects of a situation and behave accordingly. Furthermore, provision of opportunity for one to perceive certain aspects of a physical or social environment in a certain way by no means guarantees that that particular perception will occur or that the perception that does occur will have anything like a one-to-one relationship to the objective environment as it appears to someone else. In perception nothing is absolutely fixed. Rather, one interprets everything in terms of the situation as a whole. What a person perceives -- his reality -- consists of what he makes of what seems to be himself and his environment. Depending on the habits -- insights or understandings -- he brings to a particular occasion, he seems to give meaning and order to things in terms of his own needs, abilities, and purposes.

As one lives, one moves through a series of life spaces. In dynamic human beings, we would not expect consecutive life spaces to be identical. However, we can anticipate some degree of similarity and continuity of life spaces as the experiences of one moment shade into those of the next. Within a series of overlapping life spaces, a person's life is a continuity of psychological tensions, locomotions, and new equilibriums. When there is an increase of tension in one part of a life space relative to the rest of the system, disequilibrium occurs. When a person finds himself in a state of disequilibrium and attempts to return to equilibrium, psychic energy is expended; he engages in psychological locomotion.

Dewey saw human behavior neither as a process of responding to stimuli nor as one of interpreting sensations and directing movements. In How We Think he pointed out the fallacy of thinking of mind as either passive or active. He stated, "Thus the basic error of the two schools is the same. Both ignore and virtually deny the fact that tendencies toward a reflective and truly logical activity are native to the mind, and that they show themselves at an early period, since they are demanded by outer conditions and stimulated by native curiosity. There is an innate disposition to draw inferences, and an inherent desire to experiment and test. The mind at every stage of growth has its own logic. It entertains suggestions, tests them by observation of objects and events, reaches conclusions, tries them in action, finds them confirmed or in need of correction or rejection" (8, p. 83).

Dewey's principle of perceptual interaction, thus, was developed around the idea that it is what a person takes the world to be that serves as a foundation upon which he fashions his design for living. He may be pushed and pulled about by forces many of which he is unaware -- his world of effect. But his world of insight, what he takes the world to be, consists of the building materials that he uses for formulating his plans or designs for activity.

The principle of continuity complements that of interaction in rounding out an adequate picture of intelligent behavior. ". . . the principle of continuity of experience means that every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after" (10, p. 27).

Dewey placed greater emphasis upon influence of the social matrix than did Lewin, but when he discussed the contemporaneous life scene of an individual his thinking was strikingly similar to that of Lewin. In 1930 Dewey stated that the subject matter of psychology ". . . is the behavior of the organism so far as that is characterized by changes taking place in an activity that is serial and continuous in reference to changes in environment that is continuous, while changing in detail" (6, p. 414). However, he saw space as a ". . . comprehensive and enclosed scene within which are ordered the multiplicity of doings and undergoings in which man engages. Time ceases to be either the endless and uniform flow or the succession of instantaneous points which some philosophers have asserted it to be" (9, p. 23). Thus he saw that:

"The two principles of continuity and interaction are not separate from each other. They intercept and unite. They are, so to speak, the longitudinal and lateral aspects of experience. Different situations succeed one another. But because of the principle of continuity something is carried over from the earlier to the later ones. As an individual passes from one situation to another, his world, his environment, expands or contracts. He does not find himself living in another world but in a different part or aspect of one and the same world. What he has learned in the way of knowledge and skill in one situation becomes an instrument of understanding in dealing effectively with the situations which follow. The process goes on as long as life and learning continue. Otherwise the course of experience is disorderly, since the individual factor that enters in the making experience is split." (10, pp. 42-43).

This latter statement sounds very much like Lewin's description of life spaces, which may be of momentary or much longer duration and which overlap as a person lives his life. Continuity describes the overlapping of life spaces and interaction describes what takes place within a life space. Lewin's life space is Dewey's situation and "One cannot decline to have a situation for this is equivalent to having no experience, not even one of disagreement" (11, p. 69).

For us to grasp the parallel of Dewey and Lewin, we must see that Dewey used consciousness to describe the contemporaneous interaction of a person in a situation to mean about the same as Lewin's behavior in a life space. Furthermore, we must realize Dewey's mind or continuity of experience is Lewin's series of overlapping life spaces or psychological locomotion.

Psychological behavior and locomotion, as used by Lewin, are analogous concepts. Behavior describes the simultaneous functions within a life space of an individual. Locomotion refers to the relative positions of respective regions of a person's temporally continuous life spaces. When we concentrate study upon a person and his current environmental situation, behavior denotes changes that occur in a life space. However, when we consider a time element, a person appears to occupy a series of overlapping life spaces. The life spaces usually manifest a continuity; they are similar but not identical. Change in subsequent life spaces is locomotion. Consequently, depending upon whether we are centering our study upon the person-environment interactivity or the psychological continuity of a person's life spaces, we may represent any psychological phenomenon in terms of either behavior or locomotion; behavior centers upon how one sizes things up, locomotion on what one does about it as he moves into new life spaces.

Dewey stated, ". . . self, organism, subject, mind -- whatever term is used -- denotes a factor which interacts causally with environing things to produce an experience" (9, p. 250).

". . . consciousness in a being with language denotes awareness or perception of meanings; it is the perception of actual events, whether past, contemporary or future, in their meanings, the having of actual ideas. The greater part of mind is only implicit in any conscious act or state; the field of mind -- of operative meanings -- is enormously wider than that of consciousness. Mind is contextual and persistent; consciousness is focal and transitive. Mind is, so to speak, structural, substantial; a constant background and foreground; perceptive consciousness is process, a series of heres and nows. Mind is a constant luminosity; consciousness intermittent, a series of flashes of varying intensities" (2, p. 303).

Definition on Learning. Since field psychology is a purpose psychology, it contrasts rather sharply with all mechanistic psychologies. In place of thinking of learning as a process of associating stimuli and responses or associating anything else, Lewin made development of cognitive structure of a life space his pivotal learning concept. Cognitive structure is synonymous with insight. Through learning, one may change the cognitive structure of one's psychological past, present or future, and insightful changes may be verbal, preverbal or nonverbal. It is in connection with goal-directed behavior that insightful learning occurs. Through gaining and changing insights one cognitively structures both himself and his environment.

Specialized forms of change in cognitive structure are change in motivation, change in group belongingness and ideology, and gain in voluntary control of musculature or learning skills. Changes in cognitive structure take place through differentiation, generalization, and restructurization of life spaces. As a person grows, he differentiates himself from his environment, different aspects of his person and environment from each other and an irreality level from the reality level of his life space. One generalizes when one forms a concept that includes previously differentiated aspects of himself or his environment. In restructurization, a person changes the meanings of respective regions of his life space in relationship to himself and to one another.

Dewey thought that, "Everything which is distinctively human is learned, not native, even though it could not be learned without native structures which mark man off from other animals" (3, p. 154). Since he was greatly concerned with the learning that occurs in schools, he used education in such way as to mean learning. To him, a person's learning was reconstruction of his experience -- life space -- in such way as to enhance its meaning and increase his ability to control future experience.

Dewey's reconstruction of experience is Lewin's restructuring of life spaces. Both men thought that the basic learning process is within perception or consciousness, when these terms are given the broadest possible definition. "We have at present little or next to no controlled art of securing that redirection of behavior which constitutes adequate perception or consciousness. That is, we have little or no art of education in the fundamentals, namely in the management of the organic attitudes which color the qualities of our conscious objects and acts" (2, p. 316).

Neither Dewey nor Lewin had much respect for pure memorization as a process of learning. "Even general principles, when merely memorized, stand on the same level as bare particular facts. Since they are not used either in understanding actual objects and events or in giving rise, through what they imply, to other conceptual meanings, they are, to the mind that memorizes them (falsely called learning), mere arbitrary items of information" (8, p. 185). "It is assumed too frequently that subject matter is understood when it has been stored in memory and can be reproduced upon demand. The net outcome of our discussion is that nothing is really known except in so far as it is understood" (8, p. 148).

Dewey laid a foundation for field psychology with his statement ". . . I have held that the relative effects of both the idealistic and realistic epistemologies is a result of their failure to set knowing in this context of problematic situations. . ." (12, p. 560). In How We Think, he described learning as a spiral process within which ". . . foreign subject matter transformed through thinking into a familiar possession becomes a resource for judging and assimilating additional foreign subject matter" (8, p. 291). He thought that it is through dynamic action that a person brings into his chain of experience or series of life spaces new objects, materials, and relationships that were previously foreign to him, and that a disturbance that initiates knowing is a disturbance of a situation in which an organism and environment are functionally united (12, p. 584).

According to Dewey, the proper object of knowledge is a sizing up of relationships of events. An idea is what it is because of what it does in clearing up a perplexity or in harmonizing what is otherwise fragmentary. "Taking what is already known or pointing to it is no more a case of knowledge than taking a chisel out of a tool-box is the making of the tool" (5, p. 188). "To grasp the meaning of a thing, an event, or a situation is to see it in its relations to other things: to note how it operates or functions, what consequences follow from it, what causes it, what uses it can be put to" (8, p. 137).

A problematic situation is an unsettled or indeterminate situation. "Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole" (11, pp. 104-105). "A variety of names serves to characterize indeterminate situations. They are disturbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused, full of conflicting tendencies, obscure, etc." (11, p. 105). "Judgment has been analyzed to show that it is a continuous process of resolving an indeterminate, unsettled situation into a determinately unified one, through operations which transform subject-matter originally given" (11, p. 283). Learning is a process within which objects once uncertain and confused are rendered clear and stable. ". . . the art of knowing demands skill in selecting appropriate sense-data on one side and connecting principles, or conceptual theories on the other" (5, pp. 171-172). Data are taken not given (5, p. 178). In learning, there is constant exercise of judgment to detect relations. The outcome of learning is a continuously growing intellectual integration. The process of learning, at any age, is purposive seeking and using, amassing, and organizing insights within the limits set by capacity and experience. ". . . knowing is not the act of an outside spectator but of a participator inside the natural and social scene. . ." (5, p. 196). ". . . learning is something that the pupil has to do himself and for himself. . ." (8, p. 36).

Both Dewey and Lewin saw learning as a process of either development or change of insights or cognitive structures of life spaces. Attained knowledge produces meanings and these meanings are capable of being separated from the special cases of knowledge in which they originally appear and are being incorporated and funded cumulatively into habits so as to constitute mind. When applied in new experiences, these meanings constitute intelligence (12, p. 564).

Some quotations from Dewey provide an excellent description of a person and his life space being involved in differentiating, generalizing, and restructuring his psychological environment through changes in motivation, changes in group belongingness and ideology, and gain in control of masculature. "The rhythm of loss of integration with environment and recovery of union not only persists in man but becomes conscious with him; its conditions are material out of which he forms purposes. Emotion is the conscious sign of a break, actual or impending. The discord is the occasion that induces reflection. Desire for restoration of the union converts mere emotion into interest in objects as conditions of realizations of harmony" (9, p. 15). "An emotion is implicated in a situation, the issue of which is in suspense and in which the self that is moved in the emotion is vitally concerned" (9, p. 67). "Emotion is a perturbation from clash or failure of habit, and reflection, roughly speaking, is the painful effort of disturbed habits to readjust themselves. . ." (1, p. 76).

In How We Think Dewey wrote, "We may sum up by stating that things gain meaning when they are used as means to bring about consequences (or as means to prevent the occurrence of undesired consequences), or as standing for consequences for which we have to discover means. The relation of means-consequence is the center and heart of all understanding. The operations by which things become understood as chairs, tables, shoes, hats, food, illustrate the means-consequence relations from the 'means' side. The relation beginning with the 'consequence,' or result-sought, side is illustrated in any invention. . . . In short, there is a challenge to understanding only when there is either a desired consequence for which means have to be found by inquiry, or things (including symbols in the degree in which experience has matured) are presented under conditions where reflection is required to see what consequences can be effected by their use" (8, pp. 146-147). ". . . no knowing takes place without an overt act of taking and employing things on the basis of their meanings. . ." (2, p. 331).

"Since mastery of the bodily organs is necessary for all later developments, such problems are both interesting and important, and solving them supplies a very genuine training of thinking power. The joy the child shows in learning to use his limbs, to translate what he sees into what he handles, to connect sounds with sights, sights with taste and touch, and the rapidity with which intelligence grows in the first year and a half of life (the time during which the more fundamental problems of the use of the organism are mastered) are sufficient evidence that the development of physical control is not a physical, but an intellectual, achievement" (8, p. 206).

"It follows that with every differentiation of structure the environment expands. For a new organ provides a new way of interacting in which things in the world that were previously indifferent enter into life-functions" (11, p. 25). "There are occasions when for the proper conduct of knowing as the controlling interest, the problem becomes that of reconstruction of the _self_ engaged in inquiry" (12, p. 587).

To summarize my paper, I think that pragmatism in education generally has misfired because it has used a psychology inadequate to implement its philosophical position. Kurt Lewin, a Dewey contemporary, developed a psychology apposite to Dewey's pragmatism, but there apparently was little, if any, communication between the two men.

Pragmatism's best chance to contribute constructively to the current educational scene is to adopt and expand a field approach to human psychology. Assimilation of relativistic educational philosophy and field psychology can provide the emergent synthesis upon which to build for the future a constructive approach to educational enterprises.

Documentations.

1. Dewey, John, _Human Nature and Conduct_, Henry Holt & Co., 1922.

2. Dewey, John, _Experience and Nature_, Open Court Publishing Company, 1925.

3. Dewey, John, _The Public and Its Problems_, Henry Holt & Co., 1927.

4. Dewey, John, _The Sources of a Science of Education_, H. Liveright Co., 1929.

5. Dewey, John, _The Quest for Certainty_, Minton, Balch & Co., 1929.

6. Murchison, Carl, _Psychologies of 1930_, Ch. 22 "Conduct and Experience," by John Dewey, Clark University Press, 1930.

7. Dewey, John, _Philosophy and Civilization_, Minton, Balch and Co., 1931.

421.

8. Dewey, John, *How We Think*, D. C. Heath and Company, 1933.

9. Dewey, John, *Art as Experience*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1934.

10. Dewey, John, *Experience and Education*, The Macmillan Company, 1938.

11. Dewey, John, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Henry Holt, 1938.

12. Schilpp, Paul (ed.), *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, Part IV, "John Dewey: Experience, Knowing and Value: A Rejoinder," 1939.

13. Dewey, John and Bentley, Arthur F., *Knowing and the Known*, The Beacon Press, 1949.

CHAPTER 39.

CÉLESTIN FREINET: THE FRENCH DEWEY. (1)

WILLIAM BRADLEY LEE.

I have some misgivings about the title of this paper. To call Célestin Freinet (1896-1967) the French Dewey is both accurate and misleading: accurate in that there are striking similarities of educational doctrine, misleading, however, if one concludes that Dewey's ideas inspired Freinet, for they did not. The title does, however, serve as an initial point of reference.

My own introduction to the Freinet movement came in a rather roundabout way. For a number of years, while teaching the course "Philosophies of Education," I have shown the film "Passion for Life" (2) in conjunction with reading of Dewey's Experience and Education. You may recall that the film is about a young elementary school teacher (instituteur) returning from World War I military service. He assumes a teaching post in a village in southern France where he introduces a child-centered approach to education. The students are delighted, most of the parents approve, but the ruling clique of the village is at first skeptical and then later hostile.

One of the opening scenes sets the tone. When the City Council hesitates to furnish fuel for the chilly school, the classroom platform is broken up for firewood. More than just a piece of furniture, the raised platform from which the teacher pronounces ex cathedra, symbolizes the gulf between pupil and teacher and the hierarchy of traditional education.

In another incident, disbelieving pupils are asked to tear a sheet of paper from their CAHIER, the sacred notebook of French education, and to write whatever comes into their minds. Everyday events in their lives become the point of departure for learning activities: the arrival of the new teacher leads to the conjugation of verbs --

I have a new teacher

423.

You have a new teacher

He has a new teacher . . .

A bicycle race spurs students to find out about the history of the wheel, and village gossip is related to Beaumarchais' commentary on calumny.

Education is no longer confined to the classroom. Encouraged by their teacher, the pupils turned "detectives" and "reporters" are soon busily investigating many facets of village life. They uncover a royal coat of arms on an old piece of furniture, measure the city square, draw up plans for a new fountain and build a dam and a small hydro-electric plant on a nearby stream. Parents and other villagers are interviewed about their jobs and avocations. From these investigations reports are carefully written and shared with classmates.

One day the teacher appears with a mysterious package. After a certain amount of suspense it is opened and the students discover printer's type. Plans for a small printing press are immediately drawn up and it is subsequently built by one of the fathers. The pupils are now able to print the better compositions for their classmates. The very best are selected for a booklet which they print and sell to the villagers and later send to pupils in a school in Brittany with whom they are corresponding.

With this as a background you may well understand my chagrin and astonishment at the following incident in the spring of 1973 in Metz, France. I was escorting a group of teachers and university students through the schools and as I had been a frequent visitor, our hosts found a different one for me to visit. In the classrooms I found the pupils busily engaged in a variety of individual and small group activities such as reading, writing, mathematics, painting and drawing. And off in one corner were two students setting type to print the compositions which had been written that morning.

It was at this moment that I realized the existence in real life of ECOLE MODERNE PEDAGOGIE FREINET.

The film, I discovered, was based on the early teaching experiences of Célestin Freinet. A veteran of World War I who was hospitalized for four years due to war injuries, he assumed in 1920 his first teaching post. He spent almost all of his life in the Provence region of southern France where he practiced his pedagogy portrayed in the film. Although approved by students and most of the parents, his unconventional teaching methods did embroil him in continual controversies with municipal and educational officials. In the 1930's he was forced out of public education whereupon he founded his own school which still exists in St. Paul de Vence near Nice. (3)

As I had assumed that the story was fictitious, I was surprised in seeing classes in Metz resembling those in the film. Even more startling however, was to find this approach in France where schooling is still abstract, theoretical, and almost exclusively teacher and subject matter centered. (To cite a recent example, in the fall of 1974 I visited a class -- and a very good one, I should add -- where a first grade teacher was lecturing to his pupils from the venerable raised platform.)

My initial classification of the man and the movement is reflected in the title of this paper and, if ethnocentrism can be forgiven, it does serve as a useful point of departure. One can easily list a number of fundamental assertions basic to the position of John Dewey (4) and most progressive educators which would also be embraced by Célestin Freinet and l'ECOLE MODERNE. These would include:

1. A democratic school is necessary in order to achieve a democratic society.

2. The starting point of instruction should be the experiences, capacities, needs, and interests of the child.

3. The child has both the right and the competencies to make important educational decisions.

4. Committee work and other group activities should be encouraged.

5. The school should not be isolated from the every day events in its community.

6. The community is a rich resource which should be used by the students as a learning laboratory.

7. Properly planned manual activities, involving shops and kitchens are legitimate activities for the schools.

8. The time focus should be on the present. The past, while important, is a means to understanding the present.

9. The scientific method provides a working pattern for education at all levels.

But as we all know, Dewey did not always agree with progressive educators and it is in illustrating some of these differences that "Passion For Life" is an effective pedagogical tool. In the film, the teacher did not abdicate his authority. Even though his role changed from a harsh disciplinarian to a guide and a counselor, he is clearly in the words of Dewey, "leader of group activities." (5) He quite obviously organized classroom activities, inspired the community investigations, and it was he who judged if student reports conformed to the rules of grammar and spelling. His leadership would meet the approval of Dewey who criticizes teachers [who]

"seem to be afraid even to make suggestions to the members of a group as to what they should do. I have heard of cases in which children are surrounded with objects and materials and then left entirely to themselves, the teacher being loath to suggest even what might be done with the materials lest freedom be infringed upon. Why, then, even supply materials, since they are a source of some suggestion or other? But what is more important is that the suggestion upon which pupils act must in any case come from somewhere. It is impossible to understand why a suggestion from one who has a larger experience and a wider horizon should not be at least as valid as a suggestion arising from some more or less accidental source." (6)

The film also stressed the importance of subject matter which Dewey, of course, never intended to discard. He was especially critical of "many of the newer schools [which] tend to make little or nothing of organized subject matter of study." (7)

In the film the life experiences of the pupils were guided toward traditional, academic disciplines. The lively discussion precipitated by the arrival of the new teacher was followed by verbs being conjugated; after chattering about the bicycle race, pupils investigated the history of the wheel and its role in building the earliest civilization; village gossip was related to a quotation from BEAUMARCHAIS and from there to a study of French literature.

Life experiences, Dewey insisted, were only the starting point of instruction.

"The next step is the progressive development of what is already experienced into a fuller and richer and also more organized form, a form that gradually approximates that in which subject-matter is presented to the skilled, mature person." (8)

Dewey's positions on the role of the teacher and the place of organized subject matter are commonly misunderstood today. His name is often erroneously associated with a more permissive approach to education which would carry the idea of freedom far beyond what Dewey had in mind. (9) "Passion For Life" by providing concrete and dramatic examples from the pedagogy of Célestin Freinet does help to clarify Dewey's point of view and dispel these misconceptions.

Interested as I am with the similarities between Freinet and Dewey, I am even more fascinated with the dissimilarities and I am especially intrigued in the differences of approach to the development of classroom materials for the new education. Dewey considered the new education particularly vulnerable in this respect. He asserted in 1938, "That up to the present time the weakest point in progressive schools is in the matter of selection and organization of intellectual subject matter." (10) Part of this vacuum can be excused by the newness of the movement, for progressive educators had not yet time, less than a generation, to develop new materials. Still he warns this vital task cannot be continually ignored.

"It is a ground for legitimate criticism, however, when the ongoing movement of progressive education fails to recognize that the problem of selection and organization of subject-matter for study and learning is fundamental. Improvisation that takes advantage of special occasions prevents teaching and learning from being stereotyped and dead. But the basic material of study cannot be picked up in a cursory manner Occasions which are not and cannot be foreseen are bound to arise wherever there is intellectual freedom. They should be utilized. But there is a decided difference between using them in the development of a continuing line of activity and trusting to them to provide the chief material of learning." (11)

Progressive educators, of course, did not ignore curricular development. Freinet was personally acquainted with the Winnetka materials probably because Carlton Washburne travelled to Europe in the spring of 1931. He could scarcely have been more critical of them. They were in his opinion a reflection of a capitalistic educational system which attempts to "increase production, to amass knowledge, without worrying about how that knowledge would be put to human use." (12) He further described the books as "dry, inflexible and relentless like an assembly line." (13)

I have no way of knowing if Freinet was informed about other curricular materials of the progressive movement such as the project method of Kilpatrick, Harold Rugg's social science tests, and the Denver Monograph Series. (14) I am, however, relatively confident that he would be skeptical and suspicious of them. William Kilpatrick and Harold Rugg were university professors too far removed from the real life of normal classrooms to be taken very seriously. Freinet distrusted professors as they expropriate knowledge readily available to all of us, clothe it in a cover of incomprehensible jargon, and then mete it out to the classroom teacher in doses which they alone prescribe. They add to the mystification of the educational process.

Freinet would have approved of the teacher involvement in the Denver Monograph Series, but be dismayed that the leadership was in the hands of the superintendent, Jesse Newlon. Such collaboration is always suspect as administrators tend to put their own professional advancement before the interests of children.

Both Freinet and Dewey recognized the necessity for new classroom materials. Dewey, however, was not actively involved in developing them and even in his laboratory school at Chicago he did not consider it a primary function to produce materials for the existing school system. (15) Freinet, on the other hand, attached the highest priority and an extraordinary sense of urgency to the development of new materials. Without them, he insisted, teachers, despite good intentions, would return to traditional methodology and content.

In 1924 at the outset of his career Freinet confronted this problem and today materials of the ECOLE MODERNE include tapes, programmed learning materials, a magazine of children's art, the professional magazine, L'Educateur, as well as three periodicals for different age groups which contain lessons or units which now number more than 1,000 titles.

All of them are published and marketed through a teachers cooperative which Freinet founded in 1926 and which today employs about 100 people and grosses annually about 2 1/2 million dollars.

Of particular interest is the process for developing these materials which was initiated by Freinet and is still being largely followed today. An example would be in the preparation for an issue of one of the pupil periodicals. The idea would emanate from a teacher and probably be from a successful unit or lesson in his own classroom. He, with the assistance of another colleague or two, (16) would prepare a first draft which would then be tried out by other members of the movement with their classes. Based on their reactions and suggestions a revised edition in limited quantity would then be published; this in turn would be further refined with information and advice from as many sources as possible including not only teachers and pupils, but also scholars and scientists. Even when the "final" edition is ready, it is always considered tentative and imperfect, never final and definitive.

A recent issue of Biblioteque De Travail, Junior (17) for 7-10 year olds illustrates the results of this approach. It is about French Grandma Moses and is entitled "Un Peintre est né a 71 ans" (A Painter Is Born at 71"). On the title page a teacher is listed as principal author, six others credited with assisting him and the contributions of all their classes are recognized. This 32 page booklet contains photographs of "M'an Jeanne" engaged in various activities in her home including painting with about a dozen examples of her canvases. School children are shown interviewing her and the questions and answers are reported. The young readers are encouraged to conduct their own interviews with sculptors, painters, and poets and even invite them to class. On the final pages of the issue are examples of student paintings inspired by the visit to M'an Jeanne.

For Freinet it was only natural for teachers to have the ultimate responsibility for curriculum, for who knows more about children and who are more concerned with their welfare and less inclined to exploit them for personal and selfish ends?

To the best of my knowledge there is no counterpart of this process in American education. New curriculum materials are usually funded by government grant or publishing firms and developed by teams of specialists in content, psychologists and professional writers. Classroom teachers are involved but nowhere are they elevated to the pivotal decision making role. We may have passed through the "teacher proof" phase of the 60's but "teacher-made" materials is still a term of pejoration. Skeptics -- and these may well include most teachers -- would be well advised to examine the carefully prepared, appealing, and immensely useable materials of the ECOLE MODERNE PEDAGOGIE FREINET.

One of the reasons that the Freinet educators feel confident in their approach lies in the broad definition they give to experimental research. They are unwilling to confine this definition to the activities of narrow specialists far removed from the bustle of ordinary classrooms. They, the classroom teachers, are the scientists and their classrooms are the laboratories. Materials are tried out under actual teaching conditions, and the findings reported to other scientist-teachers who may test them in their own classroom-laboratories. The process is open, the results tentative and always subject to revision.

And what has been the impact of ECOLE MODERNE PEDAGOGIE FREINET? It is very difficult to assess. In his own life Freinet accused authorities of conducting a "conspiracy of silence." Certainly it has been out of the mainstream of French pedagogy and all but ignored in teachers' training colleges. Its birth was due to the missionary zeal and the organizational genius of Célestin Freinet and its continued existence to a relatively small group of energetic elementary school teachers. How many of them are there? No one seems to know, as the ECOLE MODERNE has no dues, no elections and no official memberships. Estimates range from 7,000 to 20,000. (There are an estimated 300,000 instituteurs in France.) L'EDUCATEUR has a circulation of 15,000 but there is no way of knowing if subscribers practice the pedagogy of the movement and of course one could use all or part of the method without subscribing to the journal. The uprisings of May 1968 created a new interest in the movement and in some cases the technique and strategies are being used in classes of slow learners. It is doubtful if the movement will ever be absorbed in the mainstream of French education and a recent article in l'EDUCATEUR illustrates why. (18) The Minister of Education proposes a limit of 40 students per class, the militant teachers' union responds with 35, while the EDUCATEUR insists on a long range goal of 15.

You may recall my reservations about the title of this paper, Célestin Freinet -- The French Dewey, as Freinet was not indebted to Dewey for his educational ideas. But where did they come from? The question is, of course, an appropriate one for members of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society and one about which you may have already some tentative answers. Freinet concerns himself with it in the opening paragraphs of one of his books (19) and cites the usual references to Rabelais, Montaigne and Rousseau and others in the Western intellectual tradition. You may be surprised to learn that he rejects this interpretation. He asks "But are you certain that these ideas that the intellectuals believed to have discovered were not always to be found among the common people." (20) For those who might be skeptical he continues "One only has to look at the way ordinary people take care of and train animals to find these great educational principles." (21)

And Freinet looked and found verification everywhere in the village and peasant life:

-- the shepherd who leads rather than follows

-- the hunter who trains his young dog slowly and patiently

-- the peasant who digs the well where the water is

-- the farmer who doesn't beat young animals.

His writings are literally sprinkled with references to common people making wise decisions without knowledge of theoretical abstractions or the intellectual underpinnings. The philosophical source of Freinet's ideas is in the observation of common unlettered people.

I also mentioned earlier that Freinet's education was interrupted by World War I. What I neglected to add was that he left teachers' training college before reading any of the thinkers normally associated with educational philosophy. As reported by his wife, he had already begun teaching and had formulated his basic approach in practice before becoming acquainted with Rabelais, Montaigne, Pestalozzi or Rousseau whose existence he "scarcely suspected." (22)

In the introduction to his book, Les Dits de Mathieu, which is appropriately subtitled a modern pedagogy of common sense, he succinctly and eloquently sets forth his philosophy of education.

"My long experience with ordinary people, children and animals has convinced me that the laws of life are general, natural and valid for all beings. It is the scholastics who have dangerously complicated the knowledge of these laws in making us believe that the behavior of individuals only complies with mysterious data for which a pretentious science claims the paternity, in a sort of private preserve where common people, including teachers are excluded." (23)

A more apt title for this paper probably would have been Célestin Freinet -- Educational Populist.

Documentations.

1. Some of the information in the article appeared in William B. Lee, "Fresh Perspectives From Western Europe," Phi Delta Kappan 57 (January 1976): 306-309.

2. Ecole buissonière in French, faire l'école buissonière literally translated means playing hookey.

431.

3. I visited this school in July 1975. While there were no students, I was able to interview the retiring principal MAURICE BERTELOOT and CHRISTIAN ADRIANSEN who assumed the post in September 1975. Monsieur Berteloot was a long-time colleague of Freinet's and co-authored books and articles with him.

4. I compiled this particular list from John Dewey, *Experience and Education* (New York: Collier Books, 1963).

5. *Ibid*., p. 59.

6. *Ibid*., p. 71.

7. *Ibid*., p. 22.

8. *Ibid*., p. 73-74.

9. *Ibid*., p. 22.

10. *Ibid*., p. 78.

11. *Ibid*., p. 78-79.

12. Célestin Freinet as quoted by Elise Freinet, *Naissance d'une Pedagogie Populaire* (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1969), p. 138.

13. *Ibid*., p. 139.

14. A re-reading of Laurence Cremin, *Transformation of the American School* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1961) has been invaluable in reviewing the Progressive Era.

15. *Ibid*., p. 136, 290.

16. Much of the pedagogical communication of the movement is done through *l'Educateur*. In the September 1975 issue there were 5 appeals for cooperation in this type of curriculum development.

17. D. Carre et sa classe, "Un Peintre Est Ne A 71 Ans," *Biblioteque de Travail* 112 (25 April 1975): 1-32.

18. M. Barre, "45, 40, ou 35 Seulement," *L'Educateur* (September 1975): 13.

19. Célestin Freinet, Les dits de Mathieu 3rd Ed. (Neuchatel, Switzerland: Delachaux et Niestle., 1973), p. 9.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Elise Freinet, p. 22.

23. Célestin Freinet, p. 5.

CHAPTER 40.

MARTIN BUBER AND THE ONE-SIDED DIALOGICAL RELATION.

DONALD S. SECKINGER.

Martin Buber has probed perhaps most deeply and movingly into the tangled strands of human beings in our century and, for our purposes as educators as well as philosophers, to have written most directly about educative acts from a theistic existential perspective. Within the limitations of this paper I propose to focus on what is probably Buber's least understood concept: the one-sidedness of the teaching relation in the context of dialogical relations generally.

At the root of becoming for human beings is what Buber calls the "originator instinct." Speculative philosophers may argue as to who put this instinct into man and the why of creation as such, but Buber finds it more fruitful to take existence as a given fact and trace out the human expression of origination and its significance for the development of man. In his essay on "Education" in Between Man and Man, he describes it thus:

". . . (it is) an autonomous instinct, which cannot be derived from others, whose appropriate name seems to me to be the 'originator instinct.' Man, the child of man, wants to make things. . . . What the child desires is its own share in this becoming of things: it wants to be the subject of this event of production." (1)

Buber does not question the origin of the creative originator instinct. For him it is enough that it exists, that the world is born again with each human life thrown into existence, and that the educator must confront this fact of being with his own:

". . . the decisive influence (in educating) is to be ascribed not to the release of an instinct but to the forces which meet the released instinct, namely, the educative forces. It depends on them, on their purity and fervour, their power of love and their discretion, into what connexions the freed element enters and what becomes of it." (2)

The unfolding of the instinct, even under benign social influences, is not enough. All educative forces must be dialogical, avoiding both egoistic self-containment and the mode of social interaction which is nothing more than transitory mutual self-interest. Creative accomplishment for oneself, even in the company of others, is insufficient.

A community of laws and customs, in school or society, is better than no community at all. But the best is a dialogical community, a community of love and of sacrifice. "Action leading to individual achievement," says Buber, "is a 'one-sided' event. There is a force within the person, which goes out, impresses itself on the material, and the achievement arises objectively: the movement is over, it has run in one direction from the heart's dream into the world, and its course is finished." (3)

The insufficiency of a one-sided action or material achievement is not balanced out by a retreat into the soothing rituals of organized religion as such, the mere social consensus of democratic ethics, or the rationalizations of Marxist ideology, no matter how well intended or comforting these activities may be. Such involvements may make us feel that we are doing something about our freedom to be, but it is all an illusion if there is no meeting one another in the sacrificial risk of love.

Buber's dialogical alternative, as we try to go beyond the originator instinct, moves us from a community of interest and function, up from the outward forms of religion, ethics, and ideology, and closer to the inner heart which these symbol systems were intended to explicate. First find yourself in relation to others, in giving and helping and sharing which transcends social roles and duties, and then you are truly living your way into a life -- be it the life of the Methodist or the Marxist.

Living precedes learning. Mystery and wonder and joy precede and breathe life into social and intellectual systems:

". . . as an originator man is solitary. He stands wholly without bonds in the echoing hall of his deeds. Nor can it help him to leave his solitariness that his achievement is received enthusiastically by the many. . . . Only if someone grasps his hand not as a 'creator' but as a fellow-creature lost in the world, to be his comrade or friend or lover beyond the arts, does he have an awareness and a share of mutuality." (4)

Viewed in this light, all social philosophies are inadequate because they are merely social. They take their life from a glorification of the originator instinct, which is then distorted into acquisitive or mutually self-interested channels. The object values of traditional knowledge as power and control, no less than the ingenious strategies of social ethics to gloss over the I-it relations of modern living, are bound to fail in meeting man's deepest needs. Social philosophies and objectified systems of religion are alike in that they fail to take seriously the spiritual locus in which we live and move and have our being.

Human freedom, therefore, must be characterized not merely in terms of minimizing external restraints, nor even from the view of maximizing external opportunities in the social order -- although both of these are necessary conditions to the meaningful exercise of inner freedom. All material approaches to the problem of freedom, as important as they may be, can only set the stage for the process Buber calls communion, in which persons go out from themselves to others in whole-heartedness and trust:

". . . at the opposite pole from compulsion there stands not freedom but communion. Compulsion is a negative reality; communion is the positive reality; freedom is a possibility, possibility regained. At the opposite pole of being compelled by destiny or nature or men there does not stand being free of destiny or nature or men but to commune and covenant with them. . . . Freedom is the vibrating needle, the fruitful zero." (5)

What are the central tasks of education? At the least these must involve so arranging the social order that external restraints are minimized and legitimate opportunities to learn are opened as widely as possible. More important, and proceeding from these raw foundations or, more typically, in conjunction with them, is the kind of educator who will call forth in relation with his learners an invitation to share anew in the discovery and wonder of knowledge. Educative situations always will be in a state of expectancy, contingency, and anticipation of an unanticipated mystery which is the mystery of encounter:

". . . Freedom in education is the possibility of communion; it cannot be dispensed with and it cannot be made use of in itself; without it nothing succeeds, but neither does anything succeed by means of it: it is the run before the jump, the tuning of the violin." (6)

The learner's freedom, just because it exists as possibility in educative situations, becomes his responsibility no less than his teacher's when the teacher is in the situation with him. Dialogical freedom is not license to do only what one feels like doing, for to do this would be to regress into the self-willed impasse which drains freedom of all possibility of growth. "Life lived in freedom is personal responsibility or it is a pathetic farce." (7)

Freedom well exercised by learner and teacher yields up blessings in knowledge of which neither had dared to hope, or even to visualize. If your teacher stands before you as a present being, and you are to him a fellow subjectivity and not a mere object of use; if he goes out to you in expectation of meeting you as a presence in the world; then and only then are you mutually included in one another's reality. You have by this inclusion brought about a higher reality for you both:

"Inclusion is . . . the extension of one's own concreteness, the fulfillment of the actual situation of life, the complete presence of the reality in which one participates. . . . this one person, without forfeiting anything of the felt reality of his activity, at the same time lives through the common event from the standpoint of the other." (8)

The dialogical relation, then, must be characterized by inclusion. It must involve common shared experiences. Most of all, at least one of the parties involved must be able to see things not only through his own eyes, but from the standpoint of the other. This is especially true in helping relationships such as healing, ministering, and teaching; without this vision, the helper cannot function.

But for all of this mutuality and sharing, these helping relationships are of necessity one-sided dialogical relations. They are clearly distinguished by Buber from the more fully matured dialogical relations of friendship and familial love. Although the teacher, for example, may see both his own and the learner's side in their dialogue, the learner for his part can only imagine the teacher's side.

It may well be argued that Buber narrows his conception of teaching at this point by taking away all that he has built up before. Indeed this is, in its own way, as much of a paradox as is the inscrutable universe which includes us all and which makes demands upon us which we must take on faith and infer from their consequences, yet will never fully understand.

In speaking of the helping relationships, Buber shifts from the grounds of spiritual fellowship to those of moral and intellectual authority. He postulates that it is in the nature of being a pupil to exist in a zone of more limited horizons than one's teacher. The teacher, moreover, would have always as his goal the aspiration that someday his pupils would go beyond his own replication of experience and would then enter into a two-sided relation as friends.

Buber retains the underlying conception of spiritual fellowship as well as human solitariness in his perception of anxiety and the inevitability of a certain degree of failure. The teacher must be willing to submit himself to a basic ego sacrifice in which he often will be humbled and sobered in the knowledge that he is not reaching others as he would like. Attention is called to this chastening experience which is familiar to all sensitive persons who would attempt the dialogue:

". . . The man whose calling it is to influence the being of persons that can be determined, must experience this action of his . . . ever anew from the other side. . . . Only when he catches himself 'from over there,' and feels how it affects one, how it affects this other human being, does he recognize the real limit, baptize his self-will in Reality and make it true will, and renew his paradoxical legitimacy." (9)

Teaching must be sharing and feeling "from the other side" or it is an empty exercise, and yet it can never be two-sided in the dialogical sense while it is taking place. Only after one has learned more from his teacher than either of them knew existed is he able to go on his own way -- and not as a mere disciple, but with what he now knows and what his teacher has helped him to know -- only then will he be educated to his possibilities as a person in the world. His role of pupil is of necessity one of faith and dependence, no matter how intense the mutuality of give and take in the educative act:

". . . He (the teacher) experiences the pupil's being educated, but the pupil cannot experience the educating of the educator. The educator stands at both ends of the common situation, the pupil only at one end. In the moment when the pupil is able to throw himself across and experience from over there, the educative relation would be burst asunder, or change into friendship." (10)

The educator consistently must be in tune with the growth patterns of the learner and must recognize both his own and the learner's strengths and weaknesses. It is a rare person who is able to teach dialogically, to subordinate his own self-will to the shared reality of the learning situation. Buber shares a glimpse of what it must be like:

"In learning from time to time what this human being needs and does not need at the moment, the educator is led to an ever deeper recognition of what the human being needs in order to grow. But he is also led to the recognition of what he, the 'educator,' is able and what he is unable to give of what is needed -- and what he can give now, and what not yet." (11)

For the teacher the situation is particularly poignant because it demands a recognition that no matter how intensively and passionately we want to give to our pupils, we will not be able to reach many of them in the right way at the right time even though we go out to them wholeheartedly as an act of sacrifice and trust.

The paradox of dialogical education is that we are called forth to give in spite of our own weaknesses, and yet its glory is just that we may glimpse on occasion the spark of recognition which comes from the "other side." "The constructive forces," Buber reminds us, "are eternally the same: they are the world bound up in community, turned to God. The educator educates himself to be their vehicle." (12)

Documentations.

1. Martin Buber, "Education," in Between Man and Man, Trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1965), p. 85.
2. Ibid., pp. 86-87.
3. Ibid., p. 87.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 91.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 92.
8. Ibid., p. 97.
9. Ibid., pp. 99-100.
10. Ibid., pp. 100-101.
11. Ibid., p. 101.
12. Ibid.

CHAPTER 41.

JOHN ELOF BOODIN'S VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE DISCIPLINES.

KENNETH R. SUTTON.

John Elof Boodin was born in Pjetteryd, Sweden, on September 14, 1869. He came to the United States in 1887, and managed to work his way through a normal school in Illinois. He taught for a year before entering college. (1)

He briefly attended the University of Colorado, transferring to the University of Minnesota the following year. He studied under a student of William James, and from that time desired to go to Harvard. He received an M.A. degree from Brown in 1895, and entered Harvard. Both James and Josiah Royce were impressed with his work.

He began his career in midwestern schools: Grinnell College, Iowa, 1900-1904, University of Kansas, 1904-1913 and Carleton College, Minnesota, 1913-1927. He finished his career in California, teaching at the University of Southern California, 1927-1928, and at the University of California at Los Angeles, 1928-1939.

During his career he lectured abroad, and received both foreign and domestic honors. He was an active philosopher until the latter part of 1947, publishing several books and articles. On November 14, 1950, he died in Los Angeles at the age of 91. (2)

I believe Boodin deserves a more prominent place in American philosophy than historians have given him to date. I especially think his work is worthy of more consideration by philosophers of education.

One of the more important educational issues he treated is the problem of the proper operation of disciplines of knowledge. His epistemology was sufficiently comprehensive as to include proposals for both the methodology of disciplines and the interaction of their distinctive functions.

Boodin argued for broad application of the "ordinary" scientific means of testing hypotheses. He required that projected results be judged against actual results of specified action. (3) Boodin believed that all outcomes of experiences are true. One of two truth feelings are evident at the outcome of an experience: (1) a feeling that intentions are realized, or (2) a feeling that intended results are open to modification. (4) Meaningful truth, involving outcomes of experience according to expectations, (5) is not the only truth. An outcome which does not confirm projections provides true information about those expectations. Chaos can be just as factual as control. (6)

Unlike Dewey, (7) Boodin avoided contending for any detailed operational steps in his view of the scientific method. We shall see that he was concerned that it could be applied in all disciplines of knowledge. He evidently felt that detailed steps would limit some participants in the quest for knowledge too severely.

Boodin did not only associate the scientific method with "practical" sciences. It can be used to test hypotheses which only refer to mathematical or logical schemes. One may project that he can effect a specified result by applying a new quantity to a mathematical system. Even though he merely relates arbitrary factors, he is involved in a scientific test of an hypothesis. (8)

Use of the scientific method is not limited to practical scientific quests for utility or abstract scientific attempts to achieve simplicity. One may have aesthetic purposes which condition him to perform less useful and more complicated operations to achieve his intended result. (9) Although one may prefer a more tedious route to testing his hypothesis, the scientific method can be ligitimately employed.

Future orientation is not necessary to use of scientific methodology. Persons with conservative interests can test the viability of their recommendations of traditional practices. One may believe in a map already provided, as long as that map is efficient toward guiding him to his destination. (10)

Historians can also employ the scientific method. A historian typically reconstructs history on the basis of available data, and may test his reconstruction by gathering new facts. Historical knowledge is scientific when it is "interpretation guided by the facts of experience and open to revision on the basis of experience." (11) Historians differ from members of other disciplines only in the object of their interest. Their object, the past, is irreversible, while experimental scientists may change their objects by determining new causal relationships. Historians are associated with a more intimately human object than that of many scientists. Abstraction or selection of relevant facts is more precarious for a historian. (12) Nevertheless, historians can use the scientific method.

Religious scholars are akin to some scientists in their intention to make the environment more harmonious with human desires. However, they are impatient with small-step procedures employed by scientists to achieve results. Consequently, their efforts to synthesize their aims with actual experience are characterized by broad intuitive leaps. In spite of dependence on intuition, their attempts can have the "discovery" quality necessary for the exercise of scientific testing. (13)

The fact that philosophers may seek "whole views" does not prevent them from using the scientific method. Boodin recognized that man often demands more comprehension then he can immediately effect. In such cases, he experimentally generates instruments to bring him into a testing relationship with his object. Logics can be such instruments. Logical rules can be tested against their actual necessity in making relational judgments. Logics, as any instruments, are hypothesized as efficient epistemological tools. (14) The fact that philosophers do not typically gather particular truths by experimentation does not exclude them from using scientific methodology. They can vicariously participate in results of many particular experiments, and perform a special experiment of their own -- attempting to comprehend the significance of many specialized analyses. (15)

We can observe at this point that Boodin conceived that all knowledge disciplines could utilize the same general scientific method. Hypotheses can always be tested against results, even though different interests may condition different means of generating results. Disciplines, then, were believed to be properly distinct in interests, while sharing a common methodology.

We have suggested that Boodin believed the distinctive function of philosophy is the quest for "whole views." He was aware that this function is not accepted by all philosophers, and he was prepared to defend it.

He noted that in the Occident all modes and concerns of knowing were once included under the rubric, "philosophy." However, as early as the third century B.C., the University of Alexandria established separate schools of mathematics, physics and astronomy. This was the genesis of a trend toward specialization that has continued into the present age. Psychology and social sciences have recently declared their independence from philosophy.

Boodin believed philosophy would continue to lose areas of domain. Logic is moving toward mathematics, and may become a specialized discipline in that field. Ethics could become a social science. Aesthetics is liable to be captured by art departments. (16)

Because of present and projected loss of domain from philosophy, Boodin advocated a function so distinctively philosophical that it could not conceivably be lost to philosophy through specialization. Metaphysics, conceived as a "whole view," is immune to specialization by definition. (17)

Boodin's view of metaphysics is not to be construed as an attempt to probe beyond results of experience. He regarded metaphysics as an attempt to comprehend and relate experiential outcomes of various sorts. Metaphysicians are to hypothesize general attributes of reality which are representative of results of experiences, or are representative of relationships between varying results. Attributes must be able to make a difference to reflective experience. (18)

Boodin knew that philosophers of the past had introduced non-verifiable notions -- notions that are removed from test by experienced outcomes. He called such ideas "fictions," or "blind alleys, linguistic confusions, which have frustrated discovery." (19)

Apparently, Boodin thought Aristotle had generated some of the more persistent fictions in metaphysics. Among Aristotelian notions Boodin used as examples of philosophical fiction, was the view of "matter as substrate," accounting for the appearance of changing essences. Aristotle regarded certain opposites, e.g., "heat" and "cold," as essences. Essences, of course, are not supposed to undergo change or transformation. Yet, "heat" is observed as if it changes into "cold," or is so transformed. Thus, in order to preserve certain essences, matter was conceived as actually undergoing change, while essences only appear to do so. (20) We may note that Aristotle appealed beyond effects of experience in order to preserve the consistency of his views. Because of this appeal, Boodin classified "matter as substrate" as a philosophical fiction.

In light of the comprehensive task and rigorous verification Boodin proposed, we might be tempted to regard generation of "whole views" as an impossibility. Boodin offered two arguments against this supposition. First, he maintained that philosophers could not be expected to perform their distinctive task perfectly. Error should not shock philosophers when they consider their short lives and the enormity of their tasks. Philosophers should be most anxious to avoid considering their conclusions final. (21) Naturally, they should expect their views to fall short of comprehension of all types of experiential effects. A single philosopher cannot even be generally aware of results of experience in all knowledge disciplines. (22)

Boodin's second argument was an appeal to future possibility, pointing toward a creative interaction of knowledge disciplines. He proposed that theorists in various research fields could help philosophers construct more comprehensive "whole views." In his day he was impressed with the work of several scientific theorists, especially in the field of physics. He regarded these as men of "broad" vision, who drew out the general significance of research in a single field. (23) Theorists, then, generate partial "whole views," simplifying the task of philosophers and giving them more comprehensive vision. The further development of theory in various disciplines would enable philosophers to be more sensitive to the effects of the knowledge process in a greater number of disciplines. Their work could exhibit a much higher degree of scientific rigor in this situation.

Boodin thought that members of specialized disciplines were as much in need of the assistance of philosophers, as philosophers were in need of assistance from them. Specialists often fail to see the significance of the kinds of hypotheses they test, because they fail to comprehend their results in relation to results of hypothesis-testing in other fields. They may gain insight into their particular problems, but they could well discover that others produce more significant effects. This discovery might show them the way to more significant hypotheses associated with the distinctive interests of their fields. Boodin contended that if one fails to consider the world in respect to the many facets of human experience, he refuses to think. (24) He may encounter random particular truths, but the broad significance of these truths escapes him.

Just as specialists can communicate with philosophers by means of theories representative of their disciplines, philosophers have a means of communicating with specialists. This is the case, due to the fact that philosophers share some special human concerns with members of particular disciplines.

Knowledge disciplines share the problem of knowing, although they may deal with different aspects of that problem. Some scientists, for example, may attempt to determine the causes or conditions of knowledge. Philosophers, on the other hand, would be more interested in the general function of knowing. Boodin considered the problem of knowing an "overlapping" problem, shared by the disciplines of knowledge. (25)

He believed all disciplines participate in valuation. Whenever one calls an experience or object "true or false, good or bad, beautiful or ugly," he is involved in valuation. Philosophers and some social scientists are even practicing "valuation of valuation." Value, then, is far from being just "the domain of philosophy." (26)

We have noted that specialists need the assistance of philosophers in order to understand the significance of their work. Since all disciplines are familiar with at least some aspects of the problems of knowing and valuation, philosophers could best communicate with specialists concerning these subjects.

Boodin did not doubt that metaphysicians could definitely influence specialists. He believed that metaphysics is an early concern of every person, citing Comenius, who claimed that broad relationships between various effects of experience are suggested "at the mother's knee:" "The child comes to know himself, and by his daily experience, certain general and abstract expressions; he comes to comprehend the meaning of the words sometning, nothing, thus, otherwise, where, similar, different; and what are generalizations and the categories expressed by these words but the rudiments of metaphysics." (27) Thus, metaphysics "opens up into the special compartments of truth." It inspires special knowledge disciplines to seek unity in "our seemingly chaotic world." It indicates the direction and significance of their work. It helps each correct its "partial emphasis." (28)

Boodin believed theorists in special disciplines could condition communication from specialists to philosophers. He thought philosophers who apply their work to areas of common interest with specialists could communicate from general philosophers to specialists. Thus, he deemed practical philosophers and theorists agents of interaction between the disciplines of knowledge.

We may employ the interaction between educational theorists and philosophers of education to illustrate his view. Educational theorists attempt to comprehend the effects of many specific research projects pertaining to education. They are effective toward increasing the awareness of philosophers of education concerning outcomes of current educational experience -- the contemporary possibilities of education. On the other hand, philosophers of education are familiar with work in recent general philosophy, and are participating in that work. They apply current "whole views" to problems of knowing and valuation in education. By this means they familiarize educational theorists with the significance of the results of research in fields other than education. The theorists, of course, are in a better position to directly influence the direction of educational research than philosophers of education, since they work in closer co-operation with researchers in education. Philosophers of education communicate with researchers indirectly, by influencing theorists, and theorists communicate with general philosophers indirectly, by influencing philosophers of education.

Boodin advocated that philosophers should engage in such interaction with all disciplines of knowledge. We can easily imagine that the effect of such a state of affairs would be enormously positive. The total quest for knowledge would reach new levels of precision and comprehension.

Boodin called interactions of this sort "creation." He used this term to distinguish his view of evolution from "preformation," which entails the notion that change is strictly determined by a prior force of organization. (29) He also wished to distinguish his view from "emergence," which denotes that change takes place as a result of accidental combinations of particular elements and forces. (30)

His "creation" is a "both-and" concept of process. Certain biases of Western logic, condition some people to think in strict "either-or" terms. This leads to the concept that things must be substantially the same if they are to interact. Co-existence of wholeness and organization with partially and dissociation is considered strictly impossible. Boodin argued that this sort of thinking is based on rather arbitrary logic, and results in "min's that are so narrow that ideas must travel in single file." (31)

The interaction between wholeness and partiality or synthesis and analysis, is well described as "creation" or "creativity." It effects more than habitual response or repetition. It is synergy -- energetic synthesis involving adaptation of our environment to our needs for orderly comprehension and control. It does not magically occur, but is conditioned by forces which threaten entropy or dissociation of existing syntheses. Because of the actuality of dissociation, those who synthesize must work continually and non-repetitiously. (32) Boodin's definition of "creation" was in terms of an active, non-repetitious ordering. This ordering is caused by interaction with particularizing forces.

Thus, he projected the creative interaction of knowledge disciplines. Philosophers perform continual experimental syntheses, while specialists continually generate new information concerning effects of experience. Theorists and practitioners of applied philosophy facilitate communication between philosophers and representatives of more specialized interests. Because philosophers experience the impact of many analyses more acutely than if thecrists offered no help, they are stimulated to modify their syntheses more often. They may find that new information points to a complete reconstruction of their "whole views" of reality, or to radical modifications. They will certainly find that they will need tc integrate it into their views in some fashion. Specialists will be more aware of the significance of their analyses, and will be encouraged to test new hypotheses. These tests will provide new effects of experience for philosophers to consider.

Boodin's view of knowledge disciplines is both comprehensible and promising. A general means of knowing is applicable to all disciplines. This was indicated by showing how this method could be used in disciplines not usually associated with its use.

Particulars of methodology can be variously decided by members of disciplines representing different human interests. This does not affect the general method Boodin advocated. His method was general enough to allow many variations. At the same time, it was useful enough to be efficient as a means for determining the relevance of detailed procedures to the interests of respective fields.

Recognizing that present disciplines are not as productive as he would desire them to be, he projected a means for improvement. He did not suppose that scholars could magically advance their search for knowledge. He proposed operational conditions for this advance which can be easily conceived as appropriate causes for the desired effect.

John Elof Boodin's philosophy has been ignored by philosophers of education. I offer his view of knowledge disciplines as an example of his work.

Documentations.

1. Donald Ayres Piatt, in the introduction to Boodin's *Studies in Philosophy*: *The Posthumous Papers of John Elof Boodin*, (Los Angeles: The University of California, 1957).

2. Donald A. Piatt, Carolyn S. Fisher, Waldemar Westergaard, *In Memoriam*: *John Elof Boodin*, *1869-1950*, (Los Angeles: University of California, 1950).

3. John Elof Boodin, "What Pragmatism Is and Is Not," *The Journal of Philosophy* VI, No. 23 (1909), p. 627.

4. John Elof Boodin, "The New Realism," *The Journal of Philosophy* IV, No. 20 (1907), p. 537.

5. John Elof Boodin, "Truth and Meaning," *The Psychological Review*, XV, No. 3 (1908), p. 172.

6. *Ibid*., pp. 175-176.

7. John Dewey, *How We Think*, (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., Publishers, 1910), pp. 72-78.

8. Boodin, "What Pragmatism Is and Is Not," *op*. *cit*., pp. 627-628.

9. *Ibid*., p. 628.

10. *Ibid*.

11. John Elof Boodin, "Philosophy of History," *Twentieth Century Philosophy*, ed., Dagobert D. Runes, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943), pp. 89-90.

12. *Ibid*., pp. 90-91.

13. John Elof Boodin, *Religion of Tomorrow*, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943), pp. 11-13.

14. John Elof Boodin, "Functional Realism," *The Philosophical Review*, XLIII, No. 2 (1934), p. 154.

15. John Elof Boodin, "The Nature of Truth," *The Philosophical Review*, XIX, No. 4 (1910), p. 50.

16. Boodin, *Studies in Philosophy*, *op*. *cit*., pp. 1-2.

17. *Ibid*., p. 3.

18. John Elof Boodin, "The Ultimate Attributes of Reality," *The Journal of Philosophy*, IV, No. 11 (1907), p. 283.

19. John Elof Boodin, "Fictions in Science and Philosophy," *The Journal of Philosophy*, XL, No. 25 (1943), p. 673.

20. *Ibid*., pp. 673-674.

21. John Elof Boodin, "Philosophical Tolerance," *The Monist*, XVIII, No. 2 (1908), pp. 299-300.

22. Boodin, *Studies in Philosophy*, *op*. *cit*., p. 3.

23. *Ibid*., p. 4.

24. John Elof Boodin, "God and Cosmic Structure," in *The Development of American Philosophy*, ed., Walter G. Muelder, Laurence Sears, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940), p. 500.

25. Boodin, *Studies in Philosophy*, *op*. *cit*., p. 5.

26. *Ibid*., p. 130.

27. Comenius, cited by John Elof Boodin in *A Realistic Universe*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), p. xvi.

28. Boodin, *A Realistic Universe*, p. xxiii.

29. John Elof Boodin, *Three Interpretations of the Universe*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), pp. 13-29.

30. *Ibid*., p. 95.

31. John Elof Boodin, *God*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), p. 83.

32. Boodin, *Studies in Philosophy*, *op*. *cit*., pp. 8-9.

Readings. 33. Boodin, John Elof, *A Realistic Universe*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931.

34. ____________, "Fictions in Science and Philosophy," *The Journal of Philosophy*, XL, No. 25 (1943).

35. ____________, "Functional Realism," *The Philosophical Review*, XLIII, No. 2 (1934).

36. ____________, *God*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

37. ____________, "God and Cosmic Structure," in *The Development of American Philosophy*, Muelder, Walter G., Sears, Laurence, ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940.

38. ____________, "Philosophy of History," in *Twentieth Century Philosophy*, Runes, Dagobert D., ed. New York: Philosophical Library, 1943.

39. ____________, "Philosophical Tolerance," *The Monist*, XVIII, No. 2 (1908).

40. ____________, *Religion of Tomorrow*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1943.

41. ____________, *Studies in Philosophy: The Posthumous Papers of John Elof Boodin*. Los Angeles: The University of California.

42. ____________, "The Nature of Truth," *The Philosophical Review*, XIX, No. 4 (1910).

43. ____________, "The New Realism," *The Journal of Philosophy*, IV, No. 20 (1907).

44. ____________, "The Ultimate Attributes of Reality," *The Journal of Philosophy*, IV, No. 11 (1907).

45. ____________, *Three Interpretations of the Universe*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

46. ____________, "Truth and Meaning," *The Psychological Review*, XV, No. 3 (1908).

47. __________, "What Pragmatism Is and Is Not," The Journal of Philosophy, IV, No. 20 (1907).

48. Dewey, John, How We Think. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., Publishers, 1910.

49. Piatt, Donald A., Fisher, Carolyn S., Westergaard, Waldeman, In Memoriam: John Elof Boodin, 1869-1950. Los Angeles: The University of California, 1950.

CHAPTER 42.

THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF ABRAHAM J. HESCHEL.

MORTON C. FIERMAN.

I.

Abraham Joshua Heschel, professor of Ethics and Mysticism at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in New York City was born in Warsaw, and arrived in the United States in March, 1940. Before joining the Jewish Theological Seminary in 1945, he was associate professor of Philosophy and Rabbinics at Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati for five years.

He is known as a scholar, author, philosopher and theologian. His major work in two volumes, Man Is Not Alone, and God In Search of Man, has been widely acclaimed for its profound and creative approach to religious philosophy.

He is the product of two different worlds, of Eastern European Jewry on the one hand, and the philosophy and scholarship of Western civilization on the other. He is a descendant of outstanding leaders of Chassidism. He grew up in the closed God-centered world of Jewish piety. During the formative years of his childhood and youth, he obtained two things that are manifest on every page of his published work: a knowledge and an understanding -- knowledge of his Jewish religious heritage, and an understanding for the realness of the spirit and for the holy dimension of all existence, as Fritz A. Rothschild writes it in the Introduction to Heschel's work, Between God and Man. (1)

It is of interest that in 1937 Martin Buber chose Heschel as his successor at the Central Organization for Jewish Adult Education in Germany and the Freies Judisches Lehrhaus. The latter had been founded by Franz Rosenzweig in Frankfurt on the Main, August 1, 1920.

II.

The educational philosophy of Heschel cannot be separated from his general philosophy and theology. It is all of a piece. He is at all times devoted to reverence for life. This reverence carries with it the spiritual feeling that life is sacred in all its dimensions. Furthermore, he states that "the task of religion is to be a challenge to the stabilization of values," (2) and it must be relevant, otherwise its message becomes meaningless. (3)

Heschel's approach to life and all of its manifestations is affected by his rootedness in prophetic Judaism and his love for the spirituality of Chassidism. And yet, he possesses "the yearning for free inquiry and objective truth of the modern Western Scholar." (4)

For Heschel, "the task of the teacher is to be a midwife to the student... At the hands of a clumsy practitioner," he advises, "ideas will be stillborn, the outcome may be a monster. At the hands of a master, a new life will be born." (5) And yet, he states that "education is a matter which rests primarily with the parent, with the father," (6) not with the teacher. Though at this moment he is discussing religious education, and notes that "the teacher is but a representative of the father, according to Jewish tradition," (7) nevertheless, he is suggesting that all education to be effective education must begin at home.

"The secret of effective teaching," for Heschel, "lies in making a pupil a contemporary of the living moment of teaching. The outcome is not only the retention of the content of teaching but also of the moment of teaching. It is not enough for the pupil to appropriate the subject matter, the pupil and the teacher must go through significant moments, sharing insight and appreciation." (8)

Heschel knows of the vicissitudes in teaching as well as its glory. He senses its many difficulties as well as its horizons. For him, "the first moment in each class is like the hour in which the Jews stood at the Red Sea. But when the reward comes," he proclaims, "it is a song." (9)

Heschel is not only a dedicated teacher himself, but he sets up the teaching profession on a high pedestal. It is a sanctified calling, in his way of thought. It is a dedicated profession as he considers it.

In his purview, "the teacher is more than a technician. He is the representative as well as the interpreter of mankind's most sacred possessions." (10)

And when writing of Judaism, Heschel affirms that the teacher is the central pillar of Jewish living; past, present, and future." (11) Heschel further explains that "the teacher is not an automatic fountain from which intellectual beverages may be obtained. He is either a witness or a stranger. To guide a pupil into the promised land, he must have been there himself. When asking himself: Do I stand for what I teach? Do I believe what I say? He must be able to answer in the affirmative. What we need more than anything else," he proclaims, "is not textbooks but text-people. It is the personality of the teacher which is the text that the pupils read; the text they will never forget." (12)

III.

As Heschel considers the teaching profession in glowing terms, so he considers learning. "Learning" as he describes it, "is holy, an indispensable form of purification as well as ennoblement." (13) Furthermore, he points out that "genuine reverence for the sanctity of study is bound to invoke in the pupils the awareness that study is not an ordeal but an act of edification; that the school is a sanctuary, not a factory; that study is a form of worship." (14) "True learning," he avers, "is a way of relating oneself to something which is both eternal and universal. The experience of learning counteracts tribalism and self-centeredness. The work of our hands is private property; the fruits of the intellect belong to all men. The ultimate meaning of knowledge is not power, but the realization of a unity that surpasses all interests and all ages. Wisdom is like the sky, belonging to no man, and true learning is the astronomy of the spirit." (15)

Thoughts and language of this kind can only be rooted in something beyond a philosophy of education. Indeed they are. They are a part of the larger tradition of Heschel's faith, which is Judaism, and a segment too of his very personal weltanschauung. Certainly to some extent it can be traced to the statement in Pirke-Avoth (The Sayings of the Fathers): "The world rests upon three pillars, upon learning, upon worship, and upon charity." (16) As Heschel himself writes it, "learning meant having a share in divine wisdom." (17)

Heschel feels that "learning, worship, charity are ends, not means." (18) He conceives that "it is wrong to define education as preparation for life. Learning is life," he underscores, "a supreme experience of living, a climax of existence." (19) "Learning, study," also, "is more than preparation of young people of good citizenship. Study is a form of worship, an act of inner purification." (20) "Learning, too, is a religious commandment." (21) Heschel does not mean the possession of learning, erudition, but the very act of study, "of being overwhelmed by the marvel and mystery of God's creation." (22)

In his paper, Essay on Youth, presented to the White House Conference on Children and Youth in 1960, Professor Heschel crystallizes the differences between the Greek conception of learning, the Hebrew's goal of learning, and modern man's idea of learning. "The Greeks," he explains, "learned in order to comprehend. The Hebrews learned in order to revere. The modern man learns in order to use, accepting the maxim which declares: 'Knowledge is power.' This is how people are urged to study: knowledge means success. We no longer know how to justify any value except in terms of expediency. Man is willing to define himself as a 'seeker after the maximum degree of comfort for the minimum expenditure of energy.' He equates value with that which avails. He feels, acts, and thinks as if the sole purpose of the universe were to satisfy his needs." (23)

What is true learning to Heschel? "True learning is a way of relating oneself to something which is both holy and universal." (24) Do we have some thoughts here, which suggest parallels to Martin Buber's "I-Thou" philosophy? Perhaps. In Heschel's conception of reverence for life, the way that one relates to life in holiness, and his grasp of the idea of freedom -- he is similar to Buber.

We are tempted at this juncture to categorize Heschel's philosophy of education. Indeed, he is an experimentalist we say, but we will find that he is not quite that. Then he is an idealist. Hasn't he written that "perhaps the most amazing aspect about man is what is latent in him. One thing that sets man apart from animals is a boundless unpredictable capacity for the development of an inner universe. There is more potentiality in his soul than in any other being known to us....indeed, the essence of human being is not what he is, but in what he is able to be." (25) Let us make a further investigation and find out where Heschel stands.

IV.

What are some of the goals, which Heschel has suggested for education? What are the mountain tops, as it were, that he is seeking -- horizons which he desires? To an extent, we should understand that he doesn't separate education from life, that he sees them not apart, but together, fused. Thus, he states that "all men are endowed with a sense of wonder, with a sense of mystery. But our system of education fails to develop it and the anti-intellectual climate of our civilization does much to suppress it. Mankind will not perish for lack of information; it may collapse for want of appreciation." (26) We see in these words that Heschel wants man to be able to comprehend, be sensitive, and appreciate the magnificence and mystery of the world. Furthermore, this goal, education for reverence is the foundation stone for the preservation of freedom, according to his philosophy. Freedom, or rather its preservation, is also a goal within his framework for life, and consequently, in his educational skaffolding. "Freedom," Heschel says, "is a burden that God has thrust upon man. Freedom is something we are responsible for. If we succeed, we will help in the redemption of the world; if we fail, we may be crushed by its abuse." (27)

"Loyalty to freedom means loyalty to the substance of freedom," Heschel has indicated. "A major root of freedom lies in the belief that man, every man, is too good to be the slave of another man. However, the dynamics of our society, the cheapening and trivialization of existence, continue to corrode that belief. The uniqueness and sacred preciousness of man in being refuted with an almost cruel consistency." (28) Thus, Heschel firmly believes in the concept that "the glory of a free society lies not only in the consciousness of my right to be free, and my capacity to be free, but also in the realization of my fellow man's right to be free, and his capacity to be free." (29)

Still another goal with which Heschel is concerned is what he calls "ultimate significance and ultimate preciousness of one's own existence." (30) Without this, we have a threat to freedom. Routine has set into human life, standardization has taken the meaning out of it. "We teach our students how to recognize labels," Heschel admonishes, "not how to develop taste." (31) Heschel despises the trivialization of existence, mechanization of the person, the de-sanctification of time, and the de-personalization of humanity. He wants the human being to strive for nobility of soul. The way to do so is through "moral dedications, acts of worship, intellectual pursuits...Personal concern for justice in the market place, for integrity in public affairs and in public relations is a prerequisite for our right to pray," (32) he advocates. We must reach man by education to teach him these underlying cherished thoughts upon which civilization is established. Because education is being involved in wisdom, the beginning of wisdom is to recognize this.

Another goal of education as Heschel senses it is the manner in which young people can be brought up with a proper sense of responsibility in an affluent society. Heschel has been aware of modern man's standard and preoccupation: "_What will I get out of life_? Suppressed is the question: _What will life, what will society get out of me_?....There is no sense of responsibility without reverence for the sublime in human existence, without a sense of dignity, without loyalty to a heritage, without an awareness of the transcendence of that living. Self respect is the fruit of discipline, the sense of dignity grows with the ability to say No to oneself." (33) Fundamental for Heschel in man's existence is a sense of indebtedness to both society and God. He cannot fathom existence without it. He considers that "What is emerging in our age is a strange inversion," (34) and he is apparently quite concerned about it, for he asks a most embarrassing question: "How can we expect the young to be noble if we ourselves continue to tolerate the ignoble? This is the advice given by a director of a large plant to his managers: he mentions by way of illustration, "Do not associate with unsuccessful people." (35)

Heschel, an individualist himself is desirous that the teacher be dedicated to the needs of the individual child. "We teachers face the pupil as an individual," he has said, "we have to take into consideration his rights and his tasks. To respect these rights and to think of these tasks is the great duty of educators, for to educate means to meet the inner needs, to respond to the inner goals of the child. We dare not commit human sacrifice by immolating the individual child upon the altar of the group." (36) Heschel doesn't want the individual to be eclipsed by the social aspect of life. Throughout his writings he mentions that in the literature of Judaism "it is as individuals, not as members of a mass-mind that we are asked to observe mitzvoth" (37) -- divine demands. Certainly in these sentences, Heschel illustrates his strong interest in the preservation of that precious entity, called individualism.

A unique goal for education, although certainly evident in the area of religion, which Abraham Heschel seeks for education, is what he describes as self-attachment. He does not believe that "our supreme goal is to express the self. What is the self that we should idolize it?" he asks.

"What is there in the self that is worthy of being expressed and conveyed to others? The self gains when it loses itself in the contemplation of the nonself, in the contemplation of the world, for example. Our supreme goal is self-attachment to what is greater than the self rather than self-expression." (38) Heschel does not desire to minimize the great importance of self-expression in education, but rather feels that in order to help a pupil to attain self-expression we must first help him to attain self-attachment, attachment to sources of value experience. (39)

While Heschel was addressing a conference of Jewish educators when he first spoke the following words, nevertheless, they are important for all educators to consider as elemental for their own philosophies and as a major goal in education. "What we glorify," Heschel says, "is not knowledge, erudition, but study and the dedication to learning. According to Rabba 'when man is led in for judgment, he is asked...did you fix time for learning?' (Shabbat 31a)...Man is not asked how much he knows, but how much he learns. The unique attitude of the Jew is not the love of knowledge but the love of studying. A learned rabbi in Poland, the story goes, was dismissed by his community because no light was seen in his house after midnight -- a sign that he was not studying enough. It is not the book, it is the dedication that counts." (40) Certainly contemporary education, both secular and religious, would not go far afield if it pursued this goal.

Still another goal of education in which Heschel is interested is the necessity to teach our young people the knowledge of the dark side of life. "They see," he says, "a picture of ease, play and fun. That life includes hardships, illness, grief, even agony; that many hearts are sick with bitterness, resentfulness, envy -- are facts of which young people have hardly an awareness. They do not feel morally challenged, they do not feel called upon... The young person of today is pampered. In moments of crisis he transfers his guilt to others. Society, the age, or his mother is blamed for his failure. Weakened by self-indulgence, he breaks down easily under hardship...What is there about our life that accounts for the plethora of morbidity and gloom in the works of the contemporary artists? There are jobs, opportunities for success, comfort, security, but there is not exaltation, no sense for that which is worthy of sacrifice, no lasting insight, no experience of adoration, no relatedness to the ultimately precious." (41) Heschel is asking us to be realistic and recognize that "the burning issue is not things to come, but the things that happen here and now." (42) On the other hand he is reflecting an idealistic manner, when he asks us to strive to expose young people to the dark side of life -- to the "realities" of existence, hopefully suggesting that if this is done, life in its totality would be better. He would thus also wish that our young would become aware that "the source of danger today is not the brutality of the beast but the power of man," (43) as he phrases it -- thus again dealing "idealistically" with a fundamental "reality" of life experience.

V.

No matter how much we know of anyone's philosophy of education, we must, if not first of all, at least at some time, seek out his conception of man. For one's conception of man tops off, as it were, one's philosophy. One might even state that in many ways it is the apex of a philosophy of education; it is the very essence of such a philosophy and gives meaning and validity to it. Abraham Heschel has said that, the obsession with power which modern man possesses has not only stunted his concern for beauty and grandeur, but that we are distorting our sight of the world; we are reducing the status of man from that of a person to a thing. In reducing the world to an instrument, man himself becomes an instrument. Man is the tool, and the machine is the consumer. The instrumentalization of the world leads to the disintegration of man. (44) These thoughts are reminiscent of Martin Buber in his book, I and Thou, as well as his essays: "Education," "The Education of Character," and "What Is Man?" in his work, Between Man and Man.

Heschel speaks of the "metaphysical dignity of man, the divine preciousness of human life." "Man," he contends, "is not valued in physical terms; his value is infinite. To our common sense, one human being is less than two human beings. Jewish tradition tries to teach us that for him who has caused a single soul to perish, it is as though he had caused a whole world to perish; and that for him who has saved a single soul, it is as though he had saved a whole world." (45)

Heschel searches and researches, as it were, to comprehend man. Man is important to him for many things. Not alone because "life is a partnership of God and Man" (46) to Heschel. But human life is holy, and therefore, sacred, as a consequence. "The idea of man having been created in the image of God was interpreted, not as an analogy of being but as an analogy of doing. Man is called upon to act in the likeness of God. 'As he is merciful, be thou merciful.' The future of the human species depends upon our degree of reverence for the individual man.

Heschel contrasts the Greek concept of man and that of the Hebrew. For the Greek, the idea was "a being in search of meaning. The Biblical contention was 'unless the Lord builds the house, those who build it labor in vain. The pursuit of meaning is meaningless unless there is meaning in pursuit of man. To the biblical mind, man is not only a creature who is constantly in search of himself but also a creature God is constantly in search of. Man is a creature in search of meaning because there is a meaning in search of him, because there is God's beseeching question, 'Where art thou?'" (47)

As we come to an understanding of Heschel's philosophy of education by reading his works we see much emphasis on man. To be sure there is also much emphasis on God too -- so that in effect one might call his philosophy a religious humanism. Heschel had emphasized many qualities that man possesses, characteristics that are a challenge to the educator. He writes of preciousness, uniqueness, opportunity, nonfinality, man living in process of in an order of events, solitude and solidarity, reciprocity and sanctity. (48) Central to his concept of man is derived from Psalm 116:12 which queries, "How shall I ever repay to the Lord all the bounty he has given me!" Heschel epitomizes this in the statement: "The dignity of human existence is in the power of reciprocity." (49) "I become a person," Heschel says, "by knowing the meaning of receiving and giving. I become a person when I begin to reciprocate. The degree to which one is sensitive to other people's suffering, to other men's humanity, is the index of one's own humanity." (50)

"Who is man?" inquires Heschel. And he answers in the statement: "A being in travail with God's dreams and designs, with God's dream of a world redeemed, of reconciliation of heaven and earth, of a mankind which is truly His image, reflecting His wisdom, justice and compassion." (51)

Thus, knowing somewhat the thought of Heschel regarding man, his consideration of man's role, we can then perhaps understand more fully the statement from his paper, "Idols in the Temples," which provides in his own words his philosophy of education. It is a statement firmed out of his general philosophy and theology, stemming out of his love of the Hebrew Prophets, his intensive high regard for mankind, and his hopes for man's rising to his horizons, lifted up on wings of hope, spirituality and the demands of life itself, which give it its purpose and its holiness.

VI.

"The philosophy of educating man," Heschel writes, "is determined by the philosophy of the nature of man. The prevailing philosophy of education operates upon the assumption that man and his destiny must be conceived in terms of 'interests' and 'needs.' I maintain that if we continue to entertain such a view, education will be doomed to failure...Such a view is part of a way of thinking which tends to flatten things. We deal with human beings as if they had no depth, as if the world had only two dimensions...Intellectually, we know the universe is not here for our sake...practically, however, we act as if the purpose of the universe were to satisfy our interests and needs. However, a life without 'demands' on the mind, heart, body, and soul, a life without constant intellectual effort, spells the doom of culture. An adequate philosophy of education must seek to understand its goals _in terms of ends as well as in terms of needs_, in terms of values as well as in terms of interests and desires. Our tradition insists we must neither defy desire nor villify it. Far from defying legitimate needs, it regards authentic needs, as spiritual opportunities. It tries to teach us not only to satisfy needs, but also to surpass them. The error of idolatry is to idolize needs, to convert needs into ends...the goal is to convert ends into needs. To develop a need for that which we may not feel the need of, to desire what is commanded. Satisfying a need is part of the continuance of psyche, serving an end, doing a _mitzvah_, is a _breakthrough_. However, the goal remains to integrate the end into the psychological structure of needs, for action to generate motivation. Ultimate ends, as seen by our tradition, are not timeless values, metaphysical entities, frozen absolutes. Ultimate ends are 'mitzvoth,' 'demands.' (52)

We begin to catch a glimpse of Heschel's philosophy of education in words such as the preceding, and we commence to realize that he doesn't fit into our contemporary educational philosophies very easily. Let us, however, continue. We may come to a better understanding in a moment.

Heschel criticizes contemporary educational philosophy. He advises that "the cardinal sin of our educational philosophy is that we have asked too little. Its modest standards are unfair to the potentialities of man. Is it true that man is capable of profundity, of sacrifice, of love, or self-denial? Perhaps this is the central issue: the instrumentalization of values. Are we truly committed to the notion that ideals and values vary and alter in accordance with changing condition? Should we not question such a relativistic dogma? Is it not the degree of our sensitivity to the validity of the ultimate ideals and values that fluctuates rather than the ultimate ideals and values." (53)

Is Heschel saying something to us in these sentences -- saying that he is not an experimentalist, and instrumentalist? Isn't he disclosing that he possesses a hierarchy of values, and that he wishes mankind to possess it too? Doesn't he believe in ultimates, and certainly in an ultimate of divine characteristics? Isn't he demonstrating at this point aspects of the philosophy of idealism, if not all classic elements of it, certainly important segments of it? Furthermore, isn't this idealism, religious idealism predicated too upon the concept that "to exist as a human is to assist the divine," (54) as Heschel phrases it? Thus, can't we say that Heschel is a religious idealist? And isn't his religious humanism the foundation of his religious idealism, or put another way, doesn't his religious humanism issue forth from his religious idealism?

VII.

We have attempted to pinpoint in small measure the rich thought of Abraham J. Heschel, contemporary philosopher and theologian. We would hope that we might motivate others to read his works, each page of which is profound, each sentence of each page of which is full of significance and symbolism and most often poetic in imagery if not in form. Heschel can be of great influence upon all teachers if they would but read and listen to his admonitions. His words are as old as the Holy Scriptures, his ideas are as new as tomorrow's lesson plans. He writes in the manner of an ancient scribe, with the contemporaneity of modern media. His is a lesson of yesterday, for the problem of today. His is the problem of yesterday, for the lesson of today.

Epigrams by Abraham J. Heschel.

"Indeed, the enigma of human being is not in what he is but in what he is able to be. Who is Man?, p. 39.

"The dignity of human existence is in the power of reciprocity." Who is Man?, p. 46.

"For every new insight we must pay a new deed. We must strive to maintain a balance of power and mercy, of truth and generosity. Knowledge is a debt, not a private property. To be a person is to reciprocate, to offer in return for what one receives. Reciprocity involves appreciation. Biologically, we all take in and give off. I become a person by knowing the meaning of receiving and giving. I become a person when I begin to reciprocate." Who is Man?, p. 46.

"The issue we face is not the dichotomy of being and misbeing, but that of righteous and unrighteous being. The tension is not between existence and essence but between existence and performance." Who is Man?, p. 47.

"Philosophy is what man dares to do with his ultimate surmise of the meaning of existence." Who is Man?, p. 55.

"The only way to avoid despair is to be a need rather than an end. Happiness, in fact, is a divine cunning in history which seems to prove that the wages of absolute expediency is disaster." Who is Man?, p. 86.

"All that is creative in man stems from a seed of endless discontent. New insight begins when satisfaction comes to an end, when all that has been seen, said, or done looks like a distortion." Who is Man?, p. 86.

"Character education will remain ineffective if it is limited to the teaching of norms and principles. The concern must be not to instill timeless ideas but to cultivate the concrete person." Who is Man?, p. 99.

"The authentic individual is neither an end nor a beginning but a link between ages, both memory and expectation. Every moment is a new beginning within a continuum of history. It is fallacious to segregate a moment and not to sense its involvement in both past and future. Humbly the past defers to the future, but it refuses to be discarded. Only he who is an heir is qualified to be a pioneer." Who is Man?, p. 99.

"The teaching of our society is that more knowledge means more power, more civilization -- more comfort. We should have insisted in the spirit of the prophetic vision that more knowledge should also mean more reverence, that more civilization should also mean less violence. The failure of our culture is in demanding too little of the individual, in not realizing the correlation of rights and obligations, in not realizing that there are inalienable obligations as well as inalienable rights. Our civilization offers comfort in abundance and asks for very little in return. Ours is essentially a Yes education, there is little training in

463.

the art of saying 'no' to oneself." Who is Man?, p. 100.

"In receiving a pleasure, we must return a prayer, in attaining a success we must radiate compassion." Who is Man?, p. 118.

Documentations.

1. Rothschild, Fritz A., "Introduction," Between God and Man. New York: Free Press, 1959, p. 7.

2. Heschel, Abraham J., "Religion In a Free Society," The Insecurity of Freedom. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1966, p. 9.

3. Ibid., pp. 3 and 4.

4. Rothschild, op. cit., p. 9.

5. Heschel, Abraham J., "Idols in the Temple," The Insecurity of Freedom, p. 55.

6. Ibid., p. 54.

7. Ibid., p. 54.

8. Ibid., p. 55.

9. Ibid., p. 55.

10. Heschel, Abraham J., Essay on Youth. New York: Synagogue Council of America, 1960, p. 7.

11. Heschel, Abraham J., "The Spirit of Jewish Education," Jewish Education, Vol. 24, No. 2, Fall 1953, p. 9.

12. Ibid., p. 19.

13. Heschel, Abraham J., Essay on Youth, p. 7.

14. Ibid., p. 7.

15. Ibid., p. 7.

16. Herford, R. Travers, *Pirke Aboth*. New York: The Jewish Institute of Religion, 1930, p. 22.

17. Heschel, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

20. Heschel, Abraham J., "Idols in the Temple," *The Insecurity of Freedom*, p. 57.

21. Heschel, Abraham J., "Religion in a Free Society," *The Insecurity of Freedom*, p. 20.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

23. Heschel, Abraham J., *Essay on Youth*, p. 5.

24. Heschel, Abraham J., "Idols in the Temple," p. 57.

25. Heschel, Abraham J., "The Patient as a Person," *Conservative Judaism*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, Fall, 1964, p. 2.

26. Heschel, Abraham J., "Religion in a Free Society," p. 21.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

33. Heschel, Abraham J., *Essay on Youth*, p. 9.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

465.

36. Heschel, Abraham J., "The Spirit of Jewish Education," p. 12.

37. *Ibid*., p. 11.

38. *Ibid*., p. 13.

39. *Ibid*., p. 14.

40. *Ibid*., p. 19.

41. Heschel, Abraham J., *Essay on Youth*, pp. 8 and 9.

42. *Ibid*., p. 8.

43. *Ibid*., p. 8.

44. *Ibid*., p. 6.

45. Heschel, Abraham J., "Sacred Images of Man," *The Insecurity of Freedom*, p. 154.

46. *Ibid*., p. 160.

47. *Ibid*., p. 163.

48. Heschel, Abraham J., *Who is Man?* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965, Chapter III.

49. *Ibid*., p. 46.

50. *Ibid*., pp. 46-47.

51. *Ibid*., p. 119.

52. Heschel, Abraham J., "Idols in the Temple," pp. 62-63.

53. Heschel, Abraham J., *Essay on Youth*, p. 11.

54. *Ibid*., p. 15.

Readings. 55. Brown, McAfee, Heschel, Abraham J., Novak, Michael, *Vietnam: Crisis of Conscience*. New York: Behrman House, 1967.

56. Fierman, Morton C., "What Is Man?" Santa Ana: Temple Beth Sholom, 1959.

57. Heschel, Abraham J., "Architecture of Time," Judaism, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 1952), pp. 44-51.

58. Heschel, Abraham J., Between God and Man. New York: The Free Press, 1959.

59. Heschel, Abraham J., "The Divine Pathos," Judaism, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January 1953), pp. 61-67.

60. Heschel, Abraham J., The Earth Is the Lord's and The Sabbath. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966.

61. Heschel, Abraham J., Essay on Youth. New York: Synagogue Council of America, 1960.

62. Heschel, Abraham J., Existence and Celebration. New York: Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds. (The Herbert R. Abeles Memorial Address delivered November 13, 1965.)

63. Heschel, Abraham J., "Faith," The Reconstructionist, Vol. X, November 3, 1944, No. 13, pp. 10-14.

64. Heschel, Abraham J., God In Search of Man. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1959.

65. Heschel, Abraham J., "Idols in the Temple," Religious Education, March-April 1963, pp. 127-137.

66. Heschel, Abraham J., "The Inner World of the Polish Jew," The Jewish Digest, July, 1966, pp. 46-48.

67. Heschel, Abraham J., The Insecurity of Freedom. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1966.

68. Heschel, Abraham J., Man is Not Alone. New York: Harper and Row, 1951.

69. Heschel, Abraham J., Man's Quest for God. New York: Scribner's, 1954.

70. Heschel, Abraham J., "The Meaning of This Hour," Dimension, Spring, 1967, pp. 20-22.

71. Heschel, Abraham J., "The Meaning of This War," *Liberal Judaism*, February 1944, pp. 18-21.

72. Heschel, Abraham J., "The Patient as a Person," *Conservative Judaism*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Fall 1964), pp. 1-10.

73. Heschel, Abraham J., *The Prophets*. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1962.

74. Heschel, Abraham J., "Protestant Renewal: A Jewish View," *Christian Century*, Vol. 80, No. 49 (December 4, 1963) pp. 1501-1504.

75. Heschel, Abraham J., "Space, Time and Reality," *Judaism*. Vol. 1, No. 3 (July, 1952), pp. 262-269.

76. Heschel, Abraham J., "The Spirit of Jewish Education," *Jewish Education*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1953), pp. 9-19, 62.

77. Heschel, Abraham J., "Toward An Understanding of Halacha," *Yearbook*, CCAR, Vol. 63 (1953), pp. 386-409.

78. Heschel, Abraham J., "The Two Great Traditions," *Commentary*, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 1948, pp. 416-422.

79. Heschel, Abraham J., "What We Might Do Together," *Religious Education*, March-April, 1967, pp. 133-140.

80. Heschel, Abraham J., *Who Is Man?* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965.

81. Hubler, Richard G., "What Is Man? Search for Answer," *Los Angeles Times*, November, 1967.

82. Kokotek, Jacob J., "Who Is Man?" *Pointer*, Vol. II, No. 4, Summer, 1967, p. 16.

83. Stevens, Wallace, "A Collect of Philosophy," *The Age of Complexity*, Mentor, pp. 252-269.

84. Petuchowski, Jakob J., "Faith as the Leap of Action," *Commentary*, May 1958, pp. 390-397.

CHAPTER 43.

NIETZSCHE'S DISSECTION OF THE SCHOLAR.

JAMES W. HILLESHEIM.

Nietzsche maintained that the creative spirit necessary for the furthering of art, science and philosophy was fast disappearing from the universities, that the ideal of the scholar was replacing that of the productive thinker. Indeed, it has reached the point where scholarship stands opposed to wisdom and creativity:

"Here and there I come into contact with German universities: what an atmosphere prevails among their scholars, what desolate spirituality -- and how contented and lukewarm it has become! It would be a profound misunderstanding if one wanted to adduce German science against me -- it would also be proof that one has not read a word I have written. For seventeen years I have never tired of calling attention to the despiritualizing influence of our current science-industry. The hard helotism to which the tremendous range of the sciences condemns every scholar today is a main reason why those with a fuller, richer, profounder disposition no longer find a congenial education and congenial educators. There is nothing of which our culture suffers more than of the superabundance of pretentious jobbers and fragments of humanity; our universities are, against their will, the real hothouses of this kind of withering of the instincts of the spirit." (1)

In the following pages we shall examine Nietzsche's critique of the university scholar. It will be argued that the scholarly ideal is opposed to that of the true philosopher.

The Dissection of the Scholar.

In the name of objectivity and scientific rigor university scholars consider it their duty to view the world as a series of intellectual problems, carefully divorced from their own passions and instincts. Nietzsche observes that "scholarship [Wissenschaft] has the same relationship to wisdom as righteousness has to holiness: it is cold and dry, it is loveless and knows no deep feelings of inadequacy or longing." (2)

The danger, as Nietzsche sees it, is that the conditions which promote scholarship hinder self-surpassing [Selbstüberwindung] and the cultivation of superior men. (3) A promising young man who embarks on a scholarly career, who lives and works with reputable scholars, will soon ossify into a bloodless specimen of academic respectability. "If one accustoms oneself to translating every experience into a dialectic play of question and answer and into a purely intellectual matter, it is astonishing in how short a time man can wither up at such activity and become a bunch of rattling bones." (4) But why, then, would anyone want to join the ranks of scholarship? To answer this question Nietzsche suggests that we adopt the scholar's technique of bloodless dissection -- only in this case the scalpel will be applied to the scholar himself, to discover what motives, values and desires lure and chain him to the academic life. As we proceed with the dissection it will become clear that the scholar "consists of a confused tangle of very different motives and stimuli," (5) that he possesses certain valuable traits and skills but that these are usually wasted or misemployed because of a distorted hierarchy of values.

Three General Traits. There are three general traits that are regularly to be seen among scholars: first, "a strong and ever-increasing inquisitiveness, the search for intellectual adventure." (6) In the scholar this impulse leads him to whatever is "new and rare in contrast to the old and boring." (7) A second trait is "a certain inclination to dialectical sleuthing, the huntsman's joy in cunning, foxy ways of thought, so that it is not actually truth which is sought but rather the seeking itself, and the chief pleasure is found in a cunning encircling and an artful kill." (8) A third general trait is "the compulsion to contradict; the scholar's personality will assert itself in opposition to all others; battle becomes a joy, and personal victory is the goal, whereas the fight for truth is only the pretext." (9)

One might well remark that inquisitiveness, dialectical sleuthing and contest are necessary qualities in Nietzsche's image of the educated man. But in the scholar these impulses lack direction: they are not being guided by the axiological goal of self-surpassing. Instead of pursuing the truth wherever it may lead, the scholar pursues only those particular truths that he feels will bring him recognition, income, security, promotion and other personal benefits. The scholar inquires not out of a passion for truth, but "out of servility to particular ruling people, castes, opinions, churches and governments, because he feels that he is advancing himself by bringing 'truth' to their side." (10)

Twelve Additional Traits. In addition to the three general traits just described there are several other qualities to be found in the scholar. These qualities occur "less regularly, but often enough." (11) First, there is respectability and a reverence for old or accepted opinions. However, "this respectability is of little worth and seldom fruitful even for scholarship, since it is a slave to convention and is in the habit of telling the truth only in simple matters or in *adiaphoris*; for in these cases it is easier to tell the truth than to keep it quiet." (12) The scholar tends to resist anything that is really new, anything that might upset established ways of thought, anything that "necessitates a re-learning." (13) Nietzsche argues that "every generation of scholars has an involuntary standard for *permissible* sagacity." (14) If any scholar should be imprudent enough to suggest an hypothesis which challenges the current standard, the hypothesis is not only doubted but "used as a basis for an attack on the scholar's reputation." (15) A good example of this is the Copernican hypothesis, which "was opposed by a respectability which had common sense and custom on its side." (16)

Secondly, the scholar has a highly developed "sharpsightedness for near objects. . . ." (17) Unfortunately this trait, which is almost universal among scientific workers, is "linked with a severe myopia for distant and general objects." (18) If we look carefully we find that

"the scholar's field of vision is usually very small, and his eyes must be held close to the object. If he wants to move from one point which he has just investigated to another, he must move his whole seeing apparatus. He analyzes a picture into sections, like someone who uses opera glasses to see the stage, and sees now a hand, now a piece of clothing, but nothing complete. He never sees those single sections connectedly, he only infers their interrelationship; therefore, he has no strong impression of anything general. For example, he judges a piece of writing by single passages, sentences or errors because he is incapable of seeing it as a whole; he would be tempted to maintain that an oil painting is a confused heap of blotches." (19)

Thirdly, the scholar is generally of a "sober and conventional" (20) disposition. This trait will express itself as an interest in historical studies whereby the scholar receives special delight in discovering his own commonplace motives in the events of the past. "A mole is happiest in a mole-hill." (21) Because his own motives and preferences are so commonplace he is usually "incapable of understanding and valuing what is rare, great and uncommon, that is, what is important and essential." (22)

Fourthly, the scholar has a detached, cold, hard, even cruel quality which allows him "to perform vivisections." (23) This enables him to venture into "realms where other's hearts quake." (24) This may appear to be a sign of courage, but in reality it is simply an indication of the scholar's "poverty and dryness of feeling." (25) The emotions having been allowed to wither away, the scholar "has no idea of the suffering which accompanies many kinds of knowledge." (26) People may think that he "is audacious, but he is not -- not any more than the mule which does not know dizziness." (27)

Another characteristic is that by and large scholars are humble and modest. They show "little self-esteem" (28) or pride. "Even though they are condemned to obscurity, they have no sense of sacrifice or wasted effort." (29) There is no sense of sacrifice because they "seem to know that deep down in them they are creatures that crawl, not fly." (30)

Sixthly, scholars are followers, faithful imitators of "their teachers and leaders." (31) Scholars are thankful for guidance and desirous to help their academic superiors, for they realize that "it is only through them that they gained entrance into the worthy halls of scholarship, into which they would never have come had they followed their own way." (32) A curious consequence is that nowadays, with so many young graduates pressing to be let into the academic ranks, "whoever opens up a new field, where even lesser minds can work with some success, becomes famous in a short time." (33) However, this is a mixed blessing for the master, for in the process of imitation "his faults appear immoderately large and exaggerated. The master's virtues are thus correspondingly diminished because they occur in such petty individuals." (34)

William James once remarked that habit is the great flywheel of society. Nowhere is this more evident than in the life of the scholar who, out of a lack of ideas, routinely progresses in his career from sheer "force of habit." (35)

"Such persons are collectors, explainers and compilers of indices and herbaria; they study and do research in the field for the simple reason that it does not occur to them that there are other fields. Their industry has something of the huge stupidity of the forces of gravity." (36)

Eighthly, the scholar pursues his work out of a fear of boredom. While the self-surpassing man desires nothing so much as leisure, "the common scholar avoids it because he does not know what to do with it." (37) The scholar's primary means of escape is the printed page.

Ninthly, the scholar is faced, as are most laborers, with the problem of earning a living, "that is, the famous 'borborygmus of an empty stomach.'" (38) However, it is difficult to set limits to one's material needs, and soon the scholar knows no higher goal than that of his own economic advantage. His life and studies are then controlled by his desire to earn as much money as possible:

"Truth is served when it is able to promote one quickly to good salaries and higher positions, or at least to win the favor of those who have bread and honors to confer. But only this truth is served. Therefore, a line can be drawn between the profitable truths, which are served by many, and the unprofitable truths, to which very few are devoted." (39)

A "rarer but higher motive than the last, yet not uncommon," (40) is the scholar's respect for his colleagues and his willingness to abide by the rules of the academic game:

"All the members of the guild most jealously watch over each other so that the truth, on which so much hangs -- bread, office and honor -- might be baptized in the name of its discoverer. One pays strict tribute to the other man for the truth that he has found in order to demand the tribute back in case one should discover a truth himself. Mistakes and errors are noisily exploded so that the number of competitors does not become too large; yet sometimes even the real truth is exploded, so for a short time at least the way is cleared for stubborn and brazen errors." (41)

Somewhat less frequent is vanity. The vain scholar "wants, if possible, to have a field all to himself, and for this reason he chooses curiosities, especially when they involve unusual expenditures, travels, excavations and numerous connections in various countries." (42) His satisfaction comes not from financial remuneration but from the honor and recognition given him as an expert and specialist.

A twelfth characteristic to be found in the scholar is the play-instinct. "He finds delight in looking for and solving knotty problems in the sciences, taking care not to exert himself too much lest he lose the spirit of the game." (43) It is true that the scholar's "playfulness" is a device for avoiding depth, but it does have the saving virtue of allowing him to perceive things that the overly somber, "professional scholar, with his laboriously creeping eyes, never sees." (44)

What the Scholar Lacks.

Considering this motley collection of desirable as well as all-too-human traits that characterize the scholar, what judgment are we to make as to his worth? Nietzsche's conclusion is that the scholar at his best is a "harmless drudge" (to borrow a term from Samuel Johnson) and at his worst a corrupter of youth. The reason for the unfruitful nature of the scholar is not that he possesses all-too-human traits and animalistic impulses (for the genius and superman also possess these) but that he lacks the axiological orientation which would lead him on to more creative endeavors. The scholar's life is not being guided by the ultimate aim of self-surpassing. He has given up or never joined in the struggle to produce conditions of challenge favorable to the genesis of genius. If the scholar heeds the call, "Become who you are!" he will cease to be a scholar and become a philosopher. As it stands the scholar is simply "too ignorant of the goal of culture." (45)

Pedagogically the scholar lacks the one trait most necessary to learning -- i.e., passion. To be effective as a teacher or as a learner one must be on fire with the passion to know and the desire to create a just culture (i.e., a culture which values individual great men). Nietzsche asserts that "a spark from the fire of justice, when it falls into the soul of a scholar, is enough to enflame his whole life and aspirations, to consume and at the same time to purify them, so that he has no more rest and is driven out for good from the luke-warm or frosty mood in which most [illegible] do their daily work." (46)

Nietzsche believes that it is of utmost importance not to confuse the scholar with the self-surpassing man. If we fail to keep the two types of men distinct we are in danger of elevating the scholar to the position of serving as our educational ideal. Nietzsche argues that we should not make the error of thinking that one can be both a scholar and a creative person: "Geniuses and scholars have at all times been at war." (47) Indeed, history teaches us that "very fortunate times neither needed nor knew the scholar; sick and decadent times valued him as the highest and most worthy man and ranked him highly." (48)

The reaction of the productive thinker to the passionless scholar is expressed in the metaphors of Zarathustra:

"I am too hot and burned by my own thoughts; often it nearly takes my breath away. Then I must go out into the open and away from all dusty rooms. But they [the scholars] sit cool in the cool shade: in everything they want to be mere spectators, and they beware of sitting where the sun burns on the steps. Like those who stand in the street and gape at the people who pass by, they, too, wait and gape at thoughts that others have thought." (49)

The Scholar and the Teaching of Philosophy.

Perhaps the best illustration of the corrupting effect of the scholarly ideal can be seen in the teaching of philosophy. Both the professor and the student suffer when philosophy makes concessions to scholarship. Let us conclude with a brief account of these harmful effects.

When the ideal of the scholar rules, the philosophy professor is not expected "to be a thinker but at the most an intellectualizer and cerebrater, and above all a learned connoisseur of all early thinkers; he will always be able to tell something about them which his students did not know." (50)

In the hands of the scholar, with his narrow historical interests, his lack of passion and his withered imagination, philosophy prostitutes itself to the history of philosophy. Erudition is substituted for insight. (51)

Nietzsche counters this scholarly ideal by arguing that "the learned history of the past was never the business of a true philosopher, either in India or in Greece; and a philosophy professor, if he concerns himself with such things, must be content with people saying of him at best: 'He is an excellent philologist, intiquary, linguist, historian' — but never: 'He is a philosopher.'" (52) By this criterion much that passes for philosophy in our institutions of higher learning and in our scholarly journals is not philosophy at all, but merely a display of the academician's delight in "wallowing in strange and twisted opinions." (53)

If one doubts the extent of the inroads made by the pedants Nietzsche suggests that one look at the recent scholarly works dealing with Greek philosophy. Nietzsche cites several reputable nineteenth-century German scholars -- Ritter, Brandis and Zeller -- as examples of university professors who have nothing better to do than write "horribly boring" texts which spread a "soporific haze" over the genius of the Greeks. (54) Nietzsche goes so far as to say that "I at least prefer reading Diogenes Laertius to Zeller, because in the former at least the spirit of the ancient philosophers lives, in the latter, however, neither that nor any other spirit lives." (55) A professor who is more concerned with accurate historical information than with re-creating a living, passionate image of a great thinker has no right to be called a philosopher.

When we turn to the plight of the philosophy student we see to what extent the scholarly ideal has pervaded the colleges and universities. Nietzsche's remarks deserve quoting in their entirety:

"For heaven's sake, what business have our youths with the history of philosophy? Shall the confusion of opinions discourage them from having opinions of their own? Shall they be trained to join in the jubilation of our wonderful progress? Shall they even learn to hate and despise philosophy? One would almost think the latter was the case if one knew how students have to torture themselves for their philosophy examinations in order to cram into their brains the craziest and sharpest ideas of the human mind together with the greatest and most difficult. The only criticism of a philosophy which is possible, and which also proves something -- that of seeing if one can live by it -- has never been taught at the universities: but always criticism of words by words. And now let one imagine a youthful and inexperienced mind, in which fifty verbal systems and fifty criticisms of the same are stored next to each other in confusion -- what wilderness, what chaos, what mockery of the philosophical education! In fact, one is not educated for philosophy, as is admitted, but for a philosophy examination: the usual result being, as is well known, that the person taking the test -- an all too severe test! -- says to himself with a heavy sigh: 'Thank God that I am no philosopher, but a Christian and a citizen of my State!'" (56)

The most harmful consequence of scholars masquerading as philosophers is that "they make philosophy something ridiculous" (57) and thereby insure that students will look with scorn on the highest goal of culture: "the production of philosophical genius." (58)

Documentations.

1. Twilight of the Idols, "What the Germans Lack," 3. The Portable Nietzsche, translated and selected with an Introduction, Preface and Notes by Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1960), pp. 507-508. In this and the forthcoming footnotes the numbers immediately following the titles of Nietzsche's works refer to chapter and/or section divisions.

2. Schopenhauer as Educator, A Gateway Edition, translated with Notes by James W. Hillesheim and Malcolm R. Simpson, Introduction by Eliseo Vivas (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1965), 6, p. 71. Zarathustra proclaims that "if you seize them [the scholars] with your hands they raise a cloud of dust like flour bags, involuntarily: but who could guess that their dust comes from grain and from the yellow delight of summer fields?" Thus Spoke Zarathustra, II, "On Scholars." The Portable Neitzsche, p. 237.

3. The terms "superior man," "genius," and "philosopher" are used by Nietzsche to indicate the creative, self-surpassing individual. In his later works Nietzsche employs the term "superman."

4. Schopenhauer as Educator, 6, p. 71.

5. Ibid., p. 72.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., pp. 72-73.

13. Ibid., p. 73.

477.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Schopenhauer as Educator, p. 73. Speaking through the mouth of Zarathustra, Nietzsche comments on his own experience among scholars: "I have moved from the house of the scholars and I even banged the door behind me. My soul sat hungry at their table too long; I am not, like them, trained to pursue knowledge as if it were nutcracking. I love freedom and the air over the fresh earth; rather would I sleep on ox hides than on their decorums and respectabilities." Thus Spoke Zarathustra, II, "On Scholars." The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 236-237.

17. Schopenhauer as Educator, 6, p. 73.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 74.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Schopenhauer as Educator, 6, p. 74.

478.

33. *Ibid*., pp. 74-75.

34. *Ibid*., p. 75.

35. *Ibid*.

36. *Ibid*.

37. *Ibid*.

38. *Ibid*.

39. *Ibid*., pp. 75-76.

40. *Ibid*., p. 76.

41. *Ibid*.

42. *Schopenhauer as Educator*, p. 76. Scholars may stick closely together, but it is not without suspicion and malice. In the words of Zarathustra: "They watch each other closely and mistrustfully. Inventive in petty cleverness, they wait for those whose knowledge walks on lame feet: like spiders they wait. I have always seen them carefully preparing poison; and they always put on gloves of glass to do it. They also know how to play with loaded dice; and I have seen them play so eagerly that they sweated." *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, II, "On Scholars." *The Portable Nietzsche*, pp. 237-238.

43. *Schopenhauer as Educator*, 6, pp. 76-77.

44. *Ibid*., p. 77.

45. *Ibid*., p. 78.

46. *Ibid*., p. 77.

47. *Ibid*., p. 78.

48. *Ibid*.

49. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, II, "On Scholars." *The Portable Nietzsche*, p. 237.

50. *Schopenhauer as Educator*, 8, p. 97.

51. That Nietzsche is speaking from personal experience can be seen in the following reflections made late in life on his past academic career: "I saw that it was high time for a little introspection. At once it became appallingly clear to me how much time I had already wasted -- how useless, how willful my whole existence as a philologist appeared by the side of my life-task. I was ashamed of this false modesty. . . . Ten years were behind me, during which I had received absolutely no spiritual nourishment, during which I had acquired no useful knowledge, but had forgotten countless things in the pursuit of a hotch-potch of dry-as-dust scholarship. To plow through old Greek metricians, meticulously, half-blind -- that was what I had come to!" Ecce Homo, "Human, All-too-Human," 3. The Philosophy of Nietzsche, trans. by Thomas Common, et. al., with an Introduction by W. H. Wright (New York: Modern Library, 1954), p. 881.

52. Schopenhauer as Educator, 8, p. 98.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid. Of the three historians cited only Eduard Zeller (1814-1908) is still widely read today. Zeller's major writings on the Greeks are currently in print -- some even in paperback editions. His Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy is "recommended reading" in many philosophy classes in this country.

55. Ibid. Diogenes Laertius, who probably lived in the early third-century A.D., is the author of an extant work titled Lives of the Philosophers. This work contains much fascinating information about the private lives of the ancient Greek philosophers (including the content of Aristotle's will). The full thrust of Nietzsche's comparison can only be understood in light of the fact that Diogenes' Lives is considered to be unreliable, uncritical, perhaps largely fictional, and of no real philosophical value in itself (as Nietzsche was well aware!).

56. Schopenhauer as Educator, pp. 98-99.

57. Schopenhauer as Educator, p. 103.

58. Ibid., p. 99.

Citations. 59. Schopenhauer as Educator. Translated with Notes by James W. Hillesheim and Malcolm R. Simpson, Introduction by Eliseo Vivas. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., A Gateway Edition, 1965.

60. *The Complete Works*. 18 Vols. Edited by Oscar Levy, translated by Thomas Common, *et*. *al*. New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1964. (First published between 1909-1911; London and New York: The Macmillan Co.)

61. *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*. Translated by Thomas Common, *et*. *al*., with an Introduction by W. H. Wright. New York: The Modern Library, 1954.

62. *The Portable Nietzsche*. Translated and selected, with an Introduction, Preface and Notes by Walter Kaufmann. New York: The Viking Press, 1960.

63. Rogers, Robert, "The Moral Philosophy of Nietzsche," *The Personalist*, XLVI, No. 1 (1965), 18-38.

CHAPTER 44.

THE INTEGRATION OF COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE DIMENSIONS OF LEARNING: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY.

STEVEN L. HACKBARTH.

Cognition and affectivity can be conceived of as two dimensions of the learning process. (1) A review of recent publications in the field of education reveals that several contemporary educators consider the "integration" or "confluence" of these dimensions of students' learning to be their primary concern. (2) Such "confluent" educators have attempted to illustrate the nature of their aim by providing case studies and examples from classroom practice. Their more explicit analyses of what it means to integrate cognitive and affective dimensions of learning are usually stated in the mentalistic terms of some psychological theory that leave precise interpretation largely up to each individual reader. Since confluent educators frequently cite the works of those psychologists whose philosophical foundations are largely to be found in existential phenomenology, the special meaning that they assign to "integrated learning" might profitably be understood from the perspective of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a highly regarded scholar in the field. (3) The purpose of this paper is to draw upon his philosophical writings in an effort to provide an explicit and coherent interpretation of the concept "integrated learning."

The use of the insights of existential phenomenologists to render educational phenomena more explicit has been advocated and demonstrated by Donald Vandenberg. (4) He claims that the descriptive writings of such philosophers as Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty contain the language necessary to accurately express educational concepts. He outlines a three phase interpretive ("hermeneutic") process (adapted from the writings of Otto F. Bollnow) for making sense out of educational phenomena that I follow in my analysis of integrated learning.

The first phase of Vandenberg's analytic method entails an attempt to explicate the pretheoretical understanding, or tacit knowledge, of an educational phenomenon through clarification of the language actually used by concerned educators. Such tacit knowledge is commonly expressed in the conversations and professional writings of teachers who are daily immersed in schooling activities and similarly in the publications of curriculum designers and reformers with classroom experience. These firsthand insights are pretheoretical in the sense that they usually are limited to illustrations from practice and lack explicit analyses of terms as well as integration into a general conceptual framework. In Vandenberg's terms:

"...the experienced practitioner uses educational concepts within the implicit network of understanding that he, the practitioner, cannot make fully explicit in formally adequate ways. Because this network of meanings is acquired through the joys and sorrows of the pedagogic relation rather than by selling shoes or playing golf, it seems also more correct to say that this is indeed a differentiated form of awareness and knowledge even though this differentiation is not yet illuminated by a unique conceptual structure." (5)

The second and third phases of the analysis essentially consist of describing the educational phenomenon under study from the perspective of one or more of the existential phenomenologists and then relating the specific phenomenon to the whole domain of education.

I initially intended to clarify what confluent educators as a group meant when they referred to their most prized aim -- integrated learning. However, after reviewing the diverse definitions that they have put forth, I concluded that no single interpretation could possibly be consistent with all of them. Furthermore, I discovered that while Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of knowledge as content from the academic disciplines and affectivity as patterns of activity make possible a precise and coherent interpretation of integrated learning, they might well be considered too restrictive to encompass fully the richness of meaning that confluent educators have been striving to communicate.

"Integrated Learning" as Expressed by Confluent Educators.

The writings of confluent educators are marked by some of the most imaginative and humorous metaphors in the educational literature, especially those of George Brown: "Essentially we are attempting ...to pour back some juice into dehydrated educational practices. As a result, the dried-up prunes of classroom process become plums of learning --

plump, sweet, and nourishing." (6) While such analogies are perhaps necessary to facilitate the communication of esoteric notions in a newly emerging field, they cannot substitute for an explicit and rigorous conceptual analysis. In a recent article entitled "Can Learning Encompass Both Ideas and Feelings?" Carl Rogers defines learning by the "whole person" in terms of the presence of cognitive ("the intellect working at top speed") and feeling ("curiosity, excitement, passion") elements. (7) In a further attempt at clarification George Brown writes:

"Simply stated, confluent education means combining thinking with feelings so that both benefit. Thinking is sometimes called the cognitive domain. Feelings and emotion fall in the affective domain. Confluent education seeks to integrate these two domains so they emerge to the extent that they both lose their boundaries and result in more holistic or 'together' behavior on the part of the student." (8)

Recent efforts to develop "models" of confluent education have contributed very little to the clarification of "integrated learning." One paper purports to follow the procedural guidelines for an ordinary language conceptual analysis. However, it merely lists features that the author believes characterize confluent education and fails to actually develop paradigm, contrary, borderline, and imaginary illustrations of the concept. (9) A second paper interprets confluent education in terms of two related versions of psychotherapy. Such an analysis is reminiscent of the behaviorists' attempts to express all human learning in the language of operant conditioning in that the theoretical constructs of one discipline are uncritically applied in the domain of another. Instead of serving to clarify the concept "integrated learning," the jargon of psychotherapy obfuscates it: "...a student needs to find and experience his center, become aware of his personality aspects and subpersonalities and how they operate, assess his blocks, conflicts, and polarities, and then begin the work of growing, using the processes of awareness, energy, assimilation, and confluence." (10)

A Preliminary Analysis of "Integrated Learning."

Confluent educators use the term "cognitive" in two quite distinct ways: (a) to denote a mental faculty or function (cognitive skill or process), and (b) to refer to academic subject matter (cognitive domain or content). The former usage enables them to speak of integrated learning in cases ranging from those in which Richard Jones' students react emotionally to movies of infant nursing, animal killing, and to "digs in graves" (11) to those in which persons undergo a traumatic experience as when Carl Rogers accidently drives over his cherished flower bed. (12) Cases in which either cognition or affectivity is absent are difficult to conceive.

The sense of "cognitive" most clearly relevant to pedagogical practice is the one referring to content from the academic disciplines rather than to a specific faculty of the mind. The concern of confluent educators for the integration of cognitive and affective dimensions of learning arises because they are confronted with the task of ensuring that their pupils master academic content. They do not consider it sufficient for their charges to acquire knowledge for its own sake or even to develop intellectual acumen. Their aim is to somehow engage students' affectivity in the mastery of subject matter.

What sense of "affectivity" might coherently be related to the acquisition of knowledge? Perhaps the most common sense includes emotional reactions, moods or passions such as fear, anger, joy, and ecstasy. However, integrated learning cannot simply mean that students respond emotionally to the knowledge they encounter in the classroom. It is not enough -- not even unqualifiedly desirable -- that students be titillated, angered or awed by particular bits of information. Merleau-Ponty consistently refers to this superficial sense of affectivity as a disorganizing reaction that interferes with controlled, intelligent, and effective conduct. (13) It is difficult to imagine how students' idiosyncratic emotional reactions to subject matter can in any way facilitate its systematic comprehension.

A sense of affectivity commonly employed by educators is "interest" or "motivation." The history of pedagogy reveals how varied are the techniques that teachers have used in order to arouse and sustain student interest. Curriculum-centered approaches rely on extrinsic incentives (grades, prizes, etc.), whereas child-centered approaches allow students to pursue their own interests. Both extremes share the common goal of heightening the students' desire to learn. However, the former may fail to capitalize on their interests and aptitudes while the latter may preclude the mastery of a broad range of subject matter.

The memorization of information for the sole purpose of obtaining token rewards or avoiding punishment seems clearly not to qualify as a case of integrated learning. The pupil may be enthusiastic but his real motive is to get the prize. He does not care about acquiring knowledge, either for its intrinsic fascination or for its application in the solution of problems.

On the other hand, allowing a student to pursue his own felt inclinations might -- under certain conditions -- result in integrated learning. What might these conditions be? First, if we take "cognitive" to denote "knowledge," the student must, in fact, learn some content "X" from one of the academic disciplines. Second, in mentalistic terms that characterize confluent education literature, the student must be immediately aware of some affective state -- need, aspiration, desire or wish -- "Y" that requires an object (in the broad sense that includes any given state of affairs) for its satisfaction. (14) Third, he must believe that his learning "X" in some way will serve to satisfy "Y." In sum, integrated learning might correctly be said to have been achieved if and only if the student acquires some subject matter content in the belief that by so doing he will be able to satisfy a felt need, solve a problem he has encountered, or in some other way fulfill a conscious desire. This summary statement is more explicit than that offered by Rogers: learning as a whole person "...involves learning of a unified sort, at the cognitive, feeling and gut level, with a clear awareness of the different aspects of this unified learning." (15)

"Integrated Learning" from Merleau-Ponty's Perspective.

The preceding analysis at least appears to shed some light on the nature of integrated learning as understood and expressed by some of the confluent educators. However, it includes terms such as "need" and "satisfaction" that leave further interpretation up to each individual reader. In the absence of more specific criteria for the identification of integrated learning, different teachers would not be able to consistently concur in their claims regarding its occurrence. There might be considerable agreement among those in the humanistic faction, but their judgments would most likely be at odds with others whose views of human motivation and learning have been influenced by Burrhus Skinner or Sigmund Freud. In order to avoid the vagueness inherent in the mentalistic expression of "integrated learning," I will now attempt to analyze and clarify its meaning from the perspective of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy.

The key to understanding integrated learning from Merleau-Ponty's perspective is to recognize the role of behavior -- as it reflects all of those dimensions of affectivity expressed in mentalistic language, from moods to aspirations -- in the constitution of perception and consequently in the creation of the academic disciplines. In his thesis of the primacy of perception, he asserts that knowledge arises from reflections upon immediate perceptual experience: "All my knowledge of the world, even my scientific knowledge, is gained from my own particular point of view, or from experience of the world without which the symbols of science would be meaningless." (16)

Merleau-Ponty's account of human existence as being a particular "body-subject" precludes a mentalistic interpretation of affectivity. "Anger, shame, hate, and love," he claims, "are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom of another's consciousness: they are types of behavior or styles of conduct which are visible from the outside." (17) His rejection of mentalism is as firm as is his rejection of mechanistic behaviorism. Our physical activities constitute "...the visible form of our intentions." (18) Behavior, for Merleau-Ponty, can only be properly understood as the purposive action of a living being. Clearly it is only by means of empathic observation of human action that the language of affectivity arises for each individual and in every culture. Our bodies bear witness not simply to what we feel or think but to what we are: "...a living body's slightest reflex expresses the total subject's fundamental way of being in the world." (19) Furthermore, "...each person is nothing more nor less to us than this structure (of behavior) or way of being in the world." (20) From the perspective of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, the affective dimension of learning clearly must be interpreted in terms of a body-subject's actions directed toward the pursuit of knowledge.

The most distinctive feature of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is its emphasis on the role of the active body in human existence: "It is by means of my ever present body that I am in communication with the world." (21) "To perceive is to render oneself present to something through the body." (22) He asserts that it is by means of our actions and explorations that each of us constitutes our own perceptual experiences; actions, once again, that can only be accurately understood as the visible form of our intentions. Certainly not all of these intentions are guided by intellectual reflection: "Even our most secret affective movements, those most deeply tied to the humoral infrastructure, help to shape our perception of things." (23) Often it is only after we have acted that we become aware of our own intentions.

Scholars in the various academic disciplines are able -- to a certain extent -- to direct their attention to certain aspects of the perceptual universe in order to contribute to mankind's emerging body of valid and reliable knowledge. The affective dimension of their learning is manifested in the distinctive structure of their inquiry behavior; a structure that has been cultivated and refined by disciplined study and years of experience. As a perceiving organism, each scientist constitutes his world as he persists in his investigation of particular phenomena. What he observes at a given time and in a given context cannot be ascertained by merely, as it were, looking over his shoulder as if the objects stretched out before his gaze are readily accessible to all. It is only by viewing the world through his eyes, that is, by adopting his perspective, his experiential and theoretical framework, that one can begin to share his vision. The "same" terrain may appear quite different to the biologist, the geologist, and the historian. While the relatively naive student observer merely notes the brute existence ("savage being" in Merleau-Ponty's later writings) of a muddy river, specialists representing the various disciplines might perceive an ecosystem, a major cause of soil erosion, or a barrier to communication between two cultures. Needless to say, all see the "same" muddy water presently flowing before them. But each person interrogates this natural phenomenon in a distinctive manner, asking it different sets of questions. For example, the biologist seeks to discover what forms of life it supports while the geologist strives to determine how it has shaped the surrounding land. The historian considers the impact that its existence had on the development of and interaction between various civilizations. Each of the academic disciplines contributes content to the school curriculum that students are required to master as an essential component of their full human development. The knowledge that they contain constitutes the cognitive dimension of learning when viewed from the perspective of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy.

As I noted in the preliminary analysis, there is a sense in which all learning is necessarily "integrated." All learning is similarly "integrated" in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty; that is, all knowledge emerges from perceptual experience as constituted by the active exploration of a body-subject. What qualifies my interpretation of integrated learning as a sensible aim (a possibility rather than a logical necessity) is the stipulation that its cognitive dimension be considered some specified form of knowledge, in this case, content from the academic disciplines. The concern for integrating the cognitive and affective dimensions of learning, so conceived, arises because teachers are confronted with the task of getting students to master academic content, much of which, without proper guidance, they would probably never encounter.

It seems quite unlikely that students would stumble upon much significant systematized knowledge by means of their self-directed explorations or in pursuit of their own interests without due regard for the distinctive processes by which each subject area has been constructed. This is because (in Merleau-Ponty's terms) from the interrogations of science we stand to gain "...an encounter with certain articulations of being which otherwise (we) would find difficult to uncover." (24) The engagement of students in generalized forms of problem solving, inquiry or discovery techniques clearly seems insufficient to guarantee mastery of the distinctive concepts contained in each field. For example, the noted Merleau-Ponty scholar, Remy Kwant, notes that "...scientific phenomena are not original but (are) constructed or constituted by the scientific attitude of mind." (25) The experimental researcher creates artificial environments, isolates and manipulates what he believes to be important variables depending on the hypotheses he has contrived to test, and he records a very limited range of selected observations with complex and sensitive instruments that actually extend the "natural" human perceptual universe.

Each discipline may be characterized by its own peculiar perspective that it takes toward the world. Interpreting Merleau-Ponty's thought on this point, William Luijpen states that: "When a particular attitude of asking questions is explicitly taken up, the formal object, method, and language of the science in question is in principle fixed; and over and over again it will become evident that these are distinct from the formal object, method, and language of the other sciences." (26) Furthermore, it is not the arbitrary selection of a certain field of inquiry but the manner in which the scientists interrogate the universe that determines the dividing lines between disciplines. Extrapolating Merleau-Ponty's position on this issue, Theodore Kisiel writes that "...the phenomenal field would no longer be divided by parceling out various objective realms to different sciences; each science would establish its domain on the basis of a differing type of behavioral Gestalt, a variant dialectic between subject and object." (27) Certain lines of investigation open up entirely new domains that could not possibly have been conceived independently of the procedures originally employed. This is a clear instance of Merleau-Ponty's thesis of the perspectivism of perception: the body-subject constitutes the world from its own point of view rather than passively gazing out upon a fixed universe, complete in itself.

From the perspective of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, we may tentatively judge the cognitive and affective dimensions of learning to be integrated when the pupil is engaged in certain identifiable forms of inquiry that have in the past and continue to give rise to the emergence of the academic disciplines. Clearly, it is not sufficient for students to engage in prescribed routines without careful reflection upon the relevant aspects of the phenomena under scrutiny. Confronted with the elaborate structures of knowledge in textbook or instructional objective form, a teacher might be led to believe that his students must commit as much information to memory as possible within a limited time period. Like the technicians who have precipitated the "crisis of the understanding" in modern science, a teacher might forget about the significance that the lived phenomena have for a full comprehension of a discipline's concepts and theories. Unless the student is aware of the questions that have been asked about a particular phenomenon within the framework of a certain theory, it is unlikely that he will even perceive those aspects considered to be of significance within a given discipline.

Several scholars have attempted to express Merleau-Ponty's conception of the intimate relationship between immediate experience and the full comprehension of abstract knowledge. Extrapolating from Merleau-Ponty's writings, Mary Barral states that: "I cannot really reflect on a doctrine -- and make it mine by assimilating its meaning -- unless I 'live it' in some way." (28) Similarly, James Palermo states that from the perspective of phenomenology: "...the understanding of geometric space comes as a second order expression of the body's 'direct experience' of lived space." Furthermore, "...the subject matter of the various academic disciplines constitutes a reformulation of the body's original presence to the world." (29) Although Palermo does not clarify the precise nature of this "reformulation," it seems clearly to refer to the fact that, for Merleau-Ponty, the distinctive procedures employed in each discipline are -- admittedly contrived and complex -- modes of behavior that have a direct bearing on what the scientist discovers and what the student learns. While these authors recognize the stress that Merleau-Ponty places on bodily engagement in the accumulation of knowledge, they fail to explicate the kinds of directed experiences that a teacher might provide his pupils to ensure subject matter mastery in each discipline. Only Maxine Greene draws upon Merleau-Ponty's writings to support her contention that students should follow the procedures of inquiry characterizing each discipline in order to gain its distinct perspective on the universe:

"Merleau-Ponty, discussing the human search for the meaning of chance events, talks about the necessity to look through multiple perspectives, each with its own significance. Seeking understanding from a variety of vantage points, the individual is in no way prevented from choosing the perspectives of the disciplines, along with personal and subjective ones." (30)

The engagement of students in certain forms of inquiry certainly appears to constitute at least one means of ensuring the achievement of integrated learning. Yet, as I previously noted, another step must be taken by the students. Integrated learning remains elusive as long as the pupils continue rigidly to follow prescribed procedures without some deeper insights into their intended function and into the very nature of the phenomena being investigated. Mastery of a discipline entails far more than the accumulation of bits of information. Theoretical concepts must be understood in relation to the actual phenomena that they were devised to describe, account for, or explain. Merleau-Ponty credits Husserl with the insight that:

"We must get into contact with the social phenomenon, and understand it in its own proper frame, in order to find a social meaning in statistical facts. In the same way it is necessary to get into contact with the psyche by phenomenological reflection in order to understand the results of the empirical investigations of psychology." (31)

Before having reflected upon the experienced dimension of hunger, frustration, and satisfaction, for example, one cannot fully comprehend the strivings of a common human laborer, much less a rat in a maze. A sociologist or anthropologist does not merely tote his bag of procedural tools into the culture he intends to study. He brings a range of concepts related to the social phenomena he has experienced in his own life and culture. He actively searches for the institutions preserving a heritage, the customs celebrating a harvest, and the mores preserving order. The psychologist, donning his peculiar glasses, seeks to unravel the motives of individuals as conditioned by the environment.

From the perspective of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, one plausible means of bringing about integrated learning consists of engaging each student in the same kinds of reflective inquiry that are instrumental in the continuing advance of knowledge. The specialized natures of the various academic disciplines require different approaches in order to achieve integrated learning within the domain of each. Even though the tasks of conceptual clarification and methodological explication and reform remain (forever) unfinished, participation in the processes of inquiry currently considered valid by a given scholarly community might lead a student not only to rediscover established facts but also to gain a valuable insight into the grounds for all claims to reliable knowledge within that domain. To the extent that what he comes to know is a result of reflection upon that immediate experience where his own intentions are actualized in his inquiry, questioning, and pursuit of knowledge we may claim that his learning is integrated.

Integrated Learning within the Total Schooling Context.

The distinguishing feature of confluent education is its emphasis on the integration of cognitive and affective dimensions of learning. Yet, it would clearly be an error to deny that other forms of learning exist that might also be desirable under certain circumstances and with particular students. Rote memorization, programmed instruction, drill, and behavioral conditioning all might have their time and place in the classroom. What has been termed "experiential learning" clearly seems to be a prerequisite to integrated learning. One must have suffered or loved, for example, in order to fully comprehend analyses of these phenomena. Indeed, a single lesson might contain elements of experiencing, memorization, drill, and inquiry.

Even if Merleau-Ponty is correct in his account of the systematic emergence of knowledge, it by no means necessarily follows that the best way for students to master it is for them to engage exclusively in those processes responsible for its continuing progress. Depending upon precisely what the teacher wants his students to gain from a certain lesson, engaging them in inquiry might be quite inefficient. Technicians, for example, most likely could function optimally with a minimum of on-the-job training. In contrast, a teacher's performance might benefit tremendously from the insights gained through integrated learning. The language interpreter must perform with speed and accuracy acquired primarily by means of memorization and drill. A disciplined study of the basic procedures and concepts in many subjects might best precede profitable engagement in inquiry. Mature students might demand knowledge in its purely abstracted forms while youngsters may be incapable of performing or benefiting from certain activities. Each teacher must determine whether or not the efforts put into guided inquiry are justified in the case of his particular students and in view of his instructional intentions.

Technically, integrated learning is a process aim and, to a certain extent, what is learned is determined by how one proceeds. However, in confluent education the task of determining what knowledge is the most worthwhile, that is, which of the disciplines students should master, is left open. Obviously, integrated learning cannot be considered synonymous with the whole process of education in as much as it stresses but one form of learning without specifying what subject matter should have priority. A major goal of education might be to foster worthwhile -- particularly socially constructive -- aspirations in students. Moral education might entail gaining knowledge of principles, forming good habits, and gaining senses of responsibility for one's own actions and of duty to other persons. To suggest that the cognitive and affective dimensions of learning should be integrated does not explicitly delineate the type of moral character that ought to emerge from several years of schooling. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that certain desirable moral virtues would be fostered through participation in guided inquiry such as diligence, respect for genuine authority, and the "habit of truth." Education is a complex human enterprise. I believe that my analysis sheds some light on one very important aspect of that enterprise.

Conclusion.

It is reasonable to assume that most educators would respond affirmatively when asked whether or not they are concerned with somehow "integrating the cognitive and affective dimensions" of students' learning. Like the authors that I have reviewed in this paper they undoubtedly adhere to one of several variant conceptions of "integrated learning" and their pedagogical prescriptions to achieve it might have very few features in common. My analysis has implications primarily for those educators who find that it coherently expresses what they believe to be a desirable form of learning.

Special steps must be taken if students are successfully to investigate the world as embodied in the curriculum in the same spirit as they spontaneously expand the horizons of their lived worlds of daily existence. Engagement of students in the reflective investigation of particular phenomena by means of appropriate methods might serve to foster this spirit of adventure. Such a continuing process has been characterized by Philip Phenix as "...a guided recapitulation of the processes of inquiry that gave rise to the fruitful bodies of organized knowledge comprising the established disciplines." (32) Any teacher wishing to achieve such a recapitulation and thereby effectively ensure the integration of the cognitive and affective dimensions of his pupils' learning should: (a) study the methods actually used to gain new knowledge and the criteria by which evidence and claims to truth are assessed in his subject area; and (b) employ his expertise in the design and implementation of inquiry activities that he believes most of his students are capable of engaging in profitably.

To the extent that a teacher effectively facilitates the integration of the cognitive and affective dimensions of his students' learning, they will begin drawing implications from their observations and initiating their own inquiries as required by the new questions raised and the problems encountered. Participation in such a program would give students valuable insights into the nature of knowing per se and would serve as an ideal preparation for those individuals who ultimately will contribute to the advance of knowledge.

Documentations.

1. I thank Professors George F. Kneller and Donald Vandenberg for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

2. See George I. Brown, *Human Teaching for Human Learning: An Introduction to Confluent Education* (New York: Viking, 1971); and Gerald Weinstein and Mario D. Fantini, eds., *Toward Humanistic Education: A Curriculum of Affect* (New York: Praeger, 1970).

3. The existence of discrepancies noted by John E. Carter between "third force" or "humanistic" psychology and phenomenology might best be attributed to the former's lack of philosophical development. See John E. Carter, "Philosophical and Psychological Theories of Phenomenology," in *Philosophy of Education 1974: Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society*, ed. Michael J. Parsons (Edwardsville: Philosophy of Education Society Studies in Philosophy and Education, 1974), pp. 137-47. Giorgi, Lapointe, and Merleau-Ponty himself argue for and contribute to the conceptual development of psychology based on existential phenomenology. See Amedeo Giorgi, *Psychology as a Human Science: A Phenomenologically Based Approach* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); and Francois H. Lapointe, "The Phenomenal Body in the Later Writings of Merleau-Ponty," *The Journal of General Psychology*, 84 (1971): 251-65.

4. Donald Vendenberg, "Making Sense Out of 'Existential Thought and Education,'" in *Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society*, ed. James J. Jelinek (Tempe, Arizona: Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, 1975), pp. 23-35.

5. Donald Vandenberg, "Hirst, Hermeneutics, and Fundamental Educational Theory," in *Philosophy of Education 1973: Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth*

Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, ed. Brian Crittenden (Edwardsville, Illinois: Studies in Philosophy and Education, 1973), p. 306.

6. George I. Brown, ed., The Live Classroom: Innovation through Confluent Education and Gestalt (New York: Viking, 1975), p. 3.

7. Carl R. Rogers, "Can Learning Encompass Both Ideas and Feelings?" Education, 95 (1974): p. 104.

8. Brown, ed., The Live Classroom, op. cit., p. 3.

9. Stewart B. Shapiro, "Developing Models by 'Unpacking' Confluent Education," in Ibid., pp. 109-20.

10. Thomas Yeomans, "Search for a Working Model: Gestalt, Psychosynthesis, and Confluent Education," in Ibid., p. 151.

11. Richard M. Jones, Fantasy and Feeling in Education (New York: New York University, 1968), p. 9.

12. The latter example is given in Rogers, "Can Learning Encompass Both Ideas and Feelings?" op. cit., pp. 103-14.

13. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, trans. Alden L. Fisher (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 150; Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 86; and "The Film and the New Psychology," in Sense and Non-Sense, trans. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia A. Dreyfus (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, 1964), p. 53.

14. Client-centered psychotherapists and child-centered, open school "educators" notwithstanding, the fact that a person experiences a need does not entail its educational relevance or significance. One goal of moral education, for example, might be to foster worthwhile (particularly socially constructive) aspirations.

15. Rogers, "Can Learning Encompass Both Ideas and Feelings?" op. cit., p. 104.

16. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit., p. viii.

17. Merleau-Ponty, "The Film and the New Psychology," in Sense and Non-Sense, op. cit., p. 52.

18. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty: *A Prospectus of His Work*," in *The Primacy of Perception*, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, 1964), p. 5.

19. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Concerning Marxism," in *Sense and Non-Sense*, *op. cit*., p. 108.

20. Merleau-Ponty, "The Film and the New Psychology," in *Ibid*., p. 53.

21. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, *op. cit*., p. 75.

22. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Primacy of Perception and its Philosophical Consequences," in *The Primacy of Perception*, ed. Edie, *op. cit*., p. 42.

23. Merleau-Ponty, "An Unpublished Text," in *Ibid*., p. 5.

24. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France 1952-1960* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, 1970), p. 84.

25. Remy C. Kwant, *Phenomenology of Expression* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1969), p. 165.

26. William A. Luijpen, *Existential Phenomenology* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1960), p. 177.

27. Theodore J. Kisiel, "Merleau-Ponty on Philosophy and Science," in *Phenomenology and the Natural Sciences: Essays and Translations*, eds. Joseph J. Kockelmans and Theodore J. Kisiel (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, 1970), pp. 260-1.

28. Mary R. Barral, *Merleau-Ponty: The Role of the Body-Subject in Interpersonal Relations* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1965), p. 38.

29. James Palermo, "'Direct Experience' in the Open Classroom: A Phenomenological Description," in *Philosophy of Education 1974: Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society*, ed. Parsons, *op. cit*., p. 253.

30. Maxine Greene, *Teacher as Stranger: Educational Philosophy for the Modern Age* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1973), p. 173.

31. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man," in The Primacy of Perception, ed. Edie, op. cit., pp. 62-3.

32. Philip H. Phenix, "The Uses of the Disciplines as Curriculum Content," Educational Forum, 26 (1963): p. 279.

CHAPTER 45.

YOU CAN'T GET THERE FROM HERE: IN MEMORIAM -- LEONARD FELS.

WILLIAM H. MCGOWAN.

I once told our late colleague Leonard Fels the story about the traveler lost on a back road in Vermont who stops to ask a farmer how to get to St. Johnsbury. The farmer, after several pensive moments, finally drawls, "Well, I don't know -- but you can't get there from here." Fels grew fond of that story. After a time he even forgot I had told it to him, and in his retelling of it to me he would leave out Vermont and replace St. Johnsbury with Brownsville. After all, what could I expect from someone raised in Chicago and Los Angeles! But I had to tolerate his omission of New England because he taught me to see in the story an allegory for education. What I had invested with him as just a funny story had earned interest greater than the principal. What better example of Cephalus' definition of justice -- "to speak the truth and pay your debts" -- than to restore to someone his own story elevated to the level of a philosophical message along the lines of the Myth of the Cave!

The traveler's difficulty, as Fels saw it, is that he will never get to where he truly wants to go if he persists on the road he is already on: he needs to move into a different "space." What this means literally is that he must see things as they really are. That is what Plato meant, too, when he talked about "turning the necks" of the prisoners in the Cave. And turning our necks is what Fels was up to when he retold the story of the lost traveler.

Fels spent much of the prime of his life grappling with the workaday problems one encounters as a member of the industrial labor force and as a partner in private business. There he witnessed firsthand the anti-intellectualism which too often confines men of practical affairs to the wrong space. And as a student of American intellectual history he also understood how such anti-intellectualism had taken a hypocritical turn in this country, where what passes for respect for intellectual, moral, and aesthetic values is but the merest pretense. Yes, we Americans keep these values around, but as harmless eunuchs. We can celebrate them in our Sunday ceremonies secure in the knowledge that the responsibility for their promotion has been not even delegated but relegated to "the women" and museum curators. Fels agreed with Santayana that this "genteel tradition" is at the heart of American culture.

But Fels saw the difficulty from the other side, too. Having rejoined the Academy in his later years, he also witnessed firsthand intellectual arrogance in the guise of "intellectualism." The presumably enlightened may be as unable to reach St. Johnsbury as the original prisoners in the Cave. Plato was perhaps too enraptured by the beauty of the newly discovered Forms to recognize fully how insidiously beguiling our intellectual abstractions can be. On this point Fels was closer to the sagacity of Aristotle. In the last paper he was to deliver before this Society, (1) Fels assigned abstractionism a label of his own: "the Parmenidean error." The historical Parmenides had used his brilliant analytic mind to reach by _a priori_ means the conclusion that reality is one and unchanging, a conclusion to which he adhered without subjecting it to any test. Nietzsche puts the matter brilliantly: "Once in his life, Parmenides, probably at a fairly advanced age, had a moment of purest absolutely bloodless abstraction, unclouded by any reality." (2) Now Fels knew, of course, that philosophers must work with _a priori_ propositions, for there must be first principles or assumptions in anything; and he also knew what any tyro in philosophy knows, that such propositions cannot be proven true or false by appealing to experience. He claimed that there is nevertheless a way of testing such theories, and that is, as C. I. Lewis had held, by practice. "An inherently untestable theory," wrote Fels, "makes no sense." Parmenides' failing was in thinking that his theory required no testing. Yet it is unworkable in practice, and we look to him in vain for even a theory of "illusion" which might be tested in practice.

What Fels saw was that the sin of intellectual arrogance, which educators are duty-bound to combat, is Janus-faced: its species are, first, the anti-intellectualism of the barbarian and, second, the intellectualism of the sophisticate. If it were the case that all the barbarians were outside the Academic walls we would not even have to remind ourselves of our duty to oppose the sin in its first species. Without an elevated vision of the real giving proper direction to our pedagogical efforts we merely cater to the barbaric whims of the prisoners chained in the Cave. As Plato expressed it in the _Gorgias_, the calling of the educator is not that of a cook but that of a physician: he should not be practicing a knack but an art. If a bedside manner is necessary, it is only for attracting those whose necks are to be turned. But the elevation of his vision tempts the educator to take the results of the workings of his analytic intellect as the last word on the nature of reality, and he must especially be on guard against intellectual arrogance in this second form. The sophisticated mind is no more immune to the sin of arrogance than is the barbaric mind. If anything, it is more susceptible. Nietzsche knew how nearly irresistible is the academic temptation to pretend to power over reality by recreating it in our own image. This is a part of the pathology of the human psyche which has been explored by psychoanalysis. In the more traditional terms of theology it was known as idolatry. Common sense calls it wishful thinking. It is a vanity which can justify the farmer in his judgment that "you can't get there from here."

The scholar is expected to be diligent about the principles of his subject matter, the teacher about his pedagogical principles, and the educational philosopher about the principles of his discipline. But it is not enough for the student, the teacher, or the educational philosopher to be knowledgeable regarding the a priori principles of his concern -- he must also test these principles in practice if he is not to get himself stranded by the Parmenidean error. The scholar wants his learning to be applicable in real-life situations, the teacher wants to educate real students, and the philosopher of education wants his enterprise to serve as a potent force for enlightening -- if not directing -- the actual educational process. Before he can get there he must occupy the right space. Let me indicate briefly for each a way in which he may fail to do so.

I begin with the student. When we invite our students to cross the threshold into a highly specialized and technical area we know how strange the new territory may appear to them, without obvious "relevance" to what has always seemed familiar. Moreover, their desire to see such relevance may lead them into the usual errors of the novice. Sometimes we write textbooks to make this transition easier for the students so that eventually material which at first seemed foreign becomes, as Plato would say, as if it were "recollected." But just as Florence Nightingale maintained that whatever else a hospital does it must not spread disease, so I would maintain that whatever else a textbook does it must not obstruct the student's transition by directing him to the wrong space.

Let me cite just one instance of a textbook doing a student the disservice of inviting him to commit the Parmenidean error. Logic is a highly specialized and technical area which students in philosophy must learn to enter. There is an apparatus to be mastered if one is to become competent in appraising the formal structure of an argument. But until real arguments are transformed into standard form, technical logical competence is useless in coping with reality. Someone must make that transformation, which means that he must be able to recognize the presence of an actual argument in reality. Perhaps most students who earn academic credit in an introductory class in logic will not long remember many of the details of the apparatus of logical appraisal -- much of their newly acquired competence will wither from disuse. But it is to be hoped that at the very least they will have acquired the habit of recognizing arguments in reality and knowing that logical appraisal is relevant to such situations. A textbook in logic might do better to leave out the matter of recognizing actual arguments rather than to "spread disease" by setting up unnecessary obstacles to such recognition. Yet I find that in a textbook I am presently using in a logic class just such an obstacle has been set up.

If one is to be able to recognize arguments he must learn not to confuse arguments with what are not arguments. One pitfall awaiting the newcomer to logic is the failure to distinguish a conditional proposition from an argument. It is helpful, then, that the first chapter of the logic textbook in question points out this distinction to the student and provides him with exercises which allow him to practice making it himself. So far, so good. But immediately thereafter the textbook considers what is alleged to be another sort of non-argument as exemplified in the following: "Synonyms are good servants but bad masters; therefore select them with care." On the grounds that where there is a command there cannot be a proposition the author proceeds to assert, "In spite of the presence of the standard conclusion-indicator 'therefore' in the above passage, we do not generally regard such utterances as expressing arguments." (3) The author does not speak for most of us. Arguments are designed to establish either fact or policy. We are especially interested in the latter sort of argument, whose conclusion, I maintain, may often be expressed in the imperative mood. One should not demand that his students exclude these arguments altogether from the class of "real" arguments, for then he cannot subject them to logical appraisal. For those of us who teach logic my conclusion can be expressed in the imperative form: "Don't demand this of your students." The reason I am giving in support of this policy is that if your students were to acquiesce to this demand they would be placed in a space from which they could not fully reach their rational ends.

Ironically, our textbook author has the remedy for his problem in the second chapter of his textbook. There he asserts the following two propositions: (a) the same discourse can serve more than one function (e.g., it may at once be informative, expressive, and directive); and (b) the form of a discourse is not identical with its function (e.g., a grammatical imperative may be used in informative discourse). He allows, then, for the possibility that the words 'select them with care' can function as both a command and a proposition. As a command it is neither true nor false, but as a proposition it is one or the other.

Why did the author not avail himself of the remedy at hand? I submit that it is because he was blinded by the Parmenidean error. After recognizing an argument, the first move that a logician must make is to state it in standard form by using what grammarians call declarative or indicative sentences. This produces the strong temptation to think that all arguments "really" come in the form of declarative sentences. But different linguistic forms can be used for the same function. Yet because it is possible to distinguish cognitive from various non-cognitive functions of discourse there is the further temptation to think that the results of this analysis are components which can exist separately in reality. We can indeed dissect the human body and thereby find separable parts which are its components. But however illuminating Plato or anyone else has been in his "dissection" of the soul into its cognitive and non-cognitive elements, no one has ever been able to locate such elements in the soul as separable parts. One commits the Parmenidean error if he believes that there is in reality purely non-cognitive discourse -- and purely cognitive discourse. The error can as easily produce a false fragmentation of an integral soul as it can -- and did in the historical Parmenides -- a false assimilation of a pluralistic universe.

You might object to my speaking of the various functions of the "soul" when, as it has been said, modern psychology has lost not only its soul but its mind. If "soul" talk sounds insufferably old-fashioned, we need only translate it into the contemporary behavioral idiom. It should not be too difficult to find parallels between the behavioral divisions in, say, Bloom's taxonomy of educational objectives and some of the divisions of the soul made in antiquity. (To my mind, however, the contemporary soulless divisions sound insufferably newfangled.)

This brings me to another way in which the Parmenidean error can occur in education, this time as it affects the teacher. A teacher cannot successfully deal with a pupil just in terms of, say, the pupil's thoughts, or just in terms of his feelings, or just in terms of his drives. Something like Bloom's taxonomy may be invaluable for illuminating one's educational objectives, but it would be a serious mistake to think that an actual student's thoughts or feelings or drives can each be dealt with in isolation from the others. I would agree with the Stoics that every feeling is an intellectual judgment -- my love or disdain for you is the judgment that you are lovable or that you are contemptible. Neither I nor my students can be taught judgments without feelings and drives, nor feelings and drives without judgments. The difficulty is to teach them all as intended. With respect to whether the teacher is to teach the "whole" child there is no choice: there is no other child in reality. James Mill partly failed as a teacher of his brilliant son because he thought that he could attend solely to the intellectual aspect of John Stuart Mill's needs. The damage may have appeared to be exclusively emotional, but it was intellectual too. If I as a teacher neglect to check the analytic divisions of my psychological theory against the reality of the integral human beings I teach, my teaching smacks of unreason and is no longer an art. I am occupying the wrong space for getting to where I want to go.

Finally I come to the question of where we want to go as philosophers of education. If it is to bring enlightenment to those in charge of educational practices, we can't get there from here. Let me read to you the opening sentences of a newspaper account of a recent conference of academic religionists in Washington, D. C.:

"When medical associations meet, many a doctor is interested in how the latest research could affect his practice.

"When scientists report their findings at conferences, experimenters and technologists from various fields watch closely.

"But when theologians, Bible scholars and religion professors meet, the practitioners in the field could care less -- even if they were aware of such meetings." (4)

The plight of philosophy of education appears to be the very same as that of academic religion: we have no influence. Are the practitioners of education in the Far West breathlessly awaiting news of the outcome of this conference? Are they even aware that the conference is taking place? By "practitioners" I mean those who must make the significant workaday decisions -- at the present time not so much teachers, who may be relatively powerless, as administrators and legislators.

Undoubtedly the reasons for our plight are not simple. Part of the difficulty may stem from our unwillingness to step back down into the dimness of the Cave. Another part may stem from the genteel tradition which dictates that the "real" work of the world is not to be entrusted to such low-caste types as women and academic theorists. I submit, however, that a not insignificant portion of the difficulty lies in our own misconception of philosophy of education itself. We cannot reasonably expect to provide enlightenment for the educational process if we ourselves misconstrue what we are about.

Although the intellect divides its labors into "disciplines" which may get reflected administratively as academic departments, the tasks themselves cannot be made to be completely separate from one another as they might at the Ford Motor Company. In the intellectual world the principle of division of labor is supposed to focus the attention, not isolate it. Philosophy is considered an academic specialty, yet one cannot philosophize in a vacuum. Moral philosophy is a philosophical specialty, but the ethical philosopher cannot avoid metaphysical, epistemological, and logical questions: Spinoza's Ethics and Plato's Republic, though classics in ethics, are not without interest to the metaphysician. And what is educational philosophy a specialty of? Fels and I shared the conviction that whatever else education is it is first and foremost an enterprise with an ethical purpose, that educational philosophy makes no sense except as a branch of moral philosophy. One would make the Parmenidean error if he were to take educational philosophy as nothing but moral philosophy, but -- strangely -- that is not the way the error is usually made by the American educational philosopher. Perhaps this is due to the historical accident which places him in separate schools of education apart from the mainstream of academic philosophy. At any rate, he is more likely to want to start his thinking with the "isms" of competing metaphysical doctrines and worry about how to use his own bootstraps to move from the "isness" of a favored metaphysical doctrine to the requisite "oughtness" of an educational doctrine. Of course it cannot be done. Why should educational philosophers have to contend with this insoluble problem? They could sidestep the whole issue by refusing to insist on a reality of pure factualness, recognizing that reality is so integral as to demand value as one of its categories. Or, even if they were to find such a metaphysical position untenable, they could nonetheless eschew trying to make bloodless deductions from contrived metaphysical "isms" and concern themselves instead with the source of the "real" issues for the philosopher of education: the relevant moral ideals and means of attainment which no true educator dares ignore. It is not by showing Parmenidean scorn for reality that one becomes genuinely philosophical.

The student, the teacher, and the philosopher of education are all subject to the Parmenidean error. Most of us here are all three, and even as sophisticates we cannot consider ourselves immune to every form of intellectual vanity if we are to get to where we are headed. Leonard Fels taught us how important it is to find the right space from which to proceed. He also taught us that you can get there even if you do start from Chicago or L.A.

Documentations.

1. Fels, Leonard, "Ethics, Reality, and Education: The Parmenidean Error," a paper delivered at the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society meeting, San Francisco, 1973, and printed in the Proceedings; pp. 147-154.

2. Nietzsche, Friedrich, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, trans. Marianne Cowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962), p. 69.

3. Copi, Irving M., Introduction to Logic, fourth edition (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), p. 18.

4. Dart, John, "Conference of Religionists from Academia Under Way in Capital," Los Angeles Times, October 26, 1974, p. 27.

CHAPTER 46.

A THINK TANK APPROACH: THE PROBLEM OF JUDGMENT STYLIZATION.

T. FRANK SAUNDERS.

"If the meaning of an expression is not an entity denoted by it, but a style or operation performed with it, not a nominee but a role, then it is not only repellent but positively misleading to speak as if there existed a Third Realm whose denizens are Meanings." G. Ryle.

The problem of style is fundamental to every issue in human meaning. Deliberate stylization requires categories and methodizing such that meanings can be re-instituted as qualitative combinations. A model for such a concept of style is necessary.

Ostensibly our biggest problems today are smog, pollution, student protests, minority militancy, and the population explosion. Yet, when a "problem" can be stated as having a particular solution, e.g., man as a rational animal in certain philosophic terms of realism, or as having patterned solutions, e.g., any definition of man requires an examination of the types of definitions used and their defining categories, assumptions of those categories, relevance of that definition to some stated problems, and finally of the connections established between the categories of the defining agency, the problem-conclusion process is not merely one of developing premises to conclusion. The major focus must be on the "way" of the solution. Indeed, the "way" the goal of the solution itself is derived determines the kinds of solutions that are possible.

Can philosophy, or more strictly, philosophy of education play a role in helping to formulate problems such that there are solutions built into the framing of the problems themselves? Can the framing of problems come to incorporate the "style" issue?

There may be two kinds of solutions to problems but there are many more stylizations in the process of the problem-solving. The two kinds of solutions are:

(a) Content or direct solutions which have been arrived at by pursuing the various terminal goals which constitute, in some sequential way, in combination the solution to a bigger problem. In this situation the pattern is "one thing at a time," piecemeal solving such as one pieces together a puzzle without seeing the completed patterns but merely combines common colors, shape to shape, line to line.

(b) The other kind of solution is structural and anticipates other contexts in which the method of the solution will be applicable or transferable. There is no limit to the continued concern for problems when a structural type solution is sought. The principles of "looking for common colors" and "continued lines" become patterns of similarity, contiguity, probable sequences. These principles and others like them become the categories of structural method solutions.

The varieties of social problems we have in our society today beg the question of solutions unless we have made clear that even the unstructured question is a formalized complaint which appeals to rules, though unarticulated, which place the question in some structured sequence of judgment.

How, for instance, can we design a structure for placing in some inclusive system the structured and the unstructured question? Where and under what conditions does terminal problem solving fit into structural problem solving and are there differences within each type of problem solving judgments which seem at times incompatible in terms of some common grounds?

Any design which attempts to include the diversity of judgment types in problem solving must be so fundamental that there would be no case of judgment making which is not classifiable or diagnosible by means of that design or model.

The pervasive chosen for the design in this paper is style and judgment stylization. The term style is here taken to mean the habituation to, and operational diagnosis of certain combinational patterns. (The use of the term "style" in psychological categories is here held to be a mistake in classification.)

This is to say that given an option to define something the definitions will take a characteristic form which is predictable once the model for diagnosing the habituation is made explicit. This also means the style employed can become an option in the face of competing styles. Deliberation is the key to change.

Style in a more complex meaning will refer to judgment characteristics rather than to mere choosing of definitional types by which a term is subsequently defined. The choosing of a style or habituation at the judgment characteristics level, then is the goal for all educative efforts and becomes the directing agency for all choices when deliberation is found to be the final criterion of competence in any teaching of the judgment process.

We can operationally define a person's interests in terms of the things he usually talks about and his specialization in terms of the way he talks about a subject matter or the way he approaches an object of technical attention. We can even describe him in terms of the number of specializations or number of goals he can specify in his interests and specializations, and by the number of approaches he can formulate for each level of these three concerns.

A computer may pose two equally viable solutions for a given problem. The computer selects in terms of the programmed sequences and availability of fed alternatives. The computer does not construct goals toward which a program sequence is to go. The programmed solution is not unlike the digital, sequential, piecemeal, content judgment type solution.

The human chooses in terms of some "style" which has incorporated an extensive number of habituations, range definitions, and a selected rather specific number of goals which determine both his choice and his style of choosing.

When man chooses in the sequential pattern or style he opts for the sequence type solution of the machine in which there are few alternate or adjunctive goals to compound his choicing issue. The keys are not only limited alternatives, but limited deliberation concerning these alternatives.

The concept of style has had a varied history. There is no room in the confines of this paper to examine the many ways in which the term "style" has been used. The only thing for sure is that there is no consistency nor determinateness in its usage or application.

Style is often meant to refer to the intrinsic, necessary, actual, or real way of doing something. An ape walking or a fish swimming could be considered a style, but in like fashion people would have a style genetically traceable rather than socially learnable. On the other hand, style is often seen as the result of certain psychological and/or physiological characteristics. This usage employs radical reductionism and limits the description of style and the criteria of style evaluation to psychological and physiological language and criteria characteristic of those universes of discourse. Style on these grounds is located after-the-fact rather than as having a foreseen consequence which determines its type.

Style may mean "style of painting" in which the describing circumstance has appealed to both a school of painting and to the peculiar techniques of a given artist. In any event, this notion of style carries with it style as a persisting structure which pervades all efforts of that particular artist in those particular contexts. Style remains when components are altered. A musical piece is recognizable even in completely different chords.

Style may be a value term in the descriptive sense when it refers to some normative claim. "He has style," or "The content of his writing is provocative and expertly stated, but his overall style of writing restricts anyone from appreciating his points."

In terms of S-R Bond theory, style is that qualification of the stimulus which modifies the response when the qualification differs between two subjects or organisms.

There have been some attempts to describe styles of thinking. A sequential or digital style characterized by "tunnel vision" is employed when data are rejected and selected strictly in terms of a single goal and a lineal method. Another thought style can be defined as adjunctive in which goals outside of the natural sequence of a problem-solving process enter the process and change the character of the method as well as the available means. A contextual relational style can be located as one in which the interdisciplinary, inter-category goals have determined that one focus on methods, means, and ends as themselves the categories of some larger area of study. Here is the integrative style of the mediator and on occasion the philosopher. It is in this last sense of style as it applies to thought patterns and the habituation to selective categories and qualitative pervasives that this paper intends to use the term. A qualitative pervasive binds all thought on a common line of reasoning.

Judgment: Categories and Sequence.

One model for understanding the demands on judgment formation insists on a specifiable set of categories in specifiable sequence for all judgment types. Without trying in this section to re-establish the entire model, it must be sufficient to point out the requirements in general terms and try to show a sequence which determines an exhaustive judgment. The two types of solutions mentioned above will now multiply almost geometrically. The stylization of these many types of solutions, however, may be reduced, in terms of this model, to three fundamental forms.

First, then, the nine criteria of adequate judgment are:

(1) A simple question or the direct reaction to a problem (goalless).

(2) Any contextualization or seeing of alternative meanings in the process of changing categories (competing frameworks with competing goals).

(3) The goal of any judgment sequence always determines the relevance of any contexts in (2) and ultimately determines the answer given in (1) and even the method by which this process takes place. The goal here is always stated as a value which conditions everything below it.

(1.a) A judgment must always examine in the simplest way the meaning of the terms as transformational equivalence in some structure, i.e., the meaning of "human" first as a referential term and then as, a term placed in quotes, a syntactic symbol having its meaning with other grammar components.

(2.a) A context category must always apply for membership. There are rules which determine when a theory can be considered a theory. There are criteria which anything must meet to belong to a classification of which it is a member; i.e., man is considered human on grounds that differentiate him from the animals and yet because of his common physiology he meets the requirements of the "animal classification."

(3.a) Values which in (3) determine the appropriateness of the competing contexts in (2) are themselves open to question in the sense that it is not always easy to determine the difference between normative and descriptive claims and even worse the attempt to coordinate value issues and empirical criteria is surely doomed to confusion if not failure. The question of a generic framework or inclusion principle in judgment for value claims and quantifiable claims stands as the focus for this category.

(1.b) This category carries with it the unsophisticated or direct ontological assertion where there is no question as to the existence or reality of the components of the question framed in (1).

(2.b) The traditional concerns for the coordination of reality claims and knowledge claims in whatever proportion belong to this category. Whether the real determines what is known or the knowing determines what is real, or whether these two kinds of meaning function in a reciprocal way form the context in which the very structure of the membership criteria of (2.a) are themselves established.

(3.b) Assuming that one has met each of the foregoing categories in his travels on the way to completing a judgment, he is now ready to make a judgment about whatever it was he had as an initial concern. This judgment at this level and at this depth is necessarily an expert judgment worthy of being a major alternative to any other judgment having been constructed by the same rigorous categories. The judger now judges and becomes the Legislator of meaning and the appropriate method and context.

A Master Legislator would be one who could select and decide the appropriateness of the styles through which judgments can be made to effect any particular judgment sequence as well as goals beyond the competence of his peers. This "beyond competence" may well be the only viable definition of creativity available.

Within the structure of these nine categories it should be possible to label the adequacy of the judgment sequence. But more important it should be possible now to describe someone's style in terms of the categories and transition between categories he employs or is habituated to employing in the solution of problems. This habituation can be considered stylization to the extent that it persists, that is to say, the same sets of categories are employed in the same combination regardless of the components or things being judged. This persistence of categories then becomes the structure which pervades in a given judgment pattern.

A style could be further noted by the token that a judger may have goals which are contained within any given category, extend beyond any specified number of categories, or stand between all of these categories where the goal may be strictly mediative. For example, when solving a problem for a specific goal one becomes "dogmatic" or "thin-skinned" the stylistic comment in terms of the above model would have to be that the problem solver has inserted goals not necessary to nor contingent on the solution to the initial problem. These adjunctive goals may or may not come to be final criteria for the solution to any problems. In any event, the addition of an adjunctive goal will interfere with the initial goal, but when the adjunctive goal is qualitative in character, the model of judgment in which mere categories are employed as criteria of adequacy must submit to modification in which the way of the judgment sequence is modified. This modification marks the stylization. Style, then, employs criteria and/or categories which modulate the integrative or mediative phases of the description and sequence of the judgment components.

Judgment: Stylization of Sequence.

Philosophy of education professors, and others who work at interdisciplinary levels, represent for the most part people with a penchant for elaborating questions before entertaining solutions. They tend to have a respect for methodic structural questions which explore major alternatives at some generic level. It is incidental that specific answers to specific questions emerge. They do emerge, however, as the continuation of the instrumentality or sets of categories being considered at more generic levels.

Let's begin this section by trying to share a language through which style diagnosis is possible and then attempt to formulate a sequence of steps in which we may recognize style change and instruments for producing that change.

First let's define thought or judgment process as lineal when:

(1) The sequence of solving is in a step-by-step pattern where goal is a straight solution; unbroken sequence.

(2) Information is used as it contributes to the development of the problem as stated.

(3) The sequence must be deductive, consistent, and correctly judged for relevance at each step (data are selected by relevance and relatedness to other data).

Solutions to problems are stylistically lineal whenever the sequence is from direct question to context to goal, from (1), (2), and (3). The direction of the sequence may determine its theoretically adequate character, but, nonetheless, it remains a digital straightforward habit or style. A CPA is a CPA is a CPA.

An example of lineal or digital style is found whenever extraneous ingredients and goals are assiduously avoided in the search for a solution. A bus company is beseiged by customers who complain that the service is too slow, irratic, and does not have enough stops. There is a limitation of buses and not enough money or people to warrant more stops or higher paid drivers. Solution -- get a bigger mail box and some tranquilizers.

Another judgment style may be referred to as adjunctive. Adjunctive judgment style refers to the penchant of some to avoid frontal attack on a problem and seek the solutions to alternate problems which in turn may incidentally resolve the initial difficulties. Three characteristics of adjunctive style are:

(1) Judgment components and category appeal are not sequential -- one jumps to the goal (see "good" quality lineal style above) and selects the appropriate means to that particular goal. A judgment may begin at (3) and come back to (1).

(2) It is not consistent and connected at each step as the goals keep receding before the solutions and new goals converge which compound the initial components and solutions -- the discontinuity contributes to the style by rendering each goal in turn suspect and possibly irrelevant (the operational value of the discontinuity is that a question may turn up in the wrong frame of reference and force a resolution or generic inclusion in a different framework. There may even be the hint here of the need for a method revision of question at an adjunctive level, i.e., continued habit of reaching for (2b), (2c), or even (3b) would be an example of this judgment criterion).

(3) There is a deliberate misuse or abuse of data to force a construction or formulation of new categories for relevance, i.e., the use of a multivalued logic in the elimination of the excluded middle -- the virus as neither life nor death -- new categories are found to define the new consequences as they become goals, e.g., a beginning on the (3c) category.

The continued example of the bus company plight could be an attempt to solve their problem adjunctively. Rather than spend the money on tranquilizers and mail boxes a company could decide to hire attractive models to just "happen" to be at the limited number of bus stops, insure that a coffee vendor is available at those stops, could place large mirrors in easy accessibility to the waiting platform, could make the waiting facilities inviting and comfortable, e.g., Herman Miller chairs, and generally solve the problem of the patron's discontent not even included in the initial variety of complaints. The adjunctive style does not pursue the content of an initial question or develop the pattern of that question. Rather it seeks new contexts and goals often incidental to or irrelevant to in a direct sense the initial question. It seeks these goals without regard for the means entailed by the statement of the initial problem.

Attainable goals do have built-in means by the token that a clear statement of the goal acts as an agent of its own attainment. Within that range the built-in means satisfy the requirements to the solution. Those who would pursue unobtainable goals, in whatever way we define such goals, are holding in spite of evidence against it in terms of adjunctive goals which offer a qualitative "satisfaction" which then must be the unarticulated meaning of the unobtainable goal.

Adjunctive Style does not pursue the content or develop the pattern, but, rather, restructures the pattern -- seeks new contexts without regard for the present means.

The way of the solution does not validate the solution inasmuch as the goal is established prior to the selection of the appropriate path. Reductive arguments disappear as do arguments from authority since the "proof" is in the proper selection of means and methods from the end or foreseen consequence (history gets short treatment here).

In retrospect a goal may have determined the digital pursuit and be clearly the pervasive which kept the context and the components together. Yet the adjunctive goal, emerging as it may from what Peirce calls the abductive process, may resist sharing its process of formulation all the while it enjoys acceptability. The process of the adjunctive goal is clear in lineal retrospect but the process of its derivation is of a profoundly different character and is not available to lineal or direct process of judgment.

The adjunctive goal may create its own context of relevance by intruding on less satisfactory solutions.

How do we train for the adjunctive style? Is this the final desirable style?

Let's ask again. What do we in philosophy of Education do when faced with a problem? What are our options?

(1) Keep kicking at the problem till it is solved -- finding out who really wrote Shakespeare.

(2) Go into psychology -- take a different road -- reductionism.

(3) Reexamine the language, conceptual structure, context of the problem in search of a different vehicle -- pose a new model for explanation.

This third approach is probably more characteristic of philosophers than the first two styles. Yet how would you establish the style?

Let's call this form (again after Peirce) a retroductive style with two phases. First there is the denial or polemical inference sequence in problem solving. Here the question is raised, denied, and given a competitive opposite. The "denial option" is then solved as a problem. Instead of the obvious advice to the bus company to put more buses on, you deny the advice and seek a means to implement the denial. "Don't put buses on" -- the result is adjunctive goal. You might have denied the problem instead of the solution. Not enough buses isn't your problem -- it is having too many people. Solution -- move to a less populated city.

This process offers a drastic discontinuity to the sequence of judgment. But, because the proposed sequence was not exhaustive enough, did not explain enough with few enough assumptions, a denial strategy may be employed.

Adjunctive thinking is exciting in that the contexts and the goals selecting them are always wide open. This style is contagious and often its users are accused of "creativity." The insertion of an adjunctive goal in an otherwise stable sequence will, given a model or structure for noticing the differences, increase the viable goals and available means in any given judgment sequence by providing a wider range of contexts, criteria, and relationals in general, as the inevitable effort to seek closure or inclusion systems emerges but is plagued by significant distractions.

Humor is adjunctive for the most part, as are most logical fallacies.

Retroductive Style also includes the rethinking of the other styles as to their appropriateness in judgments. Retroduction is to those other styles what those styles are to their respective goal designs. Here the style is a pervasive which controls the possibility of conflicting styles.

Adjunctive and Retroductive Styles have been cherished in the academic world. James was famed for his analogical (adjunctive) thought style.

In summary then,

(1) We must make deliberate the thinking or judgment styles by formulating descriptive instruments as models.

(2) Students must have style change as an option.

(3) The habits of Retroduction and Adjunctive judgment should be developed in the young. Specialized techniques are never as significant as structural habits.

(4) What can be described via any model or tested by any test can be taught. This does not mean that that which is tested is ever in question. It does mean that the model doing the describing offers us diagnostic means by which to correct what it, the model, has decided is the case.

The problem is, then, in summary:

(1) Construct a model which describes a variety of thought patterns.

(2) Appeal to all those who have designated patterns in judgment.

(3) Develop specific diagnostic steps which sequentialize the phase in style differences.

(4) Define style, judgment.

(5) Show examples of stylization.

(6) Propose steps and discontinuities for step change.

The steps for change as an integral part of this diagnostic model for style should place in each teacher's hands an instrument for making clear the process for helping children become retroductive stylizers.

CHAPTER 47.

ALTERNATIVE LEARNING AND ALTERNATIVE ASSESSMENT.

COLLEEN DECKER.

The history of education in the United States can be reviewed by listing the textbook and materials usage which has characterized each decade of educational program development. Or, educational programs themselves can be used to identify the major goals and emphases of each stage of the evaluation of educational services as they are currently found in American schools.

A more generic means of delineating educational goals and materials as expressed by the curricular patterns of American schools over the past 200 years, however, is to retrieve the evaluation instruments used by educators to measure the progress of students and to assess the effectiveness of the teaching process. By using "outcome measures," the very heart of our American educational hopes and procedures can be specified. (1)

Two hundred years have passed and for the most part the ways of evaluating educational success or assessing teacher effectiveness have remained essentially the same. The measures of success have been:

- increases in scores on tests of comprehension of subject matters.
- better mental discipline as measured by longer attention spans for students.
- better citizenship as identified by participation of students in school communities and by classroom deportment grades.

For all these 200 years standardized tests have been used to rank and sort students into grades and tracking systems guaranteed to help each student to attain his "maximum potential" as measured by these standardized tests. A kind of reflexive reinforcement of these standardized tests, bulwarked by a kind of a mystique for statistical quantification and mathematical formula, has sustained the credibility of standardized tests and normal distribution curves for classifying student progress and grade place. (2)

With the emergence of minority considerations in school programs as sponsored by various federal agencies, and with the revitalization of the American educational mission of multi-cultural educational goals in the schools, (3) a new search has begun to find more equitable ways to evaluate all students regardless of cultural history, personal learning problems, or language competence. (4)

"Alternative learning" and "alternative assessment:" These terms conjure up images of radical, experimental, splinter educational groups. Yet, it may now be possible to reformulate the concepts of "alternative learning" and "alternative assessment" in educational terms to satisfy even the most conservative and traditional critics.

Alternative Learning: A Definition, A Function, A Developmental Format.

Learning: A Definition.

Learning has been defined in many ways. The historical sequence of definitions has gone from "a change in behavior," to "a deliberate change in behavior," and more recently to "a deliberate change in behavior as diagnosed by some instrument which does the identification of the change in behavior."

The definitions all have in common the idea that learning is to be identified with the consequences of a student having been exposed to some variables intended to produce a change. The "change," however, is invariably associated with an increase in information, in skills for doing something, and, occasionally, change is associated with the use of some abstraction process which was not present prior to the student's exposure to the instructional variables.

Alternative Learning: A Definition.

Alternative learning can be defined in parallel to the above definitions of learning.

Learning as a "change in behavior" can be demonstrated in alternative learning terms as a result of the student's being exposed to material not directly related to the subject in question.

For example, if a student is to learn to be a bank teller, in the first sense of learning, a simulated situation is established where the trainee "pretends" to do teller operations. An alternative learning activity focuses, instead, on some more basic skills necessary for a teller to perform efficient and correct operations. Visual imagery games, digit span exercises, coding transfers, as examples, are developed to set the stage for performing operations which are specific cases of the skills transferred from the alternative learning exercises indicated above.

Remedial programs and the many attempts to provide individualized or tutorial instruction are probably the best illustrations of the effectiveness of the use of this definition of learning in schools. "An increase in information" is the goal. Delivery strategies are modified for each student, and the personal attention that a student receives in the programs can best be seen as the key to alternative learning; i.e., as producing a change in behavior where the student gains on performance scores although that student may not have participated in the formulation of the program or alternative delivery strategies used with him by the instructor. An increase in selected skills is hoped for.

Alternative Learning Recommendation #1.

The first steps in the process are:

- To formulate some guidelines for designating the essential operations to be addressed,
- to develop some generic exercises to be used for improving the performance item selected,

- to identify and collate the support material to be used, and

- to establish the diagnostic and evaluative bases used in locating "changes" in behavior of more information and better skills.

When learning is defined as having a "deliberate" component, a student must demonstrate somewhere in the learning sequence that the learning steps used have been clearly selected for the purpose at hand by that student. The key concept involved here deals with foreseen consequences or planning in learning.

Alternative deliberateness in changes in behavior must, then, refer to the presence of alternative purposes or futures, different plans or contexts into which a given learning component can fit. The availability of a choice pattern for these various futures or purposes can serve as a definition of alternative deliberateness in behavior change. New futures dictate procedures alternative to the originally planned futures procedures.

If the teller example is to be continued from the first example of the definition of learning as a "change in behavior," it can be pointed out that the teller could be taught to make mistakes in a consistent manner in an effort to make clearly deliberate the "correct response." Alternative futures or purposes may include the sustained effort to extend, broaden, and make more inclusive, the teller's perspective on the place of teller functions in the total operation of the bank, or of the place of fiscal institutions in the development of an economy.

This extension of contexts or purposes is designed to compound the "simple choice" of a teller and encourage the teller to add alternative goals or purposes to an otherwise digital or rote operation. This process is intended to broaden the horizons of the person instructed and to support the teller's consideration of personal growth and professional advancement in the occupational and social hierarchy.

Programs and courses designed for professional growth are examples of the use of the definition of learning as "deliberate change in behavior" in that the deliberateness emphasizes the presence of choice and suggests, implicitly or explicitly, that a choice requires a deliberate contrasting of several plans or options before a decision is made. Deliberateness involves a reflexive examination of the process of specific choices.

Delivery strategies for alternative learning in this definition are different from those that merely present the materials by either prosaic or ingenuous methods. The strategies are those that require the instructor to share the "teacher's manual" with the student. The student has learned when, and only when, the instructor has shared, in a professional pattern, the most significant problems that the instructor can confront as a professional and as a specialist in the specific area of training of that instructor. The information transfer becomes secondary to the "sharing of the instructor process."

Alternative Learning Recommendation #2.

The second steps in the process are:

- To explore and record for each student the range of futures which may be compatible with each phase of training or education received by that student in the area involved,

- to locate and catalog materials to be used that emphasize critical or contrasting views of all of the ideas explored in the student's program, and

- to formulate some diagnostic/instructional instruments by which to demonstrate that a student has indeed understood and can function with alternative futures and that the student has confronted some of the implications of these choices as determined by the instructor.

Finally, if a parallel is to be drawn between the definition of learning as "diagnosed by some instrument which does the identification of the change in behavior" and the definition of alternative learning, a subtle reformulation of the issue is necessary.

The problem seems to be that learning and alternative learning do not rest primarily on the acquisition of information nor on training in better skills. The concern may well be found in the use of some abstraction process which was not present prior to the student's exposure to the instructional variables presented by the instructor.

The refocus necessary can be located most easily when it is realized that alternative learning, as well as learning in the most popular sense, must stipulate alternative assessment if alternative learning is to be identifiable. Patterns for alternative assessment must be designed before any activity to be measured is identified. Alternative learning precludes the use of standard measures in that an instrument for assessment can only measure what it is designed to measure. An I.Q. test, for example, cannot presume to measure the height of a building, much less can it presume to locate anything but that which the test constructor assumed as essential variables in a specific definition of intelligence.

Alternative learning, then, in this last sense, is directly equivalent to the assessment instruments used to measure whatever is to be designated as alternative learning. The critical issue is to be found in the model or design basic to the generation of the assessment instruments.

A major topic for alternative learning in the above definition is learning habit rather than something to be learned. This reflexive interest in the instrument of learning establishes the focus on the style and pattern of the learner, who, in each instance of an identifiable learning experience, will approach the learning situation with a learning habit pattern peculiar to each case of learning for that student.

This not-so-subtle change in emphasis places a heavy burden on the system used to develop diagnostic/instructional programs for alternative learning/alternative assessment.

Learning habits, then, as the subject matter which is most appropriate to alternative learning as a process and as one of the first implications of alternative assessment, introduce a concept which is the key to alternative learning/assessment. This key concept has to do with learning or thought styles.

A learning habit, loosely defined, can be found in the kinds of material selected by a student for processing into the kind of meaning which is important to the student.

The teller example can continue to serve as an illustration. When shown how to "balance" the transactions at the end of the day, one "learning habit pattern" will copy all of the techniques for the day, but, due to the lineality of the learning habit, will not help the teller complete a transaction when new variables are put into the transaction. "Tunnel vision" learning can be described as a kind of learning habit. A teacher modeling behavior expects the student to "copy" in a lineal learning habit pattern.

It can generally be expected that a learning habit used by a student in one situation will be identifiable as a pattern of learning in most, if not all, situations which confront that student.

If we do not come in to the problem of alternative learning from the side of:

- logistics,
- delivery strategies,
- content, nor from
- learning patterns

as defined above, it is possible to re-enter the problem of learning habit from the perspective of a more generic model.

We can define learning as:

- the time taken...
- to place in a context...
- some piece of information.

For an individual student,

- the time usually taken...
- to place in a selected context...
- some familiar piece of information.

An alternative learning process can be initiated in this sequence by defining learning habits (thought style) as one of three types:

Lineal: (a) A problem is solved in a literal way without concern for bigger problems.

Lateral: (b) A problem is solved by placing it in different contexts in an effort to explore new possibilities.

Retroductive: (c) A problem is placed in the largest perspective possible at the time to help give relevance to the many contexts in which the problem can be solved.

This definition of learning provides a way of identifying alternative learning from the viewpoint of the way a student can vary the process of learning by having that student develop a deliberate way to explore the learning process itself.

It is rather evident that there are many who are critical of alternative or experimental learning concepts. While some of the criticism is obviously due to misunderstanding on the part of the critics, the burden of proof rests upon the professional community to demonstrate the effectiveness of the alternative learning processes.

Further, it may be important to help people distinguish between two rather different directions of inquiry into learning alternatives:

A Comparison of Contrasting Concepts of Alternative Learning.

Alternative Learning	Expanded "Regular Learning."
·Student's learning styles.	·Alternative materials provided to student.
·Deliberate choice by student for appropriate learning pattern.	·Alternative strategies used on student.
·Design for identification and instruction, diagnosis and correction of learning style selection.	·An Alternative Learning Center established for student choice for how and what can be learned.

When alternative learning is located on the right side of this diagram, it is difficult to isolate activities peculiar to Alternative Learning Centers and regular activities in other classrooms.

Alternative learning on the left side of the above diagram places an emphasis on diagnosis and instruction criteria for evaluation and accountability for educational success in operational terms.

Alternative Assessment: Some Current Tests.

There are several writers today who have addressed themselves to the alternative assessment problem.

The B.I.T.C.H. test, (5) for instance, is designed to assess the vocabulary of Blacks in terms of their cultural awareness in a way parallel to the use of vocabulary assessment of Anglos based on Anglo culture.

For example, the word "pick" is used in place of "comb." An Afro haircut would not need a comb. This Black Intelligence Test of Cultural Homogeneity is a plea for an equal chance in the game of evaluation. According to its author, a child who knows Malcolm X's birthday and the date of his assassination shows as much intelligence as the child who knows Washington's birthday. This test, then, wants to make the language of educational evaluation attentive to the cultural syndrome of Black culture.

Another attempt to produce clearer tests results for minorities is the A.B.I.C. test of Mercer and Lewis. These investigators have tried to find a way to differentiate the mentally handicapped child from the minority child who merely tests as a retarded child. Adaptive behavior was conceptualized as an individual's ability to plan ever more complex social roles in a progressively widening circle of social systems.

If a child scores low on the test designed for his own system, he is probably mentally handicapped. However, if the child scores high on the test based on his own system and only normal or low on the open social norms, it can be assumed that he is quite bright and even gifted. The problem is ours as educators.

These new tests are referred to here to indicate the emerging concern for children's school evaluations. They also point up two other more pertinent questions:

(a) Are we clear about what norms mean and how they must be clearly used in all written materials evaluating students?

(b) Are we clear about what measurement means in terms of differentiating content items (6) and abstraction skills, models used in constructing measurement instruments and models for identifying thought patterns? (7, 8)

The major difficulties of these "alternative assessments" then are to be found in their continuation of the basic theme that there is a norm or a base from which students can be compared with one another on different subject matter tests and on cultural items. Yet, what does it gain a student to learn to fit into his own culture as well as into the dominant culture in which he finds himself in terms of two different norms?

These "alternative tests" do explain whether a student is indeed a "low achiever" on both tests formulated for two different "cultures." However, there are no instructional components established for correcting educational problems of the "low achievers."

A different basis for evaluating for diagnosis and instruction is needed to assure each student of success in education and society. Non-failure evaluation must be designed to support each student in his search for self-respect and for success in the open marketplace of ideas.

Conclusion.

Alternative assessment as a bicentennial issue becomes much more than a passing fad or a dramatic illustration of how to improve "learning for students."

A national commitment to open and equal access education carries with it a dedication to human growth in terms of non-failure educational programs and greater participation by students in the learning process which affects them.

Since no student can participate in that content or material with which he has no knowledge, the "participation" must be in the structure of the student's learning and in the deliberateness by which the student can select appropriate thought styles for different purposes.

Learning is a shared enterprise:

- a sharing in hopes and futures,

- a sharing in learning processes.
- a sharing in personal successes.

Documentations.

1. A basic assumption here is that by an inverse extrapolation the evaluation goal and procedure, the instruments used, and the pattern of evaluation used will "inform" the meaning and the relevance of the data being submitted for evaluation.

2. "Some Theoretical Considerations of Measurement: A Philosophic Analysis," Proceedings of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society. Pomona, California, 1972 by Colleen S. Decker and T. Frank Saunders.

3. Tucson Public Schools: Compliance Plan, 1975.

4. "Alternative Assessment: Focus on Native American Students," by T. Frank Saunders and Roy Blake, 1976.

5. "Violations of Human Civil Rights: Tests and Use of Tests," Report of the Tenth National Conference on Civil and Human Rights in Education, National Education Association, 1972, page 17.

6. "Adaptive Behavior Inventory for Children," 1972-73 Standardized Edition, by Mercer, Jane R., and Lewis, June R., (an unpublished pamphlet).

7. It should be pointed out that it is never adequate to respond to a vocabulary item with a definition of the usage for the word. The classification of the term in a generic frame is the issue. Abstraction skills get the best score.

8. "Some Theoretical Considerations of Measurement: A Philosophic Analysis," Proceedings of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society. Pomona, California, 1972 by Decker, Colleen S. and Saunders, T. Frank.

527.

9. "Symboling: Thinking, Culture, and Alternative Assessment," paper presented to the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society. San Francisco, California, December 1973 by Decker, Colleen.

10. Decker, Colleen and Saunders, T. Frank, *LAPSE: An Alternative and Unbiased Assessment System for Diagnostic Instructional Program Development*. Tucson: Farmington Press, 1976.

11. Decker, Colleen, "Symboling: Thinking, Culture, and Alternative Assessment," *Proceedings of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society*. Ed. James J. Jelinek. Tempe: Arizona State University, 1974.

12. Decker, Colleen, "Thinking and Think Tanks: Perspective and Proposal," *Proceedings of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society*. Ed. James J. Jelinek. Tempe: Arizona State University, 1972.

13. Enriquez, L. S., Farr, P., and Saunders, T. Frank, "Cultural Awareness: A Definition, Developmental Format, and an Inservice Model," *Proceedings of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society*. Ed. James J. Jelinek. Tempe: Arizona State University, 1976.

14. Mercer, Jane and Ysseldyke, James, "Designing Diagnostic-Intervention Programs," in *Non-Biased Assessment of Minority Group Children with Bias Toward None*, Coordinating Office for Regional Resource Centers, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 1976.

15. National Education Association Pamphlet: "Violations of Human Civil Rights: Tests and the Use of Tests," *Report of the Tenth National Conference on Civil and Human Rights in Education*, 1972.

16. Saunders, T. Frank and Blake, Roy F., "Alternative Assessment: Focus on Native American Students," unpublished pamphlet, 1976.

17. Saunders, T. Frank, "Cultural Deprivation as Meaning Deprivation," *Proceedings of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society*. Ed. James J. Jelinek. Tempe: Arizona State University, 1966.

18. Saunders, T. Frank and Decker, Colleen, *Doublethink*. Tucson: Farmington Press, 1973.

19. Saunders, T. Frank and Davis, Dorothy, *Thought Stylization: A Pattern for Thinking*. Tucson: Farmington Press, 1973.

CHAPTER 48.

INSTRUCTIONAL SUPERVISION IN SCHOOLS.

ROBERT ALLEY AND VIRGINIA BOYLE.

In their book Supervision: The Reluctant Profession, Mosher and Purpel point out that "by and large, teachers massively resist supervision, are suspicious of it and are reluctant to consider its positive dimension." (1) That this is true is no startling revelation to the profession, but that it is true should be of concern. The profession should be asking itself why supervision meets such widespread opposition in view of the fact that while countless definitions exist for supervision, with some authorities maintaining that it is an inspection process; some, a teacher development process; and still others a curriculum development process, (2) the crucial element or thread for all definitions of supervision is that it is a process whereby the teacher is provided assistance for the purpose of improved instruction in the classroom. In substance, the supervisor's role is universally viewed as a "helping role," and it is with this definition in mind that the problems and weaknesses of today's supervisory programs across the country are analyzed.

Administrators as Supervisors.

The reasons for teacher negativism and resistance toward supervision are doubtless complex and varied, but certain obvious causes appear to stand out. First, a further critical examination of the definitions and descriptions of supervision and the supervisor's role presents us with possible clues. It is apparent in examining the literature that either explicitly by definition or implicitly through detailed discussion the profession has come to define supervision as a function of the school administrator. For example, Doll defined supervision as "a function of educational administration which is concerned mainly with helping other people improve teaching and learning in a school." (3) Other authorities may not so explicitly define supervision in terms of administrative functions, but will discuss supervisory roles in terms of the responsibility of the chief school officer or his designee to supervise instruction thus implying an administrative function.

Direct Responsibility.

Further, the definition has often been applied too literally, with the assumption made that the administration must be directly responsible for the supervisory act. One common pattern evident in school district supervisory practices has been to directly assign responsibility for instructional supervision to the building principal, assistant principal, department head or some combination of these persons. (4) In other instances, a district-wide process is developed with a staff of supervisors, curriculum coordinators, or "inspectors" as the British call them, responsible to the director of curriculum, assistant superintendent, or other district level administrator. In each of these two basic designs, the assumption is made that supervision is the _direct_ responsibility of administrative personnel.

"Snoopervision."

The basic thesis in this discussion is that there is a relationship between the lack of success of supervising programs and its administrative orientation. Indeed, generally speaking, supervision will never be successful so long as administrators are _directly_ involved in the process. Again reasons for this are doubtless many and varied but basically too many teachers today view the administrator with suspicion for such patterns to be effective. For example, teachers are often heard to refer to the process as "snoopervision" or to apply some other equally ignominious term. By use of such terminology, teachers confirm their hostility and at the same time raise a second major problem in present supervisory practice. They illustrate that they view the process as inspection or an evaluative process as opposed to the "helping role" so imperative to a successful supervisory process.

Misuse of Supervisory Data.

Negative teacher attitudes toward direct administrator supervision stem in large measure from the use of the data from the supervisory process for purposes, as viewed by teachers, not directly related to improvement of instruction in the classroom. For example, evaluative data on teaching effectiveness has been used in salary decisions on merit pay, tenure procedures, dismissal proceedings, and a host of other administrative functions which under other conditions are quite legitimate. This confusion of purpose contributes to the negative attitude in teachers' minds because, as indicated earlier, the evaluative process and the supervisory process are not separated into two distinct processes in the minds of the teachers. The school administration views all of these processes as aimed toward improved instruction. The teacher, on the other hand, has great difficulty in viewing negative evaluation data in any light other than that of the negative and expecting it to be used against him/her in questions of tenure or salary. The question will inevitably be asked in the mind of the teacher: "Do I dare expose my weaknesses to the supervisor in order to get help when those weaknesses may be revealed to the personnel office or my principal and may come home to haunt me through salary or perhaps a non-tenure decision?" The confusion of aims and definitions between evaluation and supervision is thus suggested as a second major problem hindering effective supervision in today's schools.

Role of Teacher Militancy.

Another quite evident factor weakening present supervisory practices is that teachers are no longer content to accept the notion that only the administration of a school is capable of or responsible for the instructional program as past practice has implied. Indeed, teachers in their militancy are demanding an ever increasing role in the decision-making process of the school system especially as it related to instructional questions. This trend is evidenced by the numerous master contracts between teacher negotiating groups and school systems speaking to this concern through provisions detailing the supervisory process as one which must involve teachers in its design and implementation. It is a simple reality that teacher militancy has brought about a basic division between teachers and administrators and the development of an adversary relationship between them. This adversary relationship is difficult to assess in its impact upon the supervisory process, but it definitely is a factor of some importance in reducing the effectiveness of present administratively oriented supervisory processes.

Principles of Good Supervision.

Several basic problems which impede supervisory programs in schools today have been identified above. The failures of the supervisory process, at least so far as the "helping role" concept of supervision is concerned, can be alleviated and a successful program implemented through the application of certain basic principles.

(a) Teachers must be involved in the careful defining and specifying of the supervisory process ultimately adopted by the administration and board of education of a school system. Preferably the process should be jointly and formally adopted by both the school system and the teacher organization.

(b) Supervision must clearly be established in such a manner as to prevent the process from being confused with evaluation or inspection. Its purpose must clearly be to help the teacher do a better job of instruction. Further, and most importantly, it must be perceived in that light by the teachers.

(c) The bulk of the data gathering which is the basis for instructional improvement should be carried out in the classroom by teachers and/or teams of teachers who are clearly not members of the school's administration.

(d) In principle, each school system must adopt supervisory procedures which are suitable to its specific needs and situation.

A Model Supervisory Program.

It has only been in the last few years that the practice and function of supervision has begun to be examined. These investigations have shown that research and theory have played a miniscule role in the development of supervision. In attempting to determine that body of knowledge that can be labelled as supervision, Lucio and McNeil in their research found it difficult to do so. (5) Supervisory practices appear to have developed from functions designated as supervisory, but with little relation to constructed theory. In other words, supervision was defined from practice rather than deduced from a carefully constructed body of theory.

The model of supervision developed by Cogan in the Teacher Education Project at Harvard appears to be a beginning step toward analyzing the supervisory process. This model "Cycle of Supervision" includes eight processes: (6)

1. Establishing the teacher-supervisor relationship.
2. Planning with the teacher.
3. Planning the strategy of observation.
4. Observing instruction.
5. Analyzing the teaching-learning processes.
6. Planning the strategy of the conference.
7. The conference.
8. Renewed planning.

School personnel can be trained to use the model with a program similar to that developed at the University of Pittsburgh with the direction and guidance of Morris Cogan. A program can be devised to use simulation techniques which closely relate to actual practice.

Establishing the Relationship. In the first step of the cycle, establishing the teacher-supervisor relationship, one objective is to get to know the teacher in order to develop rapport and trust. This can be accomplished by conferencing with the teacher about the class, students, or personal interests. In addition the supervisor may want to share some information about himself which helps to establish an on-going relationship. Another objective would be to discuss the clinical model and the steps involved. This helps to prepare the teacher for an active role in the supervision process. These objectives should generally be accomplished before the supervisor observes in the teacher's classroom.

Plan With the Teacher. The teacher and the supervisor, in the second step, plan jointly for the learning situation to be observed. Through this effort joint responsibility for the instruction to take place is established. As the teacher and supervisor review the teacher's plans, the supervisor may pose questions or alternatives, thereby giving input prior to the implementation of the lesson plan rather than afterward. Various elements of the lesson such as objectives, procedures, outcomes, and assessment can be analyzed by both the teacher and the supervisor.

Observation. The supervisor must plan for observation in the classroom in steps three and four. How will the necessary data be collected? What instrument will be used? The teacher may make suggestions as to the particular kind of data to be collected. After decisions are made regarding these issues, the supervisor observes the instruction.

Conferencing. Steps five and six occur after the observation. The teacher and the supervisor analyze what occurred in the classroom. Usually this is completed separately, but it can be a joint effort. During this phase of the process, plans are made for a conference. Strategies concerning the conference objectives should be determined by the supervisor or by both the teacher and the supervisor. At some time during the conference, future plans should be made to continue the cycle by deciding desired behavioral changes the teacher wishes to make and planning for future observations and conferences and thus step eight is accomplished.

Summary. If such a model is followed and the suggested principles adhered to, teachers will not look upon the process of supervision in such a negative fashion as they currently do. They will have a clear understanding of the process, will have helped design it, and will be largely responsible for implementing it. This in turn will lead to an improved learning environment for children through improved instruction in their classes which is, after all, the ultimate goal of the supervisory process.

Documentations.

1. Mosher, Ralph and David Purpel, Supervision: The Reluctant Profession, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972, p. 21.

534.

2. Ibid., pp. 17-21.

3. Doll, Ronald C., Curriculum Improvement: Decision-Making and Process, Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1970, p. 8.

4. Mosher, 1972.

5. Lucio, William H. and John McNeil, Supervision: A Synthesis of Thought and Action, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962.

6. Cogan, Morris L., Clinical Supervision, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973, pp. 10-12.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

OFFICERS.

President. Dr. Hobert W. Burns, San Jose State University, San Jose, California 95192.

Vice President. Dr. John B. Connely, California State Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo, California 93401.

Secretary-Treasurer. Dr. Donald S. Seckinger, Post Office Box 3518, University Station, Laramie, Wyoming 82071.

Editor. Dr. James John Jelinek, College of Education, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85281.

Representative. Dr. Michael Praetorius, Whittier College, Whittier, California 90608.

Representative. Dr. Robert J. Rossi, American Institutes for Research, 1791 Arastradero Road, Palo Alto, California 94302.

APPENDIX B.

HISTORY.

The Far Western Philosophy of Education Society was founded December 29, 1952. It has held annual meetings in December as follows:

1952. Stanford University.
1953. University of Southern California.
1954. Stanford University.
1955. Loyola University of Los Angeles.
1956. Fresno State College.
1957. Mt. San Antonio College.
1958. Sacramento State College.
1959. University of California at Los Angeles.
1960. San Francisco State College.
1961. Los Angeles State College.
1962. Fresno State College.
1963. Arizona State University.
1964. California State College at Hayward.
1965. San Fernando Valley State College.
1966. University of Santa Clara.
1967. University of California at Santa Barbara.
1968. University of San Francisco.
1969. California State College at Fullerton.
1970. University of Southern California.
1971. Arizona State University.
1972. California State Polytechnic University.
1973. University of California at Davis.
1974. California State University at Long Beach.
1975. California State University at San Jose.
1976. California State Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo.

Officers of the Society have included the following:

1952-53. Robert L. Brackenbury, President. Lawrence G. Thomas, Vice President. Lester B. Sands, Secretary. Arthur B. Fallico, Board Member. Darrell F. X. Finnegan, Board Member.

1953-54. Lawrence G. Thomas, President. Darrell F. X. Finnegan, Vice President. Joe Apple, Secretary. Morris Bigge, Board Member. Samuel Burkhard, Board Member.

1954-55. Darrell F. X. Finnegan, S.J., President. Morris L. Bigge, Vice President. Willard W. Smith, Secretary. Thomas Hunt, Board Member. Frederic Lilge, Board Member.

1955-56. Morris L. Bigge, President. Thomas Hunt, Vice President. Glenn Austin, Secretary. George F. Kneller, Board Member. Daniel McGloin, Board Member.

1956-57. Thomas C. Hunt, President. Willard W. Smith, Vice President. Clyde V. Martin, Secretary. Glenn Austin, Board Member. Arch Lang, Board Member.

1957-58. Glenn Austin, President. Willard W. Smith, Vice President. David Ferris, Secretary. Keith Oakes, Board Member. John J. O'Farrell, Board Member.

1958-59. Willard W. Smith, President. George F. Kneller, Vice President. Arch D. Lang, Secretary. Stephen Alley, Board Member. Daniel McGloin, Board Member.

1959-60. George F. Kneller, President. Arch D. Lang, Vice President. Wilbur F. Murra, Secretary. John J. O'Farrell, Board Member. Maurice P. Hunt, Board Member.

1960-61. Arch D. Lang, President (to May 1961). Joe Apple, Vice President. Julian Roth, Secretary. Louis Fischer, Board Member. M. Rose Emmanuella, Board Member.

1961-62. Julian Roth, President. Maurice P. Hunt, Vice President. Louis Fischer, Secretary. Wilbur Murra, Board Member. Herman Yeager, Board Member.

1962-63. Maurice P. Hunt, President (to November 1963). Wilbur F. Murra, Vice President. Herman V. Yeager, Secretary. Richard Dettering, Board Member. Daniel McGloin, Board Member.

1963-64. Clyde E. Curran, President. Herman V. Yeager, Vice President. Gerald McDonald, Secretary. Lester B. Sands, Board Member. Louis Fischer, Board Member.

1964-65. Herman V. Yeager, President. Louis Fischer, Vice President. Gerald McDonald, Secretary-Treasurer. Wayne Hill, Board Member. William O'Neill, Board Member.

1965-66. Louis Fischer, President. Gerald McDonald, Vice President. William O'Neill, Secretary-Treasurer. Father O'Farrell, Board Member. Lester Sands, Board Member.

1966-67. Gerald McDonald, President. Lester B. Sands, Vice President. Kenneth Lottich, Secretary-Treasurer. John J. O'Farrell, Board Member. Lloyd Scritchfield, Board Member.

1967-68. Lester Sands, President. John J. O'Farrell, Vice President. James J. Jelinek, Secretary-Treasurer. Bernice Goldmark, Board Member. Frank Saunders, Board Member.

1968-69. John J. O'Farrell, President. Morton Fierman, Vice President. James J. Jelinek, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Clyde E. Crum, Board Member. Leroy Troutner, Board Member.

1969-70. Morton Fierman, President. William O'Neill, Vice President. James J. Jelinek, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Hugh C. Black, Board Member. Edwin Carr, Board Member.

1970-71. William O'Neill, President. James J. Jelinek, Vice President. Robert Bruce McLaren, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Thomas A. Reed, Board Member. Leonard Fels, Board Member.

1971-72. James John Jelinek, President. T. Frank Saunders, Vice President. Robert Bruce McLaren, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Homer Bronson, Representative. Wayne Hill, Representative.

1972-73. T. Frank Saunders, President. Hugh C. Black, Vice President. Robert Bruce McLaren, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Dr. Leonard Fels, Representative. Helen Isabel Nicklin, Representative.

1973-74. Hugh C. Black, President. Leonard Fels and Robert B. McLaren, Vice President. Donald S. Seckinger, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Thomas A. Reed, Representative.

540.

1974-75. Robert B. McLaren, President. William H. McGowan, Vice President. Donald S. Seckinger, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. James L. Jarrett, Representative. Helen I. Nicklin, Representative.

1975-76. Dr. Hobert W. Burns, President. Dr. John B. Connely, Vice President. Dr. Donald S. Seckinger, Secretary-Treasurer. Dr. James John Jelinek, Editor. Dr. Michael Praetorius, Representative. Dr. Robert J. Rossi, Representative.